SCOTUS Oral Arguments

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Velazquez v. Garland, Att'y Gen. Nov 12, 2024

Show notes

Velazquez v. Garland, Att'y Gen., No. 23-929

Argued on 2024-11-12.

For petitioner: Gerard J. Cedrone, Boston, Mass. For respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

Federal immigration law allows the government to grant a "voluntary departure" period of up to 60 days to a noncitizen "of good moral character" who receives an adverse decision in removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. §1229c(b). If the noncitizen fails to depart during that window, he or she is subject to a civil fine and is ineligible for various forms of immigration relief (like cancellation of removal or adjustment of status) for 10 years. §1229c(d)(1). If, however, the noncitizen "file[s] a post-decision motion to reopen or reconsider during the period allowed for voluntary departure," the penalties for failure to voluntarily depart do not apply. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(b)(3)(iii). The question presented is: When a noncitizen's voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart?

Oral Argument Links:

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Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

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Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF GERARD J. CEDRONE

(00:26:53) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ANTHONY A. YANG

(01:03:57) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF GERARD J. CEDRONE

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Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Delligatti v. United States Nov 12, 2024

Show notes

Delligatti v. United States, No. 23-825

Argued on 2024-11-12.

For petitioner: Allon Kedem, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), a felony qualifies as a "crime of violence" if it "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another." Courts have disagreed about how to apply use-of-force language to crimes that require proof of a victim's bodily injury or death but can be committed by failing to take action. In the decision below, the Second Circuit held that any crime requiring proof of death or bodily injury categorically involves the use of physical force, even if it can be committed through inaction-such as by failing to provide medicine to someone who is sick or by failing to feed a child. That ruling reflects the law in eight circuits. Two courts of appeals, by contrast, have held that the use of force is not an element of such crimes if the crime may be committed by inaction. One of those courts recently rejected the government's petition for rehearing en banc, which had argued that any crime requiring proof of bodily injury or death necessarily involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. The question presented is: Whether a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but can be committed by failing to take action, has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

Oral Argument Links:

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Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ALLON KEDEM

(00:26:55) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ERIC J. FEIGIN

(00:58:02) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF ALLON KEDEM

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

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Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Facebook, Inc. v. Amalgamated Bank Nov 06, 2024

Show notes

Facebook, Inc. v. Amalgamated Bank, No. 23-980

Argued on 2024-11-06.

For petitioners: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Kevin K. Russell, Washington, D. C.; and Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Question Presented:

This petition presents two important questions that have divided the federal courts of appeals. First , the circuits have split three ways concerning what public companies must disclose in the "risk factors" section of their 10-K filings. The Sixth Circuit holds that companies need not disclose past instances when a risk has materialized. The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits hold that companies must disclose that a risk materialized in the past if the company knows that event will harm the business. The Ninth Circuit here adopted a third, outlier position requiring companies to disclose that a risk materialized in the past even if there is no known threat of business harm. Second , the circuits disagree on the proper pleading standard for the loss causation element of a private securities-fraud claim. The Fourth Circuit holds that loss causation allegations must satisfy Federal Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard for fraud, while the Fifth and Sixth Circuits apply the ordinary Rule 8 standard. The Ninth Circuit here initially applied Rule 8, then substituted citations of Rule 9(b) without changing its analysis. The questions presented are: 1. Are risk disclosures false or misleading when they do not disclose that a risk has materialized in the past, even if that past event presents no known risk of ongoing or future business harm? 2. Does Federal Rule 8 or Rule 9(b) supply the proper pleading standard for loss causation in a private securities-fraud action?

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:04) ORAL ARGUMENT OF KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

(00:46:42) ORAL ARGUMENT OF KEVIN K. RUSSELL

(01:13:16) ORAL ARGUMENT OF KEVIN J. BARBER

(01:38:49) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera Nov 05, 2024

Show notes

E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera, No. 23-217

Argued on 2024-11-05.

For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.; and Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Lauren E. Bateman, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) covers more than 140 million workers and guarantees eligible workers a minimum wage and overtime pay. But the FLSA also contains 34 exemptions from those requirements. Employers do not have to pay overtime to, e.g ., bona fide executives, agricultural workers, and outside salesmen. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)-(b). The question presented is: Whether the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the applicability of an FLSA exemption is a mere preponderance of the evidence-as six circuits hold-or clear and convincing evidence, as the Fourth Circuit alone holds.

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Cert. Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF LISA S. BLATT

(00:26:13) ORAL ARGUMENT OF LAUREN E. BATEMAN

(00:40:21) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF LISA S. BLATT

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

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Advocate Christ Medical v. Becerra, Sec. of H&HS Nov 05, 2024

Show notes

Advocate Christ Medical v. Becerra, Sec. of H&HS, No. 23-715

Argued on 2024-11-05.

For petitioners: Melissa Arbus Sherry, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

Because low-income patients are often costlier to treat, Congress directed the government to reimburse hospitals that treat a disproportionate share of low--income patients at higher Medicare rates. A hospital qualifies for higher payments in part based on the number of days that a hospital provides inpatient care to senior (or disabled) low- income patients, measured as those who "were entitled to benefits under part A of [Medicare] and were entitled to supplementary security income [SSI] benefits." 42 U.S.C.§ 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(vi)(I). In Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation , this Court agreed with the agency that "entitled to [Medicare part A] benefits" included "all those qualifying for the [Medicare] program," whether or not Medicare paid for that hospital stay. 597 U.S. 424, 445 (2022). But Empire expressly left open the question of whether "entitled to [SSI] benefits" likewise includes all those who qualify for the SSI program. Id . at 434 n.2. The agency still insists, contrary to its Medicare interpretation, that only patients who received an SSI cash payment for the month of their hospital stay are "entitled to benefits." This case thus presents Empire 's open question: Does the phrase "entitled ... to benefits," used twice in the same sentence of the Medicare Act, mean the same thing for Medicare part A and SSI, such that it includes all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received.

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MELISSA ARBUS SHERRY

(00:36:08) ORAL ARGUMENT OF EPHRAIM McDOWELL

(01:05:14) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF MELISSA ARBUS SHERRY

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

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Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

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Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. U.S., ex rel. Heath Nov 04, 2024

Show notes

Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. U.S., ex rel. Heath, No. 23-1127

Argued on 2024-11-04.

For petitioner: Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, Tex. For respondent: Tejinder Singh, Washington, D. C.; and Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Question Presented:

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 directs the FCC to further the goal of universal access to telecommunications services. In response, the FCC established what's known as the "E-rate" program to provide discounted services to eligible schools and libraries. The program is administered by a private, non-profit corporation and funded entirely by contributions from private telecommunications carriers. After telecommunications carriers provide services to eligible schools and libraries, either the schools and libraries or the providers can submit reimbursement requests to the private corporation for the amount of the discount. In this way, the E-rate program distributes up to $4.5 billion each year. The question presented is: Whether reimbursement requests submitted to the E-rate program are "claims" under the False Claims Act.

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ALLYSON N. HO

(00:39:56) ORAL ARGUMENT OF TEJINDER SINGH

(01:16:22) ORAL ARGUMENT OF VIVEK SURI

(01:29:40) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF ALLYSON N. HO

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Bufkin v. McDonough, Sec. of VA Oct 16, 2024

Show notes

Bufkin v. McDonough, Sec. of VA, No. 23-713

Argued on 2024-10-16.

For petitioners: Melanie L. Bostwick, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

For more than a century, veterans have been entitled to the benefit of the doubt on any close issue relating to their eligibility for service-related benefits. As presently codified, "[w]hen there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs] shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant." 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b). In 2002, Congress enacted the Veterans Benefits Act. Among other things, the Act supplemented the responsibilities of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (the "Veterans Court") by requiring it to "take due account of the Secretary's application of section 5107(b)" as part of its review of benefits appeals. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1). In these cases, the Federal Circuit held that § 7261(b)(1) "does not require the Veterans Court to conduct any review of the benefit of the doubt issue beyond the clear error review" of underlying factual findings - something already required by the pre-2002 review statute, under 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a). Pet. App. 16a-17a (quoting Pet. App. 8a- 11a). The question presented is: Must the Veterans Court ensure that the benefit-of- the-doubt rule was properly applied during the claims process in order to satisfy 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1), which directs the Veterans Court to "take due account" of VA's application of that rule?

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:04) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MELANIE L. BOSTWICK

(00:36:30) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SOPAN JOSHI

(01:08:19) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF MELANIE L. BOSTWICK

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

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Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

San Francisco v. EPA Oct 16, 2024

Show notes

San Francisco v. EPA, No. 23-753

Argued on 2024-10-16.

For petitioner: Tara M. Steeley, Deputy City Attorney, San Francisco, Cal. For respondent: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C

Question Presented:

Congress designed the Clean Water Act (CWA or the Act) to ensure that anyone holding a discharge permit issued under the Act has notice of how much they must control their discharges to comply with the law. The CWA requires that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and authorized states provide this notice by prescribing specific pollutant limitations in the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits they issue. Consistent with its text, this Court and the Second Circuit have read the Act to require EPA and states to develop specific limits to achieve goals for surface waters, called water quality standards. Parting with these decisions, the Ninth Circuit held here that EPA may issue permits that contain generic prohibitions against violating water quality standards. Rather than specify pollutant limits that tell the permitholder how much they need to control their discharges as required by the CWA, these prohibitions effectively tell permitholders nothing more than not to cause "too much" pollution. These generic water quality terms expose San Francisco and numerous permitholders nationwide to enforcement actions while failing to tell them how much they need to limit or treat their discharges to comply with the Act. The question presented is: Whether the Clean Water Act allows EPA (or an authorized state) to impose generic prohibitions in NPDES permits that subject permitholders to enforcement for exceedances of water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their discharges must conform.

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF TARA M. STEELEY

(00:46:27) ORAL ARGUMENT OF FREDERICK LIU

(01:34:27) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF TARA M. STEELEY

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

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Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

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Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, Sec. of Homeland Security Oct 15, 2024

Show notes

Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, Sec. of Homeland Security, No. 23-583

Argued on 2024-10-15.

For petitioner: Samir Deger-Sen, New York, N. Y. For respondents: Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

When considering whether to approve a petition for an immigrant visa, the government must adhere to certain nondiscretionary criteria. See, e.g ., 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (c) (providing that "[n]o petition shall be approved" if the individual seeking a visa has previously entered a marriage "for the purpose of evading the immigration laws"). When a visa petition is denied based on a petitioner's failure to satisfy such a nondiscretionary requirement, it is generally understood that the petitioner has a right to judicial review of that decision. Once a visa petition has been approved, the government has the power to revoke approval of the visa petition for "good and sufficient cause" pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1155. The circuits are in open conflict over whether judicial review is available when the government revokes an approved petition on the ground that it had initially misapplied nondiscretionary criteria during the approval process. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits hold that judicial review is available under these circumstances, but the Second, Third, Seventh, and now the Eleventh Circuit all hold that revocations are "discretionary" decisions for which there is no right to judicial review, even when they are based on a misapplication of the same nondiscretionary criteria that would be reviewable if the petition had originally been denied. The question presented is: Whether a visa petitioner may obtain judicial review when an approved petition is revoked on the basis of nondiscretionary criteria.

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SAMIR DEGER-SEN

(00:26:43) ORAL ARGUMENT OF COLLEEN R. SINZDAK

(00:45:05) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF SAMIR DEGER-SEN

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

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Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

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Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn Oct 15, 2024

Show notes

Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn, No. 23-365

Argued on 2024-10-15.

For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.

Question Presented:

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) creates a civil treble-damages action for “[ a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of ” certain offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). The question presented is: Whether economic harms resulting from personal injuries are injuries to “ business or property by reason of ” the defendant's acts for purposes of civil RICO.

Oral Argument Links: