SCOTUS Oral Arguments

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Noem, Sec. of Homeland v. Al Otro Lado Mar 24, 2026

Show notes

Noem, Sec. of Homeland v. Al Otro Lado, No. 25-5

Argued on Mar 24 2026.

For petitioners: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Kelsi B. Corkran, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq . , provides that an alien who "arrives in the United States" may apply for asylum and must be inspected by an immigration officer. 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A), 1225(a)(1) and (3). The question presented is whether an alien who is stopped on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border "arrives in the United States" within the meaning of those provisions.

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF VIVEK SURI

(00:39:18) ORAL ARGUMENT OF KELSI B. CORKRAN

(01:17:10) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF VIVEK SURI

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Watson v. RNC Mar 23, 2026

Show notes

Watson v. RNC, No. 24-1260

Argued on Mar 23 2026.

For petitioner: Scott G. Stewart, Solicitor General, Jackson, Miss. For respondents: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.; and D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Question Presented:

The federal election-day statutes-2 U.S.C. § 7, 2 U.S.C. § 1, and 3 U.S.C. § 1-set the Tuesday after the first Monday in November in certain years as the "election" day for federal offices. Like all other States, Mississippi requires that ballots for federal offices be cast-marked and submitted to election officials-by that day. And like most other States, Mississippi allows some of those timely cast ballots (mail-in absentee ballots, in Mississippi's case) to be counted if they are received by election officials a short time after election day (in Mississippi, within 5 business days after election day). Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15- 637(1)(a). In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit held that the federal election-day statutes require that ballots be both cast by voters and received by election officials by election day and thus preempt Mississippi's law. The question presented is whether the federal election-day statutes preempt a state law that allows ballots that are cast by federal election day to be received by election officials after that day.

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SCOTT G. STEWART

(00:55:51) ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL D. CLEMENT

(01:51:01) ORAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. D. JOHN SAUER

(02:04:16) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF SCOTT G. STEWART

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC Mar 04, 2026

Show notes

Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, No. 24-1238

Argued on Mar 04 2026.

For petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va. For respondents: Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Los Angeles, Cal.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Question Presented:

The common law permits a cause of action for negligent selection. For example, a person injured in a truck crash has a cause of action against someone that negligently selected the truck driver to transport property. A federal statute expressly preempts state laws "related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property." 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). The statute has a safety exception, providing that the statute "shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles." Id . § 14501(c)(2)(A). The question presented is: Does§ 14501(c) preempt a state common-law claim against a broker for negligently selecting a motor carrier or driver?

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL D. CLEMENT

(00:42:50) ORAL ARGUMENT OF THEODORE J. BOUTROUS, JR.,

(01:08:41) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SOPAN JOSHI

(01:35:16) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL D. CLEMENT

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Hunter v. United States Mar 03, 2026

Show notes

Hunter v. United States, No. 24-1063

Argued on Mar 03 2026.

For petitioner: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

This Court has recognized that "no appeal waiver serves as an absolute bar to all appellate claims." Garza v. Idaho , 586 U.S. 232, 238 (2019). But the Court has "ma[de] no statement ... on what particular exceptions [to appeal waivers] may be required." Id . at 238-39 & n.6. In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its precedent, holding that there are only two grounds on which defendants who sign general appeal waivers may challenge their sentence on appeal: (1) claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) claims that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. The Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits adopt a similarly narrow view of the exceptions to general appeal waivers. In stark conflict, the First, Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits permit defendants who sign general appeal waivers to raise a broad range of constitutional challenges to their sentences beyond the limited exceptions recognized by the Fifth Circuit and the other courts on its side of the circuit split. The Fifth Circuit below also reaffirmed its precedent holding that an appeal waiver applies even when the sentencing judge advises the defendant that he has a right to appeal and the government does not object to that advice. Although other circuits agree with the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit squarely holds otherwise, releasing defendants from appeal waivers in identical circumstances. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the only permissible exceptions to a general appeal waiver are for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. 2. Whether an appeal waiver applies when the sentencing judge advises the defendant that he has a right to appeal and the government does not object.

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF LISA S. BLATT

(00:44:04) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ZOE A. JACOBY

(01:32:41) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF LISA S. BLATT

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

United States v. Hemani Mar 02, 2026

Show notes

United States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234

Argued on Mar 02 2026.

For petitioner: Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Erin E. Murphy, Alexandria, Va.

Question Presented:

Whether 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3), the federal statute that prohibits the possession of firearms by a person who "is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance," violates the Second Amendment as applied to respondent.

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SARAH M. HARRIS

(00:59:31) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ERIN E. MURPHY

(01:49:45) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF SARAH M. HARRIS

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Pung v. Isabella County Feb 25, 2026

Show notes

Pung v. Isabella County, No. 25-95

Argued on Feb 25 2026.

For petitioner: Philip L. Ellison, Hemlock, Mich. For United States, as amicus curiae: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Matthew T. Nelson, Grand Rapids, Mich.

Question Presented:

Isabella County confiscated the Pung Estate's private home for approximately $2,200 in taxes and fees (that were never actually owed). The

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:08) ORAL ARGUMENT OF PHILIP L. ELLISON

(00:50:09) ORAL ARGUMENT OF FREDERICK LIU

(01:18:32) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MATTHEW T. NELSON

(01:41:54) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF PHILIP L. ELLISON

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel Feb 24, 2026

Show notes

Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel, No. 24-783

Argued on Feb 24 2026.

For petitioners: John J. Bursch, Caledonia, Mich. For respondent: Ann M. Sherman, Solicitor General, Lansing, Mich.

Question Presented:

Whether district courts have the authority to excuse the thirty-day procedural time limit for removal in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1).

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JOHN J. BURSCH

(00:30:42) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ANN M. SHERMAN

(00:57:45) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JOHN J. BURSCH

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. Feb 23, 2026

Show notes

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A., No. 24-699

Argued on Feb 23 2026.

For petitioner: Morgan L. Ratner, Washington, D. C.; and Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Jules L. Lobel, Pittsburgh, Pa.

Question Presented:

In 1960, the Cuban government confiscated the property of American nationals and transferred it to state-owned enterprises. After years without a diplomatic resolution, Congress enacted the Helms-Burton Act, which created a damages action for American nationals against "any person ... that traffics in" such confiscated property. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1). The Act defines "person" to include "any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state," id. § 6023(11), and expressly contemplates "judgment[s] against an agency or instrumentality of the Cuban Government," id . § 6082(d). The question presented is: Whether the Helms-Burton Act abrogates foreign sovereign immunity in cases against Cuban instrumentalities, or whether parties proceeding under that Act must also satisfy an exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Cert. Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:08) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MORGAN L. RATNER

(00:31:44) ORAL ARGUMENT OF CURTIS E. GANNON

(00:58:41) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JULES L. LOBEL

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Feb 23, 2026

Show notes

Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, No. 24-983

Argued on Feb 23 2026.

For petitioner: Richard D. Klingler, Washington, D. C.; and Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.

Question Presented:

The LIBERTAD Act is an essential pillar of United States foreign policy toward Cuba's hostile and anti-American regime. Title III of that Act creates a private right of action for United States nationals who have a claim to property confiscated by that regime against persons who traffic in that property. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1). The Act specifies that such trafficking "undermines the foreign policy of the United States" by, among other things, "provid[ing] badly needed financial benefit" to the Cuban regime. Id . § 6081(6). The question presented here applies in every case brought under Title III, and will determine whether that provision continues to advance U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba: whether a plaintiff must prove that the defendant trafficked in property confiscated by the Cuban government as to which the plaintiff owns a claim (as the statute requires), or instead that the defendant trafficked in property that the plaintiff would have continued to own at the time of trafficking in a counterfactual world "as if there had been no expropriation" (as the divided Eleventh Circuit panel held below).

Oral Argument Links: