Case Preview: Geo Group v. Menocal | The Procedural Privilege: The Immunity Fast-Pass to Appeal Nov 02, 2025

Geo Group v. Menocal Case No. 24-758 | Oral Argument Date: 11/10/25

Overview

This episode examines The GEO Group, Inc. versus Menocal, a technical procedural fight with massive real-world consequences for the hundreds of billions of dollars the U.S. government spends on contracts annually. The case pits the efficiency of the justice system against the government's ability to use private contractors to carry out its functions. At stake is whether a government contractor who loses a pre-trial claim of "derivative sovereign immunity" can appeal that decision immediately, or must wait until after a full, costly trial before an appeals court can weigh in.

Episode Roadmap

Opening: A Procedural Privilege: A Fast-Pass to Appeal?
Upcoming Oral Arguments: Week of November 3, 2025

Monday, Nov. 3:

Rico versus United States
Hencely versus Fluor Corp.

Tuesday, Nov. 4:

Coney Island Auto Parts, Inc. versus Burton
Hain Celestial Group versus Palmquist

Wednesday, Nov. 5:

The Trump Tariff Cases (Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., et al. and Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump)

• Note: The argument for Hamm versus Smith has been moved to December 10th.

Key Concepts Explained:

Sovereign Immunity: The "king can do no wrong" principle; governments generally cannot be sued without their consent.
Derivative Sovereign Immunity: The core defense from Yearsley, claiming a contractor shares the government's immunity when it "performed as the Government directed."
Collateral-Order Doctrine: The Cohen exception; allows immediate appeal for a true "immunity from suit," not just a "defense to liability."

Background:

The GEO Group, a private contractor operating an ICE facility, was sued by detainees.
The claims allege forced labor (violating the TVPA) and unjust enrichment ($1/day pay).
GEO claimed Yearsley immunity, arguing ICE directed the policies.

Lower Court Journey:

The district court denied GEO's immunity claim, finding GEO had discretion.
The Tenth Circuit dismissed GEO's immediate appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
The court found an "overlap" between the immunity claim (facts of direction) and the case merits (facts of lawfulness), so it was not a "collateral order."
This created a deep circuit split.

Petitioner's (GEO) Arguments:

Yearsley provides a true "immunity from suit," not just a defense.
Precedent compels appealability: Filarsky (giving immunity to an individual contractor) + Mitchell (making that immunity appealable) = GEO wins.
The Tenth Circuit's "overlap" reasoning was rejected in Mitchell.
Policy: Denying appeals hamstrings government functions; contractors will "raise their price."

Respondent's (Menocal) & U.S. Government's Arguments:

"Derivative sovereign immunity" doesn't exist; sovereign immunity is "non-delegable."
Yearsley only grants a "defense to liability" (no liability), not an "immunity from suit" (no suit).
A true immunity protects unlawful conduct (if law isn't clear), but Yearsley only protects lawful conduct (following directions).
The order fails Cohen's third prong: It can be effectively reviewed after a final judgment.

GEO's Reply:

Respondents are attacking a "Grand Straw Man"; GEO claims conditional immunity, not the government's total immunity.
The Court cannot ignore Filarsky: An individual contractor received this protection, and a corporation is no different.

Stakes & Oral Argument Preview:

How will the Justices treat the Filarsky and Mitchell precedents?
The "battle of the bright lines": Does GEO's rule flood the courts, or does Menocal's rule terrify contractors?

Case Preview: Landor v. Louisiana Dept. of Corrections | Landor's Lost Locks: When Prison Guards Clip Constitutional Claims Nov 01, 2025

Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections | Case No. 23-1197 | Oral Argument Date: 11/10/25 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether an individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of RLUIPA.

Overview

This episode examines Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, a case that could reshape religious liberty enforcement in prisons by determining whether inmates can sue individual prison officials for personal damages under RLUIPA. The case centers on Damon Landor, a devout Rastafarian whose decades-long dreadlocks were forcibly shaved despite existing Fifth Circuit precedent protecting such religious practices.

Episode Roadmap

Opening: Religious Freedom Behind Bars

• November 10th, 2025 oral argument date

• Stakes: Personal liability for prison officials violating religious rights

• Case follows Supreme Court's 2020 Tanzin decision allowing individual damages under sister statute RFRA

• Potential nationwide impact on prisoners' religious rights enforcement

Background: The Nazarite Vow Violation

• Damon Landor: devout Rastafarian following biblical Nazarite Vow for nearly two decades

• Dreadlocks fell "nearly to his knees" when incarcerated in August 2020

• First four months uneventful at two accommodating facilities

• Transfer to Raymond Laborde Correctional Center with three weeks left in sentence

The Shocking Violation

• Landor provided intake guard with Ware decision requiring accommodation

• Guards threw legal materials in garbage and summoned warden

• Warden demanded documentation from sentencing judge

• When Landor couldn't immediately provide, officials handcuffed him to chair and shaved him bald

• Prison then kept Landor in lockdown for remainder of sentence

Statutory Framework: RFRA and RLUIPA as "Sister Statutes"

• Both enacted in response to Employment Division v. Smith limiting religious freedom protection

• RLUIPA applies to state prisons receiving federal funds through Spending and Commerce Clauses

• Identical language to RFRA: "appropriate relief against a government"

• Tanzin held RFRA permits individual-capacity damages - question is whether RLUIPA does same

The Circuit Split and Lower Court Decision

• Fifth Circuit rejected individual-capacity claims under RLUIPA

• Distinguished Tanzin as applying only to federal officials under RFRA

• Judge Oldham's dissent called facts "stark and egregious"

• Judge Clement's concurrence noted "visceral" need for damages remedy

Landor's Arguments (Seeking Individual Damages)

• RLUIPA's text is "identical" to RFRA's - same language must mean same remedies

• Damages were available against state officers before Smith decision

• RLUIPA "made clear" Congress intended to "reinstate" pre-Smith protections and remedies

• Damages often "only form of relief that can remedy" violations like forced head-shaving

Louisiana's Arguments (Opposing Individual Liability)

• RLUIPA only permits suits against "government" entities, not individual officials

• Sossamon precedent shows Congress did not clearly authorize damages against states

• Spending Clause conditions cannot extend to individual officer liability

• Sovereign immunity principles protect state officials from personal damages

Constitutional Stakes: Spending Clause Analysis

• Whether Congress can impose personal liability conditions on state officials through federal funding

• Landor argues conditions clearly relate to federal spending on prisons

• Louisiana contends extending liability to individuals exceeds spending power

• Parallel to other federal funding programs requiring individual compliance

The Practical Impact Question

• Damages as deterrent: Will personal liability improve religious accommodation?

• Louisiana's policy change: Department amended grooming policy in response to lawsuit

• Private enforcement supplement: Government cannot monitor all prison violations

• Fifth Circuit precedent shows even clear legal rulings insufficient without enforcement mechanism

Broader Religious Liberty Implications

If Landor Wins:

• Prisoners gain powerful enforcement tool for religious rights violations

• Individual deterrent effect on prison officials nationwide

• Consistency with Tanzin's RFRA interpretation

• Enhanced protection for minority religious practices in institutional settings

If Louisiana Wins:

• Limits enforcement to institutional defendants only

• Potential immunity shield for individual religious rights violations

• Inconsistency between RFRA and RLUIPA despite identical language

• Reduced deterrent effect on individual officer misconduct

Looking Ahead to November 10th Oral Arguments

• Justices' reaction to "sister statute" argument and Tanzin precedent

• Questions about Spending Clause limits on individual officer liability

• Practical enforcement concerns and deterrent effects

• Constitutional consistency between federal (RFRA) and state (RLUIPA) religious liberty protection

Key Legal Concepts Explained

Individual-capacity versus official-capacity lawsuits
RLUIPA's Spending Clause and Commerce Clause foundations
Religious accommodation in correctional settings

• Statutory interpretation of identical language across related statutes

• Personal liability as enforcement mechanism for constitutional rights

Case Preview: Coney Island Auto Parts v. Burton | The Time Trap Tangle: When Void Judgments Gain Validity Oct 31, 2025

Coney Island Auto Parts v. Burton | Case No. 24-808 | Oral Argument Date: 11/5/25 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a default judgment void for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Overview

This episode examines a deceptively simple civil procedure case that could fundamentally reshape how federal courts handle void judgments, creating a constitutional tension between centuries-old legal principles and modern procedural rules about timing requirements for challenging judgments that courts never had authority to enter.

Episode Roadmap

Opening: The Void Judgment Paradox

November 5th, 2025 oral argument date
Circuit split: Sixth Circuit stands alone against every other federal circuit
Core tension: Can procedural rules validate what should never have existed?
Affects every federal court nationwide using Rule 60

Background: The Seven-Year Journey

Vista-Pro Automotive bankruptcy in Nashville, Tennessee
February 2015: Default judgment against Coney Island Auto Parts for $48,696.21
Coney Island claims never received proper service - no personal jurisdiction
2020: Trustee registers judgment in New York, freezes $100,000 in bank accounts
March 2022: Seven years later, Coney Island files Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate

The Central Legal Question

Rule 60(b)(4): Courts can vacate judgments that "are void"
Rule 60(c)(1): "Any motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time"
Does "reasonable time" apply to truly void judgments?
Fundamental question: Can time limits apply to legal nullities?

Lower Court Journey

Tennessee bankruptcy court grants motion to vacate
Sixth Circuit reverses 2-1, applies "reasonable time" requirement
Creates circuit split with every other federal circuit
Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve nationwide inconsistency

Constitutional Framework: Due Process and Jurisdiction

Personal jurisdiction: Court's authority over parties
Void judgment: "No judgment at all" - legal nullity from inception
Due process concerns: Enforcing judgments without proper notice
Historical principle: Void judgments attackable at any time

Petitioner's Arguments (Coney Island Auto Parts):

Argument 1: Logical Impossibility

"If a judgment is void immediately upon entry, how could the passage of time vivify it?"
Void means legal nullity - cannot gain validity through delay
Procedural rules cannot breathe life into what never existed

Argument 2: Historical Practice and Tradition

Centuries of precedent allowing challenges to void judgments at any time
1946 Advisory Committee intended "reasonable time" for voidable, not void judgments
Advisory Committee statements distinguish void from voidable judgments

Argument 3: Judicial Consensus

Every circuit except Sixth Circuit recognizes exception for void judgments
Well-established understanding that void judgments are special category
Circuit split demonstrates widespread acceptance of traditional rule

Respondent's Arguments (Burton):

Argument 1: Plain Text Controls

Rule 60(c)(1): "A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time"
Rule 60(b)(4) is part of Rule 60(b) - text is unambiguous
Every tool of statutory interpretation supports time limits

Argument 2: Rule Structure and Drafting History

Drafters knew how to create exceptions - did so for Rules 60(b)(1)-(3)
Advisory Committee rejected proposal imposing no time limits for void judgments
Committee agreed "all motions should be made within a reasonable time"

Argument 3: Procedural vs. Substantive Distinction

Time limits don't validate void judgments - they impose procedural requirements
Distinction between judgment validity and challenge procedures
Prevents "flagrantly inequitable conduct" and protects finality interests

Episode Highlights

Key Legal Concepts Explained

Personal Jurisdiction: Court's legal authority over parties to a lawsuit
Void Judgment: Legal nullity with no validity from the moment entered
Default Judgment: Judgment entered when defendant fails to respond
Rule 60(b)(4): Federal rule allowing relief from void judgments
Service of Process: Legal requirement to provide proper notice of lawsuit
Circuit Split: When federal appeals courts reach conflicting decisions
Due Process: Constitutional requirement of fair legal proceedings

Case Preview: Trump Tariff Cases | A Constitutional Clash: Trump's Tariffs and the Separation of Powers Oct 30, 2025

Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., et al. | Oral Argument: November 5, 2025 | Case No. 25-250 | Docket Link: Here

Consolidated with: Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump | Case No. 24-1287 | Docket Link: Here

September 10th Episode (A Constitutional Clash: Trump's Tariffs and the Separation of Powers): https://scotus-oral-arguments.captivate.fm/episode/a-constitutional-clash-trumps-tariffs-and-the-separation-of-powers/

Overview

This episode examines the Supreme Court's September 9, 2025 Order that expedited review of two consolidated cases challenging President Trump's authority to impose sweeping tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), representing a constitutional clash over the separation of powers and presidential trade authority.

Roadmap

Opening: Explosive Constitutional Questions

September 9, 2025 certiorari grant and consolidation order
Expedited briefing schedule for November 2025 oral arguments
Stakes: Presidential power to tax trillions in trade and reshape the economy

Background: The Trump Tariff Orders

Reciprocal Tariffs: 10% on virtually all imports, higher rates for 57 countries
Trafficking Tariffs: Levies on Mexico, Canada, and China for drug enforcement
IEEPA as claimed statutory authority for both tariff schemes
National emergency declarations underlying the orders

The Central Legal Question

Does "regulate" in IEEPA include power to impose tariffs?
Constitutional separation of taxing vs. regulating powers
Article I distinctions between taxation and commerce regulation
Historical significance: "No taxation without representation"

Lower Court Journey

Multiple simultaneous lawsuits in different courts
District court and Court of International Trade conflicting approaches
Federal Circuit en banc decision striking down tariffs
Judge Taranto's influential dissent supporting tariff authority

Referenced Cases

Trump v. V.O.S. Selections | Case No. 24-1286 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether IEEPA authorizes the President to impose these specific sweeping tariffs

Government Arguments:

"Regulate" includes power to impose tariffs as lesser-included authority
Historical practice supports broad executive trade power during emergencies
Major questions doctrine doesn't apply in foreign policy contexts

V.O.S. Arguments:

Constitutional separation requires clear authorization for taxation
"Regulate" and "tariff" are distinct powers with different purposes
Major questions doctrine requires explicit congressional authorization

Learning Resources v. Trump | Case No. 24-1287 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether IEEPA authorizes any presidential tariffs whatsoever

Learning Resources Arguments:

"Regulate" means control behavior, "tariff" means raise revenue - fundamentally different
No historical practice of IEEPA tariffs in nearly 50 years
Constitutional avoidance: IEEPA covers exports where tariffs are prohibited

Government Arguments:

Plain text of "regulate importation" naturally includes tariff authority
Yoshida precedent shows Congress ratified tariff interpretation
Presidential action deserves greater deference than agency action

Key Legal Precedents Examined

Historical Foundation Cases

Gibbons v. Ogden (1824): Marshall's distinction between taxing and regulating powers
United States v. Yoshida International (1975): Nixon import surcharge precedent
Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG (1976): "Adjust imports" includes fees

Modern Constitutional Doctrines

Major Questions Doctrine: Clear authorization required for "vast economic and political significance"
Constitutional Avoidance: Interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional problems
Noscitur a Sociis: "Word known by company it keeps" interpretive principle

Strategic Legal Arguments

Government's Core Position

Textual: "Regulate" includes "control" and "adjust by rule" - tariffs qualify
Historical: Congressional ratification of Yoshida through IEEPA enactment
Foreign Policy Exception: Major questions doctrine doesn't apply to national security
Presidential vs. Agency: Direct presidential delegation deserves greater deference

Challengers' Core Position

Separation of Powers: Taxing and regulating are constitutionally distinct
Textual Context: Other IEEPA verbs don't involve revenue raising
Constitutional Avoidance: Export tax prohibition requires narrow reading
Major Questions: $4 trillion impact requires explicit authorization

Broader Constitutional Implications

If Government Wins

Sweeping presidential tariff authority during declared emergencies
Expansion of executive power over traditionally congressional domain
Potential model for other emergency economic powers

If Challengers Win

Reinforcement of congressional primacy over taxation
Strengthening of major questions doctrine application to presidential action
Constraint on emergency powers in economic regulation

Key Legal Concepts Explained

IEEPA (International Emergency Economic Powers Act): 1977 law granting emergency economic authorities
Major Questions Doctrine: Requirement for clear authorization for actions of vast significance
Constitutional Avoidance: Interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional problems
Separation of Powers: Constitutional division of authority between branches
Foreign Policy Exception: Debate over whether normal limits apply to international contexts

Timeline and Practical Impact

September 19, 2025: Opening briefs due
September 23, 2025: Amicus briefs due
October 20, 2025: Response briefs due
October 30, 2025: Reply briefs due
November 2025: Oral arguments (first week)
Expected Decision: January 2026 or sooner

Case Preview: Hain Celestial v. Palmquist | Forum Fight: Can Courts Cure Their Own Jurisdictional Mistakes? Oct 29, 2025

Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist | Case No. 24-724 | Oral Argument Date: 11/4/25 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether a district court's final judgment as to completely diverse parties must be vacated when an appellate court later determines that it erred by dismissing a non-diverse party at the time of removal; and whether a plaintiff may defeat diversity jurisdiction after removal by amending the complaint to add factual allegations that state a colorable claim against a nondiverse party when the complaint at the time of removal did not state such a claim.

Overview

This episode examines a technical but consequential case about federal court jurisdiction that could affect thousands of removal cases nationwide. The dispute centers on whether federal courts can preserve judgments when they make jurisdictional errors, presenting a fundamental tension between judicial efficiency and strict adherence to jurisdictional limits in our federal court system.

Episode Roadmap

Opening: When Federal Courts Keep Cases They Shouldn't

November 4th, 2025 oral argument date
Circuit split requiring Supreme Court resolution
Stakes: Balance between judicial efficiency and jurisdictional integrity
Affects every lawsuit involving forum manipulation and removal

Background: A Family Tragedy Becomes a Jurisdictional Mess

The Palmquist family's baby food poisoning lawsuit in Texas
E.P.'s severe heavy-metal toxicity from Hain's Earth's Best products
Complete diversity destroyed by Texas plaintiffs suing Texas defendant Whole Foods
Defendants' removal strategy and fraudulent joinder claim

Constitutional and Statutory Framework

28 U.S.C. § 1332: Complete diversity requirement for federal jurisdiction
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c): Mandatory remand when jurisdiction lacking
"Completely diverse" means every plaintiff from different state than every defendant
Federal courts as courts of limited jurisdiction

Procedural Journey: From State Court to Supreme Court

District court's fraudulent joinder ruling dismissing Whole Foods
Two years of federal litigation and two-week jury trial
Fifth Circuit reversal: Whole Foods properly joined, judgment vacated
Case remanded to state court after years of federal proceedings

The Central Legal Questions

Can jurisdictional "cure" occur through erroneous dismissal?
Voluntary versus involuntary party dismissals
When does jurisdictional defect "linger" through final judgment?

Episode Highlights

Petitioners' Three-Pronged Strategy (Hain and Whole Foods)

Caterpillar Cure Doctrine: Drawing on 1996 precedent arguing jurisdictional defects can be cured by dismissing non-diverse parties before final judgment, tracing principle to 19th-century cases
Efficiency and Finality: Emphasizing "considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy become overwhelming" once diversity case tried in federal court with state law
Newman-Green Discretionary Authority: Arguing Fifth Circuit should have dismissed Whole Foods as "dispensable party" under Rule 21 to preserve final judgment

Respondents' Counter-Attack (The Palmquist Family)

Voluntary vs. Involuntary Distinction: Emphasizing Caterpillar involved voluntary settlement dismissal while here "respondents opposed the dismissal of Whole Foods and never voluntarily abandoned their claims"
Master of Complaint Principle: Invoking plaintiff's right to "establish—or not—the basis for a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction" and choose forum
No Cure Occurred: Arguing jurisdictional defect persisted because "the case has lacked complete diversity at every minute from the moment of its filing"

Key Legal Concepts Explained

Diversity jurisdiction and complete diversity requirement
Fraudulent joinder doctrine and removal strategy
Voluntary versus involuntary dismissals in jurisdictional context
Newman-Green dispensable party doctrine under Rule 21

Competing Precedential Interpretations

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis (1996): Battle over whether jurisdictional cure applies to involuntary dismissals
Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger (2025): Recent decision on voluntary versus involuntary dismissal effects
Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group (2004): Limits on Caterpillar's jurisdictional cure doctrine

Case Preview: Rico v. United States | The Disappearing Defendant Dilemma: When Sentence Clocks Stop Ticking Oct 28, 2025

Rico v. United States | Case No. 24-1234 | Oral Argument Date: 11/3/25 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether the fugitive-tolling doctrine applies in the context of supervised release.

Overview

This episode examines Rico v. United States, a Supreme Court case that challenges the boundaries between judicial power and congressional authority in criminal sentencing. The case asks whether federal courts can indefinitely extend supervised release terms for defendants who abscond, despite Congress never explicitly authorizing such extensions. Through Isabel Rico's story - a woman whose 42-month sentence ballooned to over 60 months due to a judge-made doctrine - the episode explores fundamental questions about separation of powers, statutory interpretation, and criminal justice fairness.

Episode Roadmap

Opening: From Hollywood Script to Constitutional Crisis

Fugitive imagery from popular culture versus legal reality
Isabel Rico's five-year disappearance and its consequences
The "time stands still" assumption challenged

The Question and Key Statutory Text

Fugitive-tolling doctrine definition and application
18 U.S.C. § 3624(e): Congress's one explicit tolling rule
Supervised release versus parole distinctions

Rico's Story: Facts

2010 drug conviction and original sentencing
2017-2018 supervised release violations and abscondment
2021-2022 state crimes during fugitive period

Legal Arguments: Three-Way Battle

Rico's textual, historical, and common law challenges
Government's supervision, tradition, and policy defenses
Reply brief rebuttals and constitutional principles

Oral Argument Preview

Key dynamics to watch on November 3rd
Justice personalities and criminal law philosophies
Practical implementation questions

Broader Constitutional Stakes

Separation of powers implications
Impact on federal supervised release practice
Criminal law interpretation principles

Episode Highlights

"Time Stood Still" Myth Exposed

Rico's case reveals that the popular assumption about fugitive time - that sentence clocks pause when defendants flee - has no basis in federal supervised release statutes.

Congressional Intent Detective Work

Detailed exploration of how Congress explicitly authorized fugitive tolling for parole in 1976 but deliberately omitted it when creating supervised release in 1984.

Sentencing Consequences Breakdown

Rico's violations jumped from 8-14 months to 33-36 months purely based on a judicial doctrine, demonstrating real-world impact of legal technicalities.

Separation of Powers Tension

The case crystallizes fundamental questions about whether courts can enhance criminal punishments that Congress hasn't explicitly authorized.

Common Law Versus Statute Battle

Government's claim of "ancient tradition" meets Rico's challenge: "Show me the cases" - revealing potential gaps in historical precedent.

Rule of Lenity Application

A canon providing that ambiguous criminal statutes should be interpreted in favor of defendants when Congress hasn't spoken clearly.

Key Legal Concepts Explained

Supervised Release: Post-prison supervision distinct from parole
Fugitive Tolling: Judge-made doctrine extending sentence terms for absconders
Grade A vs. Grade C Violations: Sentencing classification system for supervised release breaches
Expressio Unius Canon: When Congress includes one thing, it excludes others
Common Law Incorporation: How historical legal principles enter modern statutes
Rule of Lenity: Constitutional principle favoring defendants in ambiguous criminal laws
Separation of Powers: Constitutional limits on judicial sentence enhancement authority

Case Preview: Hencely v. Fluor | Battlefield Immunity Battle: When Contractors Breach and Soldiers Bleed Oct 27, 2025

Hencely v. Fluor | Case No. 24-924 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Should Boyle be extended to allow federal interests emanating from the FTCA's combatant-activities exception to preempt state tort claims against a government contractor for conduct that breached its contract and violated military orders?

Overview

This episode examines Hencely v. Fluor Corporation, a case that could dramatically reshape government contractor immunity law by determining whether the Supreme Court's narrow Boyle defense should be expanded to protect military contractors who breach their contracts and violate military orders during wartime operations.

Episode Roadmap

Opening: Constitutional Clash Over Contractor Accountability

Tragic 2016 terrorist attack at Bagram Airfield killing Army Staff Sergeant Ryan Hencely
Son's lawsuit against Fluor Corporation under South Carolina tort law
Core tension: contractor immunity versus accountability for contract violations

The Factual Foundation

Afghan national Nayeb's attack facilitated by Fluor's supervision failures
Army investigation: Fluor's "lack of reasonable supervision" was "primary contributing factor"
Army Contracting Command finding: Fluor "indisputably did not comply with key contractual requirements"
Escort and supervision protocol violations despite clear contractual obligations

The Legal Landscape: Boyle's Boundaries

1988 Boyle decision: narrow three-part test for contractor immunity
Required contractor conformance to government specifications
Current case: contractor violated rather than followed government directions
Circuit split over extending Boyle beyond specification-following scenarios

Procedural Journey Through the Courts

2019 federal district court filing in South Carolina
Political question doctrine rejected - claims about "Fluor, not military decisions"
Summary judgment for Fluor based on "uniquely federal interests" preemption
Fourth Circuit affirmance despite acknowledging FTCA "does not apply to government contractors"
Judge Heytens partial dissent noting factual disputes over military "command authority"

The Constitutional Question

FTCA combatant activities exception: governs suits against government, not contractors
Article I war powers versus state tort law authority
Supremacy Clause analysis: when does federal interest preempt state law?
Distinction between express congressional preemption and judicial policy-making

Petitioner's Three-Pronged Attack

Statutory Argument: FTCA text addresses government suits, not contractor liability
Constitutional Argument: Boyle violates Supremacy Clause through "freewheeling judicial inquiry"
Factual Distinction: No immunity for contractors who breach contracts and violate orders

Respondent's Constitutional Defense

War Powers: Exclusive federal authority over battlefield operations
FTCA Guidance: Combatant activities exception reflects congressional policy against battlefield tort liability
Broad Immunity: Preemption regardless of contractor compliance with government directions

Government's Structural Argument

Constitutional war powers create "uniquely federal interests"
State tort regulation conflicts with exclusive federal battlefield control
Immunity applies "regardless of whether state-law tort claims challenge contractual violations or discretionary actions"

Episode Highlights

The Boyle Distinction: Contrasting contractor immunity when following versus violating government orders
South Carolina Tort Claims: Negligent supervision, entrustment, control, and retention explained
Circuit Split Analysis: Different approaches to contractor immunity across federal courts
• Constitutional Stakes: Balance between contractor accountability and federal war powers
• Practical Implications: Impact on military contractor incentives and family legal recourse

Referenced Cases

Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. (1988) | Established government contractor defense requiring: (1) precise government specifications, (2) contractor conformance, (3) danger warnings to government
Miree v. DeKalb County (1977) | Example of when contractor could comply with both state tort duties and federal contract obligations
Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co. (1940) | Early precedent protecting contractors who execute government directions

Oral Argument: Case v. Montana | Case No. 24-624 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25 Oct 15, 2025

Oral Argument: Case v. Montana | Case No. 24-624 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25

Link to Docket: Here

Case Preview: Here

Question Presented: Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Fred A. Rowley, Jr., Los Angeles
For Respondent: Christian B. Corrigan, Solicitor General, Montana
United States as Amicus Curiae: Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice

Link to Opinion: TBD.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Episode Preview

[00:00:50] Argument Begins

[00:01:02] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:03:12] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[00:27:25] Petitioner Sequential Questions

[00:39:50] Respondent Opening Statement

[00:41:41] Respondent Free for All Questions

[00:55:44] Respondent Sequential Questions

[01:00:52] United States as Amicus Curaie Opening Statement

[01:02:01] United States as Amicus Curaie Free for All Questions

[01:09:15] United States as Amicus Curaie Sequential Questions

[01:10:40] Petitioner Rebuttal

Oral Argument: Louisiana v. Callais | Case No. 24-109 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25 Oct 15, 2025

Oral Argument: Louisiana v. Callais | Case No. 24-109 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25

Link to Docket: Here

Consolidated with: Robinson v. Callais | Case No. 24-110 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25 | Docket Link: Here

Case Preview: Here

Background: Over the State's strenuous objections, the Middle District of Louisiana held, Robinson v. Ardoin , 605 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. La. 2022)-and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, Robinson v. Ardoin , 86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023)-that Louisiana likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by failing to create a second majority-Black congressional district. The Fifth Circuit gave the Legislature a small window of time to adopt its own remedial plan, or else the State would have to go to trial, which would almost certainly end in the Middle District imposing its own preferred map.

Rather than acquiesce in the Middle District's preferences, the Legislature reclaimed its sovereign redistricting pen and passed S.B. 8, which created a second majority-Black district as the courts demanded, protected the Legislature's sovereign prerogatives, and achieved its political goals. In this case, a majority of a three-judge court sitting in the Western District of Louisiana enjoined S.B. 8 as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.

Question Presented: Did the majority err in finding that race predominated in the Legislature's enactment of S.B. 8? Did the majority err in finding that S.B. 8 fails strict scrutiny? Did the majority err in subjecting S.B. 8 to the Gingles preconditions? Is this action non-justiciable?

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner Press Robinson: Janai Nelson, New York
For Petitioner Louisiana: J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, Louisiana
For Appellees: Edward D. Greim, Kansas City, Missouri
For United States, as Amicus Curiae, in Support of Appellees: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice

Link to Opinion: TBD.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:00] Argument Begins

[00:01:09] Appellant Press Robinson Opening Statement

[00:03:32] Appellant Press Robinson Free for All Questions

[00:26:15] Appellant Press Robinson Sequential Questions

[00:47:32] Appellant Louisiana Opening Statement

[00:49:02] Appellant Louisiana Free for All Questions

[00:57:59] Appellant Louisiana Sequential Questions

[01:20:21] Callais Appellees Opening Statement

[01:21:47] Callais Appellees Free for All Questions

[01:31:11] Callais Appellees Sequential Questions

[01:40:35] United States as Amicus Curaie Opening Statement

[01:41:42] United States as Amicus Curaie Free for All Questions

[01:51:08] United States as Amicus Curaie Sequential Questions

[02:25:32] Appellant Press Robinson Rebuttal

Oral Argument: Ellingburg v. United States | Case No. 24-482 | Oral Argument Date: 10/14/25 Oct 14, 2025

Oral Argument: Ellingburg v. United States | Case No. 24-482 | Oral Argument Date: 10/14/25

Link to Docket: Here

Case Preview: Here

Question Presented: Whether criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) is penal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Amy M. Saharia, Washington, D.C. argued for petitioner.
For Respondent in Support of Vacatur: Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice argued for respondent in support of vacatur.
For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below: John F. Bash, Austin, Texas.

Link to Opinion: TBD.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:00:58] Argument Begins

[00:01:06] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:03:14] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[00:14:04] Petitioner Sequential Questions

[00:18:36] Respondent in Support of Vacatur Opening Statement

[00:19:45] Respondent in Support of Vacatur Free for All Questions

[00:33:22] Respondent in Support of Vacatur Sequential Questions

[00:34:41] For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below Opening Statement

[00:37:03] For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below Free for All Questions

[01:01:03] For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below Sequential Questions

[01:02:09] Petitioner Rebuttal

Oral Argument: Bowe v. United States | Case No. 24-5438 | Oral Argument Date: 10/14/25 Oct 14, 2025

Oral Argument: Bowe v. United States | Case No. 24-5438 | Oral Argument Date: 10/14/25

Link to Docket: Here

Case Preview: Here

Background: Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), “[ a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed. ” (emphasis added).

Question Presented:

Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. * * * Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E), “[ t]he grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition . . . for a writ of certiorari. ” (emphasis added).
Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) deprives this Court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Andrew L. Adler, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida.
For Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below as to Question 1: Kasdin M. Mitchell, Dallas, Tex.

Link to Opinion: TBD.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:00:47] Argument Begins

[00:00:55] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:02:46] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[00:23:01] Petitioner Sequential Questions

[00:36:49] Respondent Opening Statement

[00:39:09] Respondent Free for All Questions

[01:03:04] Respondent Sequential Questions

[01:14:14] Court-Appointed Amicus Opening Statement

[01:16:15] Court-Appointed Amicus Free for All Questions

[01:27:23] Court-Appointed Amicus Sequential Questions

[01:28:11] Petitioner Rebuttal

Oral Argument: Postal Service v. Konan | Case No. 24-351 | Oral Argument Date: 10/8/25 Oct 08, 2025

Oral Argument: Postal Service v. Konan | Case No. 24-351 | Oral Argument Date: 10/8/25

Link to Docket: Here

Case Preview: Here

Background: The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671 et seq .), generally waives the United States' sovereign immunity for suits seeking damages "for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission" of an employee of the federal government "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1). The FTCA, however, excepts from that waiver of immunity "[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter." 28 U.S.C. 2680(b).

Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff's claim that she and her tenants did not receive mail because Postal Service employees intentionally did not deliver it to a designated address arises out of "the loss" or "miscarriage" of letters or postal matter. 28 U.S.C. 2680(b).

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Easha Anand, Menlo Park, Ca.

Link to Opinion: TBD.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

Timestamps:

Oral Argument: Bost v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections | Case No. 24-568 | Oral Argument Date: 10/8/25 Oct 08, 2025

Oral Argument: Bost v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections | Case No. 24-568 | Oral Argument Date: 10/8/25

Link to Docket: Here

Case Preview: https://scotus-oral-arguments.captivate.fm/episode/upcoming-oral-argument-bost-v-illinois-ballot-box-bout-when-can-candidates-challenge-election-rules/

Background: Federal law sets the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the federal Election Day. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 7; and 3 U.S.C. § 1. Several states, including Illinois, have enacted state laws that allow ballots to be received and counted after Election Day. Petitioners contend these state laws are preempted under the Elections and Electors Clauses. Petitioners sued to enjoin Illinois' law allowing ballots to be received up to fourteen days after Election Day.

Question Presented: Whether Petitioners, as federal candidates, have pleaded sufficient factual allegations to show Article III standing to challenge state time, place, and manner regulations concerning their federal elections.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.;
United States, as Amicus Curiae: Michael Talent, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Jane E. Notz, Solicitor General, Chicago, Ill.

Link to Opinion: TBD.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

Timestamps:

Oral Argument: Chiles v. Salazar | Case No. 24-539 | Oral Argument Date: 10/7/25 Oct 07, 2025

Oral Argument: Chiles v. Salazar | Case No. 24-539 | Oral Argument Date: 10/7/25

Link to Docket: Here

Case Preview: Here

Question Presented: Whether a law that censors certain conversations between counselors and their clients based on the viewpoints expressed regulates conduct or violates the Free Speech Clause.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: James A. Campbell, Lansdowne, Va.
For United States as Amicus Curiae: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Shannon W. Stevenson, Colorado Solicitor General

Link to Opinion: TBD.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Case Preview

[00:00:50] Argument Begins

[00:00:57] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:02:46] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[00:17:59] Petitioner Sequential Questions

[00:27:48] United States Opening Statement

[00:35:27] United States Sequential Questions

[00:45:41] Respondent Opening Statement

[01:09:00] Respondent Sequential Questions

[01:22:28] Petitioner Rebuttal

Oral Argument: Barrett v. United States | Case No. 24-5774 | Oral Argument Date: 10/7/25 Oct 07, 2025

Oral Argument: Barrett v. United States | Case No. 24-5774 | Oral Argument Date: 10/7/25

Link to Docket: Here

Case Preview: Here

Question Presented:

Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits two sentences for an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and§ 924(j), a question that divides seven circuits but about which the Solicitor General and Petitioner agree.
Whether "Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under §924(c) (3)(A), a question left open after" United States v. Taylor , 596 U.S. 845 (2022). United States v. Stoney , 62 F.4th 108, 113 (3d Cir. 2023).

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Matthew B. Larsen, Assistant Federal Defender, New York, N. Y.
For Respondent in Support of Petitioner: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below: Charles L. McCloud, Washington, D.C.

Link to Opinion: TBD.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Case Preview

[00:01:00] Argument Begins

[00:01:07] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:02:51] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[00:14:24] Petitioner Sequential Questions

[00:30:00] United States Opening Statement

[00:31:10] United States Free for All Questions

[00:41:24] United States Sequential Questions

[00:45:49] Court-Appointed Amicus Opening Statement

[00:47:41] Court-Appointed Amicus Free for All Questions

[01:00:45] Court-Appointed Amicus Sequential Questions

[01:00:57] Petitioner Rebuttal

Oral Argument: Berk v. Choy | Case No. 24-440 | Oral Argument Date: 10/6/25 Oct 06, 2025

Oral Argument: Berk v. Choy | Case No. 24-440 | Oral Argument Date: 10/6/25

Link to Docket: Here

Episode Preview: Here

Background:

Question Presented: Whether a state law providing that a complaint must be dismissed unless it is accompanied by an expert affidavit may be applied in federal court.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Frederick R. Yarger, Denver, CO.

Link to Opinion: TBD.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Intro

[00:00:33] Argument Begins

[00:00:39] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:02:57] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[00:25:46] Petitioner Sequential Questions

[00:31:36] Respondent Opening Statement

[00:33:52] Respondent Free For All Questions

[00:59:19] Respondent Sequential Questions

[01:00:05] Petitioner Rebuttal

Oral Argument: Villarreal v. Texas | Case No. 24-557 | Oral Argument Date: 10/6/25 Oct 06, 2025

Oral Argument: Villarreal v. Texas | Case No. 24-557 | Oral Argument Date: 10/6/25

Link to Docket: Here

Preview Episode: Here

Question Presented: Whether a trial court abridges the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by prohibiting the defendant and his counsel from discussing the defendant's testimony during an overnight recess.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Stuart Banner, Los Angeles, Cal.
For Respondent: Andrew N. Warthen, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, San Antonio, Tex.; and Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Timestamps

Table of Contents

[00:00:00] Episode Intro

[00:00:41] Argument Begins

[00:00:48] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:25:46] Petitioner Sequential Questions

[00:40:29] Respondent Opening Statement

[01:02:00] Respondent Sequential Questions

[01:02:38] United States Opening Statement

[01:13:14] United States Sequential Questions

[01:16:15] Petitioner Rebuttal

Upcoming Case Preview | Louisiana v. Callais | Redistricting Reckoning: The Race to Refine Race, Representation, and Voting Rights Oct 03, 2025

Louisiana v. Callais | Case No. 24-109 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether the State's intentional creation of a second majority-minority congressional district violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

Other Referenced Episodes:

• August 19th – Road Work Ahead: How Four 2024 Cases May Be Reshaping First Amendment Scrutiny | Here

Overview

This episode examines Louisiana v. Callais, a potentially transformative voting rights case that could reshape Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and minority representation nationwide. After ordering reargument and supplemental briefing, the Supreme Court confronts whether race-conscious redistricting to create majority-minority districts violates the very constitutional amendments the VRA was designed to enforce, creating a fundamental paradox at the intersection of civil rights law and equal protection doctrine.

Episode Roadmap

Opening: A Constitutional Paradox

• Supreme Court's unusual reargument order and supplemental question

• From routine redistricting challenge to existential VRA question

• Constitutional paradox: using civil rights laws to potentially strike down civil rights protections

Constitutional Framework: The Reconstruction Amendments

• Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement clauses

• Congressional power versus Equal Protection constraints

• Strict scrutiny as constitutional roadblock for race-conscious government action

Background: From Robinson to Callais

• 2022 Robinson v. Ardoin litigation establishing Section 2 violation

• Complex procedural ping-pong through federal courts

• Louisiana's creation of SB8-6 with second majority-Black district

• March 2025 oral argument leading to reargument order

Section 2 Framework: The Gingles Test

• Effects test versus intent requirement

• Three-part analysis for Section 2 violations

• Majority-minority districts as remedial tool

Legal Arguments: Competing Constitutional Visions

Appellants' Defense (Louisiana & Robinson Intervenors):

• Congressional authority under Reconstruction Amendments

• Section 2 compliance as compelling governmental interest

• Narrow tailoring through built-in Gingles limitations

Appellees' Challenge (Callais):

• Section 2 fails congruence and proportionality review

• Students for Fair Admissions requires specific discrimination evidence

• "Good reasons" test provides insufficient constitutional protection

Oral Argument Preview: Key Questions for Reargument

• Temporal scope of congressional enforcement power

• SFFA's impact on voting rights doctrine

• Practical consequences for existing majority-minority districts

• Federalism tensions in electoral oversight

Episode Highlights

Constitutional Tension: The same Reconstruction Amendments used to justify the VRA in 1965 now being invoked to potentially strike it down in 2025

Procedural Drama: Court's unusual reargument order signals fundamental doctrinal questions about VRA's constitutional foundations

Practical Stakes: Could eliminate dozens of majority-minority congressional districts and significantly reduce minority representation

Historical Evolution: From 1982 Section 2 effects test designed to combat discrimination to 2025 argument that it perpetuates discrimination

SFFA Integration: How 2023 affirmative action ruling's anti-classification principle applies to political representation

Evidence Battle: Whether current Louisiana record contains sufficient proof of ongoing intentional discrimination to justify race-conscious remedies

Referenced Cases

Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard | 600 U.S. 181 (2023)

Question Presented: Whether universities may use race as a factor in student admissions decisions
Arguments: Established anti-classification principle requiring specific evidence of discrimination before race-conscious government action; appellees argue this standard should apply to voting rights and eliminate Section 2's effects test

Miller v. Johnson | 515 U.S. 900 (1995)

Question Presented: Whether Georgia's congressional redistricting plan violated Equal Protection by using race as predominant factor
Arguments: Warned that VRA's command for race-based districting "brings the Act into tension with the Fourteenth Amendment"; central to appellees' argument that this tension has only worsened over decades

Shaw v. Hunt | 517 U.S. 899 (1996)

Question Presented: Whether North Carolina's race-conscious redistricting plan satisfied strict scrutiny
Arguments: Established "good reasons" test allowing states to consider race if they have strong basis in evidence for believing VRA compliance required; appellees attack this as insufficient constitutional protection

City of Boerne v. Flores | 521 U.S. 507 (1997) | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeded Congress's enforcement powers under Fourteenth Amendment
Arguments: Established congruence and proportionality test requiring congressional remedies be proportional to constitutional violations; appellees argue Section 2 fails this test due to lack of current discrimination findings

Thornburg v. Gingles | 478 U.S. 30 (1986)

Question Presented: What standards govern Section 2 vote dilution claims
Arguments: Created three-part test for Section 2 violations requiring minority political cohesion, majority bloc voting, and geographic compactness; appellants argue these requirements provide adequate constitutional constraints

Allen v. Milligan | 599 U.S. 1 (2023) | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether Alabama's congressional map violated Section 2 by diluting Black voting strength
Arguments: Reaffirmed Section 2's continued vitality but left constitutional questions unresolved; Alabama's immediate non-compliance cited by appellants as evidence ongoing discrimination requires continued VRA protection

Shelby County v. Holder | 570 U.S. 529 (2013)

Question Presented: Whether Section 4's coverage formula for Section 5 preclearance violates Equal Protection
Arguments: Struck down VRA preclearance based on outdated congressional findings; appellees argue similar logic should apply to Section 2's effects test lacking current discrimination evidence

Upcoming Case Preview | Case v. Montana | Warrantless Welfare Checks: When Can Cops Enter to your Castle Without Cause? Oct 02, 2025

Case v. Montana | Case No. 24-624 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.

Other Referenced Episodes:

August 5th Roundup: Presidential Power Crushes Agency Independence, Court Places Voting Rights Act in Crosshairs and Maryland v. Shatzer, a Case That Evolved Beyond Its Origins | Here

Overview

This episode examines Case v. Montana, a Fourth Amendment case that has drawn unprecedented attention with 35 states weighing in, challenging the established emergency-aid exception by asking the Supreme Court to require probable cause rather than the current "objectively reasonable belief" standard for warrantless home entries during emergencies. The case could fundamentally reshape how police respond to suicide calls, medical emergencies, and welfare checks nationwide.

Episode Roadmap

Opening: Unprecedented Stakes and Attention

October 15th, 2025 oral argument date
35 states weighing in, with 34 opposing the petitioner's position
Potential nationwide impact on emergency response procedures
Novel aspect: Petitioner seeking to restrict, not expand, police authority

Constitutional Framework: The Fourth Amendment Text

"The right of the people to be secure... against unreasonable searches and seizures"
Two-clause structure: Reasonableness Clause vs. Warrant Clause
No textual emergency-aid exception - entirely judge-made doctrine
Court's recent skepticism toward expansive judge-made constitutional doctrines

Background: The Tragic Facts in Anaconda, Montana

September 2021: William Trevor Case's suicide threat to ex-girlfriend J.H.
Escalating call: drinking, gun cocking sounds, "pop" followed by dead air
J.H.'s 9-1-1 call reporting believed suicide attempt
Officers' prior knowledge of Case's history with suicide attempts and violence

The Police Response and Corroborating Evidence

18-minute preparation period with protective equipment
Window observations: keys on table, empty beer cans, empty gun holster, apparent suicide note
Entry through unlocked door during protective sweep
Case emerges from closet pointing handgun at Sergeant Pasha
Officer shoots Case in abdomen; medical aid rendered

Procedural History: The Court Journey

Trial court denies suppression motion, finds "exigent circumstance"
Case convicted of assaulting peace officer, sentenced to 60 years
Montana Supreme Court affirms 4-3 with vigorous dissent
Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve deep circuit split

The Circuit Split Crisis

"Reasonable Belief" Courts:

First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits plus Montana and three other states
Standard: "Objective, specific and articulable facts from which an experienced officer would suspect citizen needs help"

"Probable Cause" Courts:

D.C., Second, and Eleventh Circuits plus Nebraska and Colorado
Standard: "Probable cause to believe person is seriously injured or threatened with such injury"

Case's Three Main Arguments (Seeking Higher Standard)

Argument 1: Historical Originalism

Common law required "more than probable cause, not less" for warrantless home entries
Only allowed entries to stop "affrays" that officers personally witnessed
Framers expected higher standard than current practice

Argument 2: Fourth Amendment's Core Purpose

Chief purpose: "restrain discretionary government searches of the home"
Lower standards invite pretextual searches and abuse
Homes deserve highest level of Fourth Amendment protection

Argument 3: Universal Probable Cause Requirement

Probable cause was "general safeguard against all unreasonable searches"
Should apply to all government intrusions, not just criminal investigations
Framers viewed probable cause as "vital safeguard against unfounded searches"

Montana's Three Main Arguments (Defending Current Standard)

Argument 1: Constitutional Structure and Reasonableness Standard

Fourth Amendment's two-clause structure allows independent operation
Reasonableness, not probable cause, is ultimate constitutional touchstone
Historical practice: officers liable for trespass unless jury found action "reasonable"
Extensive common law permitted warrantless entries for various purposes including "saving life"

Argument 2: Probable Cause Would Eliminate Emergency-Aid Exception

"Criminality inheres in the concept of probable cause" - rooted in criminal investigations
Officers cannot develop probable cause when no crime has occurred
Emergency situations (suicide, medical emergencies, welfare checks) typically involve no criminal activity
Would create deadly consequences: homes become "place where citizens who need urgent medical help died alone and in agony"

Argument 3: Officers' Actions Were Objectively Reasonable

Detailed 9-1-1 call from identified person with personal knowledge
Multiple corroborating observations: vehicle, empty holster, apparent suicide note
Officers took exactly the investigative steps the Constitution should require
Even under heightened standard, facts here would satisfy constitutional requirements

Key Precedents in Battle

Brigham City v. Stuart (2006)

Established current "objectively reasonable basis for believing" standard
Officers may enter without warrant when occupant needs emergency aid
No mention of probable cause requirement for emergency-aid entries

Michigan v. Fisher (2009)

Reaffirmed Brigham City's "objectively reasonable" standard
Rejected repeated requests to adopt probable cause or reasonable suspicion standards

Caniglia v. Strom (2021)

Rejected broad community caretaking authority but preserved emergency aid exception
Justice Kavanaugh noted need for Court to clarify "contours of exigent circumstances doctrine"
Distinguished between community caretaking functions and actual exigencies

Lange v. California (2021)

Emphasized exigent circumstances require only "objectively reasonable" belief
No probable cause requirement for exigencies themselves

Constitutional Stakes and Broader Implications

If Case Wins (Probable Cause Required):

Could eliminate effective emergency response in non-criminal situations
Would require much higher certainty before officers can help people in crisis
Particularly impacts rural areas where police are first responders
Creates potential constitutional barrier to life-saving interventions

If Montana Wins (Reasonable Belief Preserved):

Maintains current emergency response capabilities
Preserves established Brigham City doctrine from 2006
Could potentially enable broader police entries with limited oversight
Keeps focus on reasonableness rather than rigid probable cause requirement

Cultural and Legal Tensions

Privacy rights versus public safety needs
Judicial restraint versus practical emergency response
Individual autonomy versus community protection
Textual interpretation versus judge-made doctrine

Looking Ahead to October 15th Oral Arguments

How justices handle circuit split requiring national resolution
Practical consequences: workability of probable cause in emergencies
Historical disputes about common law and Framers' intent
Court's approach to relatively recent Brigham City precedent (2006)
Impact of Court's recent skepticism toward broad judge-made exceptions

Key Legal Concepts Explained

Emergency-aid exception to warrant requirement
Objectively reasonable belief standard vs. probable cause
Fourth Amendment's Reasonableness Clause vs. Warrant Clause
Circuit splits and Supreme Court resolution function
Exigent circumstances doctrine
Judge-made constitutional exceptions
Constitutional balancing tests

Upcoming Case Preview | Bowe v. United States | The Do-Over Dilemma: Federal Prisoners and the Jurisdiction Trap Oct 01, 2025

Bowe v. United States | Case No. 24-5438 | Oral Argument Date: 10/14/25 | Docket Link: Here

Questions Presented:

Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) deprives this Court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Overview

This episode examines Bowe v. United States, where the government concedes error but argues the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to correct it. The case explores whether the "do-over bar" in AEDPA applies to federal prisoners and whether an acknowledged legal error will go unremedied due to jurisdictional barriers.

Episode Roadmap

Opening: An Acknowledged Error Without a Remedy

Government's unusual position: conceding error but claiming the Court can't fix it
Michael Bowe's years-long struggle to challenge his conviction
Constitutional context: Ex Post Facto Clause and retroactive application of Davis and Taylor

The Two Questions Presented

Question One: Does the do-over bar (§ 2244(b)(1)) apply to federal prisoners even though it references only state prisoner applications under § 2254?

Question Two: Does § 2244(b)(3)(E) bar Supreme Court certiorari review of authorization decisions for federal prisoners?

Background: Michael Bowe's Journey

2008: Pled guilty including Section 924(c) conviction (using firearm during crime of violence)
2019: Davis strikes down residual clause; Bowe seeks authorization but Eleventh Circuit denies based on circuit precedent
2022: Taylor abrogates that precedent; Bowe seeks authorization again
2022: Eleventh Circuit dismisses under do-over bar in In re Baptiste
2024: Third authorization request denied; all alternatives rejected
2025: Supreme Court grants certiorari; government switches position

Legal Framework

Section 2255: Federal prisoner post-conviction relief vehicle

Section 2244: Originally for state prisoners; contains:

(b)(1): Do-over bar—bars claims "presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254"
(b)(3): Authorization procedures, including (b)(3)(E)'s certiorari bar

Section 2255(h): "Second or successive motion must be certified as provided in section 2244"—key question is what this incorporates

Circuit Split: Six circuits apply do-over bar to federal prisoners; three reject it

Petitioner's Main Arguments

Argument One: Plain Text Excludes Federal Prisoners

Do-over bar explicitly references "section 2254" (state prisoners only)
Federal prisoners use § 2255 motions, not § 2254 applications
Section 2255(h) incorporates certification procedures only, not substantive bars
Even Eleventh Circuit admits § 2255(h) doesn't incorporate § 2244(b)(2)—can't incorporate (b)(1) either since both use identical "section 2254" language

Argument Two: Federalism Explains Differential Treatment

AEDPA repeatedly subjects state prisoners to stricter requirements
State prisoner habeas implicates federalism and comity concerns
Federal prisoners challenging federal convictions raise no federalism issues
Do-over bar fits pattern of protecting state sovereignty, not restricting federal prisoner access

Argument Three: Court Has Jurisdiction

No clear statement stripping jurisdiction for federal prisoners
Eleventh Circuit "dismissed" rather than "denied"—certiorari bar covers only "grant or denial"
No actual authorization determination made; court applied wrong legal standard
Constitutional avoidance: barring all review raises Exceptions Clause concerns
Circuit split needs resolution; federal prisoners lack alternative Supreme Court access unlike state prisoners

Respondent's Main Arguments

Argument One: Certiorari Bar Applies

Section 2255(h) comprehensively incorporates § 2244(b)(3) as integrated whole
All five subparagraphs use "authorization" language
Castro implicitly recognized incorporation
Cannot separate certiorari bar from rehearing bar

Argument Two: "Dismissal" Is "Denial"

Plain meaning: "deny" means "refuse to grant"
Binary framework: must "grant or deny" within 30 days—no third category
Courts frequently style identical dispositions as "denials"
Accepting distinction would create arbitrary geographic lottery
Court acted on authorization request; applying wrong standard doesn't remove it from "authorization" category

Argument Three: No Constitutional Problem

Common law provided no right to habeas appeal or successive attacks
Felker rejected Exceptions Clause challenge for state prisoners
Alternative mechanisms exist: certification, All Writs Act, potential district court review
Bowe's claim is statutory (not constitutional), so doesn't satisfy § 2255(h)(2) anyway
Preexisting doctrines (Sanders, law of case) prevent abuse without statutory bar

Key Points for Oral Arguments

Justice reactions to government conceding error but claiming no remedy
Practical consequences if do-over bar doesn't apply—floodgates or manageable?
Whether ensuring circuit uniformity is "essential" Supreme Court jurisdiction
Formalism of "dismissal" versus "denial" distinction
Federalism pattern throughout AEDPA's structure
What happens to thousands of potentially affected prisoners in six circuits?

Broader Implications

Immediate impact on hundreds or thousands of federal prisoners
Geographic lottery based on circuit precedent
Statutory interpretation of AEDPA's cross-references and incorporation provisions
Jurisdictional doctrine: clear statement rule and constitutional limits on jurisdiction-stripping
Access to justice: when procedural barriers prevent meritorious claims
Separation of powers: congressional authority to limit Supreme Court review

Upcoming Case Preview | Ellingburg v. United States | The Restitution Riddle: When Does Compensation Become Punishment? Sep 29, 2025

Ellingburg v. United States | Case No. 24-482 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) is penal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Overview

This episode examines Ellingburg v. United States, one of the most procedurally unusual Supreme Court cases in recent memory. After the Court granted certiorari, the government switched positions following a change in presidential Administration, now agreeing with the criminal defendant that the Eighth Circuit erred. The Court appointed an outside attorney as amicus curiae to defend the lower court's judgment, creating a rare scenario where both named parties argue for the same outcome. At its core, the case asks whether mandatory criminal restitution constitutes punishment subject to the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause—a question with profound implications for thousands of federal defendants and the government's authority to retroactively enforce criminal restitution obligations.

Episode Roadmap

Opening: A Procedural Rarity

Government switches sides after Administration change
Court appoints amicus curiae to defend Eighth Circuit's judgment
Unusual three-way legal battle over fundamental constitutional question
Implications for thousands convicted of federal crimes before 1996

Background: Ellingburg's Story

1995: Holsey Ellingburg, Jr. robs bank in St. Louis, Missouri
1996: Sentenced to 322 months imprisonment, ordered to pay $7,567 restitution under pre-MVRA law (VWPA)
Under original law, restitution obligation expired November 2016 (20-year limit)
2022: Released from prison, rebuilding life on minimum wage
2023: Government demands $13,476 using MVRA's extended collection period and mandatory interest
Pro se motion challenges retroactive application as Ex Post Facto violation

The Central Legal Question

Is MVRA restitution criminal punishment or civil remedy?
If criminal: Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits retroactive application
If civil: Government can apply new collection rules to old offenses
Statutory construction as threshold issue: What did Congress intend?

Procedural Journey Through the Courts

District Court: Denied motion, held MVRA application merely "procedural"
Eighth Circuit: Affirmed on different ground—restitution is civil remedy, not criminal punishment
Circuit relied on Carruth precedent despite Pasquantino and Paroline developments
Two concurring judges questioned binding precedent's continued validity
Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve circuit split

Constitutional Framework: The Ex Post Facto Clause

Article I, Section 9, Clause 3: "No ex post facto Law shall be passed"
Prohibits retroactively increasing punishment for criminal acts
Only applies to criminal laws, not civil remedies
Constitutional protection against arbitrary government power

The Statutory Text Battle

Section 3663A: Restitution ordered "when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense"
"In addition to, or in lieu of, any other penalty authorized by law"
Codification in Title 18 criminal code, Chapter 227 "Sentences"
Criminal procedures govern: presentence reports, probation officers, appellate review
Enforcement through threat of imprisonment for nonpayment

Petitioner's Three Main Arguments

Argument 1: Text and Structure Prove Criminal Intent

Statutory language integrates restitution into criminal sentencing
Grouped with fines and imprisonment as penalties
Criminal procedures from start to finish
Codified in "Sentences" chapter alongside other criminal punishments
Section 3556 requires courts imposing sentences to order restitution

Argument 2: Enforcement Through Criminal Punishment and Express Penal Purpose

Backed by threat of imprisonment—"paradigmatic affirmative disability"
Nonpayment can result in revocation of probation/supervised release
Resentencing possible without new indictment, prosecution, or conviction
Section 3614(b)(2) explicitly references "purposes of punishment and deterrence"
Congress included "to the extent constitutionally permissible" language showing Ex Post Facto concerns

Argument 3: Precedent and Historical Understanding

Pasquantino: Purpose is "to mete out appropriate criminal punishment"
Paroline: Restitution "serves punitive purposes" and has "penological purposes"
Kelly v. Robinson: State restitution is "criminal sanction" and "penal sanction"
Courts of appeals uniformly treated VWPA restitution as criminal for Seventh Amendment purposes
Government's own historical position: Solicitor General directed non-retroactive application in 1998

Government's Arguments (Supporting Petitioner/Vacatur)

Argument 1: Statutory Construction Demonstrates Criminal Nature

Question is "principally a question of statutory construction" (Kansas v. Hendricks)
Text and structure integrate restitution into defendant's criminal sentence
Codification in "Sentencing" provisions alongside imprisonment and fines
Procedural mechanisms mirror other criminal penalties
Probation officers, presentence reports, criminal appellate review

Argument 2: Precedent Supports Criminal Characterization

Pre-MVRA courts uniformly held VWPA restitution was criminal penalty
Kelly: Criminal restitution has "deterrent effect" and serves "effective rehabilitation penalty"
Pasquantino: Would be "passing strange" to apply only tort law model to criminal restitution
Paroline: Restitution "imposed by the Government at the culmination of a criminal proceeding"
Majority of circuits recognize Ex Post Facto Clause applies to MVRA restitution

Argument 3: Alternative Ground for Affirmance Exists

Eighth Circuit erred by ignoring statutory text and structure
But alternative ground available: extending collection period may not increase punishment
Original debt amount ($7,567.25) unchanged by MVRA amendments
"Time horizon" for collection arguably not separate punishment
Requests vacatur and remand for court of appeals to consider alternative ground

Court-Appointed Amicus's Arguments (Defending Eighth Circuit)

Argument 1: No "Conclusive Evidence" of Punitive Intent

Mendoza-Martinez requires "unmistakable penal intent" and "overwhelming indications"
Clear statement requirement grounded in separation of powers
Congress didn't use "criminal restitution" label
Mandatory structure eliminates judicial discretion typical of criminal sentencing
Courts cannot consider defendant's culpability, economic circumstances, or penological goals
Payment goes to victims, not government as prosecuting sovereign
Victims can enforce like civil creditors with liens and collection procedures

Argument 2: Not Punitive Under Mendoza-Martinez Factors

Traditional civil restitution focuses on victim's losses, not defendant's gain
No "affirmative disability or restraint" from restitution itself
Consequences of nonpayment don't make underlying obligation punitive
Criminal conviction required to serve nonpunitive purpose (victim compensation)
Doesn't implicate traditional punishment aims—courts barred from considering deterrence/retribution
Award capped at victim's loss, offset by civil judgments
Substantial nonpunitive purpose (compensation) without excess

Argument 3: Petition Improvidently Granted

Question asks about "restitution under the MVRA"
But Ellingburg's restitution imposed under pre-MVRA VWPA
Only MVRA's collection period and interest provisions applied retroactively
Answering MVRA question would be advisory opinion
Ex Post Facto analysis requires examining VWPA restitution's nature, not MVRA's
Parties failed to disclose this threshold issue in briefing

The Legal Frameworks Explained

Kansas v. Hendricks / Smith v. Doe Framework

Whether penalty is criminal "is principally a question of statutory construction"
Courts must ascertain whether legislature meant to establish criminal or civil proceedings
If legislature intended punishment, inquiry ends and Ex Post Facto Clause applies
Focus on legislative intent through statute's text and structure

Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez Two-Step Test

Step One: Is there "conclusive evidence" of congressional punitive intent?
If not conclusive, Step Two: Seven-factor analysis of whether "so punitive" as to be criminal

Broader Implications

If Petitioner/Government Prevail:

Thousands of pre-1996 defendants may have expired restitution obligations
MVRA restitution subject to other criminal constitutional protections
Potential Excessive Fines Clause applications
Limits on retroactive enforcement of criminal restitution
Confirmation of decades of circuit court precedent

If Amicus Prevails:

Government can continue enforcing MVRA provisions retroactively
Restitution treated differently from other criminal penalties
Broader state authority to craft victim compensation schemes
Different constitutional protections apply to civil versus criminal restitution

Cultural and Legal Tensions

Victim compensation versus defendant rights
Retroactivity and fairness in criminal law
Separation of powers: Congress's authority to define punishment
Government position changes with Administration changes
Practical impact on criminal defendants' ability to rebuild lives post-incarceration

Key Dates and Next Steps

Briefs completed June 2025
Oral arguments to be scheduled
Decision expected by June 2026
Potential remand to Eighth Circuit on alternative grounds

Referenced Cases

Kansas v. Hendricks | 521 U.S. 346 (1997)

Question Presented: Whether Kansas's Sexually Violent Predator Act, which provides for civil commitment of persons likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence, violates substantive due process, the Double Jeopardy Clause, or the Ex Post Facto Clause
Arguments: Established that determining whether law is civil or criminal "is principally a question of statutory construction"; courts must ascertain whether legislature meant to establish civil or criminal proceedings; if legislature intended punishment, that ends the inquiry for Ex Post Facto purposes.

Smith v. Doe | 538 U.S. 84 (2003)

Question Presented: Whether Alaska's Sex Offender Registration Act violates the Ex Post Facto Clause
Arguments: Applied two-step Hendricks/Mendoza-Martinez framework; if legislative intent was to impose punishment, inquiry ends; if intent was civil and nonpunitive, party challenging must show "clearest proof" that scheme is "so punitive either in purpose or effect" as to negate legislature's intention; courts accord "considerable deference" to legislative intent as stated.

Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez | 372 U.S. 144 (1963)

Question Presented: Whether statute divesting citizenship of persons who leave or remain outside United States to evade military service constitutes punishment
Arguments: Established seven-factor test for determining whether sanction is criminal punishment: (1) affirmative disability or restraint; (2) historically regarded as punishment; (3) requires scienter; (4) promotes traditional aims of punishment; (5) behavior already a crime; (6) alternative nonpunitive purpose; (7) excessive relative to alternative purpose. Requires "conclusive evidence" of punitive intent.

Pasquantino v. United States | 544 U.S. 349 (2005)

Question Presented: Whether federal wire fraud statute applies to scheme to defraud foreign government of tax revenue
Arguments: Court stated "[t]he purpose of awarding restitution" under MVRA is "to mete out appropriate criminal punishment"; noted restitution "imposed by the Government at the end of a criminal proceeding against a defendant convicted of a criminal offense"; emphasized restitution serves purposes that "differ from (though they overlap with) the purposes of tort law."

Paroline v. United States | 572 U.S. 434 (2014)

Question Presented: How to determine restitution amount under 18 U.S.C. § 2259 for child pornography victims when defendant is one of thousands who possessed victim's images
Arguments: Court recognized that while restitution's "primary goal" is "remedial or compensatory," "it also serves punitive purposes"; described restitution's "penological purposes"; noted restitution "is imposed by the Government at the culmination of a criminal proceeding and requires conviction of an underlying crime"; emphasized it serves to hold offenders "accountable for the harm [they] caused."

Kelly v. Robinson | 479 U.S. 36 (1986)

Question Presented: Whether restitution obligation imposed as condition of state criminal probation is dischargeable in bankruptcy as debt "for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit"
Arguments: Court held state criminal restitution is "criminal sanction" and "penal sanction" serving "the State's interests in rehabilitation and punishment"; noted restitution has "deterrent effect" and is "an effective rehabilitation penalty" that forces "the defendant to confront, in concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused"; emphasized that despite benefit to victims, restitution remains fundamentally penal.

California Department of Corrections v. Morales | 514 U.S. 499 (1995)

Question Presented: Whether California statute reducing frequency of parole reconsideration hearings for certain inmates violates Ex Post Facto Clause
Arguments: Court stated Ex Post Facto Clause "is aimed at laws that 'retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts'"; establishes foundational principle that Clause only applies to criminal laws that disadvantage defendants by increasing punishment.

United States v. Bajakajian | 524 U.S. 321 (1998)

Question Presented: Whether forfeiture of $357,144 for failure to report currency transportation violates Excessive Fines Clause
Arguments: Court analyzed whether forfeiture constitutes "punishment" for Eighth Amendment purposes; established that forfeitures can be civil in nature but still constitute punishment for constitutional purposes if they serve in part to punish.

Calder v. Bull | 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798)

Question Presented: Early interpretation of Ex Post Facto Clause's scope and limitations
Arguments: Landmark early Supreme Court decision establishing that Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal laws, not civil legislation; defined four categories of ex post facto laws including those that aggravate crimes or increase punishment for acts already committed.

Hughey v. United States | 495 U.S. 411 (1990)

Question Presented: Whether Victim and Witness Protection Act authorizes restitution for losses from uncharged conduct related to convicted offense
Arguments: Court interpreted VWPA to limit restitution to losses caused by specific conduct underlying offense of conviction; established narrow interpretation of restitution statutes; government argued restitution under VWPA was "criminal rather than civil sanction" based on "language, structure, and legislative history."

Dolan v. United States | 560 U.S. 605 (2010)

Question Presented: Whether 90-day deadline in 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5) for determining restitution amount is mandatory and jurisdictional
Arguments: Court held deadline is mandatory claim-processing rule, not jurisdictional; emphasized compensatory purpose of MVRA in making crime victims whole; noted restitution integrated into federal criminal sentencing system.

Key Legal Concepts Explained

Ex Post Facto Clause: Constitutional prohibition on retroactively increasing punishment for crimes
Criminal vs. Civil Punishment: Fundamental distinction determining which constitutional protections apply
Statutory Construction: Method of interpreting what Congress intended when enacting law
Mendoza-Martinez Factors: Seven-factor test for determining if sanction is criminal punishment
Clear Statement Rule: Requirement that Congress clearly indicate intent when testing constitutional limits
Lesser-Included Offense: Crime necessarily committed when committing greater offense
Confession of Error: Rare instance when government admits lower court ruling was wrong
Amicus Curiae: "Friend of the court" appointed to argue position when parties agree
Mandatory vs. Discretionary Sentencing: Distinction between required penalties and judicial discretion
Penal vs. Remedial Purpose: Whether law aims to punish wrongdoers or compensate victims

Oral Argument Preview | Bost v. Illinois | Ballot Box Bout: When Can Candidates Challenge Election Rules? Sep 26, 2025

Bost v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections | Case No. 24-568 | Oral Argument Date: 10/8/25 | Docket Link: Here

Overview

This episode examines Bost v. Illinois, a Supreme Court case that could reshape how candidates challenge election laws in federal court. Congressman Michael Bost and two Republican presidential elector nominees are challenging Illinois's law allowing mail-in ballots to be counted up to 14 days after Election Day, creating a fundamental test of Article III standing doctrine in the election law context. The case sits at the intersection of constitutional standing requirements and the unique competitive dynamics of electoral politics, with implications for whether candidates should receive special treatment to challenge election rules or must meet the same concrete injury standards as all other plaintiffs.

Episode Roadmap

Opening: A Fundamental Question About Federal Courts

• October 8, 2025 oral argument date

• Standing doctrine meets election law in crucial constitutional test

• Circuit split on candidate challenges to election rules

• Implications for flood of pre-election litigation vs. orderly dispute resolution

Background: Illinois's Ballot-Receipt Extension

• 2005 Illinois law change allowing 14-day post-Election Day counting window

• Historical roots in Civil War soldier voting accommodations

• About half of states now allow similar extended receipt deadlines

• Congressman Michael Bost and two Republican presidential elector nominees challenge law

Constitutional Framework: Article III's Case-or-Controversy Requirement

• "Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity"

• Standing doctrine requires concrete, particularized, traceable injury

• Tension between candidate investment in election rules and generalized grievances

• Elections Clause and Electors Clause federal framework

Procedural Journey Through the Courts

• May 2022: Pre-enforcement challenge filed

• July 2023: District court dismisses for lack of standing

• Seventh Circuit affirmed in split decision with Judge Scudder's influential partial dissent

• Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve candidate standing question

The Three-Way Legal Battle

• Petitioners' blanket candidate standing rule vs. concrete injury requirements

• Electoral harm theory: competitive disadvantage vs. speculative injury

• Pocketbook injury claims: campaign extension costs vs. manufactured standing

Clapper Doctrine and Mitigation Expenditures

• When spending money to avoid harm creates standing vs. speculative preparation

• Illinois's challenge to factual basis of extended campaign operations

• "Near certainty" of ballot counting vs. substantial risk standard

Oral Argument Preview: Key Tensions to Watch

• Justices' reaction to special candidate standing exception

• Factual record problems and thin allegations

• Floodgates concerns vs. orderly pre-election resolution

• Purcell principle timing considerations

Broader Constitutional Stakes

• Article III's role in limiting federal court jurisdiction

• Election law's unique challenges for traditional standing doctrine

• Federalism questions about state election rule authority

• Volume and intensity of modern election litigation trends

Referenced Cases

Clapper v. Amnesty International | 568 U.S. 398 (2013)

Question Presented: Whether respondents have Article III standing to challenge FISA Amendments Act surveillance provisions
Arguments: Established restrictive doctrine that plaintiffs cannot manufacture standing by spending money to mitigate speculative future harm; requires substantial risk of concrete injury that mitigation expenditures are designed to avoid; Illinois relies heavily on this precedent to challenge Bost's campaign extension costs as insufficient for standing.

Davis v. Federal Election Commission | 554 U.S. 724 (2008)

Question Presented: Whether provisions of McCain-Feingold Act that impose different contribution limits on candidates facing self-funded opponents violate Equal Protection and First Amendment
Arguments: Supreme Court recognized candidate standing based on competitive electoral harm and fundraising disadvantages in "competitive context of electoral politics"; petitioners rely on this precedent to support their electoral prospects injury theory; demonstrates Court's acceptance that campaign competition can create cognizable Article III injury.

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus | 573 U.S. 149 (2014)

Question Presented: Whether plaintiffs have Article III standing to bring pre-enforcement constitutional challenge to Ohio election law prohibiting false campaign statements
Arguments: Established framework for pre-enforcement challenges in election context using "substantial risk" standard for future harm; relevant to petitioners' argument that they face substantial risk of electoral and financial harm from Illinois's ballot-receipt deadline; provides precedential support for challenging election rules before they take effect in specific election.

Oral Argument Preview | Postal Service v. Konan | Dictionary Duel Over "Loss," "Miscarriage," and Government Liability Sep 25, 2025

Postal Service v. Konan | Case No. 24-351 | Oral Argument Date: 10/8/25 | Docket Link: Here

Episode Overview

This episode examines United States Postal Service v. Lebene Konan, a Supreme Court case that asks whether the federal government has immunity when postal employees intentionally refuse to deliver mail as part of a campaign of racial harassment. The case centers on the interpretation of the Federal Tort Claims Act's "postal exception" and whether terms like "loss" and "miscarriage" cover intentional wrongdoing or only negligent acts.

Episode Roadmap

Opening: A Deceptively Simple Question

Can you sue the federal government when postal workers intentionally withhold your mail?
The answer hinges on the Federal Tort Claims Act's postal exception
Core tension between remedy for wrongs vs. government immunity

Legal Framework: The Federal Tort Claims Act

28 U.S.C. § 2680(b): Exception for claims arising from "loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission" of mail
Key interpretive battle: Does "negligent" modify only "transmission" or all three terms?
Government argues broad immunity; plaintiff argues narrow exception

The Facts: Alleged Racial Harassment Campaign

Lebene Konan: Black realtor and landlady in Euless, Texas
Two-year campaign by USPS employees Raymond Rojas and Jason Drake
Allegations: Changed postal records, changed mailbox locks, refused mail delivery
Over 50 administrative complaints filed; Inspector General investigation ordered delivery

Procedural Journey

District court: Dismissed under postal exception
Fifth Circuit: Reversed, held "loss" and "miscarriage" imply unintentional acts
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit split

Government's Arguments

"Miscarriage" = broad failure to arrive (Webster's 1940s definition)
"Loss" = deprivation, regardless of intent
Structural argument: FTCA uses "loss" to cover intentional acts elsewhere
Policy concern: Flood of litigation if intent matters

Konan's Counter-Arguments

"Miscarriage" = mail mistakenly delivered to wrong place
"Loss" = destruction or misplacement, both inherently accidental
Statutory structure shows Congress concerned only with negligence
"Negligent transmission" proves Congress knew how to limit scope when intended

Battle of the Dictionaries

Government relies on neutral 1940s definitions from Webster's Second
Konan cites specific legal definitions and Oxford English Dictionary
Competing interpretations of what "loss" and "miscarriage" historically meant

Looking Ahead to Oral Arguments

How will Justices react to competing dictionary definitions?
Will practical consequences (floodgates) persuade the Court?
Strange incentive structure if government immune for intentional but not negligent acts

Referenced Cases

Dolan v. USPS | 546 U.S. 481 (2006) | Docket Link

Question Presented: Interpretation of FTCA postal exception terms
Overview: Supreme Court precedent that both parties cite for their competing interpretations of "miscarriage" in the postal exception context.

Key Legal Concepts Explained

Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): Law allowing lawsuits against the United States for employee torts
Sovereign Immunity: Government's general protection from lawsuits
Statutory Interpretation: Battle between textualist approaches using period dictionaries
Presumption of Consistent Usage: Principle that same word should mean same thing throughout statute

Stakes and Implications

If Government Wins:

Strong immunity shield for Postal Service regardless of employee intent
Potential closure of courthouse doors for wide range of intentional misconduct
Confirmation that postal exception creates hard barrier to liability

If Konan Wins:

FTCA exceptions have limits; immunity doesn't protect intentional torts
"Negligent" in statute colors interpretation of related terms
Opens door for relief against intentional postal employee misconduct

Broader Significance:

Masterclass in statutory interpretation and use of historical dictionaries
Tension between providing remedy for wrongs vs. protecting essential government services
Question of whether immunity should vary based on employee intent

Oral Argument Preview | Barrett v. United States | Double Jeopardy Dilemma Over Sentence Stacking Sep 22, 2025

Barrett v. United States | Case No. 24-5774 | Oral Argument Date: 10/7/25 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits punishment under both 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and § 924(j) for one act that violates each statute

Other Referenced Episodes:

September 10th: A Constitutional Clash: Trump's Tariffs and the Separation of Powers

Overview

This episode explores Barrett v. United States, a fascinating Double Jeopardy case where the federal government unusually sides with a criminal defendant against its own prosecution. The Supreme Court must determine whether convicting someone under both federal gun statutes—one for using a firearm during a violent crime and another for causing a death with that firearm—violates the Fifth Amendment's protection against being punished twice for the same offense. With no one defending the lower court's judgment, the Court appointed an outside attorney to argue that sentence stacking should be permitted, creating a rare three-way legal battle over fundamental constitutional protections and congressional intent in criminal sentencing.

Episode Roadmap

Opening: A Constitutional Twist

October 6th Supreme Court term preview continuation
Fourth case in opening week after Berm v. Choy, Villarreal v. Texas, and Chiles v. Salazar
Unusual scenario: Government sides with criminal defendant
November 5th Trump Tariffs Case announcement

The Core Question

Can government punish someone twice for single criminal act--using a firearm while trafficking drugs?
Federal gun statutes create potential double jeopardy violation
Section 924(c): Using gun during violent crime (5-year minimum, up to life)
Section 924(j): Killing someone with that gun (death penalty or life for murder)

The Barrett Facts

2011 New York robbery crew case
Dwayne Barrett as getaway driver during minivan robbery
Co-conspirator shot and killed Gamar Dafalla during robbery
Government charged Barrett under both gun statutes for single act

Legal Journey Through the Courts

Initial district court: Merged sentences, avoided double punishment
Second Circuit flip: Required stacking both sentences after Supreme Court's Lora decision
Circuit split on handling these overlapping prosecutions
Government "confessed error" - switched sides under Trump administration

Constitutional Framework: Double Jeopardy Protection

Fifth Amendment: "No person shall... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy"
Blockburger test: Same-elements analysis for determining "same offense"
Presumption against double punishment unless Congress clearly authorizes it
Court-appointed amicus ensures adversarial presentation when government switches sides

Barrett and Government Arguments

Section 924(c) is lesser-included offense of Section 924(j)
Cannot violate fatal results statute without first violating gun use statute
Congress knew how to authorize stacking: Section 924(c)(5) armor-piercing provision
Omission of stacking language in Section 924(j) proves contrary intent

Court-Appointed Amicus Arguments

Consecutive-sentence mandate in Section 924(c): "any other term of imprisonment"
Two statutes punish different evils: danger of gun vs. harm of death
Absurd results hypothetical: Machinegun manslaughter (15-year max) vs. machinegun brandishing (30-year minimum)
Congress intended comprehensive punishment for escalating criminal conduct

Reply Brief Rebuttals

Prosecutorial discretion avoids hypothetical absurd results
Supreme Court rejected similar "implausible results" arguments in Lora
Consecutive-sentence mandate governs sequencing, not Double Jeopardy authorization
Blockburger elements test controls regardless of different policy rationales

Broader Constitutional Stakes

Fundamental protection against government overreach
Separation of powers: Congressional crime definition vs. judicial interpretation
Nationwide impact on federal gun crime prosecutions and sentencing
Clarity requirement for "clear statement" when constitutional rights at stake

Referenced Cases

Blockburger v. United States | 284 U.S. 299 (1932)

Question Presented: Landmark case establishing "same-elements test" for determining whether two offenses constitute "same offence" under Double Jeopardy Clause
Arguments: Established that offenses are distinct if each requires proof of fact the other does not; creates presumption against multiple punishment for greater and lesser-included offenses unless Congress clearly indicates contrary intent.

Lora v. United States | 599 U.S. 453 (2023)

Question Presented: Whether Section 924(j) requires proof that defendant personally used firearm that caused death
Arguments: Supreme Court established that Sections 924(c) and 924(j) represent different congressional approaches to punishment - mandatory minimums constraining judicial discretion versus sentencing flexibility with higher maximum penalties including death.

United States v. Davis | 588 U.S. 445 (2019)

Question Presented: Whether definition of "crime of violence" in Section 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague
Arguments: Supreme Court struck down residual clause of crime of violence definition, leading to Barrett case remand and resentencing that eliminated one of his Section 924(c) convictions.

Whalen v. United States | 445 U.S. 684 (1980)

Question Presented: Whether consecutive-sentence provision alone provides clear congressional authorization for cumulative punishment of same offense
Arguments: Supreme Court held that even explicit consecutive-sentence mandate insufficient to overcome Double Jeopardy presumption without clear indication Congress intended to authorize multiple convictions for same underlying conduct.

Oral Argument Preview | Chiles v. Salazar | Battle Over Conversion Therapy and Therapist Free Speech Rights Sep 19, 2025

Chiles v. Salazar | Case No. 24-539 | Oral Argument Date: 10/7/25 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether a law that censors certain conversations between counselors and their clients based on the viewpoints expressed regulates conduct or violates the Free Speech Clause.

Other Referenced Episodes:

August 19 – Road Work Ahead: How Four 2024 Cases May Be Reshaping First Amendment Scrutiny | Here

Overview

This episode examines one of the most anticipated cases of the October 2025 Supreme Court term - a First Amendment challenge to Colorado's "conversion therapy" ban that has generated over 50 amicus briefs and sits at the intersection of free speech, parental rights, LGBTQ issues, and professional regulation.

Roadmap

Opening: A Constitutional Perfect Storm

October 7th, 2025 oral argument date
Over 50 amicus briefs filed (compared to 7 for most cases)
Intersection of hot-button topics: parental rights, LGBTQ issues, religious freedom, professional regulation

Background: The Players and the Law

Kaley Chiles: Licensed counselor in Colorado Springs at Deeper Stories Counseling
Christian counselor using "client-directed" approach with speech-only methods
Colorado's 2019 law banning "conversion therapy" for minors
Penalties: fines up to $5,000, license suspension or revocation

Constitutional Framework: The First Amendment Text

"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech"
Extension to state governments through Fourteenth Amendment
The simplicity of "no law" language

Procedural History: The Court Journey

2022: Chiles filed pre-enforcement challenge
District court denied preliminary injunction using rational basis review
Tenth Circuit affirmed in divided panel decision
Judge Hartz's "scathing dissent" calling majority approach "remarkable" and "contrary" to precedent

The Central Constitutional Question

Speech versus conduct: When does professional speech become conduct that can be regulated?
Level of scrutiny determines case outcome
Three-tiered analysis: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny

Understanding Scrutiny Levels: The Road Analogy

Rational basis: Highway with minimal obstacles
Intermediate scrutiny: Busy road with stop signs and traffic lights
Strict scrutiny: Road closure - "fatal in fact" for government

Competing Legal Frameworks

Chiles's Arguments (Strict Scrutiny)

Content-based discrimination: "You can help with binge eating, but not sexual orientation behaviors"
Viewpoint-based discrimination: "Support gender transition but forbid comfort with biological body"
Speech-only counseling deserves full First Amendment protection

Colorado's Arguments (Rational Basis)

Professional healthcare treatment regulation, not speech restriction
Traditional state authority over professional standards
"Professional healthcare treatment that happens to involve words"

Key Supreme Court Precedents Battle

National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA) (2018)

Chiles interpretation: Professional speech gets full First Amendment protection
Colorado interpretation: States can prohibit substandard treatment involving words

Reed v. Town of Gilbert (2015)

Content-based restrictions trigger strict scrutiny
Foundation for Chiles's discrimination arguments

The Evidence Battle

Colorado's medical organization statements vs. lack of specific studies
Colorado counsel's concession: No studies on "talk therapy by licensed counselor with willing minor"
Recent developments: Cass Review from UK, new HHS reports

Narrow Tailoring Problems

Overinclusive: Bans all counseling conversations on these topics
Underinclusive: Only applies to licensed professionals, not life coaches or religious counselors
Fatal inconsistency under strict scrutiny

Broader Implications

If Chiles Wins

Expanded protection for professional speech generally
Limits on state regulation of counselor-client conversations
Potential impact on other professional speech regulations

If Colorado Wins

Broader state authority to regulate professional conversations
Precedent for public health rationales overriding speech concerns
Framework for regulating other controversial therapeutic approaches

Cultural and Legal Tensions

Expertise versus individual choice
Regulatory authority versus family autonomy
Professional consensus versus personal beliefs

Looking Ahead to October 7th Oral Arguments

Watch for justices' reaction to speech versus conduct framing
Evidence questions: How much proof does Colorado need?
Narrow tailoring challenges about unlicensed practitioners
Potential references to recent Court skepticism of professional speech restrictions

Key Legal Concepts Explained

Content-based vs. viewpoint-based discrimination
Professional speech doctrine
Pre-enforcement challenges
Strict scrutiny analysis
Constitutional avoidance principles

Oral Argument Preview | Villareal v. Texas | Constitutional Conundrum Over the Right to Counsel and Witness Coaching Sep 18, 2025

Villarreal v. Texas | Case No. 24-557 | Oral Argument Date: 10/6/25 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether a trial court abridges the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by prohibiting the defendant and his counsel from discussing the defendant's testimony during an overnight recess.

Overview

This episode examines Villareal v. Texas, a case that addresses a fundamental question affecting every criminal trial where a defendant takes the stand: what happens when testimony gets interrupted by an overnight recess? The case explores the intersection of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and trial courts' authority to prevent witness coaching during extended breaks in testimony.

Episode Roadmap

Opening: The Constitutional Dilemma

David Villareal's murder trial and self-defense claim
The overnight recess that created a constitutional question
The judge's "qualified conferral order" - a middle-ground approach
Why this affects every criminal trial with testifying defendants

The Trial Court's Balancing Act

Judge's concern about overnight "coaching" of defendant's testimony
The court's solution: prohibit testimony discussions, allow everything else
Defense counsel's understanding and preserved Sixth Amendment objection
Conviction and 60-year sentence outcome

Constitutional Territory: Competing Precedents

Sixth Amendment's broad language: "assistance of counsel for his defence"
Geders v. United States (1976): overnight recesses require full consultation
Perry v. Leeke (1989): 15-minute recesses allow complete prohibition
The gap: what about partial restrictions during long recesses?

Split in Lower Courts

Federal circuits generally reject qualified orders during overnight recesses
State supreme courts (including Texas) embrace the middle-ground approach
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals: "type of communication" controls, not recess length
The constitutional question that prompted Supreme Court review

Villareal's Three-Pronged Attack

Perry already resolved this: "unrestricted access" during overnight recesses
The rule is unworkable: testimony and strategy discussions are "inextricably intertwined"
Practical impossibilities: plea negotiations, perjury prevention, attorney-client privilege

Texas's Constitutional Defense

Perry endorsed qualified orders even during short recesses
Substance matters more than timing: testimony discussions aren't constitutionally protected
The rule works in practice: defense counsel understood and complied
Fairness and truth-seeking justify the restriction

The Current Court's Jurisprudence

Emphasis on workability and bright-line rules
Skepticism of broad constitutional rules that are difficult to administer
Text and original meaning analysis of "assistance of counsel"
Historical wrinkle: defendants couldn't testify when Sixth Amendment was ratified

Stakes and Implications

Impact on trial court management of testimony scheduling nationwide
Effect on criminal defendants' consultation rights during testimony breaks
Broader tension: advocacy system vs. truth-seeking function
Potential for significant practical impact regardless of outcome

Relevant Precedential Cases

Geders v. United States | 425 U.S. 80 (1976)

Holding: Trial courts violate the Sixth Amendment by completely prohibiting defendants from speaking with counsel during overnight recesses, which are "often times of intensive work, with tactical decisions to be made and strategies to be reviewed."

Perry v. Leeke | 488 U.S. 272 (1989)

Holding: During brief (15-minute) recesses, trial courts may completely prohibit defendant consultation with counsel because there's "virtual certainty that any conversation would relate to ongoing testimony." However, defendants have "unrestricted access" to counsel during overnight recesses, and "discussions will inevitably include some consideration of ongoing testimony" without compromising constitutional rights.

Key Legal Concepts Explained

Qualified Conferral Order: Court instruction allowing defendant-counsel consultation on some topics (trial strategy, plea negotiations) while prohibiting discussion of others (ongoing testimony) during recess
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel: Constitutional guarantee of "assistance of counsel for his defence" in all criminal prosecutions
Attorney-Client Privilege: Protection of confidential communications between lawyer and client from disclosure
Witness Coaching: Improperly instructing a witness on what to say or how to testify
Stare Decisis: Legal principle of adhering to precedent in court decisions

Oral Argument Preview | Berk v. Choy | Showdown Over Federal Uniformity and State Authority Sep 17, 2025

Berk v. Choy | Case No. 24-440 | Oral Argument Date: 10/6/25 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether Delaware's expert affidavit requirement for medical malpractice claims conflicts with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when applied in federal diversity cases

Episode Overview

This episode examines Berk v. Choy, a case that started with a simple fall but could reshape how federal courts handle state law requirements across the country. The Supreme Court must decide whether Delaware's expert affidavit requirement for medical malpractice claims conflicts with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when applied in federal diversity cases, presenting a fundamental clash between federal procedural uniformity and state regulatory authority.

Roadmap

Opening: A Fall That Could Reshape Federal Court Practice

Harold Berk's fall from bed leads to medical malpractice case with nationwide implications
Delaware's expert affidavit requirement vs. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
29 states with similar medical malpractice requirements creating potential patchwork

The Legal Framework: Erie Meets the Federal Rules

Erie Doctrine (1938): Federal courts must apply state substantive law for state claims
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938): Uniform procedures for all federal courts
Shady Grove Test: When Federal Rule and state law "answer the same question," Federal Rule wins
Tension between federal procedural uniformity and state regulatory authority

The Shady Grove Foundation

Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance (2010) background
$500 individual claim vs. multimillion-dollar class action potential
New York's prohibition on statutory penalty class actions vs. Federal Rule 23
Fractured Decision: Scalia plurality vs. Stevens concurrence vs. four dissents

The Procedural Journey: From Delaware District Court to the Supreme Court

Berk's five-month struggle to obtain required expert affidavit
Dr. Raikin's refusal despite initially supporting Berk's case
Multiple physicians declining to provide affidavits against other doctors
Third Circuit's dismissal: affidavit "not a pleading" with "different purpose"

Petitioner's Three-Pronged Attack

Direct conflict with Federal Rules 8 and 9 under Shady Grove test
Uniformity concerns: Undermines federal procedural consistency established in 1938
Anti-circumvention: State requirements shouldn't allow end-run around federal pleading standards

Respondents' Three-Part Defense

Separate spheres: Delaware law operates as evidentiary requirement distinct from pleading rules
Erie compliance: Represents substantive state law that federal courts must respect
Limited Shady Grove: Fractured decision provides narrow precedential value

CASE SIGNIFICANCE

The outcome will likely determine whether federal courts remain faithful to both federal procedural uniformity and state substantive authority, or whether one value must give way to the other in the modern era of complex state regulatory schemes.

Key Legal Concepts Explained

Diversity Jurisdiction: Federal court authority over cases between citizens of different states involving state law claims
Erie Doctrine: Principle requiring federal courts to apply state substantive law in diversity cases while using federal procedure
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Uniform procedural rules governing all federal courts since 1938
Expert Affidavit Requirements: State laws requiring medical expert certification before proceeding with malpractice claims
Shady Grove Test: When Federal Rule and state law "answer the same question," Federal Rule controls
Procedural vs. Substantive Law: Distinction between how cases are conducted (procedural) and legal rights/remedies (substantive)
Forum Shopping: Practice of choosing favorable court jurisdiction for litigation advantage

SCOTUS 2025 Term Launches: Your Preview Series Begins Now Sep 15, 2025

Episode Overview

The Supreme Court returns from summer recess with a blockbuster lineup of cases for October and November 2025. This episode provides a comprehensive preview of the 19 cases already scheduled for oral argument, spanning critical issues from voting rights to conversion therapy bans to criminal procedure reforms. We examine why this term opens with such consequential cases and what practitioners and citizens should watch for as the arguments unfold.

What You'll Learn

Complete October & November argument schedule with key dates and case pairings
Why Louisiana v. Callais could be the most significant voting rights case in years - including why the Court ordered reargument with explosive new briefing
How Chiles v. Salazar tests the boundaries between professional regulation and First Amendment protection
Criminal justice cases that could reshape double jeopardy doctrine, death penalty procedures, and federal sentencing
What these early cases signal about the Court's priorities for the full 2025-2026 term

Episode Roadmap

Opening: Term Overview

Supreme Court's 2025-2026 schedule: 19 cases across 10 argument days
Why the Court frontloaded significant cases in October-November
What's still coming: Additional cases and argument dates to be announced

October Arguments Deep Dive

Week 1: October 6-8

Villarreal v. Texas - Sixth Amendment right to counsel during trial recesses
Berk v. Choy - State procedural rules in federal court
Chiles v. Salazar - Colorado conversion therapy ban and First Amendment clash
Barrett v. United States - Double jeopardy and multiple sentences
Bost v. Illinois Board of Elections - Standing to challenge election procedures
U.S. Postal Service v. Konan - Federal tort immunity for intentional mail failures

Week 2: October 14-15

Criminal procedure cases: Bowe and Ellingburg on post-conviction relief and ex post facto protections
The blockbuster: Louisiana v. Callais reargument on voting rights and equal protection
Case v. Montana - Fourth Amendment emergency aid exception

November Arguments Analysis

Early November Focus Areas:

Capital punishment: Hamm v. Smith on intellectual disability assessments
Government contractor liability: Hencely v. Fluor Corporation
Prisoners' religious rights: Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections

Federal Sentencing Reform Finale:

Fernandez, Rutherford, and Carter cases on "extraordinary and compelling" sentence reductions

Looking Ahead: What's Next

Additional cases expected throughout fall
Pattern analysis: What these early cases reveal about Court priorities
Preview of upcoming episode plans for individual case deep-dives

Key Cases Highlighted

Must-Watch Cases

Louisiana v. Callais (Oct. 15) - Could fundamentally alter Voting Rights Act enforcement
Chiles v. Salazar (Oct. 7) - Conversion therapy ban meets First Amendment
Hamm v. Smith (Nov. 4) - Life-or-death intellectual disability standards

Important for Practitioners

Berk v. Choy - Federal court procedure and state law intersection
Bost v. Illinois Board of Elections - Election law standing requirements
Sentencing trio (Nov. 12) - Federal prison sentence modification standards

Technical but Significant

Barrett v. United States - Double jeopardy doctrine refinement
Case v. Montana - Fourth Amendment warrant exceptions
Civil procedure cases throughout November

Resources Mentioned

SCOTUSblog case pages for detailed briefing schedules
Supreme Court argument calendars (October & November 2025)
Voting Rights Act Section 2 background materials

A Constitutional Clash: Trump's Tariffs and the Separation of Powers Sep 10, 2025

Overview

This episode examines the Supreme Court's September 9, 2025 Order that expedited review of two consolidated cases challenging President Trump's authority to impose sweeping tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), representing a constitutional clash over the separation of powers and presidential trade authority.

Roadmap

Opening: Explosive Constitutional Questions

September 9, 2025 certiorari grant and consolidation order
Expedited briefing schedule for November 2025 oral arguments
Stakes: Presidential power to tax trillions in trade and reshape the economy

Background: The Trump Tariff Orders

Reciprocal Tariffs: 10% on virtually all imports, higher rates for 57 countries
Trafficking Tariffs: Levies on Mexico, Canada, and China for drug enforcement
IEEPA as claimed statutory authority for both tariff schemes
National emergency declarations underlying the orders

The Central Legal Question

Does "regulate" in IEEPA include power to impose tariffs?
Constitutional separation of taxing vs. regulating powers
Article I distinctions between taxation and commerce regulation
Historical significance: "No taxation without representation"

Lower Court Journey

Multiple simultaneous lawsuits in different courts
District court and Court of International Trade conflicting approaches
Federal Circuit en banc decision striking down tariffs
Judge Taranto's influential dissent supporting tariff authority

Referenced Cases

Trump v. V.O.S. Selections | Case No. 24-1286 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether IEEPA authorizes the President to impose these specific sweeping tariffs

Government Arguments:

"Regulate" includes power to impose tariffs as lesser-included authority
Historical practice supports broad executive trade power during emergencies
Major questions doctrine doesn't apply in foreign policy contexts

V.O.S. Arguments:

Constitutional separation requires clear authorization for taxation
"Regulate" and "tariff" are distinct powers with different purposes
Major questions doctrine requires explicit congressional authorization

Learning Resources v. Trump | Case No. 24-1287 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether IEEPA authorizes any presidential tariffs whatsoever

Learning Resources Arguments:

"Regulate" means control behavior, "tariff" means raise revenue - fundamentally different
No historical practice of IEEPA tariffs in nearly 50 years
Constitutional avoidance: IEEPA covers exports where tariffs are prohibited

Government Arguments:

Plain text of "regulate importation" naturally includes tariff authority
Yoshida precedent shows Congress ratified tariff interpretation
Presidential action deserves greater deference than agency action

Key Legal Precedents Examined

Historical Foundation Cases

Gibbons v. Ogden (1824): Marshall's distinction between taxing and regulating powers
United States v. Yoshida International (1975): Nixon import surcharge precedent
Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG (1976): "Adjust imports" includes fees

Modern Constitutional Doctrines

Major Questions Doctrine: Clear authorization required for "vast economic and political significance"
Constitutional Avoidance: Interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional problems
Noscitur a Sociis: "Word known by company it keeps" interpretive principle

Strategic Legal Arguments

Government's Core Position

Textual: "Regulate" includes "control" and "adjust by rule" - tariffs qualify
Historical: Congressional ratification of Yoshida through IEEPA enactment
Foreign Policy Exception: Major questions doctrine doesn't apply to national security
Presidential vs. Agency: Direct presidential delegation deserves greater deference

Challengers' Core Position

Separation of Powers: Taxing and regulating are constitutionally distinct
Textual Context: Other IEEPA verbs don't involve revenue raising
Constitutional Avoidance: Export tax prohibition requires narrow reading
Major Questions: $4 trillion impact requires explicit authorization

Broader Constitutional Implications

If Government Wins

Sweeping presidential tariff authority during declared emergencies
Expansion of executive power over traditionally congressional domain
Potential model for other emergency economic powers

If Challengers Win

Reinforcement of congressional primacy over taxation
Strengthening of major questions doctrine application to presidential action
Constraint on emergency powers in economic regulation

Key Legal Concepts Explained

IEEPA (International Emergency Economic Powers Act): 1977 law granting emergency economic authorities
Major Questions Doctrine: Requirement for clear authorization for actions of vast significance
Constitutional Avoidance: Interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional problems
Separation of Powers: Constitutional division of authority between branches
Foreign Policy Exception: Debate over whether normal limits apply to international contexts

Timeline and Practical Impact

September 19, 2025: Opening briefs due
September 23, 2025: Amicus briefs due
October 20, 2025: Response briefs due
October 30, 2025: Reply briefs due
November 2025: Oral arguments (first week)
Expected Decision: January 2026 or sooner

Road Work Ahead: How Four 2024 Cases May Be Reshaping First Amendment Scrutiny Aug 19, 2025

This episode examines how the Supreme Court's 2024-25 term may be quietly reshaping First Amendment doctrine through four cases that suggest new approaches to constitutional scrutiny levels.

We analyze how the Court appears to be moving away from the mechanical application of strict, intermediate, and rational basis review established in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, instead developing more contextual approaches that consider traditional government authority, institutional expertise, and competing constitutional values.

The episode explores Catholic Charities Bureau's traditional strict scrutiny analysis of denominational discrimination, TikTok's content-neutral treatment of national security regulations, Free Speech Coalition's novel "partial protection" theory for age verification requirements, and Mahmoud's expansion of religious liberty protection in public schools.

Cases Covered:

Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission | Case No. 24-154 | Opinion Summary: Here;
TikTok Inc. v. Garland | Case No. 24-656, 24-657 | Opinion Summary: Here;
Free Speech Coalition Inc. v. Paxton | Case No. 23-1122 | Opinion Summary: Here; and
Mahmoud v. Taylor | Case No. 24-297 | Opinion Summary: Here.

Key Precedents Referenced:

Reed v. Town of Gilbert;
Employment Division v. Smith;
Wisconsin v. Yoder;
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC; and
Larson v. Valente.

The Bostock Bounce Back? How Skrmetti's Retreat from Bostock Sets Up a SCOTUS Sports Showdown Aug 11, 2025

This episode revisits the Supreme Court's 2020 Bostock decision and examines how the Court's recent retreat from Bostock in United States v. Skrmetti sets up a constitutional showdown over transgender rights in school sports.

We analyze the methodical legal reasoning behind Bostock's landmark ruling that Title VII protects gay and transgender employees, then explore how each faction of justices treated Bostock differently in Skrmetti's constitutional challenge to Tennessee's transgender healthcare ban.

The episode concludes by examining how both sides strategically deployed Bostock and anticipated Skrmetti's outcome in their cert petitions for the upcoming transgender sports cases, revealing fundamental disagreements about statutory interpretation, constitutional methodology, and the scope of civil rights protections.

Cases Covered:

Bostock v. Clayton County | Case No. 17-1618, 17-1623, 18-107 | Opinion: Here
United States v. Skrmetti | Case No. 23-477 | Opinion: Here
State of West Virginia v. B.P.J. | Case No. 24-735 | Docket Link: Here
Little v. Hecox (Idaho) | Case No. 24-38 | Docket Link: Here
West Virginia v. B.P.J. | Case No. 24-43 | Docket Link: Here

Episodes Referenced:

August 5th Roundup: Presidential Power Crushes Agency Independence, Court Places Voting Rights Act in Crosshairs and Maryland v. Shatzer, a Case That Evolved Beyond Its Origins | Link: Here
July 7th Roundup: New Certs: Transgender Rights in Schools and Religious Liberties | Link: Here
Opinion Summary: United States v. Skrmetti | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23-477 | Link: Here
Oral Argument: United States v. Skrmetti | Case No. 23-477 | Date Argued: 12/4/24 | Link: Here

August 5th Roundup: Presidential Power Crushes Agency Independence, Court Places Voting Rights Act in Crosshairs and Maryland v. Shatzer, a Case That Evolved Beyond Its Origins Aug 05, 2025

This episode catches up on recent Supreme Court developments in the regular and emergency dockets.

We examine how the Court may be preparing to reshape voting rights law through Louisiana v. Callais, then dive into the contentious emergency docket battle in Trump v. Doyle over presidential firing power and agency independence.
The second half features an in-depth analysis of Maryland v. Shatzer (2010), exploring how a seemingly narrow Miranda ruling about re-invoking counsel rights later became a foundation for broader limitations on constitutional protections, while showcasing the fractured judicial philosophies of Justices Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas on court-made constitutional rules.

Case Covered:

Trump v. Boyle | Case No. 25A11 | Docket Link: Here
Louisiana v. Callais | Case No. 24-109 | Docket Link: Here | Supplemental Briefing Order: Here (Consolidated with Robinson v. Callais | Case No. 24-110 | Docket Link: Here)
Maryland v. Shatzer | Case No. No. 08-680 | Opinion: Here
Vega v. Tekoh | Case No. 21–499 | Opinion: Here

Episodes Referenced:

Order Summary: Trump v. Wilcox | Order Date: 5/22/25 | Case No. 24A966 | Episode Link: Here

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Introduction

[00:01:58] Regular Docket Update: Louisiana v. Callais

[00:03:09] Emergency Docket Drama: Trump v. Boyle

[00:07:24] Deep Dive: Maryland v. Shatzer Analysis

[00:08:20] Shatzer's Case Details and Supreme Court Ruling

[00:19:42] Implications and Evolution of Miranda Rights

[00:21:42] Conclusion

Emergency Docket Summary: SCOTUS Green Lights Mass Firings at Education Dep't Jul 15, 2025

This episode examines a July 14th Supreme Court emergency docket ruling that reveals fundamental tensions about executive power over federal agency firings at the Education Department and the limits of congressional authority.

This episode also compares and contrasts this case (McMahon v. New York) with OPM v. AFGE, a government workforce reduction case discussed in our July 9th episode. In both cases, the government raised virtually identical arguments about standing, jurisdiction and the merits. In both cases, SCOTUS permitted the reductions to take effect while litigation played out.

Case Covered:

McMahon v. New York | Case No. 24A1203 | Docked Link: Here

Bottom Line: SCOTUS allows Trump Administration to proceed with eliminating over half the Department of Education's workforce while legal challenges continue, despite lower courts finding likely constitutional violations.

Emergency Docket Summary: SCOTUS Answers the Government's Speed-Dial Jul 09, 2025

This episode examines two major Supreme Court emergency docket rulings that reveal fundamental tensions about presidential power, judicial authority, and constitutional rights. Both cases demonstrate the Court's willingness to grant extraordinary relief to the government while exposing deep philosophical divisions among the justices.

Cases Covered:

Trump v. American Federation of Government Employees | Case No. 24A1174 | Docket Link: Here

Bottom Line: Court allows President to proceed with planning massive federal workforce reductions while legal challenges continue

Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D. | Case No. 24A1153 | Docket Link: Here

Bottom Line: Court twice intervened to help government deport individuals to third countries without additional constitutional process

July 7th Roundup: New Certs: Transgender Rights in Schools and Religious Liberties Jul 07, 2025

This episode covers four major Supreme Court cases granted certiorari in summer 2024 (July 3, 2025 Miscellaneous Order: Here), examining the Court's strategic approach to constitutional law and its rapid movement on key cultural and legal issues.

Episode Roadmap

Opening: The Court's Strategic Acceleration

Supreme Court's unusual speed in granting certiorari after major rulings
Rejection of traditional "percolation" approach
Why the Court chose direct review over GVR orders

Transgender Sports Cases

Little v. Hecox (Idaho) | Case No. 24-38 | Docket Link: Here

Background: Idaho's "Fairness in Women's Sports Act" banning transgender women from women's sports teams
Key Player: Lindsay Hecox, transgender student at Boise State University
Ninth Circuit Reasoning: Applied heightened scrutiny; found likely Equal Protection violations
Post-Skrmetti Impact: How the medical treatment precedent affects sports participation

West Virginia v. B.P.J. | Case No. 24-43 | Docket Link: Here

Background: West Virginia's H.B. 3293 categorical sports ban
Key Player: B.P.J., 14-year-old transgender student with amended birth certificate
Unique Factors: Puberty blockers, competitive performance, individual circumstances
Fourth Circuit's Approach: Case-by-case analysis vs. categorical rules
Strategic Litigation: Why B.P.J. argued for waiting on Skrmetti decision

Religious Liberty Case

Olivier v. City of Brandon | Case No. 24-993 | Docket Link: Here 24-1021

Background: Street preaching arrest and subsequent civil rights lawsuit
Core Legal Issue: Heck v. Humphrey doctrine and prospective relief
Circuit Split: Fifth Circuit's restrictive approach vs. Ninth Circuit's permissive stance
Key Arguments:
Prospective relief exception to Heck
No custody/no habeas access theory
Broader Impact: Civil rights enforcement for repeat constitutional violations

Sovereign Immunity Case

NJT v. Colt | Case No. 24-1113 | Docket Link: Here (consolidated with Cedric Galette, Petitioner v. New Jersey Transit Corporation | Case No. 24-1021 | Docket Link: Here)

Background: Manhattan pedestrian struck by NJ Transit bus
Procedural Drama: Three-year delay before immunity claim
Geographic Split: New York vs. Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions
"Arm of the State" Test:
Treasury factor debate
State control analysis
Historical corporate separateness doctrine
Nationwide Impact: Interstate transportation liability and state entity structure

Key Legal Concepts Explained

GVR Orders: Grant, Vacate, and Remand procedure
Percolation: Allowing lower courts to develop precedent before Supreme Court intervention
Heck v. Humphrey: Doctrine preventing civil suits that would invalidate criminal convictions
Interstate Sovereign Immunity: Protection for states from suits in other states' courts
"Arm of the State" Analysis: Multi-factor test for determining state entity immunity

Strategic Themes

Institutional Impatience: Court's rejection of gradual doctrinal development
Comprehensive Constitutional Architecture: Establishing unified frameworks quickly
Geographic Uniformity: Ending constitutional "lottery" based on courthouse location
Cultural Battle Resolution: Court's role in settling complex social debates definitively

June 30th Roundup: Last Week's Opinions, End of Term Stats, Deep Dive into Trump v. Casa and New Cert Grants Jun 30, 2025

This episode:

Analyzes the Supreme Court's blockbuster end to the 2024-2025 term, covering the final nine opinions and examining patterns across all 61 cases decided this term.
Explores the dramatic Friday release where cases "trickled out slowly" due to lengthy dissents read from the bench, dive into comprehensive term statistics, and conduct an in-depth analysis of Justice Barrett's methodological approach in Trump v. CASA—particularly her heavy reliance on historical sources versus textual analysis.
Concludes with analysis of seven landmark cases the Court agreed to hear for next term, including a billion-dollar copyright battle over internet piracy (Cox v. Sony Music), a campaign finance showdown (National Republican Senatorial Committee v. FEC), and disputes over federal removal deadlines, private rights of action, and criminal fugitive tolling that could reshape fundamental areas of American law. June 30 Order List: Here.

Episode Highlights

Final Week Patterns: June 27th saw uniform 6-3 splits with conservative dominance, while June 26th showed more fractures with 5-4 and 6-3 divisions

Term Overview: 61 total cases decided with a 70% reversal rate, demonstrating the Court's role as an error-correction mechanism

Voting Consensus: 43% of cases decided unanimously (26 cases), showing remarkable agreement despite ideological divisions

Barrett's Methodology: Deep dive into her historical originalism approach in Trump v. CASA versus her typical textualist methods in other cases

New Cert Grants: Overview of the 7 new cases SCOTUS agreed to hear.

Key Justice Statistics (2024-2025 Term)

The Justices wrote 5 Per Curiam opinions.

Justice Roberts: Authored or joined 59 opinions, authored or joined 1 concurrences and authored or joined 2 dissents.

Justice Thomas: Authored or joined 47 opinions, authored or joined 21 concurrences and authored or joined 14 dissents.

Justice Alito: Authored or joined 47 opinions, authored or joined 21 concurrences and authored or joined 14 dissents.

Justice Sotomayor: Authored or joined 45 opinions, authored or joined 11 concurrences and authored or joined 13 dissents.

Justice Kagan: Authored or joined 51 opinions, authored or joined 2 concurrences and authored or joined 9 dissents.

Justice Gorsuch: Authored or joined 42 opinions, authored or joined 6 concurrences and authored or joined 12 dissents.

Justice Kavanaugh: Authored or joined 57 opinions, authored or joined 9 concurrences and authored or joined 3 dissents.

Justice Barrett: Authored or joined 54 opinions, authored or joined 10 concurrences and authored or joined 5 dissents.

Justice Jackson: Authored or joined 41 opinions, authored or joined 12 concurrences and authored or joined 17 dissents.

Referenced Cases

Trump v. CASA (universal injunctions)
Grupo Mexicano (historical equity test)
Louisiana v. Callais (relisted case)
Esteras v. United States (criminal sentencing)
Medical Marijuana v. Horn (statutory interpretation)
FDA v. R.J. Reynolds (administrative law)

New Cert Grants:

M & K Employee Solutions, LLC, et al. v. Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund | Case No. 23-1209 | Docket Link: Here.
Cox Communications, Inc., et al. v. Sony Music Entertainment, et al. | Case No. 24-171 | Docket Link: Here.
FS Credit Opportunities Corp., et al. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd., et al. | Case No. 24-345 | Docket Link: Here.
Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana, et al. v. Bondi | No. 24-777 | Docket Link: Here.
Enbridge Energy, LP, et al. v. Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan, on Behalf of the People of the State of Michigan | Case No. 24-783 | Docket Link: Here.
Isabel Rico v. United States | Case No. 24-1056 | Docket Link: Here.
National Republican Senatorial Committee, et al. v. Federal Election Commission, et al. | Case No. 24-621 | Docket Link: Here.

Source cited:

Mark Walsh, Closing the book on the term, SCOTUSblog (Jun. 27, 2025, 7:15 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/06/closing-the-book-on-the-term/

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Introduction

[00:02:13] June 27th Opinions

[00:03:20] June 26th Opinions

[00:04:30] Term in Review

[00:09:48] Trump v. CASA Deep Dive: Justice Barrett's Approach

[00:13:40] Comparing Justice Barrett's Methodology Across this Term

[00:17:00] Grupo Mexicano Heavily Influenced Justice Barrett

[00:19:42] Comparison of Oral Arguments to Opinion

[00:29:33] June 30th Cert Grants

[00:29:41] Cert Grant: M & K Employee Solutions

[00:30:36] Cert Grant: Cox Communications v. Sony Music Entertainment

[00:32:16] Cert Grant: FS Credit v. Saba Capital Master Fund

[00:33:59] Cert Grant: Enbridge Energy v. Nessel

[00:38:35] Cert Grant: Urias-Orellana v. Bondi

[00:38:48] Cert Grant: Rico v. United States

[00:39:56] Cert Grant: Senate Committee on Ethics v. FEC

[00:41:22] Conclusion

June 27 Opinion Summaries: Five Major Decisions That Will Shape America Jun 27, 2025

This episode provides a comprehensive analysis of five major Supreme Court decisions released on June 27, 2025, that collectively reshape key areas of constitutional law including judicial authority, parental rights, agency power, executive appointments, and online speech regulation. We also discuss the notable absence of a decision in Louisiana v. Callais, a complex redistricting case that many Court watchers expected to be resolved.

Cases Covered:

Trump v. CASA, Inc.

Holding: Federal district courts lack authority to issue universal injunctions that prohibit government enforcement of policies against anyone beyond the named plaintiffs
Vote: 6-3 (Barrett majority; Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh concurrences; Sotomayor and Jackson dissents)

Mahmoud v. Taylor

Holding: Parents challenging a school board's LGBTQ-inclusive storybooks and refusal to allow opt-outs are entitled to preliminary injunction under the Free Exercise Clause
Vote: 6-3 (Alito majority; Thomas concurrence; Sotomayor dissent)

FCC v. Consumers' Research

Holding: The FCC's universal service contribution scheme does not violate the Constitution's nondelegation doctrine
Vote: 6-3 (Kagan majority; Kavanaugh and Jackson concurrences; Gorsuch dissent)

Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc.

Holding: U.S. Preventive Services Task Force members are inferior officers who can be constitutionally appointed by the HHS Secretary rather than requiring presidential nomination and Senate confirmation
Vote: 6-3 (Kavanaugh majority; Thomas dissent)

Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton

Holding: Texas's age verification law for pornographic websites is constitutional under intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny
Vote: 6-3 (Thomas majority; Kagan dissent)

Pending Cases: Louisiana v. Callais. On June 27, 2025, the Court stated that it will rehear this case.

Opinion Summary: Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 23-1122 Jun 27, 2025

Opinion Summary: Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 23-1122

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

This Court has repeatedly held that States may rationally restrict minors' access to sexual materials, but such restrictions must withstand strict scrutiny if they burden adults' access to constitutionally protected speech. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 663 (2004). In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit applied rational-basis review-rather than strict scrutiny-to vacate a preliminary injunction of a provision of a Texas law that significantly burdens adults' access to protected speech, because the law's stated purpose is to protect minors.

Question Presented:

Whether the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in applying rational-basis review to a law burdening adults' access to protected speech, instead of strict scrutiny as this Court and other circuits have consistently done.

Holding: H. B. 1181 triggers, and survives, review under intermediate scrutiny because it only incidentally burdens the protected speech of adults. H. B. 1181 survives intermediate scrutiny because it advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: Derek L. Shaffer, Washington, D.C.
For United States, as amicus curiae: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Mahmoud v. Taylor | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24-297 Jun 27, 2025

Opinion Summary: Mahmoud v. Taylor | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24-297

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Respondent Montgomery County Board of Education requires elementary school teachers to read their students storybooks celebrating gender transitions, Pride parades, and same-sex playground romance. The storybooks were chosen to disrupt "cisnormativity" and "either/or thinking" among students. The Board's own principals objected that the curriculum was "not appropriate for the intended age group," presented gender ideology as "fact," "sham[ed]" students with contrary opinions, and was "dismissive of religious beliefs." The Board initially allowed parents to opt their kids out- but then reversed course, saying that no opt-outs would be permitted and that parents would not even be notified when the storybooks were read.

Petitioners filed suit, not challenging the curriculum, but arguing that compelling their elementary-age children to participate in instruction contrary to their parents' religious convictions violated the Free Exercise Clause. Construing Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Fourth Circuit found no free-exercise burden because no one was forced "to change their religious beliefs or conduct."

Question Presented:

Whether public schools burden parents' religious exercise when they compel elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality against their parents' religious convictions and with-out notice or opportunity to opt out.

Holding: Parents challenging the Board's introduction of the "LGBTQ+-inclusive" storybooks, along with its decision to withhold opt outs, are entitled to a preliminary injunction.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: Eric S. Baxter, Washington, D.C.; and Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
For Respondents: Alan E. Schoenfeld, New York, N.Y.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: FCC v. Consumers' Research | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24-354 Jun 27, 2025

Opinion Summary: FCC v. Consumers' Research | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24-354

This case was consolidated with: SHLB Coalition V. Consumers' Research, Case No. 23-422.

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

In 47 U.S.C. 254, Congress required the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) to operate universal service subsidy programs using mandatory contributions from telecommunications carriers. The Commission has appointed a private company as the programs' Administrator, authorizing that company to perform administrative tasks such as sending out bills, collecting contributions, and disbursing funds to beneficiaries.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by authorizing the Commission to determine, within the limits set forth in Section 254, the amount that providers must contribute to the Fund.

2. Whether the Commission violated the nondelegation doctrine by using the Administrator's financial projections in computing universal service contribution rates.

3. Whether the combination of Congress's conferral of authority on the Commission and the Commission's delegation of administrative responsibilities to the Administrator violates the nondelegation doctrine.

Holding: The universal-service contribution scheme does not violate the nondelegation doctrine.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Jackson filed concurring opinions. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners in 24-354: Sarah M. Harris, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Petitioners in 24-422: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.
For Respondents: R. Trent McCotter, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Kennedy v. Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24-316 Jun 27, 2025

Opinion Summary: Kennedy v. Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24-316

Host Note: On 4/25/25, the Supreme Court ordered the parties to “file supplemental letter briefs addressing the following question: Whether Congress has ‘by Law’ vested the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services with the authority to appoint members of the United States Preventive Services Task Force. U. S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2.” Link to 4/25/25 Order: Here. On 5/5/25, the parties filed supplemental letter briefs.

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (Task Force), which sits within the Public Health Service of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), issues clinical recommendations for preventive medical services, such as screenings and medications to prevent serious diseases. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111 -148, 124 Stat. 119, health insurance issuers and group health plans must cover certain preventive services recommended by the Task Force without imposing any cost-sharing requirements on patients. 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(1).

Question Presented:

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the structure of the Task Force violates the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution and in declining to sever the statutory provision that it found to unduly insulate the Task Force from the HHS Secretary’s supervision.

Holding:

Result:

Voting Breakdown:

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Trump, President of U.S. v. Casa, Inc. | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24A884 Jun 27, 2025

Opinion Summary: Trump, President of U.S. v. Casa, Inc. | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24A884

Links to Docket: Here (Case No. 24A884); Here (Case No. 24A885); and Here (Case No. 24A886).

Questions Presented:

Whether the Supreme Court should stay the district courts' nationwide preliminary injunctions on the Trump administration’s 1/20/25 executive order ending birthright citizenship except as to the individual plaintiffs and identified members of the organizational plaintiffs or states.
Whether district courts have the authority to issue nationwide preliminary injunctions irrespective of class-action certification.

Background:

On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order regarding birthright citizenship.
Section 1 of the Order recognizes that the Constitution and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., confer citizenship upon all persons born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.
Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. That provision, known as the Citizenship Clause, repudiated Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), which infamously misinterpreted the Constitution to deny U.S. citizenship to people of African descent based solely on their race. Congress has reaffirmed the Citizenship Clause in the INA, which provides that “a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” is a citizen of the United States. 8 U.S.C. 1401(a).
Section 1 of the Order identifies two circumstances in which a person born in the United States is not subject to its jurisdiction: “(1) when that person’s mother was unlawfully present in the United States and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth, or (2) when that 6 person’s mother’s presence in the United States at the time of said person’s birth was lawful but temporary (such as, but not limited to, visiting the United States under the auspices of the Visa Waiver Program or visiting on a student, work, or tourist visa) and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth.” Citizenship Order § 1.
Section 2 of the Order directs the Executive Branch (1) not to issue documents recognizing U.S. citizenship to the persons identified in Section 1 and (2) not to accept documents issued by state, local, or other governments purporting to recognize the U.S. citizenship of such persons. See Citizenship Order § 2(a). Section 2 specifies that those directives “apply only to persons who are born within the United States after 30 days from the date of this order,” i.e., after February 19. Id. § 2(b).
Three district courts in Maryland, Massachusetts, and Washington have issued overlapping nationwide injunctions at the behest of 22 States, two organizations, and seven individuals. Those universal injunctions prohibit a Day 1 Executive Order from being enforced anywhere in the country, as to “hundreds of thousands” of unspecified individuals who are “not before the court nor identified by the court.”
Three Circuit Courts of Appeals refused to limit the nationwide injunctions.

Holding: Universal injunctions likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has given to federal courts. The Court grants the Government's applications for a partial stay of the injunctions entered below, but only to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue.

Result: Applications for partial stays granted.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Applicants: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For State and City Respondents: Jeremy M. Feigenbaum, Solicitor General, Trenton, N.J.
For Private Respondents: Kelsi B. Corkran, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Riley v. Bondi | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23–1270 Jun 26, 2025

Opinion Summary: Riley v. Bondi | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23–1270

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Petitioner Pierre Riley, ineligible for cancellation of removal or discretionary relief from removal, sought deferral in withholding-only proceedings, pursuant to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. After the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a decision reversing an immigration judge's grant of relief, Riley promptly petitioned for review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Although both parties urged the court to decide the merits of the case, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley's petition for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1), which states "[t]he petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal."

This holding implicates two circuit splits, each of which independently warrants review.

Questions Presented:

Whether 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline is jurisdictional, or merely a mandatory claims-processing rule that can be waived or forfeited.
Whether a person can obtain review of the BIA's decision in a withholding-only proceeding by filing a petition within 30 days of that BIA decision?

Holding: 1. BIA orders denying deferral of removal in "withholding-only" proceedings are not "final order[s] of removal" under Section 1252(b)(1). An "order of removal" includes an "order of deportation," which, in turn, is defined as an order "concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation." 2. The 30-day filing deadline under Section 1252(b)(1) is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4 as to the holding that BIA orders denying deferral of removal in "withholding-only" proceedings are not "final order[s] of removal" under Section 1252(b)(1). 9-0 as to the holding that the 30-day filing deadline under Section 1252(b)(1) is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement.

Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined in full, and in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined only as to Part II–B. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined in full, and in which Justice Gorsuch joined except as to Part IV.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner:
For Respondent:

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Gutierrez v. Saenz | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23-7809 Jun 26, 2025

Opinion Summary: Gutierrez v. Saenz | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23-7809

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

In Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230 (2023), this Court held that Rodney Reed has standing to pursue a declaratory judgment that Texas's post-conviction DNA statute was unconstitutional because ''Reed suffered an injury in fact," the named defendant "caused Reed's injury," and if a federal court concludes that Texas's statute violates due process, it is "substantially likely that the state prosecutor would abide by such a court order."

In this case, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to follow that ruling over a dissent that recognized that this case was indistinguishable from Reed. The majority formulated its own novel test for Article III standing, which requires scouring the record of the parties' dispute and any legal arguments asserted, to predict whether the defendants in a particular case would actually redress the plaintiff’s injury by complying with a federal court's declaratory judgment. Gutierrez v. Saenz, 93 F.4th 267, 274 (5th Cir. 2024).

The Fifth Circuit's new test conflicts with Reed and creates a circuit split with the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which have applied the standing doctrine exactly as this Court directed in Reed. See Johnson v. Griffin, 69 F.4th 506 (8th Cir. 2023); Redd v. Guerrero, 84 F.4th 874 (9th Cir. 2023).

Question Presented: Does Article III standing require a particularized determination of whether a specific state official will redress the plaintiff’s injury by following a favorable declaratory judgment?

Holding: Gutierrez has standing to bring his Section 1983 claim challenging Texas's postconviction DNA testing procedures under the Due Process Clause.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined, and in which Justice Barrett joined as to all but Part II.B.2. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Anne E. Fisher, Assistant Federal Defender, Philadelphia, Pa.
For respondents: William F. Cole, Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23–1275 Jun 26, 2025

Opinion Summary: Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23–1275

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

More than 30 years ago, this Court first applied what would become known as the "Blessing factors," holding that a Medicaid Act provision created a privately enforceable right to certain reimbursement rates. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1990). Later, the Court distilled from Wilder a multi-factor test for deciding whether a "statutory provision gives rise to a federal right" privately enforceable under Section 1983. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997). Five years later, though, the Court disparaged Blessing's test while clarifying that only "an unambiguously conferred right is enforceable by § 1983." Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282 (2002). Then, in Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 180 (2023), the Court doubled down on Gonzaga's "demanding bar."

The Court did not apply Blessing or Wilder in Talevski, but it did not overrule them either. After the Court GVR'd this case in light of Talevski, the Fourth Circuit applied Wilder and Blessing again and reaffirmed its prior opinions, maintaining a 5-2 circuit split over the first question presented and a 3-1 circuit split over the proper reading of O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980), which frames the second question.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether the Medicaid Act's any-qualified-provider provision unambiguously confers a private right upon a Medicaid beneficiary to choose a specific provider.

2. What is the scope of a Medicaid beneficiary's alleged right to choose a provider that a state has deemed disqualified?

Holding: Section 1396a(a)(23)(A) does not clearly and unambiguously confer individual rights enforceable under Section 1983.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: John J. Bursch, Washington, D.C.; and Kyle D. Hawkins, Counselor to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
For respondents: Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Hewitt v. United States | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23-1002 Jun 26, 2025

Opinion Summary: Hewitt v. United States | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23-1002

This case was consolidated with: Duffey V. United States, Case No. 23-1007.

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The First Step Act (FSA) significantly reduced the mandatory minimum sentences for several federal drug and firearm offenses. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115- 391, §§ 401, 403, 132 Stat. 5194, 5220-5222. Sections 401 and 403 apply to offenses committed after the FSA's enactment on December 21, 2018, and to "any offense that was committed before the date of enactment * * * if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment." FSA§§ 401(c), 403(b).

There is an acknowledged split between the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, on the one hand; and the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, on the other hand, on the question whether sections 401(c) and 403(b) apply when a pre-enactment sentence is vacated and the court must impose a new post-enactment sentence.

Question Presented: Whether the First Step Act's sentencing reduction provisions apply to a defendant originally sentenced before the FSA's enactment when that original sentence is judicially vacated and the defendant is resentenced to a new term of imprisonment after the FSA's enactment.

Holding: Under § 403(b) of the First Step Act, a sentence "has . . . been imposed" for purposes of that provision if, and only if, the sentence is extant—i.e., has not been vacated. Thus, the Act's more lenient penalties apply to defendants whose previous § 924(c) sentences have been vacated and who need to be resentenced following the Act's enactment.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV and V, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners: Michael B. Kimberly, Washington, D.C.
For respondent in support of petitioners: Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Supreme Court Roundup: Insights from June 18 and 20 Decisions and New Cert Grant Jun 23, 2025

In today's episode, we analyze the Supreme Court's recent activities across three key areas:

Last week's 11 opinions and emerging patterns
Term statistics and remaining docket overview
Major religious liberty case granted certiorari via June 23rd Order List

Key Topics Covered

Term Statistics (As of June 23, 2025)

Total cases heard: 62 unique cases this term
Cases decided: 52 (approximately 84%)
Cases pending: 11 (approximately 16%)
Methodology: Consolidated cases counted once

Last Week's Opinion Analysis

Unanimous consensus: 7 of 11 cases showed stable coalition of seven justices
Opinion distribution: Justice Thomas, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, and Barrett each authored exactly 4 opinions
Chief Justice Roberts: Finally joined dissent after 41 consecutive majority opinions
Methodological splits: Justices divided on simple textual approaches vs. complex multi-factor tests

Featured Case Deep Dive: Esteras v. United States

Issue: Whether judges can consider retribution in supervised release decisions
Majority (Barrett): Applied "expressio unius" canon - Congress deliberately excluded retribution
Dissent (Alito/Gorsuch): Criticized majority's "mind-bending exercises" for trial judges
Vote: 7-2 with additional splintering on implementation details

Standing Doctrine Analysis: FDA v. Reynolds & Diamond Energy v. EPA

Common thread: When can businesses challenge regulations affecting market participants?
Identical 7-2 splits with completely different reasoning approaches
Barrett's approach: Traditional statutory interpretation and precedent analysis
Kavanaugh's approach: Practical economic reasoning and regulatory dynamics

Certiorari Grant: Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections | Case No. 23-1197 | Docket Link: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) permits individual-capacity damages suits against state prison officials who violate prisoners' religious exercise rights.

The Shocking Facts

Petitioner: Damon Landor, devout Rastafarian with 20-year religious dreadlocks
Incident: Prison officials threw away Fifth Circuit decision protecting his rights, then forcibly shaved his head
Timeline: Occurred with just 3 weeks left in his sentence
Legal precedent: Clear violation of Ware v. Louisiana Department of Corrections

Legal Framework

RFRA (1993): Applies to federal government; Tanzin v. Tanvir (2020) permits individual damages
RLUIPA (2000): Applies to state/local governments receiving federal funds
Sister statutes: Nearly identical language and purposes
Circuit split: All courts of appeals currently reject RLUIPA individual damages

Petitioner’s (Landor) Key Arguments:

Tanzin controls: Identical "appropriate relief" language must have same meaning
Sister statute harmony: Supreme Court routinely interprets RFRA/RLUIPAtogether
Constitutional authority: Spending Clause permits individual liability under Dole test
Practical necessity: Damages often only meaningful remedy for released prisoners

Respondent’s (Louisiana) Key Arguments:

No circuit split: Unanimous rejection across all circuits
Spending Clause limits: Only grant recipients (states) can be liable, not individual officials
Sossamon precedent: "Appropriate relief" is "ambiguous" under RLUIPA
Practical concerns: Would worsen prison staffing crisis and destabilize Title IX law

United States Key Arguments:

Supports petitioner - significant federal government backing
Argues Sossamon only addressed sovereign immunity, not individual officials
Emphasizes Congress's clear Spending Clause authority

Remaining Docket Highlights

Constitutional Powder Kegs

Trump v. Casa trilogy: Immigration enforcement and nationwide injunctions
Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton: Online adult content restrictions vs. child protection

Voting Rights Crucible

Louisiana v. Callais: Racial gerrymandering vs. Voting Rights Act compliance

Religious Liberty Battleground

Mahmoud v. Taylor: Religious exercise vs. LGBTQ+ curricula in schools

Support the Podcast: If you found this analysis helpful, please subscribe, rate, and share this podcast. Your support helps us continue providing in-depth Supreme Court coverage.

Opinion Summaries: June 20, 2025 Opinions Jun 20, 2025

Opinion Summaries: June 20, 2025 Opinions

The Supreme Court released six significant opinions on June 20, 2025, spanning tobacco regulation, terrorism jurisdiction, environmental standing, telecommunications law, disability rights, and federal sentencing. This episode provides comprehensive analysis of each decision, including voting breakdowns, key holdings, and detailed examination of concurring and dissenting opinions.

Host Note: Today I'm personally narrating this episode, so the pacing may be slightly different from our usual format.

Here are details about the six cases:

1. FDA v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. | Case No. 23-1187

Holding: Retailers who would sell a new tobacco product if not for the FDA's denial order may seek judicial review of that order under § 387l(a)(1).

Result: Affirmed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

2. Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) | Case No. 24-20 (consolidated with United States v. PLO, Case No. 24-151)

Holding: The PSJVTA's personal jurisdiction provision does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because the statute reasonably ties the assertion of jurisdiction over the PLO and PA to conduct involving the United States and implicating sensitive foreign policy matters within the prerogative of the political branches.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Barrett, and Justice Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Gorsuch joined as to Part II.

Link to Opinion: Here.

3. Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA | Case No. 24-7

Holding: The fuel producers have Article III standing to challenge EPA's approval of the California regulations.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jackson filed dissenting opinions.

Link to Opinion: Here.

4. McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp. | Case No. 23-1226

Holding: The Hobbs Act does not bind district courts in civil enforcement proceedings to an agency's interpretation of a statute. District courts must independently determine the law's meaning under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation while affording appropriate respect to the agency's interpretation.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

5. Stanley v. City of Sanford | Case No. 23-997

Holding: To prevail under §12112(a), a plaintiff must plead and prove that she held or desired a job, and could perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation, at the time of an employer's alleged act of disability-based discrimination.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, in which Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, Justice Kagan, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to Parts III and IV, except for n. 12.

Link to Opinion: Here.

6. Esteras v. United States | Case No. 23-7483

Holding: A district court considering whether to revoke a defendant's term of supervised release may not consider § 3553(a)(2)(A), which covers retribution vis-à-vis the defendant's underlying criminal offense.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas Kagan and Kavanaugh joined and in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined as to all but Part II–B. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Opinion Summary: United States v. Skrmetti | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23-477 Jun 18, 2025

Opinion Summary: United States v. Skrmetti | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23-477

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether Tennessee Senate Bill 1 (SBl), which prohibits all medical treatments intended to allow "a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex" or to treat "purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity," Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1), violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Holding: SB1 is not subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and satisfies rational basis review. SB1 satisfies rational basis review.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett joined, and in which Justice Alito joined as to Parts I and II–B. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined in full, and in which Justice Kagan joined as to Parts I–IV. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
For respondents L.W., et al. supporting petitioner: Chase B. Strangio, New York, N. Y.
For respondents Jonathan Skrmetti, et al.: J. Matthew Rice, Solicitor General, Nashville, Tenn.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Timestamps:

Opinion Summary: Perttu v. Richards | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1324 Jun 18, 2025

Opinion Summary: Perttu v. Richards | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1324

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: In cases subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, do prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning their exhaustion of administrative remedies where disputed facts regarding exhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim?

Holding: Parties are entitled to a jury trial on PLRA exhaustion when that issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim that requires a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch and Jackson joined. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito and Kavanaugh joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Ann M. Sherman, Solicitor General, Lansing, Mich.
For respondent: Lori Alvino McGill, Charlottesville, Va.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Oklahoma v. EPA | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1067 Jun 18, 2025

Opinion Summary: Oklahoma v. EPA | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1067

This case was consolidated with: Pacificorp V. EPA, Case No. 23-1067.

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Under the Clean Air Act, each state must adopt an implementation plan to meet national standards, which EPA then reviews for compliance with the Act. In 2023, EPA published disapprovals of 21 states' plans implementing national ozone standards. It did so in a single Federal Register notice. The Act specifies that "[a] petition for review of the [EPA's] action in approving or promulgating any implementation plan ... or any other final action of the [EPA] under this Act ... which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in" the appropriate regional circuit, while "nationally applicable regulations ... may be filed only in" the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). Parties from a dozen states sought judicial review of their respective state plan disapprovals in their appropriate regional circuits.

The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits held that the implementation plan disapprovals of states within those circuits are appropriately challenged in their respective regional courts of appeals. In the decision below, the Tenth Circuit held that challenges to the disapprovals of Oklahoma's and Utah's plans can only be brought in the D.C. Circuit, explicitly disagreeing with the decisions of its sister circuits.

Questions Presented:

Whether a final action by EPA taken pursuant to its Clean Air Act authority with respect to a single state or region may be challenged only in the D.C. Circuit because EPA published the action in the same Federal Register notice as actions affecting other states or regions and claimed to use a consistent analysis for all states.
Whether the Environmental Protection Agency's disapproval of a State Implementation Plan may only be challenged in the D.C. Circuit under 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (b)(1) if EPA packages that disapproval with disapprovals of other States' SIPs and purports to use a consistent method in evaluating the state-specific determinations in those SIPs.

Holding: EPA's disapprovals of the Oklahoma and Utah SIPs are locally or regionally applicable actions reviewable in a regional Circuit.

Result: Reversed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners in 23-1067: Mithun Mansinghani, Oklahoma City, Okla.
For Petitioners in 23-1068: Misha Tseytlin, Chicago, Ill.
For Respondents: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C. | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1229 Jun 18, 2025

Opinion Summary: EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C. | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1229

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented:

Holding: EPA's denials of small refinery exemption petitions are locally or regionally applicable actions that fall within the "nationwide scope or effect" exception, requiring venue in the D.C. Circuit.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
For respondents Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association in support of petitioner: Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D. C.
For respondents Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C., et al.: Michael R. Huston, Phoenix, Ariz.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Timestamps:

Opinion Summary: NRC v. Texas | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1300 Jun 18, 2025

Opinion Summary: NRC v. Texas | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1300

This case was consolidated with: Interim Storage Partners, LLC V. Texas, Case No. 23-1312.

Link to Docket: Here.

Questions Presented:

Whether the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2341 et seq., which authorizes a "party aggrieved" by an agency's "final order" to petition for review in a court of appeals, 28 U.S.C. 2344, allows nonparties to obtain review of claims asserting that an agency order exceeds the agency's statutory authority.
Whether the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., permit the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license private entities to temporarily store spent nuclear fuel away from the nuclear-reactor sites where the spent fuel was generated.
(For Interim Storage Partners, LLC) Whether the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's exercise of authority to issue a license to a private party to temporarily possess spent nuclear fuel at a location away from an operating nuclear power reactor was lawful under the applicable statutes (as the D.C. and Tenth Circuits have held) or not (as the Fifth Circuit, deliberately splitting from those other circuits, held in this case).
Whether, notwithstanding an allegation of "ultra vires" agency action, a person must take steps to become a "party" to an agency proceeding under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2344, in order to then subsequently challenge the agency action resulting from that proceeding in court (as the Second, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held), or whether an allegation of "ultra vires" agency action can override statutory limitations on jurisdiction (as the Fifth Circuit, deliberately splitting from those other circuits, held in this case).

Holding: Because Texas and Fasken were not parties to the Commission's licensing proceeding, they are not entitled to obtain judicial review of the Commission's licensing decision.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners in 23-1300: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
For petitioner in 23-1312: Brad Fagg, Washington, D. C.
For respondents Texas, et al.: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.
For respondent Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd.: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Supreme Court Roundup: June 12th Insights and New Cert Grants Jun 16, 2025

In this episode, we analyze the Supreme Court's recent activities across three key areas:

Six near unanimous decisions released on June 12th, 2025
Two major cases granted certiorari via June 16th, 2025 Order

In this episode, we analyze the Supreme Court's recent activities across three key areas:

Term statistics and remaining docket overview
Six decisions released on June 12th, 2025
Two major cases granted certiorari via June 16th, 2025 Order

2024 Term Statistics

Total cases heard: 62 unique cases this term
Cases decided: 41 (approximately 66%)
Cases pending: 21 (approximately 33%)
Methodology: Consolidated cases counted once (e.g., Trump v. CASA/Washington/New Jersey)
Timing significance: June typically brings most consequential decisions

Key Observations from June 12th, 2025 Decisions

Observation #1: Unanimity Reigned Supreme. June 12th consensus: 4 unanimous (9-0) decisions, 2 near-unanimous (8-1) decisions. Two-week pattern: 9 unanimous decisions and 3 8-1 splits out of 12 total case. Historical context: Must go back 15 opinions to find more than 2 dissents (May 22nd Oklahoma Charter School case). Full-term data: 29 of 41 decided cases unanimous or near-unanimous (71% consensus)
Observation #2: Opinion Assignments Tell a Story. Recent distribution: 8 of 9 justices wrote majority opinions in past two weeks; Justice Kavanaugh who wrote sole opinion the week before)
Observation #3: Speed Suggests Strategic Docket Management. Rapid turnaround: 6-10 weeks from oral argument to decision. Contrast with pending cases: U.S. v. Skrmetti (transgender medical care): 6+ months since December 4th argument; Hewitt v. United States (First Step Act): pending since January 13th; and Stanley v. City of Sanford (ADA): pending since January 13th.
Observation #4: Uncle Sam Had a Bad Day. Government losses: 5 of 6 cases involved citizens vs. government agencies. Case types: FBI raid victims, disabled student vs. school district, veterans vs. benefits administration, prisoner vs. federal procedures, taxpayer vs. IRS. Pattern: Court prioritizing individual redress against institutional power. Only government win: Rivers v. Guerrero, which involved stricter habeas petition standards.
Observation #5: The Court as Error Corrector. Reversal rate: 10 of 12 cases vacated or reversed (83%). Term comparison: Higher than overall 66% reversal rate. "Kick it back" approach: Court often vacates with instructions rather than final resolution
Observation #6: Roberts' Perfect Record. Chief Justice pattern: 41 cases, 41 majority opinions joined. Zero concurrences, zero dissents. Contrast with other justices:Justice Thomas: 5 dissents, Justice Gorsuch: 4 dissents (including both June 12th dissents) and Justice Jackson: 3 dissents authored, 1 joined.

June 16th, 2025 Certiorari Grants

1. First Choice Women's Resource Centers v. Matthew Platkin | Case No. 24-781 | Docket Link: Here.

Question Presented: Where the subject of a state investigatory demand has established a reasonably objective chill of its First Amendment rights, is a federal court in a first-filed action deprived of jurisdiction because those rights must be adjudicated in state court?

Key Facts:

New Jersey Attorney General issued civil investigatory subpoena to faith-based pregnancy center
Subpoena sought donor identities, medical claims, operational practices
First Choice filed federal § 1983 lawsuit two days before compliance deadline
Complex parallel litigation in federal and state courts

Petitioner's Arguments:

Circuit split: Fifth Circuit bars pre-enforcement challenges vs. Ninth Circuit allows when showing objective chill
Concrete injury through chilling of First Amendment association/speech rights
§ 1983 guarantees federal forum; state court requirement creates "preclusion trap"

Respondent's Arguments:

No circuit split—Third Circuit decision was fact-specific
Case presents unique procedural complications unsuitable for broad resolution
Claims too speculative under Article III ripeness doctrine

Stakes: Federal court access for constitutional challenges to state investigations

2. Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana | Case No. 24-813 | Docket Link: Here.

Questions Presented:

Whether a causal-nexus or contractual direction test survives the 2011 amendment to the federal-officer removal statute
Whether a federal contractor can remove to federal court when sued for oil-production activities undertaken to fulfill a federal oil-refinement contract

Key Facts:

Louisiana parishes sued oil companies for environmental harm from WWII-era crude oil production
Companies sought federal officer removal based on WWII contracts to supply high-octane aviation gasoline
Fifth Circuit found companies satisfied "acting under" requirement but failed "relating to" requirement
Majority required explicit contractual directive about challenged conduct

Petitioner's Arguments:

Fifth Circuit improperly required "explicit directive" in federal contracts
Circuit split on federal officer removal standards
Vertically integrated operations inherently connected crude production to federally-mandated refinement

Respondent's Arguments:

No circuit conflict—decision was fact-specific, unpublished
Federal crude oil allocation program "severed" connection by allowing open market purchases
Contracts contained no directives about extraction methods or locations

Stakes: Determines whether climate litigation stays in state court (plaintiff preference) or moves to federal court (defendant preference); potential impact on all pending climate cases

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Timestamps

[00:00:00] Introduction

[00:00:23] Decision Tally

[00:01:25] 6-Pack of Observations: June 12th Opinions

[00:09:52] June 16 Order List

[00:10:26] Cert Grant: First Choice v. Platkin

[00:13:36] Cert Grant: Chevron v. Plaquemines

Opinion Summary: A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–249 Jun 12, 2025

Opinion Summary: A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–249

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act) require public entities and organizations that receive federal funding to provide reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities. In the decision below, the Eighth Circuit held that, for discrimination claims "based on educational services" brought by children with disabilities, these statutes are violated only if school officials acted with ''bad faith or gross misjudgment."

That test squarely implicates an entrenched and acknowledged 5-2 circuit split over the standard governing such claims. It is also plainly mistaken on the merits: As the Eighth Circuit itself acknowledged, the test lacks "any anchor in statutory text," App.5a n.2, and it arbitrarily departs from the more lenient standards that all courts-including the Eighth Circuit-apply to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought by plaintiffs outside the school setting.

Question Presented: Whether the ADA and Rehabilitation Act require children with disabilities to satisfy a uniquely stringent "bad faith or gross misjudgment" standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education.

Holding: Schoolchildren bringing ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims related to their education are not required to make a heightened showing of "bad faith or gross misjudgment" but instead are subject to the same standards that apply in other disability discrimination contexts.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Roman Martinez
For the United States, as Amicus Curiae: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General
For Respondents: Lisa S. Blatt

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Soto v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24-320 Jun 12, 2025

Opinion Summary: Soto v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24-320

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented:

Holding:

Result:

Voting Breakdown:

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner:
For Respondent:

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Martin v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–362 Jun 12, 2025

Opinion Summary: Martin v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–362

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Petitioners are the innocent victims of a wrong-house raid conducted by an FBI SWAT team in Atlanta, Georgia. Seeking a remedy for torts committed against them, Petitioners brought a cause of action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In its opinion below, the Eleventh Circuit held that all of Petitioners' FTCA claims are barred by sovereign immunity supplied either through the Constitution's Supremacy Clause or the FTCA's discretionary-function exception. In one or more ways, the opinion below conflicts with decisions from every other circuit.

Questions Presented:

Whether the Constitution's Supremacy Clause bars claims under the FTCA-a federal statute enacted by Congress-when the negligent or wrongful acts of federal employees have some nexus with furthering federal policy and can reasonably be characterized as complying with the full range of federal law.
Whether the FTCA's discretionary-function exception bars claims for torts arising from wrong-house raids and similar negligent or wrongful acts by federal employees.

Holdings:

The law enforcement proviso in Section 2680(h) overrides only the intentional-tort exception in that subsection, not the discretionary-function exception or other exceptions throughout Section 2680.
The Supremacy Clause does not afford the United States a defense in FTCA suits.
On remand, the Eleventh Circuit should consider whether subsection (a)'s discretionary-function exception bars either the plaintiffs' negligent- or intentional-tort claims—undertaking that assessment without reference to the mistaken view that the law enforcement proviso applies to subsection (a).

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: Patrick M. Jaicomo
For Respondents: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General
For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below on Question 1: Christopher E. Mills

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Timestamps:

Opinion Summary: Parrish v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–275 Jun 12, 2025

Opinion Summary: Parrish v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–275

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Ordinarily, litigants must file a notice of appeal within 30 or 60 days of an adverse judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)-(b). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), however, district courts can reopen an expired appeal period when a party did not receive timely notice of the judgment. The Courts of Appeals have divided about whether a notice of appeal filed after the expiration of the ordinary appeal period but before the appeal period is reopened becomes effective once reopening is granted.

Holding: A litigant who files a notice of appeal after the original appeal deadline but before the court grants reopening need not file a second notice after reopening. The original notice relates forward to the date reopening is granted.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Amanda Rice, Detroit, Mich.
For respondent in support of petitioner: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Michael R. Huston, Phoenix, Ariz.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Zuch | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–416 Jun 12, 2025

Opinion Summary: Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Zuch | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–416

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether a proceeding under 26 U.S.C. 6330 for a pre-deprivation determination about a levy proposed by the Internal Revenue Service to collect unpaid taxes becomes moot when there is no longer a live dispute over the proposed levy that gave rise to the proceeding.

Holding: The Tax Court lacks jurisdiction under Section 6330 to resolve disputes between a taxpayer and the IRS when the IRS is no longer pursuing a levy.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For respondent: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Rivers v. Guerrero | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 23-1345 Jun 12, 2025

Opinion Summary: Rivers v. Guerrero | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 23-1345

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Under the federal habeas statute, a prisoner "always gets one chance to bring a federal habeas challenge to his conviction," Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 509 (2020). After that, the stringent gatekeeping requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) bar nearly all attempts to file a "second or successive habeas corpus application." Here, petitioner sought to amend his initial habeas application while it was pending on appeal. The Fifth Circuit applied § 2244(b)(2) and rejected the amended filing.

The circuits are intractably split on whether § 2244(b)(2) applies to such filings. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that § 2244(b)(2) categorically applies to all second-in-time habeas filings made after the district court enters final judgment. The Second Circuit disagrees, applying § 2244(b)(2) only after a petitioner exhausts appellate review of his initial petition. And the Third and Tenth Circuits exempt some second-in-time filings from § 2244(b)(2), depending on whether a prisoner prevails on his initial appeal (Third Circuit) or satisfies a seven-factor test (Tenth Circuit).

Question Presented: Whether § 2244(b)(2) applies (i) only to habeas filings made after a prisoner has exhausted appellate review of his first petition, (ii) to all second-in-time habeas filings after final judgment, or (iii) to some second-in-time filings, depending on a prisoner's success on appeal or ability to satisfy a seven-factor test.

Holding: Once a district court enters its judgment with respect to a first-filed habeas petition, a second-in-time filing qualifies as a "second or successive application" properly subject to the requirements of Section 2244(b).

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. There were no concurring opinions.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Peter A. Bruland, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.; and Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Supreme Court Roundup: Decisions, Emergency Actions, and New Grants Jun 09, 2025

Supreme Court Roundup: Decisions, Emergency Actions, and New Grants

In this episode, we analyze the Supreme Court's recent activities across three key areas:

Six unanimous decisions released on June 5th, 2025
Two significant emergency docket interventions involving DOGE
Three major cases granted certiorari via June 6th, 2025 Order

June 5, 2025 Unanimous Decisions

Remarkable consensus: 5 unanimous decisions, 1 8-1 dismissal
Strategic clearing of non-controversial cases with 30 contentious cases pending
Justice Thomas's concurrences in 5 of 6 cases challenging judge-made doctrines
Heavy focus on procedural rules as proxies for deeper policy debates

Emergency Docket Actions

1. U.S. DOGE Service v. CREW: Court limits discovery of internal executive communications

Court orders narrowing of discovery rather than outright prohibition
Decision based on separation of powers principles
Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson dissented

2. Social Security Administration v. AFSCME: Court allows DOGE access to sensitive SSA records

Justice Jackson's forceful dissent highlighting privacy concerns
Lower courts' compromise solution rejected by majority
Concerns about disclosure of personal data without legal determination

Certiorari Grants

1. Coney Island Auto Parts v. Burton | Case No. 24-808

Docket Link: Here
Question Presented: Whether a motion to vacate a void judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) must be filed within a "reasonable time"
Key Facts: Coney Island claims improper service six years after default judgment
Petitioner's Argument: Void judgments are legal nullities from the start; no time limit should apply
Respondent's Argument: Rule 60(c)(1) explicitly requires "reasonable time" with no exceptions
Stakes: Balance between jurisdictional principles and need for legal finality

2. Rutherford v. United States | Case No. 24-820 (Consolidated with Carter v. United States | Case No. 24-860)

Docket Link:Here
Question Presented: Whether the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority in allowing courts to consider non-retroactive changes in law as "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for sentence reduction
Key Fact: Carter received 70-year sentence under pre-First Step Act "stacking" provisions that would result in much shorter sentence today
Petitioner's Argument: Commission has broad authority to define "extraordinary and compelling reasons"; gross disparities qualify
Government's Argument: Commission can't circumvent Congress's decision not to make First Step Act retroactive
Stakes: Potential relief for hundreds of federal prisoners serving lengthy "stacked" sentences

3. Hamm v. Smith | Case No. 24-872

Docket Link: Here
Question Presented: How courts should apply the clinical definition of intellectual disability when all IQ scores are above 70
Key Fact: Smith has five IQ scores (75, 74, 72, 78, 74) all above 70 but significant adaptive deficits
Petitioner's Argument: Multiple IQ scores above 70 should preclude intellectual disability finding; states should be able to require proof of IQ ≤70
Respondent's Argument: Supreme Court precedent requires considering standard error of measurement and adaptive functioning when scores are in 70-75 range
Stakes: Implementation of Atkins prohibition on executing intellectually disabled individuals; states' authority to define intellectual disability criteria

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Opinion Summary: Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Davis | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 24–304 Jun 05, 2025

Opinion Summary: Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Davis | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 24–304

In this episode, I breakdown the dismissal, Justice Kavanaugh's dissent and theories for the dismissal.

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether a federal court may certify a class action when some of its members lack any Article III injury.

Result: Dismissed as improvidently granted.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Per Curiam decision. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Noel J. Francisco
For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General
For Respondents: Deepak Gupta

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 23–1141 Jun 05, 2025

Opinion Summary: Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 23–1141

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Mexican Government sued leading members of the American firearms industry, seeking to hold them liable for harms inflicted by Mexican drug cartels. According to Mexico, America's firearms companies have engaged in a series of business practices for decades-from selling semi-automatic rifles, to making magazines that hold over ten rounds, to failing to impose various sales restrictions-that have created a supply of firearms later smuggled across the border and ultimately used by the cartels to commit crimes. Mexico asks for billions of dollars in damages, plus extensive injunctive relief imposing new gun-control measures in the United States. The district court dismissed the case under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which generally bars suits against firearms companies based on criminals misusing their products. But the First Circuit reversed. It held that PLCAA does not bar this suit because Mexico stated a claim that defendants' business practices have aided and abetted firearms trafficking to the cartels, proximately harming the Mexican government.

Questions Presented:

Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States is the "proximate cause" of alleged injuries to the Mexican government stemming from violence committed by drug cartels in Mexico.
Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States amounts to "aiding and abetting" illegal firearms trafficking because firearms companies allegedly know that some of their products are unlawfully trafficked.

Holding: Because Mexico’s complaint does not plausibly allege that the defendant gun manufacturers aided and abetted gun dealers’ unlawful sales of firearms to Mexican traffickers, PLCAA bars the lawsuit.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas and Justice Jackson each filed concurring opinions.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D.C.
For respondent: Catherine E. Stetson, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Timestamps:

Opinion Summary: Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Comm’n. | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 24–154 Jun 05, 2025

Opinion Summary: Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Comm’n. | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 24–154

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented:

Holding: The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s application of § 108.02(15)(h)(2) to petitioners violates the First Amendment.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justices Thomas and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner:
For Respondent:

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Timestamps:

Opinion Summary: CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 23–1201 Jun 05, 2025

Opinion Summary: CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 23–1201

This case was consolidated with: Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., Case No. 24-17.

Link to Docket: Here.

Questions Presented:

Whether plaintiffs must prove minimum contacts before federal courts may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign states sued under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
The question presented in Antrix Corp. Ltd. is: Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, "[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under section 1608 of this title." 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b).

Host Note: Consolidated with: Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., Case No. 24-17

Holding: Personal jurisdiction exists under the FSIA when an immunity exception applies and service is proper. The FSIA does not require proof of “minimum contacts” over and above the contacts already required by the Act’s enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner in 24-17: Aaron Streett, Houston, Tex.
For petitioners in 23-1201: Matthew D. McGill, Washington, D.C.
For United States, as amicus curiae supporting petitioners: Sarah M. Harris, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For respondents: Carter G. Phillips, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Timestamps:

Opinion Summary: BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman| Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 23–1259 Jun 05, 2025

Opinion Summary: BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman| Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 23–1259

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

For more than 70 years, this Court has "required a movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6)" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "to show 'extraordinary circumstances' justifying the reopening of a final judgment." Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005) (quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950)). This Court has also stressed that a movant must be "faultless" to obtain relief. Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993). "This very strict interpretation of Rule 60(b) is essential if the finality of judgments is to be preserved." Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535 (cleaned up).

In this case, Respondents declined multiple invitations and opportunities to amend their complaint. The District Court then dismissed their complaint with prejudice, and the Second Circuit affirmed. Only then did Respondents move to vacate the judgment so they could file an amended complaint.

The District Court denied the motion under Rule 60(b)(6)'s well-settled standard. But the Second Circuit reversed, based on an unprecedented "balanc[ing]" test that requires district courts to consider Rule 15(a)'s "liberal pleading principles" when addressing a Rule 60 (b)(6) motion to reopen a judgment for the purpose of filing an amended complaint.

Question Presented: Whether Rule 60(b)(6)'s stringent standard applies to a post-judgment request to vacate for the purpose of filing an amended complaint.

Holding: Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances, and this standard does not become less demanding when the movant seeks to reopen a case to amend a complaint. A party must first satisfy Rule 60(b) before Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment standard can apply.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Robers and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined and in which Justice Jackson joined in all parts but Part III. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D. C.
For respondents: Michael J. Radine, Hackensack, N.J.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Ames v. OH Dept. of Youth Services | Case No. 23-1039 | Date Decided: 6/5/25 Jun 05, 2025

Opinion Summary: Ames v. OH Dept. of Youth Services | Case No. 23-1039 | Date Decided: 6/5/25

In this episode, we'll Ames versus Ohio Department of Youth Services, Case Number 23–1039. I'll walk through the opinion, give my thoughts on case implications and also compare how the oral arguments compared and contrasted to the ultimate opinions. Spoiler alert: oral arguments heavily forecasted the results.

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether, in addition to pleading the other elements of Title VII, a majority-group plaintiff must show "background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority."

Holding: The Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule—which re¬quires members of a majority group to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard to prevail on a Title VII claim—cannot be squared with the text of Title VII or the Court’s precedents.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Xiao Wang, Charlottesville, Va.; and Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
For respondent: T. Elliot Gaiser, Solicitor General, Columbus, Ohio.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Timestamps:

Guns, Warrantless Home Searches, and Ballot Boxes: Inside the Supreme Court's June 2nd Order List Jun 02, 2025

Guns, Warrantless Home Searches, and Ballot Boxes: Inside the Supreme Court's June 2nd Order List

In this episode of Supreme Court Oral Arguments and Opinions, I break down the Court's June 2, 2025 Order List, focusing on several cases that touch on fundamental constitutional questions affecting Americans' daily lives. The episode examines four cases where the Court granted certiorari and two denied cases that sparked passionate written dissents.

Cases Granted Review:

1. Bost v. Illinois Board of Elections | Case No. 24-568 | Docket Link: Here.

Question: Do federal candidates have standing to challenge state laws allowing ballots to be counted after Election Day?

Background: Stems from a lawsuit by Congressman Michael Bost and two Republican Presidential Elector Nominees involving a challenge to Illinois' law that allows mail-in ballots to be received and counted up to fourteen days after Election Day.

Implications: Could affect how mail-in ballots are processed in federal elections across more than half the states

2. Case v. Montana | Case No. 24-624 | Docket Link: Here.

Question: Do police need probable cause or only reasonable suspicion to enter homes without a warrant during emergencies?

Background: Stems from a welfare check that resulted in William Trevor Case being shot by police and later convicted of assaulting a peace officer

Implications: Will clarify Fourth Amendment standards for warrantless home entries during potential emergencies

3. GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal | Case No. 24-758 | Docket Link: Here.

Question: Can government contractors immediately appeal denials of derivative sovereign immunity claims?

Background: Involves allegations that a private detention center operator forced detainees to clean common areas and paid only $1.00 per day for voluntary work

Implications: Will affect litigation risks for companies contracting with the government in sensitive areas

4. Hencely v. Fluor Corp. | Case No. 24-924 | Docket Link: Here.

Question: Does federal law preempt state tort claims against military contractors in war zones?

Background: Arises from a 2016 suicide bombing at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan that severely injured a U.S. Army specialist

Implications: Billions in potential liability for military contractors and access to remedies for injured service members

Notable Cert Denials:

1. Nicholson v. W.L. York | Case No. 23–7490

Issue: When does the statute of limitations restart for repeated acts of racial discrimination?

Dissent: Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, argued that each discriminatory act should start a new limitations clock

Significance: Affects when victims of ongoing discrimination can bring legal claims

2. Snope v. Brown | Case No. 24–203

Issue: Does Maryland's ban on AR-15s and similar semi-automatic rifles violate the Second Amendment?

Statement: Justice Kavanaugh noted AR-15s' common use but supported further percolation

Dissent: Justice Thomas forcefully dissented, arguing the ban is unconstitutional

Implications: Maintains state-by-state variations in assault weapons regulations while suggesting the Court may address the issue in coming terms

Timestamps:

00:00:00 Introduction

00:01:26 Cert Granted: Bost v. Illinois Board of Elections

00:03:39 Cert Granted: Case v. Montana

00:06:59 Cert Granted: GEO Group v. Menocal

00:08:48 Cert Grant: Hencely v. Fluor Corp.

00:10:35 Cert Denied: Nicholson v. W.L. York

00:12:04 Cert Denied: Snope v. Brown

00:16:30 Conclusion

Emergency Docket Order Summary: Noem v. Doe | Order Date: 5/30/25 | Case No. 24A1079 May 30, 2025

Emergency Docket Order Summary: Noem v. Doe | Order Date: 5/30/25 | Case No. 24A1079

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the Supreme Court should stay the April 15, 2025 order entered by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts pending appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and any further proceedings in this Court.

The central issue in this case is whether the Secretary of Homeland Security lawfully terminated the CHNV parole program and the existing parole status of approximately half a million individuals through a single Federal Register Notice, or if this en masse termination exceeded the Secretary's authority and violated statutory requirements for case-by-case assessment and proper legal reasoning.

Decision: Stay granted. The Supreme Court granted the application and stayed the district court order. This means that DHS can terminate the lawful status of all CHNV parolees and proceed to remove them pursuant to law.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Reading the Eagle County Tea Leaves: How the Justices' Oral Argument Questions Foreshadowed Their Opinions May 30, 2025

Reading the Eagle County Tea Leaves: How the Justices' Oral Argument Questions Foreshadowed Their Opinions

This episode of SCOTUS Oral Arguments and Opinions delves into the case of Seven County Infrastructure Coalition versus Eagle County, decided on May 29, 2025.

The episode compares and contrasts the oral arguments and written opinions of Justices Kavanaugh and Sotomayor. Justice Kavanaugh's majority opinion emphasized broad judicial deference to federal agencies and the economic impact of extensive environmental reviews.

In contrast, Justice Sotomayor's concurrence focused on the narrow legal authority under federal transportation law. The episode highlights how Justices Barrett and Jackson influenced the written opinions despite not penning their own separate analyses.

Overall, it explores how this oral arguments predicted judicial outcomes.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Timestamps:

00:00 Introduction to the Case

01:39 Justice Kavanaugh's Majority Opinion

05:58 Justice Sotomayor's Concurrence

08:32 Influence of Other Justices

11:47 Conclusion and Final Thoughts

Opinion Summary: Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County | Date Decided: 5/29/25 | Case No. 23–975 May 29, 2025

Opinion Summary: Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County | Date Decided: 5/29/25 | Case No. 23–975

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the National Environmental Policy Act requires an agency to study environmental impacts beyond the proximate effects of the action over which the agency has regulatory authority.

Holding: The D.C. Circuit failed to afford the Board the substantial judicial deference required in NEPA cases and incorrectly interpreted NEPA to require the Board to consider the environmental effects of upstream and downstream projects that are separate in time or place from the Uinta Basin Railway.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.
For federal respondents supporting petitioners: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
For respondents Eagle County, et al.: William M. Jay, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Introduction

[00:02:10] Question Presented

[00:03:04] Voting Breakdown

[00:03:32] Justice Kavanaugh's Majority Opinion

[00:09:56] Justice Sotomayor's Concurring Opinion

[00:21:22] Case Implications

Cert Denial: Where Do Student Speech Rights End? The ‘Two Genders’ T-Shirt Controversy May 27, 2025

L. M. v. Middleborough, Petitioner v. United States, et al. | Decision Date: 5/27/25 | Case No. 24-410

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether school officials may presume substantial disruption or a violation of the rights of others from a student’s silent, passive, and untargeted ideological speech simply because that speech relates to matters of personal identity, even when the speech responds to the school’s opposing views, actions, or policies.

Result: Denial of certiorari.

Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justices Thomas and Alito dissented from the denial of certiorari.

Link to Decision: Here.

Cert Denial: Apache Stronghold: When Sacred Sites Meet Corporate Mining | Decision Date: 5/27/25 May 27, 2025

Apache Stronghold, Petitioner v. United States, et al. | Order Date: 5/23/25 | Case No. 24-291

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the government “substantially burdens” religious exercise under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), or must satisfy heightened scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause, when it singles out a sacred site for complete physical destruction, ending specific religious rituals forever.

Result: Denial of certiorari.

Voting Breakdown: 6-2. Justice Gorsuch with whom Justice Thomas joined, dissented from the denial of certiorari.

Link to Decision: Here.

Order Summary: Trump v. Wilcox | Order Date: 5/22/25 | Case No. 24A966 May 22, 2025

Order Summary: Trump v. Wilcox | Order Date: 5/22/25 | Case No. 24A966

This case comes from the Emergency Docket.

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the Supreme Court should stay the judgments issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia pending appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and any further proceedings in this Court.

The underlying case involves the questions of whether the President may remove without cause members of the National Labor Relations Board and Merit Systems Protection Board, or whether statutory for-cause removal protections for these agency heads violate the President's constitutional authority under Article II to supervise and control officers who exercise executive power on his behalf.

Holding: The Court granted the stay application. The lower court decisions are on hold until the case fully resolves.

Result: The Justices did not sign the order. Justice Kagan filed a dissent from the grant of the stay application and was joined by along with Justices Sotomayor and Justice Jackson.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Reading the Kousisis Tea Leaves: How the Justices' Oral Argument Questions Foreshadowed Their Opinions May 22, 2025

I created this episode to highlight and contrast the Justices' questions and comments at oral argument to the written opinion in Kousisis.

While all Justices agreed on rejecting the economic-loss requirement, their different concerns and questioning approaches during oral argument directly predicted the fragmented reasoning that would characterize their written opinions. The oral argument served as a laboratory for testing legal theories that would ultimately prove difficult to reconcile in a single coherent framework, explaining why this unanimous result required four separate opinions to express the Court's reasoning. Specifically:

Justice Barrett used oral argument to test the coherence of competing legal standards, ultimately crafting a majority opinion that rejected petitioners' approach while leaving significant questions unresolved.
Justice Thomas used his questioning to explore the specific regulatory context, leading to a concurrence focused on materiality as a limiting principle in DBE cases specifically.
Justice Gorsuch consistently probed the boundaries between criminal and non-criminal conduct, resulting in a concurrence defending traditional common-law limitations on fraud liability.
Justice Sotomayor maintained focus on the specific case facts and narrow legal question, producing a concurrence that warns against broader doctrinal pronouncements.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Opinion Summary: Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond | Case No. 24-394 | Date Decided: 5/22/25 May 22, 2025

Opinion Summary: Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond | Case No. 24-394 | Date Decided: 5/22/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Oklahoma Constitution requires Oklahoma to “establish[ ] and maint[ain] . . . a system of public schools, which shall be open to all the children of the state and free from sectarian control.” The Oklahoma Constitution also requires that [n]o public money . . . shall ever be appropriated . . . or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, or system of religion . . . or sectarian institution.”

Consistent with these constitutional mandates, the Oklahoma Legislature established a type of public school[] established by contract called a charter school. The Oklahoma Charter School Board established a public charter school that fully incorporates Catholic teachings into every aspect of the school, including its curriculum and co-curricular activities.

Following the Board’s predecessor’s establishment of the aforementioned public charter school, the Oklahoma Attorney filed an original action with the Oklahoma Supreme Court to prevent the charter school from operating.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a state can exclude privately owned and operated religious charter schools from its charter-school program by enforcing state-law bans on "sectarian" and religiously affiliated charter schools. The court also held that a charter school engages in state action for constitutional purposes when it contracts with the state to provide publicly funded education.

Questions Presented:

Whether the academic and pedagogical choices of a privately owned and run school constitute state action simply because it contracts with the state to offer a free educational option for interested students.
Whether a state violates the Free Exercise Clause by excluding privately run religious schools from the state's charter-school program solely because the schools are religious, or whether a state can justify such an exclusion by invoking anti-establishment interests that go further than the Establishment Clause requires.

Holding: The entire opinion reads: "The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court."

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 4-4. Per Curiam Opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners in 24-394: James A. Campbell, Lansdowne, Va.
For Petitioner in 24-396: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D.C.
For United States, as Amicus Curiae: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Gregory G. Garre, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Timestamps:

00:00 Introduction

00:15 Question Presented

00:53 Result

01:05 Opinion

01:10 Case Implications

Opinion Summary: Kousisis v. United States | Case No. 23-909 | Date Decided: 5/22/25 May 22, 2025

Opinion Summary: Kousisis v. United States | Case No. 23-909 | Date Decided: 5/22/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Questions Presented:

Whether deception to induce a commercial exchange can constitute mail or wire fraud, even if inflicting economic harm on the alleged victim was not the object of the scheme. Whether a sovereign's statutory, regulatory, or policy interest is a property interest when compliance is a material term of payment for goods or services.
Whether all contract rights are "property."

Holding: A defendant who induces a victim to enter into a transaction under materially false pretenses may be convicted of federal fraud even if the defendant did not seek to cause the victim economic loss.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion con¬curring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, Cal.
For Respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Timestamps:

00:00 Introduction

00:57 Justice Barrett’s Majority Opinion

09:01 Justice Thomas’ Concurring Opinion

15:22 Justice Gorsuch opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment

24:27 Justice Sotomayor opinion concurring in the judgment

00:29:52 Case Implications

Opinion Summary: A.A.R.P. v. Trump | Case No. 24A1007 | Date Decided: 5/16/25 May 16, 2025

Case Info: A.A.R.P. v. Trump, Case No. 24A1007 | Date Decided: 5/16/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether Venezuelan nationals detained as alleged members of a terrorist organization are entitled to constitutionally adequate notice and opportunity to challenge their removal before being deported under the Alien Enemies Act, and if so, what minimum notice requirements must the government provide to satisfy due process.

Plain Language Breakdown:

In this case, the Supreme Court decided that Venezuelan nationals detained by the government as alleged members of a terrorist organization must receive adequate notice before being removed from the United States under the Alien Enemies Act. The Court found that the District Court's inaction for over 14 hours constituted a constructive denial of the detainees' request for emergency relief, and that due process requires notice that allows detainees a meaningful opportunity to challenge their removal through habeas proceedings. The Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's dismissal of the appeal and granted an injunction preventing the government from removing class members until the Fifth Circuit could determine what level of notice is constitutionally required.

Justice Kavanaugh concurred, agreeing with the temporary injunction but expressing a preference for the Supreme Court to resolve the critical legal issues promptly rather than remanding to lower courts.

Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, arguing that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the District Court's actions were reasonable given the circumstances and insufficient evidence was presented to prove imminent harm to the detainees; he also questioned whether class relief could be obtained in habeas proceedings and whether the requirements for class certification could be met in this case.

Voting Details: The Supreme Court delivered a Per Curiam opinion. Justice Kavanaugh wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion, with whom Justice Thomas joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Timestamps:

00:00 Introduction and Plain Language Breakdown

02:10 Summary of Per Curiam Opinion

12:47 Summary of Justice Kavanaugh Concurring Opinion

14:33 Summary of Justice Kavanaugh Dissenting Opinion

Highlights: Trump, President of U.S. v. CASA, Inc. | Case No. 24A884 | Date Argued: 5/15/25 May 16, 2025

Here are some highlights from the Trump v. CASA, Inc. case heard on May 15, 2025.

Justice Kagan and Justice Barrett went viral for their questions. Those portions begin around 09:17.

Please see the oral argument episode for additional case details.

As always, I welcome any feedback on the episode or podcast.

Email: scotus.cases.pod@gmail.com.

Oral Argument: Trump, President of U.S. v. CASA, Inc. | Case No. 24A884 | Date Argued: 5/15/25 May 16, 2025

Case Info: Trump, President of U.S. v. CASA, Inc. | Case No. 24A884 | Date Argued: 5/15/25

Consolidation Note: The following cases were consolidated: (1) Trump, President of U.S. v. CASA, Inc., Case No. 24A884; (2) Trump, President of U.S. v. Washington, Case No. 24A885; and (3) Trump, President of U.S. v. New Jersey, Case No. 24A886.

Parties:

Applicants: United States and Federal Officials
Respondents: (1) States and cities such as New Jersey, California, Delaware, Massachusetts, and the City and County of San Francisco; (2) Immigrant rights organizations such as CASA, Inc. and Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project, Inc; and (3) private individuals.

Links to Docket: Here (Case No. 24A884); Here (Case No. 24A885); and Here (Case No. 24A886).

Question Presented: Whether the Supreme Court should stay the district courts' nationwide preliminary injunctions on the Trump administration’s 1/20/25 executive order ending birthright citizenship except as to the individual plaintiffs and identified members of the organizational plaintiffs or states.

Background:

On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order regarding birthright citizenship.
Section 1 of the Order recognizes that the Constitution and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., confer citizenship upon all persons born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.
Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. That provision, known as the Citizenship Clause, repudiated Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), which infamously misinterpreted the Constitution to deny U.S. citizenship to people of African descent based solely on their race. Congress has reaffirmed the Citizenship Clause in the INA, which provides that “a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” is a citizen of the United States. 8 U.S.C. 1401(a).
Section 1 of the Order identifies two circumstances in which a person born in the United States is not subject to its jurisdiction: “(1) when that person’s mother was unlawfully present in the United States and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth, or (2) when that 6 person’s mother’s presence in the United States at the time of said person’s birth was lawful but temporary (such as, but not limited to, visiting the United States under the auspices of the Visa Waiver Program or visiting on a student, work, or tourist visa) and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth.” Citizenship Order § 1.
Section 2 of the Order directs the Executive Branch (1) not to issue documents recognizing U.S. citizenship to the persons identified in Section 1 and (2) not to accept documents issued by state, local, or other governments purporting to recognize the U.S. citizenship of such persons. See Citizenship Order § 2(a). Section 2 specifies that those directives “apply only to persons who are born within the United States after 30 days from the date of this order,” i.e., after February 19. Id. § 2(b).
Three district courts in Maryland, Massachusetts, and Washington have issued overlapping nationwide injunctions at the behest of 22 States, two organizations, and seven individuals. Those universal injunctions prohibit a Day 1 Executive Order from being enforced anywhere in the country, as to “hundreds of thousands” of unspecified individuals who are “not before the court nor identified by the court.”
Three Circuit Courts of Appeals refused to limit the nationwide injunctions.

Applicant's Position:

The Solicitor General argues that universal injunctions have reached crisis levels, particularly since the start of the current Administration in 2025. The Solicitor General notes that district courts issued more universal injunctions and temporary restraining orders in February 2025 alone than through the first three years of the Biden Administration. The Solicitor General contends this trend prevents the Executive Branch from performing its constitutional functions before courts can fully examine the merits of those actions, and threatens to overwhelm the Supreme Court's emergency docket.
The Solicitor General asserts that the universal injunctions in this case are particularly problematic because they extend to all 50 states and millions of aliens nationwide, even though tailored relief for the actual plaintiffs would fully address their alleged harms.
The Solicitor General argues the injunctions were improperly granted to States that lack standing to raise Citizenship Clause claims, defying the principle that States may only assert their own rights, not those of third parties. Furthermore, the Solicitor General contends the injunctions improperly bar federal agencies from even developing implementation guidance, and the overlapping nature of multiple universal injunctions from different courts creates a "jurisdictionally messy" scenario where the government must prevail in multiple appeals to implement the Order anywhere.

Respondents' Position:

Respondents argue that this case presents a uniquely poor candidate for challenging universal injunctions. They emphasize that the Executive Order directly conflicts with binding Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Citizenship Clause, and the government notably does not even attempt to defend the Order's constitutionality in its emergency application. The Respondents contend that while emergency relief might be appropriate in some cases to limit the geographic scope of relief, it is not appropriate where the Supreme Court has already settled the precise constitutional question for the entire nation.
Respondents also argue that the government failed to demonstrate any significant or irreparable harm that would justify emergency relief, let alone warrant contravening nationwide precedent. They point out that the injunctions merely protect a status quo regarding birthright citizenship that dates back to English common law and has existed throughout American history, except for the aberration of Dred Scott.
Respondents emphasize that maintaining this status quo until the cases are resolved imposes no harm on the Executive Branch, while stripping hundreds of thousands of American-born children of their citizenship would inflict tremendous and irreparable harms on the States and the public.

Oral Advocates:

For Applicants: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For State and City Respondents: Jeremy M. Feigenbaum, Solicitor General, Trenton, N.J.
For Private Respondents: Kelsi B. Corkran, Washington, D.C.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Introduction

[00:00:14] Applicant's Opening Statement Begins

[00:02:13] Applicant Free for All Questions Begin

[00:27:45] Applicant Sequential Questions Begin

[01:03:17] Applicant Questions End, Respondent (State and City) Opening Statement Begins

[01:05:25] Respondent (State and City) Free for All Questions Begin

[01:19:03] Respondent (State and City) Sequential Questions Begin

[01:43:37] Respondent (State and City) Questions End, Respondent (Private) Opening Statement Begins

[01:44:56] Respondent (Private) Free for All Questions Begin

[02:00:10] Respondent (Private) Sequential Questions Begin

[02:13:40] Respondent (Private) Questions End, Applicant Rebuttal Begins

Opinion Summary: Barnes v. Felix | Case No. 23-1239 | Date Decided: 5/15/25 May 15, 2025

Case Info: Barnes v. Felix | Case No. 23-1239 | Date Argued: 1/22/25 | Date Decided: 5/15/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from using "unreasonable" force. U.S. Const. amend. IV. In Graham v. Connor, this Court held that reasonableness depends on "the totality of the circumstances." 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quotation marks omitted). But four circuits-the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth-cabin Graham. Those circuits evaluate whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred under the "moment of the threat doctrine," which evaluates the reasonableness of an officer's actions only in the narrow window when the officer's safety was threatened, and not based on events that precede the moment of the threat. In contrast, eight circuits-the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits-reject the moment of the threat doctrine and follow the totality of the circumstances approach, including evaluating the officer's actions leading up to the use of force.

In the decision below, Judge Higginbotham concurred in his own majority opinion, explaining that the minority approach "lessens the Fourth Amendment's protection of the American public" and calling on this Court "to resolve the circuit divide over the application of a doctrine deployed daily across this country." Pet. App. 10a-16a (Higginbotham, J., concurring).

Question Presented: Whether courts should apply the moment of the threat doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment.

Holding: A claim that a law enforcement officer used excessive force during a stop or arrest is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, which requires that the force deployed be objectively reasonable from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene. The inquiry into the reasonableness of police force requires analyzing the totality of the circumstances. That analysis demands careful attention to the facts and circumstances relating to the incident. Most notable here, the totality of the circumstances inquiry has no time limit.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Nathaniel A.G. Zelinsky, Washington, D. C.; and Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
For Respondents: Charles L. McCloud, Washington, D. C.; and Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex. (for Texas, et al., as amici curiae.)

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Timestamps:

[00:00] Introduction

[00:38] Justice Kagan Unanimous Opinion

[04:35] Justice Kavanaugh Concurring Opinion

[10:12] Case Implications

In Memoriam: A Reflection on the Remarkable Journey of Justice David Souter May 09, 2025

In Memoriam: A Reflection on the Remarkable Journey of Justice David Souter

Episode Overview

In this special memorial episode, we discuss the remarkable life and judicial career of Justice David H. Souter, a Supreme Court Justice who defied political expectations and remained committed to principled jurisprudence.

Key Highlights

Born: September 17, 1939 in Melrose, Massachusetts
Appointed to Supreme Court: 1990 by President George H.W. Bush
Retired: 2009 (succeeded by Justice Sotomayor)
Passed Away: May 8, 2025

Notable Career Milestones

Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University
New Hampshire Attorney General
Associate Justice of New Hampshire Supreme Court
Judge on the First Circuit Court of Appeals
Supreme Court Justice (1990-2009)

Landmark Cases Discussed

1. Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) (Opinion Here)

Co-authored opinion affirming Roe v. Wade
Crafted influential section on judicial precedent

2. Bush v. Gore (2000) (Opinion Here)

Demonstrated judicial independence
Critiqued recount process while questioning judicial overreach

Judicial Philosophy Highlights

Believed law should adapt to empirical realities
Advocated for judicial restraint
Supported separation of church and state
Consistently prioritized legal principles over political expectations

The Supreme Court issued two press releases: Here and Here.

Interview: From Buffalo to the Bench, A Conversation with Chief Justice Roberts May 08, 2025

Episode Description:

This episode features a May 7, 2025 conversation between Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts and U.S. District Judge Lawrence J. Vilardo. They discuss why judicial independence matters in our democracy and how it helps balance power between different parts of government.

Both judges share stories about their personal backgrounds, law school experiences, and key moments in their careers. They also talk about what makes legal writing effective and why court decisions should be written clearly so everyone can understand them. The conversation gives listeners a unique look into the thoughts of two important judges as they reflect on their shared history and how the legal world has changed over time.

Background:

On May 7, 2025, Chief Justice John Roberts headlined the Western District of New York 125th Anniversary Dinner Event in Buffalo, NY. As part of this event, U.S. District Judge Lawrence J. Vilardo interviewed Chief Justice Roberts. From the Event's press release:

“Chief Justice Roberts was born in Buffalo and spent his early childhood here, so we claim him as one of our own,” said Chief U.S. District Judge Elizabeth Wolford. “His willingness to join us for our 125th Anniversary makes the celebration all the more special. It’s a testament to Western New York’s rich legal history and the Chief Justice’s commitment to our profession.”

Event Press Release: Here.

H/T to WGRZ-TV for the recording.

Timestamps:

00:00 Welcoming Remarks and Reflections

00:57 Reflecting on the Past: A Journey Back to Buffalo

09:26 The Art of Writing Clearly

14:07 Judicial Independence and Its Implications

25:42 The Role of the Chief Justice in Public Life

32:04 Reflections on Two Decades on the Court

38:43 The Evolution of Legal Perspectives

43:20 The Influence of Judicial Mentorship

48:35 Reflections on Clerking and the Law

Emergency Docket Order Summary: United States v. Shilling | Order Decided: 5/6/25 | Case No. 24A1030 May 06, 2025

Case Info: United States v. Shilling | Order Decided: 5/6/25 | Case No. 24A1030

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the Supreme Court should stay the nationwide injunction issued by the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington.

Plain English Translation: This order means that the district court’s nationwide injunction is on hold until final adjudication of the case on the merits. The district court’s nationwide injunction prohibited the Department of Defense from implementing a policy that generally disqualifies from military service individuals who have gender dysphoria or have undergone medical interventions for gender dysphoria.

Voting Breakdown: The Order is unsigned. Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson would deny the application.

Timestamps:

00:00 Introduction

00:16 Question Presented

00:28 Emergency Order Text

01:23 Voting Breakdown

01:31 Plain English Order Summary

02:07 Procedural History - Policy Adoption

02:39 Procedural History - Respondent Identities

02:52 Procedural History - District Court Orders

04:39 Procedural History - Government Appeals Denial of Stay of Nationwide Injunction to 9th Circuit; 9th Circuit Denies Appeal

05:15 Procedural History - Government Appeals Applies to Supreme Court for a Stay

05:20 Summary of Government Application - The Policy Satisfies Rational Basis Review

06:42 Summary of Government Application - The Policy Comports with the First Amendment

07:49 Summary of Government Application - The Policy Complies with the Due Process Clause and Principles of Equity

07:59 Summary of Government Application - The District Court Erred in Issuing a Nationwide Injunction

10:04 Summary of Government Application - The Remaining Factors Support the Issuance of a Stay

Opinion Summary: Feliciano v. Department of Transportation | Date Decided: 4/30/25 | Case No. 23-861 Apr 30, 2025

Case Info: Feliciano v. Department of Transportation | Date Decided: 4/30/25 | Case No. 23-861

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether a federal civilian employee called or ordered to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency is entitled to differential pay even if the duty is not directly connected to the national emergency.

Holding: A federal civilian employee called to active duty pursuant to “any other provision of law . . . during a national emergency” as described in §101(a)(13)(B) is entitled to differential pay if the reservist’s service temporally coincides with a declared national emergency without any showing that the service bears a substantive connection to a particular emergency.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Kagan and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt
For Respondent: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Timestamps:

00:00 Introduction

00:15 Question Presented

00:23 Voting Breakdown

00:40 Justice Gorsuch Majority Opinion

08:10 Result

08:11 Justice Thomas Dissenting Opinion

14:41 Case Implications

Oral Argument: Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond | Case No. 24-394 | Date Argued: 4/30/25 Apr 30, 2025

Case Info: Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond | Case No. 24-394 | Date Argued: 4/30/25 | Date Decided: 5/22/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Oklahoma Constitution requires Oklahoma to “establish[ ] and maint[ain] . . . a system of public schools, which shall be open to all the children of the state and free from sectarian control.” The Oklahoma Constitution also requires that [n]o public money . . . shall ever be appropriated . . . or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, or system of religion . . . or sectarian institution.”

Consistent with these constitutional mandates, the Oklahoma Legislature established a type of public school[] established by contract called a charter school. The Oklahoma Charter School Board established a public charter school that fully incorporates Catholic teachings into every aspect of the school, including its curriculum and co-curricular activities.

Following the Board’s predecessor’s establishment of the aforementioned public charter school, the Oklahoma Attorney filed an original action with the Oklahoma Supreme Court to prevent the charter school from operating.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a state can exclude privately owned and operated religious charter schools from its charter-school program by enforcing state-law bans on "sectarian" and religiously affiliated charter schools. The court also held that a charter school engages in state action for constitutional purposes when it contracts with the state to provide publicly funded education.

Questions Presented:

Whether the academic and pedagogical choices of a privately owned and run school constitute state action simply because it contracts with the state to offer a free educational option for interested students.
Whether a state violates the Free Exercise Clause by excluding privately run religious schools from the state's charter-school program solely because the schools are religious, or whether a state can justify such an exclusion by invoking anti-establishment interests that go further than the Establishment Clause requires.

Holding: The entire opinion reads: "The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court."

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 4-4. Per Curiam Opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Host Notes: Justice Barrett did not participate in this case. Also, this case was consolidated with St. Isidore of Seville Sch. v. Drummond, Case No. 24-396.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners in 24-394: James A. Campbell
For Petitioner in 24-396: Michael H. McGinley
For United States, as Amicus Curiae: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice
For Respondent: Gregory G. Garre

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Timestamps:

00:00 Introduction

00:08 Petitioner (in 24-394) Opening Statement Begins

2:00 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begins

11:10 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

37:16 Petitioner Questions End, Petitioner (in 24-396) Opening Statement Begins

38:28 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

44:57 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

58:15, Petitioner Questions End, Government (as Amicus Curiae) Opening Statement Begins

59:13 Government Free for All Questions Begin

1:08:32 Government Sequential Questions Begin

1:17:33 Government Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins

1:20:01 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

1:48:30 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

2:08:50 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

Opinion Summary: Advocate Christ Medical Center v. Kennedy | Date Decided: 4/29/25 | Case No. 23-715 Apr 29, 2025

Case Info: Advocate Christ Medical Center v. Kennedy | Date Decided: 4/29/25 | Case No. 23-715

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Does the phrase "entitled ... to benefits," used twice in the same sentence of the Medicare Act, mean the same thing for Medicare part A and supplementary security income (SSI), such that it includes all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received.

Holding: In calculating the Medicare fraction, an individual is “entitled to[SSI] benefits” for purposes of the Medicare fraction when she is eligible to receive an SSI cash payment during the month of her hospitalization.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Advocates:

For Petitioners: Melissa Arbus Sherry
For Respondent: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Oral Argument: Laboratory Corp. of America v. Davis | Case No. 24-304 | Date Argued: 4/29/25 Apr 29, 2025

Case Info: Laboratory Corp. of America v. Davis | Case No. 24-304 | Date Argued: 4/29/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether a federal court may certify a class action when some of its members lack any Article III injury.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Noel J. Francisco
For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General
For Respondents: Deepak Gupta

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Timestamps:

00:00 Introduction

00:06 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins

02:16 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

21:22 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

1:09:22 Petitioner Questions End, Government Opening Statement Begins

1:10:41 Government Free for All Questions Begin

1:20:15 Government Sequential Questions Begin

1:36:29 Government Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins

1:38:22 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

2:06:52 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

2:12:05 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

Oral Argument: Martin v. United States | Case No. 24-362 | Date Argued: 4/29/25 Apr 29, 2025

Case Info: Martin v. United States | Case No. 24-362 | Date Argued: 4/29/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Petitioners are the innocent victims of a wrong-house raid conducted by an FBI SWAT team in Atlanta, Georgia. Seeking a remedy for torts committed against them, Petitioners brought a cause of action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In its opinion below, the Eleventh Circuit held that all of Petitioners' FTCA claims are barred by sovereign immunity supplied either through the Constitution's Supremacy Clause or the FTCA's discretionary-function exception. In one or more ways, the opinion below conflicts with decisions from every other circuit.

Questions Presented:

Whether the Constitution's Supremacy Clause bars claims under the FTCA-a federal statute enacted by Congress-when the negligent or wrongful acts of federal employees have some nexus with furthering federal policy and can reasonably be characterized as complying with the full range of federal law.
Whether the FTCA's discretionary-function exception bars claims for torts arising from wrong-house raids and similar negligent or wrongful acts by federal employees.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: Patrick M. Jaicomo
For Respondents: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General
For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below on Question 1: Christopher E. Mills

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Timestamps:

00:00 Introduction

00:05 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins

02:11 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

21:58 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

22:06 Petitioner Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins

23:53 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

37:10 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

39:31 Respondent Questions End, Court Appointed Amicus Curiae Opening Statement Begins

40:33 Court Appointed Amicus Curiae Free for All Questions Begin

46:45 Court Appointed Amicus Curiae Sequential Questions Begin

46:51 Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

Oral Argument: Soto v. United States | Case No. 24-320 | Date Argued: 4/28/25 Apr 28, 2025

Case Info: Soto v. United States | Case No. 24-320 | Date Argued: 4/28/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

This case determines whether thousands of medically retired combat veterans should receive all the combat related special compensation (CRSC) that Congress specifically authorized for combat veterans. The government has elected to calculate the period of retroactive compensation due using the procedure in the Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702) instead of the one in the CRSC statute (10 U.S.C. § 1413a)-a maneuver that allows the government to apply the Barring Act's six- year limitations period in order to pay the veterans less. But the Barring Act is a default provision and does not apply where "another law" provides a procedure for calculating the amount due-that is, for "settling" a demand for payment.

Although this Court's precedent defines "settlement" of demands for payment from the federal government as "the administrative determination of the amount due," it has not decided the test for whether a statute provides a settlement procedure that should apply in place of the Barring Act. And agency practice more broadly-which aligns with the test the District Court articulated and is consistent with this Court's definition of "settlement"-is irreconcilable with the novel test that the Federal Circuit applied, although both tests claim reliance on this Court's definition of "settlement."

Question Presented: When a person makes a demand for money from the federal government pursuant to federal statute, what test should courts and agencies use to determine whether that statute includes a settlement procedure that displaces the default procedures and limitations set forth in the Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702)?

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Tracy F. Flint, Chicago, Ill.
For Respondent: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Timestamps:

00:00 Introduction

00:05 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins

2:07 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

25:24 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

30:00 Petitioner Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins

32:01 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

57:40 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

57:46 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

Oral Argument: A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools | Case No. 24-249 | Date Argued: 4/28/25 Apr 28, 2025

Case Info: A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools | Case No. 24-249 | Date Argued: 4/28/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act) require public entities and organizations that receive federal funding to provide reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities. In the decision below, the Eighth Circuit held that, for discrimination claims "based on educational services" brought by children with disabilities, these statutes are violated only if school officials acted with ''bad faith or gross misjudgment."

That test squarely implicates an entrenched and acknowledged 5-2 circuit split over the standard governing such claims. It is also plainly mistaken on the merits: As the Eighth Circuit itself acknowledged, the test lacks "any anchor in statutory text," App.5a n.2, and it arbitrarily departs from the more lenient standards that all courts-including the Eighth Circuit-apply to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought by plaintiffs outside the school setting.

Question Presented: Whether the ADA and Rehabilitation Act require children with disabilities to satisfy a uniquely stringent "bad faith or gross misjudgment" standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education.

Holding: Schoolchildren bringing ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims related to their education are not required to make a heightened showing of "bad faith or gross misjudgment" but instead are subject to the same standards that apply in other disability discrimination contexts.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Roman Martinez
For the United States, as Amicus Curiae: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General
For Respondents: Lisa S. Blatt

Host Note: This is probably the sauciest oral argument I've heard this term. Respondent's counsel accuses Petitioner of lying and of asking the Court to consider "uniquely stupid standards." Respondent's counsel also accused the Supreme Court of routinely remanding cases without setting the law. All of these statements clearly made the justices uncomfortable. I included timestamps for these exchanges.

Timestamps:

00:00 Introduction

00:07 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins

2:04 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

18:06 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

23:04 Petitioner Questions End, Government Opening Statement Begins

24:29 Government Free for All Questions Begin

33:42 Government Sequential Questions Begin

45:17 Government Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins

47:16 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

50:26 Respondent alleges that Petitioner lied and made inaccurate statements about Respondent’s position

50:55 Justice Gorsuch tells Respondent to be more careful with her words with respect to alleging that Petitioner lied

52:03 Respondent states that Petitioner asks the court to adopt “uniquely stupid standards.”

1:03:17 Justice Jackson and Respondent debate whether 504 and Title II require reasonable accommodations

1:04:31 Respondent admonishes the Supreme Court for sometimes “just remand[ing] and saying we just remand” and for not “set[ting] the law.”

1:05:01 Justice Gorsuch tells Respondent that he’s troubled by Respondent’s “suggestion that your friends on the other side have lied[]” and asks Respondent “to reconsider that phrase.” Respondent backtracks and says that Petitioner is incorrect.

1:07:24 Justice Gorsuch asks Respondent to withdraw her accusation that Petitioner lied. Respondent obliges.

1:16:23 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

1:22:38 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Reply Begins

Oral Argument: Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA | Case No. 24-7 | Date Argued: 04/23/25 Apr 23, 2025

Case Info: Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA | Case No. 24-7 | Date Argued: 04/23/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act generally preempts States from adopting emission standards for new motor vehicles. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). But under Section 209(b) of that Act, EPA may grant California and only California-a waiver from federal preemption to set its own vehicle-emission standards. Before granting a preemption waiver, EPA must find that California "need[s]" its own emission standards "to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions." Id. § 7543(b)(1)(B).

In 2022, EPA granted California a waiver to set its own standards for greenhouse-gas emissions and to adopt a zero-emission-vehicle mandate, both expressly intended to address global climate change by reducing California vehicles' consumption of liquid fuel. Fuel producers challenged EPA's waiver as contrary to the text of Section 209(b). The D.C. Circuit rejected the challenge without reaching the merits, concluding that fuel producers' injuries were not redressable because they had not established that vacating EPA's waiver would have any effect on automakers.

Questions Presented:

Whether a party may establish the redressability component of Article III standing by relying on the coercive and predictable effects of regulation on third parties.
Whether EPA's preemption waiver for California's greenhouse-gas emission standards and zero-emission- vehicle mandate is unlawful.

Holding: The fuel producers have Article III standing to challenge EPA's approval of the California regulations.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jackson filed dissenting opinions.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: Jeffrey B. Wall
For Federal Respondents: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General
For State Respondents: Joshua A. Klein, Deputy Solicitor General, Oakland, Cal.

Opinion Summary: Velazquez v. Bondi, Att'y Gen. | Date Decided: 4/22/25 | Case No. 23-929 Apr 22, 2025

Case Info: Velazquez v. Bondi, Att'y Gen. | Date Decided: 4/22/25 | Case No. 23-929

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: When a noncitizen's voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart?

Holding: Under §1229c(b)(2), a voluntary-departure deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday extends to the next business day.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which the following justices joined: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Alito, and joined by Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Barrett as to Parts I and II. Justice Alito and Justice Barrett filed dissenting opinions, both joined by Justice Kavanaugh.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Gerard J. Cedrone
For Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Host Note: Please note that the opinion date is April 22, 2025.

Oral Argument: Commissioner v. Zuch | Case No. 24-416 | Date Argued: 4/22/25 Apr 22, 2025

Case Info: CIR v. Zuch | Case No. 24-416 | Date Argued: 4/22/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether a proceeding under 26 U.S.C. 6330 for a pre-deprivation determination about a levy proposed by the Internal Revenue Service to collect unpaid taxes becomes moot when there is no longer a live dispute over the proposed levy that gave rise to the proceeding.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For respondent: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: Mahmoud v. Taylor | Case No. 24-297 | Date Argued: 4/22/25 Apr 22, 2025

Case Info: Mahmoud v. Taylor | Case No. 24-297 | Date Argued: 4/22/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Respondent Montgomery County Board of Education requires elementary school teachers to read their students storybooks celebrating gender transitions, Pride parades, and same-sex playground romance. The storybooks were chosen to disrupt "cisnormativity" and "either/or thinking" among students. The Board's own principals objected that the curriculum was "not appropriate for the intended age group," presented gender ideology as "fact," "sham[ed]" students with contrary opinions, and was "dismissive of religious beliefs." The Board initially allowed parents to opt their kids out- but then reversed course, saying that no opt-outs would be permitted and that parents would not even be notified when the storybooks were read.

Petitioners filed suit, not challenging the curriculum, but arguing that compelling their elementary-age children to participate in instruction contrary to their parents' religious convictions violated the Free Exercise Clause. Construing Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Fourth Circuit found no free-exercise burden because no one was forced "to change their religious beliefs or conduct."

Question Presented:

Whether public schools burden parents' religious exercise when they compel elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality against their parents' religious convictions and with-out notice or opportunity to opt out.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: Eric S. Baxter, Washington, D.C.; and Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
For Respondents: Alan E. Schoenfeld, New York, N.Y.

Timestamps:

00:00 Introduction

00:05 Petitioner Opening Statement

02:06 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

18:38 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

53:39 Petitioner Questions End, Government Opening Statement

54:43 Government Free for All Questions Begin

1:04:21 Government Sequential Questions Begin

01:22:12 Government Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement

01:24:02 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

01:52:42 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

2:25:55 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

Oral Argument: Parrish v. United States | Case No. 24-275 | Date Argued: 4/21/25 Apr 21, 2025

Case Info: Parrish v. United States | Case No. 24-275 | Date Argued: 4/21/25 | Date Decided: 6/12/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Ordinarily, litigants must file a notice of appeal within 30 or 60 days of an adverse judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)-(b). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), however, district courts can reopen an expired appeal period when a party did not receive timely notice of the judgment. The Courts of Appeals have divided about whether a notice of appeal filed after the expiration of the ordinary appeal period but before the appeal period is reopened becomes effective once reopening is granted.

Question Presented: Whether a litigant who files a notice of appeal after the ordinary appeal period expires must file a second, duplicative notice after the appeal period is reopened.

Holding: A litigant who files a notice of appeal after the original appeal deadline but before the court grants reopening need not file a second notice after reopening. The original notice relates forward to the date reopening is granted.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Amanda Rice, Detroit, Mich.
For respondent in support of petitioner: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Michael R. Huston, Phoenix, Ariz.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: Kennedy, Sec. of H&HS v. Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. | Case No. 24-316 | Date Argued: 4/21/25 Apr 21, 2025

Case Info: Kennedy, Sec. of H&HS v. Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. | Case No. 24-316 | Date Argued: 4/21/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (Task Force), which sits within the Public Health Service of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), issues clinical recommendations for preventive medical services, such as screenings and medications to prevent serious diseases. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111 -148, 124 Stat. 119, health insurance issuers and group health plans must cover certain preventive services recommended by the Task Force without imposing any cost-sharing requirements on patients. 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(1).

Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the structure of the Task Force violates the Appointments Clause, U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, Cl. 2, and in declining to sever the statutory provision that it found to unduly insulate the Task Force from the HHS Secretary’s supervision.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.

Host Note: On 4/25/25, the Supreme Court ordered the parties to “file supplemental letter briefs addressing the following question: Whether Congress has ‘by Law’ vested the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services with the authority to appoint members of the United States Preventive Services Task Force. U. S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2.” Link to 4/25/25 Order: Here. On 5/5/25, the parties filed supplemental letter briefs.

This may mean that the Supreme Court is skeptical of Respondent’s position that the Task Force members constitute principal officers and that the Supreme Court may not remand the question to the Fifth Circuit. Check out the exchange involving Mr. Mitchell on this point at 42:00.

Opinion Summary: Cunningham v. Cornell University | Date Decided: 4/17/25 | Case No. 23-1007 Apr 17, 2025

Case Info: Cunningham v. Cornell University | Date Decided: 4/17/25 | Case No. 23-1007

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff can state a claim by alleging that a plan fiduciary engaged in a transaction constituting a furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest, as proscribed by 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C), or whether a plaintiff must plead and prove additional elements and facts not contained in the provision's text.

Holding: To state a claim under §1106(a)(1)(C), a plaintiff need only plausibly allege the elements contained in that provision itself, without addressing potential §1108 exemptions.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Advocates:

For petitioners: Xiao Wang, Charlottesville, Va.; and Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
For respondents: Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC | Date Decided: 4/2/25 | Case No. 23-1038 Apr 02, 2025

Case Info: FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC | Date Decided: 4/2/25 | Case No. 23-1038

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in setting aside FDA's denial orders as arbitrary and capricious.

Holding: The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its adjudication of manufacturers’ premarket tobacco product applications is vacated because the FDA’s denial orders were sufficiently consistent with its predecisional guidance—as to scientific evidence, comparative efficacy, and device type—and thus did not run afoul of the change-in-position doctrine.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For respondents: Eric N. Heyer, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn | Date Decided: 4/2/25 | Case No. 23-365 Apr 02, 2025

Case Info: Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn | Date Decided: 4/2/25 | Case No. 23-365

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether economic harms resulting from personal injuries are injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant's acts for purposes of civil RICO.

Holding: Under civil RICO, §1964(c), a plaintiff may seek treble damages for business or property loss even if the loss resulted from a personal injury.

Result: Affirmed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.
For respondent: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Oral Argument: Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic | Case No. 23-1275 | Date Argued: 4/2/25 Apr 02, 2025

Case Info: Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic | Case No. 23-1275 | Date Argued: 4/2/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

More than 30 years ago, this Court first applied what would become known as the "Blessing factors," holding that a Medicaid Act provision created a privately enforceable right to certain reimbursement rates. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1990). Later, the Court distilled from Wilder a multi-factor test for deciding whether a "statutory provision gives rise to a federal right" privately enforceable under Section 1983. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997). Five years later, though, the Court disparaged Blessing's test while clarifying that only "an unambiguously conferred right is enforceable by § 1983." Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282 (2002). Then, in Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 180 (2023), the Court doubled down on Gonzaga's "demanding bar."

The Court did not apply Blessing or Wilder in Talevski, but it did not overrule them either. After the Court GVR'd this case in light of Talevski, the Fourth Circuit applied Wilder and Blessing again and reaffirmed its prior opinions, maintaining a 5-2 circuit split over the first question presented and a 3-1 circuit split over the proper reading of O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980), which frames the second question.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether the Medicaid Act's any-qualified-provider provision unambiguously confers a private right upon a Medicaid beneficiary to choose a specific provider.

2. What is the scope of a Medicaid beneficiary's alleged right to choose a provider that a state has deemed disqualified?

Holding: Section 1396a(a)(23)(A) does not clearly and unambiguously confer individual rights enforceable under Section 1983.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: John J. Bursch, Washington, D.C.; and Kyle D. Hawkins, Counselor to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
For respondents: Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Fuld v. PLO | Case No. 24-20 | Date Argued: 4/1/25 Apr 01, 2025

Case Info: Fuld v. PLO | Case No. 24-20 | Date Argued: 4/1/25

Case consolidated with: United States v. PLO, Case No. 24-151.

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. § 2331 et seq., provides an extraterritorial private right of action for victims of terror attacks committed against American nationals abroad. In 2019, Congress amended the ATA by enacting the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA). Under the PSJVTA, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) "shall be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction" in an ATA action if: (a) more than 120 days after the statute's enactment, they pay any terrorist convicted of or killed while committing a terror attack against an American national, and the payment is made "by reason of' the conviction or terror attack, 18 U.S.C. § 2334(e) (1)(A); or (b) more than 15 days after the statute's enactment, they "conduct any activity" while physically present in the United States (with limited exceptions), id. § 2334(e)(1) (B).

The PLO and PA engaged in both categories of conduct after the trigger dates. But in the decisions below, the Second Circuit facially invalidated the PSJVTA. The court held that the Fifth Amendment forbids Congress from specifying conduct that triggers a defendant's consent to federal jurisdiction unless the statute provides the defendant with some "governmental benefit" in return, and that the PLO and PA had not received such a benefit.

Question Presented: Whether the PSJVTA violates the Fifth Amendment.

Holding: The PSJVTA's personal jurisdiction provision does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because the statute reasonably ties the assertion of jurisdiction over the PLO and PA to conduct involving the United States and implicating sensitive foreign policy matters within the prerogative of the political branches.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Barrett, and Justice Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Gorsuch joined as to Part II.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners in 24-20: Kent A. Yalowitz, New York, N. Y.
For Petitioner in 24-151: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents: Mitchell R. Berger, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Catholic Charities Bureau v. WI Labor Review Comm'n | Case No. 24-154 | Date Argued: 3/31/25 Mar 31, 2025

Case Info: Catholic Charities Bureau v. WI Labor Review Comm'n | Case No. 24-154 | Date Argued: 3/31/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Wisconsin exempts from its state unemployment tax system certain religious organizations that are "operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches" and that are also "operated primarily for religious purposes."

Petitioners are Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Superior and several sub-entities. Although all agree Catholic Charities is controlled by a church-the Diocese of Superior-the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Catholic Charities is not "operated primarily for religious purposes" and thus does not qualify for the tax exemption. Specifically, the court held that Catholic Charities' activities are not "typical" religious activities because Catholic Charities serves and employs non-Catholics, Catholic Charities does not "attempt to imbue program participants with the Catholic faith," and its services to the poor and needy could also be provided by secular organizations.

Questions Presented:

Does a state violate the First Amendment's Religion Clauses by denying a religious organization an otherwise-available tax exemption because the organization does not meet the state's criteria for religious behavior?
In addressing federal constitutional challenges, may state courts require proof of unconstitutionality "beyond a reasonable doubt?"

Holding: The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s application of § 108.02(15)(h)(2) to petitioners violates the First Amendment.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justices Thomas and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners: Eric C. Rassbach, Washington, D. C.; and Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
For respondents: Colin T. Roth, Assistant Attorney General, Madison, Wis.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: Rivers v. Guerrero | Case No. 23-1345 | Date Argued: 3/31/25 Mar 31, 2025

Case Info: Rivers v. Guerrero | Case No. 23-1345 | Date Argued: 3/31/25 | Date Decided: 6/12/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Under the federal habeas statute, a prisoner "always gets one chance to bring a federal habeas challenge to his conviction," Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 509 (2020). After that, the stringent gatekeeping requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) bar nearly all attempts to file a "second or successive habeas corpus application." Here, petitioner sought to amend his initial habeas application while it was pending on appeal. The Fifth Circuit applied § 2244(b)(2) and rejected the amended filing.

The circuits are intractably split on whether § 2244(b)(2) applies to such filings. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that § 2244(b)(2) categorically applies to all second-in-time habeas filings made after the district court enters final judgment. The Second Circuit disagrees, applying § 2244(b)(2) only after a petitioner exhausts appellate review of his initial petition. And the Third and Tenth Circuits exempt some second-in-time filings from § 2244(b)(2), depending on whether a prisoner prevails on his initial appeal (Third Circuit) or satisfies a seven-factor test (Tenth Circuit).

Question Presented: Whether § 2244(b)(2) applies (i) only to habeas filings made after a prisoner has exhausted appellate review of his first petition, (ii) to all second-in-time habeas filings after final judgment, or (iii) to some second-in-time filings, depending on a prisoner's success on appeal or ability to satisfy a seven-factor test.

Holding: Once a district court enters its judgment with respect to a first-filed habeas petition, a second-in-time filing qualifies as a "second or successive application" properly subject to the requirements of Section 2244(b).

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. There were no concurring opinions.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Peter A. Bruland, Washington, D.C.
For respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.; and Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Opinion Summary: United States v. Miller | Date Decided: 3/26/25 | Case No. 23-824 Mar 26, 2025

Case Info: United States v. Miller | Date Decided: 3/26/25 | Case No. 23-824

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether a bankruptcy trustee may avoid a debtor's tax payment to the United States under Section 544(b) when no actual creditor could have obtained relief under the applicable state fraudulent-transfer law outside of bankruptcy.

Holding: Section 106(a)’s sovereign-immunity waiver applies only to a §544(b) claim itself and not to state-law claims nested within that federal claim.

Result: Reversed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
For respondent: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Bondi, Att'y Gen. v. VanDerStok | Date Decided: 3/26/25 | Case No. 23-852 Mar 26, 2025

Case Info: Bondi, Att'y Gen. v. VanDerStok | Date Decided: 3/26/25 | Case No. 23-852

Link to Docket: Here.

Questions Presented:

Whether "a weapon parts kit that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive," 27 C.F.R. 478.11, is a "firearm" regulated by the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA); and
Whether "a partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver" that is "designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to function as a frame or receiver," 27 C.F.R. 478.12(c), is a "frame or receiver" regulated by the GCA.

Holding: The ATF’s rule is not facially inconsistent with the GCA. The GCA’s statute’s text, context, and structure make clear the GCA reaches some weapon parts kits and unfinished frames or receivers.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Jackson each filed concurring opinions. Justices Thomas and Alito each filed dissenting opinions.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
For respondents: Peter A. Patterson, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Oral Argument: FCC v. Consumers' Research | Case No. 24-354 | Date Argued: 3/26/25 Mar 26, 2025

Case Info: FCC v. Consumers' Research | Case No. 24-354 | Date Argued: 3/26/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

In 47 U.S.C. 254, Congress required the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) to operate universal service subsidy programs using mandatory contributions from telecommunications carriers. The Commission has appointed a private company as the programs' Administrator, authorizing that company to perform administrative tasks such as sending out bills, collecting contributions, and disbursing funds to beneficiaries.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by authorizing the Commission to determine, within the limits set forth in Section 254, the amount that providers must contribute to the Fund.

2. Whether the Commission violated the nondelegation doctrine by using the Administrator's financial projections in computing universal service contribution rates.

3. Whether the combination of Congress's conferral of authority on the Commission and the Commission's delegation of administrative responsibilities to the Administrator violates the nondelegation doctrine.

Host Note: Consolidated with: SHLB Coalition V. Consumers' Research, Case No. 23-422.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners in 24-354: Sarah M. Harris, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Petitioners in 24-422: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.
For Respondents: R. Trent McCotter, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C. | Case No. 23-1229 | Date Argued: 3/25/25 Mar 25, 2025

Case Info: EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C. | Case No. 23-1229 | Date Argued: 3/25/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

In a pair of final actions, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) denied 105 petitions filed by small oil refineries seeking exemptions from the requirements of the Clean Air Act's Renewable Fuel Standard program. Six of those refineries petitioned for review of EPA's decisions in the Fifth Circuit, which denied the government's motion for transfer to the D.C. Circuit.

Question Presented: Whether venue for the refineries' challenges lies exclusively in the D.C. Circuit because the agency's denial actions are "nationally applicable" or, alternatively, are "based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect." 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1).

Holding: EPA's denials of small refinery exemption petitions are locally or regionally applicable actions that fall within the "nationwide scope or effect" exception, requiring venue in the D.C. Circuit.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
For respondents Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association in support of petitioner: Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D. C.
For respondents Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C., et al.: Michael R. Huston, Phoenix, Ariz.

Oral Argument: Oklahoma v. EPA | Case No. 23-1067 | Date Argued: 3/25/25 Mar 25, 2025

Case Info: Oklahoma v. EPA | Case No. 23-1067 | Date Argued: 3/25/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Under the Clean Air Act, each state must adopt an implementation plan to meet national standards, which EPA then reviews for compliance with the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410. In 2023, EPA published disapprovals of 21 states' plans implementing national ozone standards. It did so in a single Federal Register notice. The Act specifies that "[a] petition for review of the [EPA's] action in approving or promulgating any implementation plan ... or any other final action of the [EPA] under this Act ... which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in" the appropriate regional circuit, while "nationally applicable regulations ... may be filed only in" the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). Parties from a dozen states sought judicial review of their respective state plan disapprovals in their appropriate regional circuits.

The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits held that the implementation plan disapprovals of states within those circuits are appropriately challenged in their respective regional courts of appeals. In the decision below, the Tenth Circuit held that challenges to the disapprovals of Oklahoma's and Utah's plans can only be brought in the D.C. Circuit, explicitly disagreeing with the decisions of its sister circuits.

Questions Presented:

Whether a final action by EPA taken pursuant to its Clean Air Act authority with respect to a single state or region may be challenged only in the D.C. Circuit because EPA published the action in the same Federal Register notice as actions affecting other states or regions and claimed to use a consistent analysis for all states.
Whether the Environmental Protection Agency's disapproval of a State Implementation Plan may only be challenged in the D.C. Circuit under 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (b)(1) if EPA packages that disapproval with disapprovals of other States' SIPs and purports to use a consistent method in evaluating the state-specific determinations in those SIPs.

Host Note: Consolidated with: Pacificorp V. EPA, Case No. 23-1067.

Holding: EPA's disapprovals of the Oklahoma and Utah SIPs are locally or regionally applicable actions reviewable in a regional Circuit.

Result: Reversed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners in 23-1067: Mithun Mansinghani, Oklahoma City, Okla.
For petitioners in 23-1068: Misha Tseytlin, Chicago, Ill.
For respondents: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. VIDED.

Oral Argument: Louisiana v. Callais | Case No. 24-109 | Date Argued: 3/24/25 Mar 24, 2025

Case Info: Louisiana v. Callais | Case No. 24-109 | Date Argued: 3/24/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Over the State's strenuous objections, the Middle District of Louisiana held, Robinson v. Ardoin, 605 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. La. 2022)-and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, Robinson v. Ardoin, 86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023)-that Louisiana likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by failing to create a second majority-Black congressional district. The Fifth Circuit gave the Legislature a small window of time to adopt its own remedial plan, or else the State would have to go to trial, which would almost certainly end in the Middle District imposing its own preferred map. Rather than acquiesce in the Middle District's preferences, the Legislature reclaimed its sovereign redistricting pen and passed S.B. 8, which created a second majority-Black district as the courts demanded, protected the Legislature's sovereign prerogatives, and achieved its political goals. In this case, a majority of a three-judge court sitting in the Western District of Louisiana enjoined S.B. 8 as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.

Questions Presented:

Did the majority err in finding that race predominated in the Legislature's enactment of S.B. 8?
Did the majority err in finding that S.B. 8 fails strict scrutiny?
Did the majority err in subjecting S.B. 8 to the Gingles preconditions?
Is this action non-justiciable?

Host Note: Consolidated with Robinson V. Callais (Case No. 24-110)

Oral Advocates:

For Appellant in 24-109: J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, La.
For Appellants in 24-110: Stuart C. Naifeh, New York, N.Y.
For Appellees: Edward D. Greim, Kansas City, Mo.

Oral Argument: Riley v. Bondi, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 23-1270 | Date Argued: 3/24/25 Mar 24, 2025

Case Info: Riley v. Bondi, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 23-1270 | Date Argued: 3/24/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Petitioner Pierre Riley, ineligible for cancellation of removal or discretionary relief from removal, sought deferral in withholding-only proceedings, pursuant to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. After the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a decision reversing an immigration judge's grant of relief, Riley promptly petitioned for review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Although both parties urged the court to decide the merits of the case, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley's petition for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1), which states "[t]he petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal."

This holding implicates two circuit splits, each of which independently warrants review.

Questions Presented:

Whether 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline is jurisdictional, or merely a mandatory claims-processing rule that can be waived or forfeited.
Whether a person can obtain review of the BIA's decision in a withholding-only proceeding by filing a petition within 30 days of that BIA decision?

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Keith Bradley, Denver, Colo.
For respondent in support of petitioner: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below: Stephen J. Hammer, Dallas, Tex.

Opinion Summary: Delligatti v. United States | Date Decided: 3/21/25 | Case No. 23-825 Mar 21, 2025

Case Info: Delligatti v. United States | Date Decided: 3/21/25 | Case No. 23-825

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but can be committed by failing to take action, has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

Holding: The knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the “use” of “physical force” against another person within the meaning of §924(c)(3)(A).

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Allon Kedem, Washington, D. C.
For respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Thompson v. United States | Date Decided: 3/21/25 | Case No. 23-1095 Mar 21, 2025

Case Info: Thompson v. United States | Date Decided: 3/21/25 | Case No. 23-1095

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which prohibits making a "false statement" for the purpose of influencing certain financial institutions and federal agencies, also prohibits making a statement that is misleading but not false.

Holding: 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false statement,” does not criminalize statements that are misleading but not false.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justices Alito and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Chris C. Gair, Chicago, Ill.
For respondent: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Co. | Case No. 22-1079 | Date Argued: 3/19/24 | Date Decided: 6/6/24 Mar 19, 2025

Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Co. | Case No. 22-1079 | Date Argued: 3/19/24 | Date Decided: 6/6/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Asbestos claims in state court have been plagued by rampant fraud, with claimants seeking inflated recoveries against some asbestos defendants by suppressing evidence of claims against other asbestos defendants. For nearly a decade, bankruptcy courts have sought to protect debtors and their insurers by requiring fraud-prevention measures-like ensuring access to claims information-before channeling the asbestos claims against the debtor to a trust. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g). In this case, a Chapter 11 debtor colluded with representatives for asbestos claimants to propose and confirm a plan that includes these fraud-prevention measures only for uninsured asbestos claims-not insured asbestos claims. Petitioner is the insurer who bears the financial burden of those 14,000 insured claims. The Bankruptcy Code's plain text empowers any "party in interest" to "raise" and "be heard on any issue" in a Chapter 11 proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). But the court of appeals refused to adjudicate Petitioner's objections to the fraud and collusion, relying on judge-made limitations engrafted onto the Code.

Question Presented: Whether an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim is a "party in interest" that may object to a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization.

Holding: An insurer with financial responsibility for bankruptcy claims is a "party in interest" under 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) that "may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue" in a Chapter 11 case.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Justice Alito, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, Tex.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
For debtor Respondents: C. Kevin Marshall, Washington, D.C.
For claimant Respondents: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.

Opinion Summary: Bufkin v. Collins | Date Decided: 3/5/25 | Case No. 23-713 Mar 05, 2025

Case Info: Bufkin v. Collins | Date Decided: 3/5/25 | Case No. 23-713

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Must the Veterans Court ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule was properly applied during the claims process in order to satisfy 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1), which directs the Veterans Court to "take due account" of VA's application of that rule?

Holding: The VA’s determination that the evidence regarding a service-related disability claim is in “approximate balance” is a predominantly factual determination reviewed only for clear error.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners: Melanie L. Bostwick, Washington, D. C.
For respondent: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Oral Argument: NRC v. Texas | Case No. 23-1300 | Date Argued: 3/5/25 Mar 05, 2025

Case Info: NRC v. Texas | Case No. 23-1300 | Date Argued: 3/5/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Questions Presented:

Whether the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2341 et seq., which authorizes a "party aggrieved" by an agency's "final order" to petition for review in a court of appeals, 28 U.S.C. 2344, allows nonparties to obtain review of claims asserting that an agency order exceeds the agency's statutory authority.
Whether the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., permit the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license private entities to temporarily store spent nuclear fuel away from the nuclear-reactor sites where the spent fuel was generated.
(For Interim Storage Partners, LLC) Whether the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's exercise of authority to issue a license to a private party to temporarily possess spent nuclear fuel at a location away from an operating nuclear power reactor was lawful under the applicable statutes (as the D.C. and Tenth Circuits have held) or not (as the Fifth Circuit, deliberately splitting from those other circuits, held in this case).
Whether, notwithstanding an allegation of "ultra vires" agency action, a person must take steps to become a "party" to an agency proceeding under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2344, in order to then subsequently challenge the agency action resulting from that proceeding in court (as the Second, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held), or whether an allegation of "ultra vires" agency action can override statutory limitations on jurisdiction (as the Fifth Circuit, deliberately splitting from those other circuits, held in this case).

Host Note: Consolidated with: Interim Storage Partners, LLC V. Texas, Case No. 23-1312.

Holding: Because Texas and Fasken were not parties to the Commission's licensing proceeding, they are not entitled to obtain judicial review of the Commission's licensing decision.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners in 23-1300: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
For petitioner in 23-1312: Brad Fagg, Washington, D. C.
For respondents Texas, et al.: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.
For respondent Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd.: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.

Opinion Summary: San Francisco v. EPA | Date Decided: 3/4/25 | Case No. 23-753 Mar 04, 2025

Case Info: San Francisco v. EPA | Date Decided: 3/4/25 | Case No. 23-753

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the Clean Water Act allows EPA (or an authorized state) to impose generic prohibitions in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits that subject permit holders to enforcement for exceedances of water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their discharges must conform.

Holding: Section 1311(b)(1)(C) does not authorize the EPA to include “end result” provisions in NPDES permits. Determining what steps a permittee must take to ensure that water quality standards are met is the EPA’s responsibility, and Congress has given it the tools needed to make that determination.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Gorsuch joined as to all but Part II. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Tara M. Steeley, Deputy City Attorney, San Francisco, Cal.
For respondent: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Oral Argument: Smith & Wesson Brands v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos | Case No. 23-1141 | Date Argued: 3/4/25 Mar 04, 2025

Case Info: Smith & Wesson Brands v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos | Case No. 23-1141 | Date Argued: 3/4/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Mexican Government sued leading members of the American firearms industry, seeking to hold them liable for harms inflicted by Mexican drug cartels. According to Mexico, America's firearms companies have engaged in a series of business practices for decades-from selling semi-automatic rifles, to making magazines that hold over ten rounds, to failing to impose various sales restrictions-that have created a supply of firearms later smuggled across the border and ultimately used by the cartels to commit crimes. Mexico asks for billions of dollars in damages, plus extensive injunctive relief imposing new gun-control measures in the United States. The district court dismissed the case under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which generally bars suits against firearms companies based on criminals misusing their products. But the First Circuit reversed. It held that PLCAA does not bar this suit because Mexico stated a claim that defendants' business practices have aided and abetted firearms trafficking to the cartels, proximately harming the Mexican government.

Questions Presented:

Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States is the "proximate cause" of alleged injuries to the Mexican government stemming from violence committed by drug cartels in Mexico.
Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States amounts to "aiding and abetting" illegal firearms trafficking because firearms companies allegedly know that some of their products are unlawfully trafficked.

Holding: Because Mexico’s complaint does not plausibly allege that the defendant gun manufacturers aided and abetted gun dealers’ unlawful sales of firearms to Mexican traffickers, PLCAA bars the lawsuit.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas and Justice Jackson each filed concurring opinions.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D.C.
For respondent: Catherine E. Stetson, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman | Case No. 23-1259 | Date Argued: 3/3/25 Mar 03, 2025

Case Info: BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman | Case No. 23-1259 | Date Argued: 3/3/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

For more than 70 years, this Court has "required a movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6)" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "to show 'extraordinary circumstances' justifying the reopening of a final judgment." Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005) (quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950)). This Court has also stressed that a movant must be "faultless" to obtain relief. Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993). "This very strict interpretation of Rule 60(b) is essential if the finality of judgments is to be preserved." Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535 (cleaned up).

In this case, Respondents declined multiple invitations and opportunities to amend their complaint. The District Court then dismissed their complaint with prejudice, and the Second Circuit affirmed. Only then did Respondents move to vacate the judgment so they could file an amended complaint.

The District Court denied the motion under Rule 60(b)(6)'s well-settled standard. But the Second Circuit reversed, based on an unprecedented "balanc[ing]" test that requires district courts to consider Rule 15(a)'s "liberal pleading principles" when addressing a Rule 60 (b)(6) motion to reopen a judgment for the purpose of filing an amended complaint.

Question Presented: Whether Rule 60(b)(6)'s stringent standard applies to a post-judgment request to vacate for the purpose of filing an amended complaint.

Holding: Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances, and this standard does not become less demanding when the movant seeks to reopen a case to amend a complaint. A party must first satisfy Rule 60(b) before Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment standard can apply.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Robers and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined and in which Justice Jackson joined in all parts but Part III. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judg¬ment.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D. C.
For respondents: Michael J. Radine, Hackensack, N.J.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: CC/Devas Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd. | Case No. 23-1201 | Date Argued: 3/3/25 Mar 03, 2025

Case Info: CC/Devas Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd. | Case No. 23-1201 | Date Argued: 3/3/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Questions Presented:

Whether plaintiffs must prove minimum contacts before federal courts may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign states sued under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
The question presented in Antrix Corp. Ltd. is: Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, "[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under section 1608 of this title." 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b).

Holding: Personal jurisdiction exists under the FSIA when an immunity exception applies and service is proper. The FSIA does not require proof of “minimum contacts” over and above the contacts already required by the Act’s enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner in 24-17: Aaron Streett, Houston, Tex.
For petitioners in 23-1201: Matthew D. McGill, Washington, D.C.
For United States, as amicus curiae supporting petitioners: Sarah M. Harris, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
For respondents: Carter G. Phillips, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Opinion Summary: Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. | Date Decided: 2/26/25 | Case No. 23-971 Feb 26, 2025

Case Info: Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. | Date Decided: 2/26/25 | Case No. 23-971

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether a Rule 41 voluntary dismissal without prejudice is a "final judgment, order, or proceeding" under Rule 60(b).

Holding: A case voluntarily dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41(a) counts as a “final proceeding” under Rule 60(b).

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No justice filed a concurring or dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Vincent Levy, New York, N. Y.
For respondent: Matthew D. McGill, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc. | Date Decided: 2/26/25 | Case No. 23-900 Feb 26, 2025

Case Info: Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc. | Date Decided: 2/26/25 | Case No. 23-900

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether an award of the "defendant's profits" under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), can include an order for the defendant to disgorge the distinct profits of legally separate non-party corporate affiliates.

Holding: In awarding the “defendant’s profits” to the prevailing plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit under the Lanham Act, §1117(a), a court can award only profits ascribable to the “defendant” itself. And the term “defendant” bears its usual legal meaning: the party against whom relief or recovery is sought—here, Dewberry Group. The Engineers chose not to add the Group’s affiliates as defendants. Accordingly, the affiliates’ profits are not the (statutorily disgorgable) “defendant’s profits” as ordinarily understood.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Thomas G. Hungar, Washington, D. C.
For United States, as amicus curiae: Nicholas S. Crown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
For respondent: Elbert Lin, Richmond, Va.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Oral Argument: Ames v. OH Dept. of Youth Services | Case No. 23-1039 | Date Argued: 2/26/25 Feb 26, 2025

Case Info: Ames v. OH Dept. of Youth Services | Case No. 23-1039 | Date Argued: 2/26/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether, in addition to pleading the other elements of Title VII, a majority-group plaintiff must show "background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority."

Holding: The Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule—which requires members of a majority group to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard to prevail on a Title VII claim—cannot be squared with the text of Title VII or the Court’s precedents.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Xiao Wang, Charlottesville, Va.; and Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
For respondent: T. Elliot Gaiser, Solicitor General, Columbus, Ohio.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Opinion Summary: Glossip v. Oklahoma | Date Decided: 2/25/25 | Case No. 22-7466 Feb 25, 2025

Case Info: Glossip v. Oklahoma | Date Decided: 2/25/25 | Case No. 22-7466

Link to Docket: Here.

Questions Presented:

Whether the State's suppression of the key prosecution witness's admission he was under the care of a psychiatrist and failure to correct that witness's false testimony about that care and related diagnosis violate the due process of law.
Whether the entirety of the suppressed evidence must be considered when assessing the materiality of Brady and Napue claims.
Whether due process of law requires reversal, where a capital conviction is so infected with errors that the State no longer seeks to defend it.

Holdings:

This Court has jurisdiction to review the OCCA’s judgment.
The prosecution violated its constitutional obligation to correct false testimony.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Alito joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Parts IV– A–1, IV–A–2, and IV–A–3. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D. C.
For respondent in support of petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.
For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Christopher G. Michel, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Lackey v. Stinnie | Date Decided: 2/25/25 | Case No. 23-621 Feb 25, 2025

Case Info: Lackey v. Stinnie | Date Decided: 2/25/25 | Case No. 23-621

Link to Docket: Here.

Questions Presented:

Whether a party must obtain a ruling that conclusively decides the merits in its favor, as opposed to merely predicting a likelihood of later success, to prevail on the merits under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Whether a party must obtain an enduring change in the parties' legal relationship from a judicial act, as opposed to a non-judicial event that moots the case, to prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Holding: The plaintiff drivers here—who gained only preliminary injunctive relief before this action became moot—do not qualify as “prevailing part[ies]” eligible for attorney’s fees under §1988(b) because no court conclusively resolved their claims by granting enduring judicial relief on the merits that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Erika L. Maley, Solicitor General, Richmond, Va.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
For respondents: Brian D. Schmalzbach, Richmond, Va.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Oral Argument: Esteras v. United States | Case No. 23-7483 | Date Argued: 2/25/25 Feb 25, 2025

Case Info: Esteras v. United States | Case No. 23-7483 | Date Argued: 2/25/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The supervised-release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), lists factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) for a court to consider when sentencing a person for violating a supervised release condition. In that list, Congress omitted the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(A)-the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense.

Question Presented: Even though Congress excluded section 3553(a)(2)(A) from section 3583(e)'s list of factors to consider when revoking supervised release, may a district court rely on the section 3553(a)(2)(A) factors when revoking supervised release?

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: Christian J. Grostic, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Cleveland, Ohio.
For Respondent: Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Perttu v. Richards | Case No. 23-1324 | Date Argued: 2/25/25 Feb 25, 2025

Case Info: Perttu v. Richards | Case No. 23-1324 | Date Argued: 2/25/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: In cases subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, do prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning their exhaustion of administrative remedies where disputed facts regarding exhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim?

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Ann M. Sherman, Solicitor General, Lansing, Mich.
For respondent: Lori Alvino McGill, Charlottesville, Va.

Oral Argument: Gutierrez v. Saenz | Case No. 23-7809 | Date Argued: 2/24/25 Feb 24, 2025

Case Info: Gutierrez v. Saenz | Case No. 23-7809 | Date Argued: 2/24/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

In Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230 (2023), this Court held that Rodney Reed has standing to pursue a declaratory judgment that Texas's post-conviction DNA statute was unconstitutional because ''Reed suffered an injury in fact," the named defendant "caused Reed's injury," and if a federal court concludes that Texas's statute violates due process, it is "substantially likely that the state prosecutor would abide by such a court order."

In this case, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to follow that ruling over a dissent that recognized that this case was indistinguishable from Reed. The majority formulated its own novel test for Article III standing, which requires scouring the record of the parties' dispute and any legal arguments asserted, to predict whether the defendants in a particular case would actually redress the plaintiff’s injury by complying with a federal court's declaratory judgment. Gutierrez v. Saenz, 93 F.4th 267, 274 (5th Cir. 2024).

The Fifth Circuit's new test conflicts with Reed and creates a circuit split with the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which have applied the standing doctrine exactly as this Court directed in Reed. See Johnson v. Griffin, 69 F.4th 506 (8th Cir. 2023); Redd v. Guerrero, 84 F.4th 874 (9th Cir. 2023).

Question Presented: Does Article III standing require a particularized determination of whether a specific state official will redress the plaintiff’s injury by following a favorable declaratory judgment?

Holding: Gutierrez has standing to bring his Section 1983 claim challenging Texas's postconviction DNA testing procedures under the Due Process Clause.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined, and in which Justice Barrett joined as to all but Part II.B.2. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Anne E. Fisher, Assistant Federal Defender, Philadelphia, Pa.
For respondents: William F. Cole, Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

Opinion Summary: Hungary v. Simon | Date Decided: 2/21/25 | Case No. 23-867 Feb 21, 2025

Case Info: Hungary v. Simon | Date Decided: 2/21/25 | Case No. 23-867

Link to Docket: Here.

Questions Presented:

Whether historical commingling of assets suffices to establish that proceeds of seized property have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
Whether a plaintiff must make out a valid claim that an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies at the pleading stage, rather than merely raising a plausible inference.
Whether a sovereign defendant bears the burden of producing evidence to affirmatively disprove that the proceeds of property taken in violation of international law have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

Holding: Alleging commingling of funds alone cannot satisfy the commercial nexus requirement of the FSIA’s expropriation exception.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners: Joshua S. Glasgow, Buffalo, N. Y.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
For respondents: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath | Date Decided: 2/21/25 | Case No. 23-1127 Feb 21, 2025

Case Info: Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath | Date Decided: 2/21/25 | Case No. 23-1127

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether reimbursement requests submitted to the E-rate program are "claims" under the False Claims Act.

Holding: The E-Rate reimbursement requests at issue are “claims” under the False Claims Act because the Government “provided” (at a minimum) a “portion” of the money applied for by transferring more than $100 million from the Treasury into the Fund.

Result: Affirmed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined, and in which Justice Alito joined as to Part I. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, Tex.
For respondent: Tejinder Singh, Washington, D. C.; and Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Williams v. Reed | Date Decided: 2/21/25 | Case No. 23-191 Feb 21, 2025

Case Info: Williams v. Reed | Date Decided: 2/21/25 | Case No. 23-191

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether exhaustion of state administrative remedies is required to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court.

Holding: Where a state court’s application of a state exhaustion requirement in effect immunizes state officials from §1983 claims challenging delays in the administrative process, state courts may not deny those §1983 claims on failure-to-exhaust grounds.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Result: Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined as to Part II.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D. C.
For respondent: Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., Solicitor General, Montgomery, Ala.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Oral Argument: Barnes v. Felix | Case No. 23-1239 | Date Argued: 1/22/25 Jan 22, 2025

Case Info: Barnes v. Felix | Case No. 23-1239 | Date Argued: 1/22/25 | Date Decided: 5/15/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from using "unreasonable" force. U.S. Const. amend. IV. In Graham v. Connor, this Court held that reasonableness depends on "the totality of the circumstances." 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quotation marks omitted). But four circuits-the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth-cabin Graham. Those circuits evaluate whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred under the "moment of the threat doctrine," which evaluates the reasonableness of an officer's actions only in the narrow window when the officer's safety was threatened, and not based on events that precede the moment of the threat. In contrast, eight circuits-the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits-reject the moment of the threat doctrine and follow the totality of the circumstances approach, including evaluating the officer's actions leading up to the use of force.

In the decision below, Judge Higginbotham concurred in his own majority opinion, explaining that the minority approach "lessens the Fourth Amendment's protection of the American public" and calling on this Court "to resolve the circuit divide over the application of a doctrine deployed daily across this country." Pet. App. 10a-16a (Higginbotham, J., concurring).

Question Presented: Whether courts should apply the moment of the threat doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment.

Holding: A claim that a law enforcement officer used excessive force during a stop or arrest is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, which requires that the force deployed be objectively reasonable from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene. The inquiry into the reasonableness of police force requires analyzing the totality of the circumstances. That analysis demands careful attention to the facts and circumstances relating to the incident. Most notable here, the totality of the circumstances inquiry has no time limit.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Nathaniel A.G. Zelinsky, Washington, D. C.; and Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
For respondents: Charles L. McCloud, Washington, D. C.; and Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex. (for Texas, et al., as amici curiae.)

Oral Argument: Cunningham v. Cornell University | Case No. 23-1007 | Date Argued: 1/22/25 Jan 22, 2025

Case Info: Cunningham v. Cornell University | Case No. 23-1007 | Date Argued: 1/22/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1) (C), prohibits a plan fiduciary from "engag[ing] in a transaction, if he knows or should know that such transaction constitutes a direct or indirect furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest." The statute elsewhere defines "party in interest" broadly to include a variety of parties that may contract with or provide services to a plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(B).

The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have applied the Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have, on the other hand, required plaintiffs to allege additional elements to state a claim, because a "literal reading" of 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C) would purportedly produce "results that are inconsistent with ERISA's statutory purpose." Albert v. Oshkosh Corp., 47 F.4th 570, 585 (7th Cir. 2022).

Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff can state a claim by alleging that a plan fiduciary engaged in a transaction constituting a furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest, as proscribed by 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C), or whether a plaintiff must plead and prove additional elements and facts not contained in the provision's text.

Holding: To state a claim under §1106(a)(1)(C), a plaintiff need only plausibly allege the elements contained in that provision itself, without addressing potential §1108 exemptions.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Advocates:

For petitioners: Xiao Wang, Charlottesville, Va.; and Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
For respondents: Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: McLaughlin Chiropractic Assoc. v. McKesson Corp. | Case No. 23-1226 | Date Argued: 1/21/25 Jan 21, 2025

Case Info: McLaughlin Chiropractic Assoc. v. McKesson Corp. | Case No. 23-1226 | Date Argued: 1/21/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the Hobbs Act required the district court in this case to accept the FCC's legal interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Holding: The Hobbs Act does not bind district courts in civil enforcement proceedings to an agency's interpretation of a statute. District courts must independently determine the law's meaning under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation while affording appropriate respect to the agency's interpretation.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Matthew W.H. Wessler, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents: Joseph R. Palmore, Washington, D.C.; and Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Oral Argument: FDA v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. | Case No. 23-1187 | Date Argued: 1/21/25 Jan 21, 2025

Case Info: FDA v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. | Case No. 23-1187 | Date Argued: 1/21/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, Div. A, 123 Stat. 1776, requires a person to obtain authorization from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before introducing a new tobacco product into interstate commerce. If FDA denies an application for authorization, "any person adversely affected by such * * * denial may file a petition for judicial review of such * * * denial with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or for the circuit in which such person resides or has their principal place of business." 21 U.S.C. 387l(a)(l). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has determined that a manufacturer may seek judicial review in that circuit even if it neither resides nor has its principal place of business there, so long as its petition is joined by a seller of its products, such as a gas station or convenience store, based in the circuit.

Question Presented: Whether a manufacturer may file a petition for review in a circuit (other than the D.C. Circuit) where it neither resides nor has its principal place of business, if the petition is joined by a seller of the manufacturer's products that is located within that circuit.

Holding: Retailers who would sell a new tobacco product if not for the FDA's denial order may seek judicial review of that order under § 387l(a)(1).

Result: Affirmed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents: Ryan J. Watson, Washington, D.C.

Opinion Summary: TikTok Inc. v. Garland | Date Decided: 1/17/25 | Case No. 24–656 Jan 17, 2025

Case Info: TikTok Inc. v. Garland | Date Decided: 1/17/25 | Case No. 24–656

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, as applied to Petitioners, violates the First Amendment.

Holding: The challenged provisions do not violate petitioners’ First Amendment rights.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: The Supreme Court wrote a Per Curiam unanimous opinion. Justice Sotomayor wrote an opinion that concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Justice Gorsuch wrote an opinion that concurred in the judgment.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners TikTok Inc., et al.: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D. C.
For petitioners Firebaugh, et al.: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Melo Park, Cal.
For respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera | Date Decided: 1/15/25 | Case No. 23-217 Jan 15, 2025

Case Info: E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera | Date Decided: 1/15/25 | Case No. 23-217

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the applicability of an FLSA exemption is a mere preponderance of the evidence-as six circuits hold-or clear and convincing evidence, as the Fourth Circuit alone holds.

Holding: The preponderance of the evidence standard applies when an employer seeks to demonstrate that an employee is exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime-pay provisions of the FLSA.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.; and Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
For respondents: Lauren E. Bateman, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Royal Canin U.S.A. v. Wullschleger | Date Decided: 1/15/25 | Case No. 23-677 Jan 15, 2025

Case Info: Royal Canin U.S.A. v. Wullschleger | Date Decided: 1/15/25 | Case No. 23-677

Link to Docket: Here.

Questions Presented:

Whether such a post-removal amendment of the complaint defeats federal-question subject-matter jurisdiction.
Whether such a post-removal amendment of the complaint precludes a district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs remaining state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Holding: When a plaintiff amends her complaint to delete the federal-law claims that enabled removal to federal court, leaving only state-law claims behind, the federal court loses supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, and the case must be remanded to state court.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners: Katherine B. Wellington, Boston, Mass.
For respondents: Ashley C. Keller, Chicago, Ill.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Oral Argument: Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton | Case No. 23-1122 | Date Argued: 1/15/25 Jan 15, 2025

Case Info: Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton | Case No. 23-1122 | Date Argued: 1/15/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

This Court has repeatedly held that States may rationally restrict minors' access to sexual materials, but such restrictions must withstand strict scrutiny if they burden adults' access to constitutionally protected speech. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 663 (2004). In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit applied rational-basis review-rather than strict scrutiny-to vacate a preliminary injunction of a provision of a Texas law that significantly burdens adults' access to protected speech, because the law's stated purpose is to protect minors.

Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in applying rational-basis review to a law burdening adults' access to protected speech, instead of strict scrutiny as this Court and other circuits have consistently done.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: Derek L. Shaffer, Washington, D.C.
For United States, as amicus curiae: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

Oral Argument: Thompson v. United States | Case No. 23-1095 | Date Argued: 1/14/25 Jan 14, 2025

Case Info: Thompson v. United States | Case No. 23-1095 | Date Argued: 1/14/25 | Date Decided: 3/21/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which prohibits making a "false statement" for the purpose of influencing certain financial institutions and federal agencies, also prohibits making a statement that is misleading but not false.

Holding: 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false statement,” does not criminalize statements that are misleading but not false.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justices Alito and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Chris C. Gair, Chicago, Ill.
For respondent: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services | Case No. 23-971 | Date Argued: 1/14/25 Jan 14, 2025

Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services | Case No. 23-971 | Date Argued: 1/14/25 | Date Decided: 2/26/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) empowers district courts, on just terms and under circumstances specified in that Rule, to "relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding."

Question Presented: Whether a Rule 41 voluntary dismissal without prejudice is a "final judgment, order, or proceeding" under Rule 60(b).

Holding: A case voluntarily dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41(a) counts as a “final proceeding” under Rule 60(b).

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No justice filed a concurring or dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Vincent Levy, New York, N. Y.
For respondent: Matthew D. McGill, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: Stanley v. City of Sanford | Case No. 23-997 | Date Argued: 1/13/25 Jan 13, 2025

Case Info: Stanley v. City of Sanford | Case No. 23-997 | Date Argued: 1/13/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, does a former employee-who was qualified to perform her job and who earned post-employment benefits while employed-lose her right to sue over discrimination with respect to those benefits solely because she no longer holds her job?

Holding: To prevail under §12112(a), a plaintiff must plead and prove that she held or desired a job, and could perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation, at the time of an employer's alleged act of disability-based discrimination.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, in which Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, Justice Kagan, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to Parts III and IV, except for n. 12.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Deepak Gupta, Washington, D.C.; and Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
For Respondent: Jessica C. Conner, Orlando, Fla.

Oral Argument: Hewitt v. United States | Case No. 23-1002 | Date Argued: 1/13/25 Jan 13, 2025

Case Info: Hewitt v. United States | Case No. 23-1002 | Date Argued: 1/13/25

This case was consolidated with: Duffey V. United States, Case No. 23-1007.

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The First Step Act (FSA) significantly reduced the mandatory minimum sentences for several federal drug and firearm offenses. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115- 391, §§ 401, 403, 132 Stat. 5194, 5220-5222. Sections 401 and 403 apply to offenses committed after the FSA's enactment on December 21, 2018, and to "any offense that was committed before the date of enactment * * * if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment." FSA§§ 401(c), 403(b).

There is an acknowledged split between the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, on the one hand; and the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, on the other hand, on the question whether sections 401(c) and 403(b) apply when a pre-enactment sentence is vacated and the court must impose a new post-enactment sentence.

Question Presented: Whether the First Step Act's sentencing reduction provisions apply to a defendant originally sentenced before the FSA's enactment when that original sentence is judicially vacated and the defendant is resentenced to a new term of imprisonment after the FSA's enactment.

Holding: Under § 403(b) of the First Step Act, a sentence "has . . . been imposed" for purposes of that provision if, and only if, the sentence is extant—i.e., has not been vacated. Thus, the Act's more lenient penalties apply to defendants whose previous § 924(c) sentences have been vacated and who need to be resentenced following the Act's enactment.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV and V, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners: Michael B. Kimberly, Washington, D.C.
For respondent in support of petitioners: Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: TikTok, Inc. v. Garland, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 24-656 | Date Argued: 1/10/25 Jan 10, 2025

Case Info: TikTok, Inc. v. Garland, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 24-656 | Date Argued: 1/10/25 | Date Decided: 1/17/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, as applied to Petitioners, violates the First Amendment.

Holding: The challenged provisions do not violate petitioners’ First Amendment rights.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: The Supreme Court wrote a Per Curiam unanimous opinion. Justice Sotomayor wrote an opinion that concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Justice Gorsuch wrote an opinion that concurred in the judgment.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners TikTok Inc., et al.: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D. C.
For petitioners Firebaugh, et al.: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Melo Park, Cal.
For respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Host Note: Consolidated with: Firebaugh v. Garland, Case No. 24-657.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc. | Case No. 23-900 | Date Argued: 12/11/24 Dec 11, 2024

Case Info: Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc. | Case No. 23-900 | Date Argued: 12/11/24 | Date Decided: 2/26/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether an award of the "defendant's profits" under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), can include an order for the defendant to disgorge the distinct profits of legally separate non-party corporate affiliates.

Holding: In awarding the “defendant’s profits” to the prevailing plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit under the Lanham Act, §1117(a), a court can award only profits ascribable to the “defendant” itself. And the term “defendant” bears its usual legal meaning: the party against whom relief or recovery is sought—here, Dewberry Group. The Engineers chose not to add the Group’s affiliates as defendants. Accordingly, the affiliates’ profits are not the (statutorily disgorgable) “defendant’s profits” as ordinarily understood.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Thomas G. Hungar, Washington, D. C.
For United States, as amicus curiae: Nicholas S. Crown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
For respondent: Elbert Lin, Richmond, Va.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Opinion Summary: Bouarfa v. Mayorkas | Date Decided: 12/10/24 | Case No. 23-583 Dec 10, 2024

Case Info: Bouarfa v. Mayorkas | Date Decided: 12/10/24 | Case No. 23-583

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether a visa petitioner may obtain judicial review when an approved petition is revoked on the basis of nondiscretionary criteria.

Holding: Revocation of an approved visa petition under § 1155 based on a sham-marriage determination by the Secretary is the kind of discretionary decision that falls within the purview of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain actions “in the discretion of” the agency.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No justice filed a concurring or dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Samir Deger-Sen, New York, N. Y.
For respondents: Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Oral Argument: Seven County Coalition v. Eagle County | Case No. 23-975 | Date Argued: 12/10/24 Dec 10, 2024

Case Info: Seven County Coalition v. Eagle County | Case No. 23-975 | Date Argued: 12/10/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

In Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004), this Court held that when an agency cannot prevent an environmental effect "due to its limited statutory authority over the relevant actions," the National Environmental Policy Act does not require it to study that effect. This holding has divided the courts of appeals. Five circuits read Public Citizen to mean that an agency's environmental review can stop where its regulatory authority stops. Two circuits disagree and require review of any impact that can be called reasonably foreseeable.

Here, the Surface Transportation Board relied on Public Citizen to cabin its environmental review of a new rail line in Utah. But the D.C. Circuit rejected that approach, ruling that the Board "cannot avoid" environmental review "on the ground that it lacks authority to prevent, control, or mitigate" distant environmental effects. As a result, it ordered the Board to study the local effects of oil wells and refineries that lie outside the Board's regulatory authority.

Question Presented: Whether the National Environmental Policy Act requires an agency to study environmental impacts beyond the proximate effects of the action over which the agency has regulatory authority.

Holding: The D.C. Circuit failed to afford the Board the substantial judicial deference required in NEPA cases and incorrectly interpreted NEPA to require the Board to consider the environmental effects of upstream and downstream projects that are separate in time or place from the Uinta Basin Railway.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.
For federal respondents supporting petitioners: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
For respondents Eagle County, et al.: William M. Jay, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: Kousisis v. United States | Case No. 23-909 | Date Argued: 12/9/24 | Date Decided: 5/22/25 Dec 09, 2024

Case Info: Kousisis v. United States | Case No. 23-909 | Date Argued: 12/9/24 | Date Decided: 5/22/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Questions Presented:

Whether deception to induce a commercial exchange can constitute mail or wire fraud, even if inflicting economic harm on the alleged victim was not the object of the scheme. Whether a sovereign's statutory, regulatory, or policy interest is a property interest when compliance is a material term of payment for goods or services.
Whether all contract rights are "property."

Holding: A defendant who induces a victim to enter into a transaction under materially false pretenses may be convicted of federal fraud even if the defendant did not seek to cause the victim economic loss.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion con¬curring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, Cal.
For respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: Feliciano v. Dept. of Transportation | Case No. 23-861 | Date Argued: 12/9/24 Dec 09, 2024

Case Info: Feliciano v. Dept. of Transportation | Case No. 23-861 | Date Argued: 12/9/24 | Date Decided: 4/30/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

This case presents a question of critical importance to hundreds of thousands of Americans who serve their country both as federal civilian employees and members of the Armed Services' reserve components.

Congress enacted the differential pay statute, 5 U.S.C. § 5538, to eliminate the financial burden that reservists face when called to active duty at pay rates below their federal civilian salaries. To ensure that these reservists suffer no financial penalty for active-duty service, the differential pay statute requires that the government make up the difference. Federal civilian employees are entitled to differential pay when performing active duty "pursuant to a call or order to active duty under * * * a provision of law referred to in section 101(a)(13)(B) of title 10." That section, Section 101(a)(13)(B), enumerates several statutory authorities and includes a catchall provision: "any other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress."

Recently, in a decision that departed from settled understandings of this language, the Federal Circuit held that reservists relying on Section 101(a)(13)(B)'s catchall provision to claim differential pay must show that they were "directly called to serve in a contingency operation." Adams v. DHS, 3 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Under that demanding, fact-intensive standard, the Federal Circuit has rejected claims for differential pay even by reservists like petitioner whose activation orders expressly invoked a presidential emergency declaration.

Question Presented: Whether a federal civilian employee called or ordered to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency is entitled to differential pay even if the duty is not directly connected to the national emergency.

Holding: A federal civilian employee called to active duty pursuant to “any other provision of law . . . during a national emergency” as described in §101(a)(13)(B) is entitled to differential pay if the reservist’s service temporally coincides with a declared national emergency without any showing that the service bears a substantive connection to a particular emergency.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Kagan and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt
For Respondent: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: United States v. Skrmetti | Case No. 23-477 | Date Argued: 12/4/24 Dec 04, 2024

Case Info: United States v. Skrmetti | Case No. 23-477 | Date Argued: 12/4/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether Tennessee Senate Bill 1 (SBl), which prohibits all medical treatments intended to allow "a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex" or to treat "purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity," Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1), violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Holding: Tennessee's law prohibiting certain medical treatments for transgender minors is not subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and satisfies rational basis review. SB1 satisfies rational basis review.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett joined, and in which Justice Alito joined as to Parts I and II–B. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined in full, and in which Justice Kagan joined as to Parts I–IV. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents L.W., et al. supporting petitioner: Chase B. Strangio, New York, N.Y.
For Respondents Jonathan Skrmetti, et al.: J. Matthew Rice, Solicitor General, Nashville, Tenn.

Oral Argument: Hungary v. Simon | Case No. 23-867 | Date Argued: 12/03/24 Dec 03, 2024

Case Info: Hungary v. Simon | Case No. 23-867 | Date Argued: 12/03/24 | Date Decided: 2/21/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

A foreign sovereign is generally immune from suit in domestic courts, subject to the specific exceptions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Under the expropriation exception, claims involving rights in property taken in violation of international law may be heard if "property or any property exchanged for such property" has a commercial nexus with the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). Specifically, the property or its proceeds must be either "present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity" or "owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States." Id. The circuit courts have split as to the showing required to meet the commercial nexus requirement.

Questions Presented:

Whether historical commingling of assets suffices to establish that proceeds of seized property have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
Whether a plaintiff must make out a valid claim that an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies at the pleading stage, rather than merely raising a plausible inference.
Whether a sovereign defendant bears the burden of producing evidence to affirmatively disprove that the proceeds of property taken in violation of international law have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

Holding: Alleging commingling of funds alone cannot satisfy the commercial nexus requirement of the FSIA’s expropriation exception.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners: Joshua S. Glasgow, Buffalo, N. Y.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
For respondents: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC | Case No. 23-1038 | Date Argued: 12/2/24 Dec 02, 2024

Case Info: FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC | Case No. 23-1038 | Date Argued: 12/2/24 | Date Decided: 4/2/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, Div. A, 123 Stat. 1776, requires a person to obtain authorization from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before introducing a new tobacco product into interstate commerce. The agency may grant such authorization only if the applicant shows, among other things, that the marketing of the product would be "appropriate for the protection of the public health." 21 U.S.C. 387j(c)(2)(A). In this case, the agency denied respondents' applications for authorization to market new e-cigarette products because they had failed to show that marketing the products would be appropriate for the protection of the public health. The Fifth Circuit set aside FDA's denial orders as arbitrary and capricious, relying on legal theories that have been rejected by other courts of appeals that have reviewed materially similar FDA denial orders.

Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in setting aside FDA's denial orders as arbitrary and capricious.

Holding: The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its adjudication of manufacturers’ premarket tobacco product applications is vacated because the FDA’s denial orders were sufficiently consistent with its predecisional guidance—as to scientific evidence, comparative efficacy, and device type—and thus did not run afoul of the change-in-position doctrine.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For respondents: Eric N. Heyer, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: United States v. Miller | Case No. 23-824 | Date Argued: 12/2/24 Dec 02, 2024

Case Info: United States v. Miller | Case No. 23-824 | Date Argued: 12/2/24 | Date Decided: 3/26/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Bankruptcy Code permits a bankruptcy trustee to avoid any prepetition transfer of the debtor's property that would be voidable "under applicable law" outside bankruptcy by an actual unsecured creditor of the estate. 11 U.S.C. 544(b)(1). The applicable law may be state law. Elsewhere, the Code abrogates the sovereign immunity of all governmental units "to the extent set forth in this section with respect to" various sections of the Code, including Section 544. 11 U.S.C. 106(a)(l). The court of appeals below joined a circuit split in holding that Section 106(a)(l) permits a bankruptcy trustee to avoid a debtor's tax payment to the United States under Section 544(b), even though no actual creditor could have obtained relief outside of bankruptcy in light of sovereign immunity, the Supremacy Clause, and the Appropriations Clause.

Question Presented: Whether a bankruptcy trustee may avoid a debtor's tax payment to the United States under Section 544(b) when no actual creditor could have obtained relief under the applicable state fraudulent-transfer law outside of bankruptcy.

Holding: Section 106(a)’s sovereign-immunity waiver applies only to a §544(b) claim itself and not to state-law claims nested within that federal claim.

Result: Reversed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
For respondent: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: NVIDIA Corp. v. E. Ohman J:or Fonder AB | Case No. 23-970 | Date Argued: 11/13/24 Nov 13, 2024

Case Info: NVIDIA Corp. v. E. Ohman J:or Fonder AB | Case No. 23-970 | Date Argued: 11/13/24 | Date Decided: 12/11/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) imposes "[e]xacting pleading requirements" on plaintiffs who file securities fraud class actions. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 311, 313 (2007). To state a claim, plaintiffs must "state with particularity all facts" supporting their allegations of falsity and must also allege "facts giving rise to a strong inference" of the required mental state. 15 U.S.C § 78u-4(b)(1), (2)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Plaintiffs frequently try to meet these requirements by claiming that internal company documents contradicted the company's public statements.

Questions Presented:

Whether plaintiffs seeking to allege scienter under the PSLRA based on allegations about internal company documents must plead with particularity the contents of those documents.
Whether plaintiffs can satisfy the PSLRA's falsity requirement by relying on an expert opinion to substitute for particularized allegations of fact.

Result: Writ of certiorari DISMISSED as improvidently granted by per curiam Opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners: Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D. C.
For respondents: Deepak Gupta, Washington, D. C.; and Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Oral Argument: Delligatti v. United States | Case No. 23-825 | Date Argued: 11/12/24 Nov 12, 2024

Case Info: Delligatti v. United States | Case No. 23-825 | Date Argued: 11/12/24 | Date Decided: 3/21/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), a felony qualifies as a "crime of violence" if it "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another." Courts have disagreed about how to apply use-of-force language to crimes that require proof of a victim's bodily injury or death but can be committed by failing to take action.

In the decision below, the Second Circuit held that any crime requiring proof of death or bodily injury categorically involves the use of physical force, even if it can be committed through inaction-such as by failing to provide medicine to someone who is sick or by failing to feed a child. That ruling reflects the law in eight circuits.

Two courts of appeals, by contrast, have held that the use of force is not an element of such crimes if the crime may be committed by inaction. One of those courts recently rejected the government's petition for rehearing en banc, which had argued that any crime requiring proof of bodily injury or death necessarily involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

Question Presented: Whether a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but can be committed by failing to take action, has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

Holding: The knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the “use” of “physical force” against another person within the meaning of §924(c)(3)(A).

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Allon Kedem, Washington, D. C.
For respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: Velazquez v. Garland, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 23-929 | Date Argued: 11/12/24 Nov 12, 2024

Case Info: Velazquez v. Garland, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 23-929 | Date Argued: 11/12/24 | Date Decided: 4/22/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Federal immigration law allows the government to grant a "voluntary departure" period of up to 60 days to a noncitizen "of good moral character" who receives an adverse decision in removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. §1229c(b). If the noncitizen fails to depart during that window, he or she is subject to a civil fine and is ineligible for various forms of immigration relief (like cancellation of removal or adjustment of status) for 10 years. §1229c(d)(1). If, however, the noncitizen "file[s] a post-decision motion to reopen or reconsider during the period allowed for voluntary departure," the penalties for failure to voluntarily depart do not apply. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(b)(3)(iii).

Question Presented: When a noncitizen's voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart?

Holding: Under §1229c(b)(2), a voluntary-departure deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday extends to the next business day.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which the following justices joined: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Alito, and joined by Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Barrett as to Parts I and II. Justice Alito and Justice Barrett filed dissenting opinions, both joined by Justice Kavanaugh.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Gerard J. Cedrone
For Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Oral Argument: Facebook, Inc. v. Amalgamated Bank | Case No. 23-980 | Date Argued: 11/6/24 Nov 06, 2024

Case Info: Facebook, Inc. v. Amalgamated Bank | Case No. 23-980 | Date Argued: 11/6/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

This petition presents two important questions that have divided the federal courts of appeals.

First, the circuits have split three ways concerning what public companies must disclose in the "risk factors" section of their 10-K filings. The Sixth Circuit holds that companies need not disclose past instances when a risk has materialized. The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits hold that companies must disclose that a risk materialized in the past if the company knows that event will harm the business. The Ninth Circuit here adopted a third, outlier position requiring companies to disclose that a risk materialized in the past even if there is no known threat of business harm.

Second, the circuits disagree on the proper pleading standard for the loss causation element of a private securities-fraud claim. The Fourth Circuit holds that loss causation allegations must satisfy Federal Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard for fraud, while the Fifth and Sixth Circuits apply the ordinary Rule 8 standard. The Ninth Circuit here initially applied Rule 8, then substituted citations of Rule 9(b) without changing its analysis.

Questions Presented:

Are risk disclosures false or misleading when they do not disclose that a risk has materialized in the past, even if that past event presents no known risk of ongoing or future business harm?
Does Federal Rule 8 or Rule 9(b) supply the proper pleading standard for loss causation in a private securities-fraud action?

Result: Writ of certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted by per curiam.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D. C.
For respondents: Kevin K. Russell, Washington, D. C.; and Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Oral Argument: E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera | Case No. 23-217 | Date Argued: 11/5/24 Nov 05, 2024

Case Info: E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera | Case No. 23-217 | Date Argued: 11/5/24 | Date Decided: 1/15/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) covers more than 140 million workers and guarantees eligible workers a minimum wage and overtime pay. But the FLSA also contains 34 exemptions from those requirements. Employers do not have to pay overtime to, e.g., bona fide executives, agricultural workers, and outside salesmen. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)-(b).

The question presented is: Whether the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the applicability of an FLSA exemption is a mere preponderance of the evidence-as six circuits hold-or clear and convincing evidence, as the Fourth Circuit alone holds.

Question Presented: Whether the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the applicability of an FLSA exemption is a mere preponderance of the evidence-as six circuits hold-or clear and convincing evidence, as the Fourth Circuit alone holds.

Holding: The preponderance of the evidence standard applies when an employer seeks to demonstrate that an employee is exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime-pay provisions of the FLSA.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.; and Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
For respondents: Lauren E. Bateman, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: Advocate Christ Medical v. Becerra, Sec. of H&HS | Case No. 23-715 | Date Argued: 11/5/24 Nov 05, 2024

Case Info: Advocate Christ Medical v. Becerra, Sec. of H&HS | Case No. 23-715 | Date Argued: 11/5/24 | Date Decided: 4/29/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Because low-income patients are often costlier to treat, Congress directed the government to reimburse hospitals that treat a disproportionate share of low--income patients at higher Medicare rates. A hospital qualifies for higher payments in part based on the number of days that a hospital provides inpatient care to senior (or disabled) low- income patients, measured as those who "were entitled to benefits under part A of [Medicare] and were entitled to supplementary security income [SSI] benefits." 42 U.S.C.§ 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(vi)(I).

In Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation, this Court agreed with the agency that "entitled to [Medicare part A] benefits" included "all those qualifying for the [Medicare] program," whether or not Medicare paid for that hospital stay. 597 U.S. 424, 445 (2022). But Empire expressly left open the question of whether "entitled to [SSI] benefits" likewise includes all those who qualify for the SSI program. Id. at 434 n.2. The agency still insists, contrary to its Medicare interpretation, that only patients who received an SSI cash payment for the month of their hospital stay are "entitled to benefits."

This case thus presents Empire's open question: Does the phrase "entitled ... to benefits," used twice in the same sentence of the Medicare Act, mean the same thing for Medicare part A and SSI, such that it includes all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received.

Question Presented: Does the phrase "entitled ... to benefits," used twice in the same sentence of the Medicare Act, mean the same thing for Medicare part A and supplementary security income (SSI), such that it includes all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received.

Holding: In calculating the Medicare fraction, an individual is “entitled to[SSI] benefits” for purposes of the Medicare fraction when she is eligible to receive an SSI cash payment during the month of her hospitalization.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Advocates:

For Petitioners: Melissa Arbus Sherry
For Respondent: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. U.S., ex rel. Heath | Case No. 23-1127 | Date Argued: 11/4/24 Nov 04, 2024

Case Info: Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. U.S., ex rel. Heath | Case No. 23-1127 | Date Argued: 11/4/24 | Date Decided: 2/21/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 directs the FCC to further the goal of universal access to telecommunications services. In response, the FCC established what's known as the "E-rate" program to provide discounted services to eligible schools and libraries. The program is administered by a private, non-profit corporation and funded entirely by contributions from private telecommunications carriers. After telecommunications carriers provide services to eligible schools and libraries, either the schools and libraries or the providers can submit reimbursement requests to the private corporation for the amount of the discount. In this way, the E-rate program distributes up to $4.5 billion each year.

Question Presented: Whether reimbursement requests submitted to the E-rate program are "claims" under the False Claims Act.

Holding: The E-Rate reimbursement requests at issue are “claims” under the False Claims Act because the Government “provided” (at a minimum) a “portion” of the money applied for by transferring more than $100 million from the Treasury into the Fund.

Result: Affirmed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined, and in which Justice Alito joined as to Part I. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, Tex.
For respondent: Tejinder Singh, Washington, D. C.; and Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: Bufkin v. McDonough, Sec. of VA | Case No. 23-713 | Date Argued: 10/16/24 Oct 16, 2024

Case Info: Bufkin v. McDonough, Sec. of VA | Case No. 23-713 | Date Argued: 10/16/24 | Date Decided: 3/5/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

For more than a century, veterans have been entitled to the benefit of the doubt on any close issue relating to their eligibility for service-related benefits. As presently codified, "[w]hen there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs] shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant." 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b).

In 2002, Congress enacted the Veterans Benefits Act. Among other things, the Act supplemented the responsibilities of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (the "Veterans Court") by requiring it to "take due account of the Secretary's application of section 5107(b)" as part of its review of benefits appeals. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1).

In these cases, the Federal Circuit held that § 7261(b)(1) "does not require the Veterans Court to conduct any review of the benefit of the doubt issue beyond the clear error review" of underlying factual findings - something already required by the pre-2002 review statute, under 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a). Pet. App. 16a-17a (quoting Pet. App. 8a- 11a).

Question Presented: Must the Veterans Court ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule was properly applied during the claims process in order to satisfy 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1), which directs the Veterans Court to "take due account" of VA's application of that rule?

Holding: The VA’s determination that the evidence regarding a service-related disability claim is in “approximate balance” is a predominantly factual determination reviewed only for clear error.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners: Melanie L. Bostwick, Washington, D. C.
For respondent: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: San Francisco v. EPA | Case No. 23-753 | Date Argued: 10/16/24 Oct 16, 2024

Case Info: San Francisco v. EPA | Case No. 23-753 | Date Argued: 10/16/24 | Date Decided: 3/4/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Congress designed the Clean Water Act (CWA or the Act) to ensure that anyone holding a discharge permit issued under the Act has notice of how much they must control their discharges to comply with the law. The CWA requires that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and authorized states provide this notice by prescribing specific pollutant limitations in the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits they issue. Consistent with its text, this Court and the Second Circuit have read the Act to require EPA and states to develop specific limits to achieve goals for surface waters, called water quality standards.

Parting with these decisions, the Ninth Circuit held here that EPA may issue permits that contain generic prohibitions against violating water quality standards. Rather than specify pollutant limits that tell the permitholder how much they need to control their discharges as required by the CWA, these prohibitions effectively tell permitholders nothing more than not to cause "too much" pollution. These generic water quality terms expose San Francisco and numerous permitholders nationwide to enforcement actions while failing to tell them how much they need to limit or treat their discharges to comply with the Act.

Question Presented: Whether the Clean Water Act allows EPA (or an authorized state) to impose generic prohibitions in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits that subject permit holders to enforcement for exceedances of water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their discharges must conform.

Holding: Section 1311(b)(1)(C) does not authorize the EPA to include “end result” provisions in NPDES permits. Determining what steps a permittee must take to ensure that water quality standards are met is the EPA’s responsibility, and Congress has given it the tools needed to make that determination.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Gorsuch joined as to all but Part II. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Tara M. Steeley, Deputy City Attorney, San Francisco, Cal.
For respondent: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C

Website Link to Oral Arguments: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Arguments: Here.

Oral Argument: Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, Sec. of Homeland Security | Case No. 23-583 | Date Argued: 10/15/24 Oct 15, 2024

Case Info: Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, Sec. of Homeland Security | Case No. 23-583 | Date Argued: 10/15/24 | Date Decided: 12/10/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

When considering whether to approve a petition for an immigrant visa, the government must adhere to certain nondiscretionary criteria. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (c) (providing that "[n]o petition shall be approved" if the individual seeking a visa has previously entered a marriage "for the purpose of evading the immigration laws"). When a visa petition is denied based on a petitioner's failure to satisfy such a nondiscretionary requirement, it is generally understood that the petitioner has a right to judicial review of that decision.

Once a visa petition has been approved, the government has the power to revoke approval of the visa petition for "good and sufficient cause" pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1155. The circuits are in open conflict over whether judicial review is available when the government revokes an approved petition on the ground that it had initially misapplied nondiscretionary criteria during the approval process. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits hold that judicial review is available under these circumstances, but the Second, Third, Seventh, and now the Eleventh Circuit all hold that revocations are "discretionary" decisions for which there is no right to judicial review, even when they are based on a misapplication of the same nondiscretionary criteria that would be reviewable if the petition had originally been denied.

Question Presented: Whether a visa petitioner may obtain judicial review when an approved petition is revoked on the basis of nondiscretionary criteria.

Holding: Revocation of an approved visa petition under § 1155 based on a sham-marriage determination by the Secretary is the kind of discretionary decision that falls within the purview of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain actions “in the discretion of ” the agency.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No justice filed a concurring or dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Samir Deger-Sen, New York, N. Y.
For respondents: Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn | Case No. 23-365 | Date Argued: 10/15/24 Oct 15, 2024

Case Info: Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn | Case No. 23-365 | Date Argued: 10/15/24 | Date Decided: 4/2/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) creates a civil treble-damages action for “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of” certain offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).

Question Presented: Whether economic harms resulting from personal injuries are injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant's acts for purposes of civil RICO.

Holding: Under civil RICO, §1964(c), a plaintiff may seek treble damages for business or property loss even if the loss resulted from a personal injury.

Result: Affirmed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.
For respondent: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: Glossip v. Oklahoma | Case No. 22-7466 | Date Argued: 10/9/24 Oct 09, 2024

Case Info: Glossip v. Oklahoma | Case No. 22-7466 | Date Argued: 10/9/24 | Date Decided: 2/25/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Questions Presented:

Whether the State's suppression of the key prosecution witness's admission he was under the care of a psychiatrist and failure to correct that witness's false testimony about that care and related diagnosis violate the due process of law.
Whether the entirety of the suppressed evidence must be considered when assessing the materiality of Brady and Napue claims.
Whether due process of law requires reversal, where a capital conviction is so infected with errors that the State no longer seeks to defend it.

Holdings:

This Court has jurisdiction to review the OCCA’s judgment.
The prosecution violated its constitutional obligation to correct false testimony.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Alito joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Parts IV– A–1, IV–A–2, and IV–A–3. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D. C.
For respondent in support of petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.
For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Christopher G. Michel, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: Bondi, Att'y Gen. v. VanDerStok | Case No. 23-852 | Date Argued: 10/8/24 Oct 08, 2024

Case Info: Bondi, Att'y Gen. v. VanDerStok | Case No. 23-852 | Date Argued: 10/8/24 | Date Decided: 3/26/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

In the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 921 et seq., Congress imposed licensing, background-check, recordkeeping, and serialization requirements on persons engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms. The Act defines a "firearm" to include "any weapon * * * which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive," as well as "the frame or receiver of any such weapon." 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(A) and (B). In 2022, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives issued a regulation clarifying that certain products that can readily be converted into an operational firearm or a functional frame or receiver fall within that definition. See 87 Fed. Reg. 24,652 (Apr. 26, 2022) (codified in relevant part at 27 C.F.R. 478.11, 478.12(c)). The Fifth Circuit held that those regulatory provisions are inconsistent with the Act.

Questions Presented:

Whether "a weapon parts kit that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive," 27 C.F.R. 478.11, is a "firearm" regulated by the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA); and
Whether "a partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver" that is "designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to function as a frame or receiver," 27 C.F.R. 478.12(c), is a "frame or receiver" regulated by the GCA.

Holding: The ATF’s rule is not facially inconsistent with the GCA. The GCA’s statute’s text, context, and structure make clear the GCA reaches some weapon parts kits and unfinished frames or receivers.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Jackson each filed concurring opinions. Justices Thomas and Alito each filed dissenting opinions.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
For respondents: Peter A. Patterson, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: Lackey v. Stinnie | Case No. 23-621 | Date Argued: 10/8/24 Oct 08, 2024

Case Info: Lackey v. Stinnie | Case No. 23-621 | Date Argued: 10/8/24 | Date Decided: 2/25/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Questions Presented:

Whether a party must obtain a ruling that conclusively decides the merits in its favor, as opposed to merely predicting a likelihood of later success, to prevail on the merits under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Whether a party must obtain an enduring change in the parties' legal relationship from a judicial act, as opposed to a non-judicial event that moots the case, to prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Holding: The plaintiff drivers here—who gained only preliminary injunctive relief before this action became moot—do not qualify as “prevailing part[ies]” eligible for attorney’s fees under §1988(b) because no court conclusively resolved their claims by granting enduring judicial relief on the merits that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioner: Erika L. Maley, Solicitor General, Richmond, Va.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
For respondents: Brian D. Schmalzbach, Richmond, Va.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Argument: Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger | Case No. 23-677 | Date Argued: 10/7/24 Oct 07, 2024

Case Info: Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger | Case No. 23-677 | Date Argued: 10/7/24 | Date Decided: 1/15/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Questions Presented:

Whether such a post-removal amendment of the complaint defeats federal-question subject-matter jurisdiction.
Whether such a post-removal amendment of the complaint precludes a district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs remaining state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Holding: When a plaintiff amends her complaint to delete the federal-law claims that enabled removal to federal court, leaving only state-law claims behind, the federal court loses supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, and the case must be remanded to state court.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners: Katherine B. Wellington, Boston, Mass.
For respondents: Ashley C. Keller, Chicago, Ill.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Oral Argument: Williams v. Washington | Case No. 23-191 | Date Argued: 10/7/24 Oct 07, 2024

Case Info: Williams v. Washington | Case No. 23-191 | Date Argued: 10/7/24 | Date Decided: 2/21/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether exhaustion of state administrative remedies is required to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court.

Holding: Where a state court’s application of a state exhaustion requirement in effect immunizes state officials from §1983 claims challenging delays in the administrative process, state courts may not deny those §1983 claims on failure-to-exhaust grounds.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Result: Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined as to Part II.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For petitioners: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D. C.
For respondent: Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., Solicitor General, Montgomery, Ala.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Opinion Summary: Trump v. United States | Date Decided: 7/1/24 | Case No. 23-939 Jul 01, 2024

The question presented in this case is: Whether and if so to what extent does a former President enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office.

The Supreme Court held: Under our constitutional structure of separated powers, the nature of Presidential power entitles a former President to absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority. And he is entitled to at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for all his official acts. There is no immunity for unofficial acts.

TIMESTAMPS:

00:00 Introduction

00:14 Question Presented

00:30 Voting Breakdown

01:10 Chief Justice Roberts Majority Opinion

02:08 Holding

21:32 Justice Thomas Concurring Opinion

23:48 Justice Barrett Opinion Concurring in Part

28:59 Justice Sotomayor Dissenting Opinion

38:40 Justice Jackson Dissenting Opinion

Trump v. United States | Case No. 23-939 | Date Argued: 04/25/24 Apr 25, 2024

The Question Presented is: Whether and if so to what extent does a former President enjoy Presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office.

Argued:

For Petitioner: D. John Sauer; For Respondent: Michael R. Dreeben, Counselor to the Special Counsel, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

TIMESTAMPS:

00:00 Introduction

00:05 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins

1:58 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

27:18 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

57:34 Petitioner Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins

59:27 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

128:11 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

2:39:15 Respondent Questions End, Rebuttal (D. John Sauer said he had nothing further)

Oral Argument: Moyle v. United States | Case No. 23-726 | Date Argued: 4/24/24 | Date Decided: 6/27/24 Apr 24, 2024

Oral Argument: Moyle v. United States | Case No. 23-726 | Date Argued: 4/24/24 | Date Decided: 6/27/24

Case consolidated with Idaho v. United States, Case No. 23-727.

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether EMTALA preempts state laws that protect human life and prohibit abortions, like Idaho's Defense of Life Act.

Holding: Certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted.

Result: Dismissed.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Per curiam opinion. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in which Justice Jackson joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined, and Justice Gorsuch joined as to Parts I and II.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Joshua N. Turner, Chief of Constitutional Litigation and Policy, Boise, Idaho.
For Respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. VIDED.

Oral Argument: Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney | Case No. 23-367 | Date Argued: 4/23/24 | Date Decided: 6/13/24 Apr 23, 2024

Oral Argument: Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney | Case No. 23-367 | Date Argued: 4/23/24 | Date Decided: 6/13/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Under the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issues, prosecutes, and adjudicates complaints alleging that employers committed unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). Section 10(j) of the Act authorizes federal district courts, while the NLRB adjudication remains pending, to grant preliminary injunctive relief at the NLRB's request "as [the court] deems just and proper." Id. § 160(j).

Question Presented: Whether courts must evaluate the NLRB's requests for section 10(j) injunctions under the traditional, stringent four-factor test for preliminary injunctions or under some other more lenient standard.

Holding: When considering the National Labor Relations Board's request for a preliminary injunction under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act, district courts must apply the traditional four factors articulated in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Austin Raynor, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Department of State v. Muñoz | Case No. 23-334 | Date Argued: 4/23/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24 Apr 23, 2024

Oral Argument: Department of State v. Muñoz | Case No. 23-334 | Date Argued: 4/23/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., the decision to grant or deny a visa application rests with a consular officer in the Department of State. Under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii), any noncitizen whom a consular officer "knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, seeks to enter the United States to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in* * * unlawful activity" is ineligible to receive a visa or be admitted to the United States.

Question Presented:

Whether a consular officer's refusal of a visa to a U.S. citizen's noncitizen spouse impinges upon a constitutionally protected interest of the citizen.
Whether, assuming that such a constitutional interest exists, notifying a visa applicant that he was deemed inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii) suffices to provide any process that is due.

Holding: A U.S. citizen does not have a fundamental liberty interest in her noncitizen spouse being admitted to the country.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents: Eric T. Lee, Southfeld, Mich.

Oral Argument: City of Grants Pass v. Johnson | Case No. 23-175 | Date Argued: 4/22/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24 Apr 22, 2024

Oral Argument: City of Grants Pass v. Johnson | Case No. 23-175 | Date Argued: 4/22/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

In Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2019), the Ninth Circuit held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prevents cities from enforcing criminal restrictions on public camping unless the person has "access to adequate temporary shelter." Id. at 617 & n.8. In this case, the Ninth Circuit extended Martin to a classwide injunction prohibiting the City of Grants Pass from enforcing its public-camping ordinance even though civil citations. That decision cemented a conflict with the California Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit, which have upheld similar ordinances, and entrenched a broader split on the application of the Eighth Amendment to purportedly involuntary conduct. The Ninth Circuit nevertheless denied rehearing en banc by a 14-to-13 vote.

Question Presented: Does the enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment?

Holding: The enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property does not constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Theane D. Evangelis, Los Angeles, Cal.
For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents: Kelsi B. Corkran, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Smith v. Spizzirri | Case No. 22-1218 Date Argued: 4/22/24 | Date Decided: 5/16/24 Apr 22, 2024

Oral Argument: Smith v. Spizzirri | Case No. 22-1218 Date Argued: 4/22/24 | Date Decided: 5/16/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

This case presents a clear and intractable conflict regarding an important statutory question under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C.1-16. The FAA establishes procedures for enforcing arbitration agreements in federal court. Under Section 3 of the Act, when a court finds a dispute subject to arbitration, the court "shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until [the] arbitration" has concluded. 9 U.S.C. 3 (emphasis added). While six circuits read Section 3's plain text as mandating a stay, four other circuits have carved out an atextual "exception" to Section 3's stay requirement-granting district courts discretion to dismiss (not stay) if the entire dispute is subject to arbitration. In the proceedings below, the Ninth Circuit declared itself bound by circuit precedent to affirm the district court's "discretion to dismiss," despite "the plain text of the FAA appear[ing] to mandate a stay." The panel candidly acknowledged the 6-4 circuit conflict, and a two-judge concurrence emphasized "the courts of appeals are divided," asserted the Ninth Circuit's position is wrong, and urged "the Supreme Court to take up this question"-an issue this Court has twice confronted but reserved in the past.

Question Presented: Whether Section 3 of the FAA requires district courts to stay a lawsuit pending arbitration, or whether district courts have discretion to dismiss when all claims are subject to arbitration.

Holding: When a district court finds that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute and a party has requested a stay of the court proceeding pending arbitration, Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act compels the court to issue a stay, and the court lacks discretion to dismiss the suit.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, Tex.
For Respondents: E. Joshua Rosenkranz, New York, N. Y.

Oral Argument: Thornell v. Jones | Case No. 22-982 | Date Argued: 4/17/24 | Date Decided: 5/30/24 Apr 17, 2024

Oral Argument: Thornell v. Jones | Case No. 22-982 | Date Argued: 4/17/24 | Date Decided: 5/30/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Over thirty years ago, Respondent Danny Lee Jones beat Robert Weaver to death and also beat and strangled Weaver's 7-year-old daughter, Tisha, to death, for which he was convicted and sentenced to death. The district court denied habeas relief following an evidentiary hearing on Jones's ineffective-assistance-of-sentencing-counsel claims. But a Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court, giving no deference to the district court's detailed factual findings. Judge Mark Bennett authored a nine-judge dissent from the denial of en banc rehearing.

Question Presented: Did the Ninth Circuit violate this Court's precedents by employing a flawed methodology for assessing Strickland prejudice when it disregarded the district court's factual and credibility findings and excluded evidence in aggravation and the State's rebuttal when it reversed the district court and granted habeas relief?

Holding: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit's grant of habeas relief on Danny Lee Jones's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was based on an erroneous interpretation and application of Strickland v. Washington.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Jason D. Lewis, Deputy Solicitor General, Phoenix, Ariz.
For Respondent: Jean-Claude Andre, Santa Monica, Cal.

Timestamps:

Oral Argument: Fischer v. United States | Case No. 23-5572 | Date Argued: March 25, 2024 Apr 16, 2024

Oral Argument: Fischer v. United States | Case No. 23-5572 | Date Argued: March 25, 2024

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Did the D.C. Circuit err in construing 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (“Witness, Victim, or Informant Tampering"). Which prohibits obstruction of congressional inquiries and investigations to include acts unrelated to investigations and evidence?

Holding: To prove a violation of §1512(c)(2), the Government must establish that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or other things used in an official proceeding, or attempted to do so.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Jeffrey T. Green, Bethesda, Md.
For Respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Introduction

[00:00:07] Petitioner Opening Statement Begins

[00:01:52] Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

[00:25:37] Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

[00:34:25] Petitioner Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins

[00:36:31] Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

[01:05:01] Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

[01:36:13] Respondent Sequential Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

Oral Argument: Snyder v. United States | Case No. 23-108 | Date Argued: 4/15/24 | Date Decided: 6/26/24 Apr 15, 2024

Oral Argument: Snyder v. United States | Case No. 23-108 | Date Argued: 4/15/24 | Date Decided: 6/26/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) makes it a federal crime for a state or local official to "corruptly solicit[,] demand[,] ... or accept[] ... anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any" government business "involving any thing of value of $5,000 or more."

Question Presented: Whether section 666 criminalizes gratuities, i.e., payments in recognition of actions the official has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions.

Holding: Federal law proscribes bribes to state and local officials but does not make it a crime for those officials to accept gratuities for their past acts.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon | Case No. 23-50 | Date Argued: 4/15/24 | Date Decided: 6/20/24 Apr 15, 2024

Oral Argument: Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon | Case No. 23-50 | Date Argued: 4/15/24 | Date Decided: 6/20/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

To make out a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that legal process was instituted without probable cause. Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1338 (2022). Under the charge-specific rule, a malicious prosecution claim can proceed as to a baseless criminal charge, even if other charges brought alongside the baseless charge are supported by probable cause. Under the "any-crime" rule, probable cause for even one charge defeats a plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims as to every other charge, including those lacking probable cause.

Question Presented: Whether Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims are governed by the charge-specific rule, as the Second, Third, and Eleventh circuits hold, or by the "any-crime" rule, as the Sixth Circuit holds.

Holding: Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and traditional common-law practice, the presence of probable cause for one charge in a criminal proceeding does not categorically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim relating to another, baseless charge.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.
For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents: Megan M. Wold, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Erlinger v. United States | Case No. 23-370 | Date Argued: 3/27/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24 Mar 27, 2024

Oral Argument: Erlinger v. United States | Case No. 23-370 | Date Argued: 3/27/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the Constitution requires a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to find that a defendant's prior convictions were "committed on occasions different from one another," as is necessary to impose an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).

Holding: The Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a unanimous jury to make the determination beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant's past offenses were committed on separate occasions for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Barrett joined. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas filed concurring opinions. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined, and in which Justice Jackson joined except as to Part III. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Menlo Park, Cal.
For Respondent supporting Petitioner: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Court-appointed Amicus Curiae in support of the judgment below: D. Nick Harper, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Connelly v. United States | Case No. 23-146 | Date Argued: 3/27/24 | Date Decided: 6/6/24 Mar 27, 2024

Oral Argument: Connelly v. United States | Case No. 23-146 | Date Argued: 3/27/24 | Date Decided: 6/6/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Closely held corporations often enter into agreements requiring the redemption of a shareholder's stock after the shareholder's death in order to preserve the closely held nature of the business. Corporations that enter such agreements often purchase life insurance on the shareholder in order to fund the transaction.

Question Presented: Whether the proceeds of a life-insurance policy taken out by a closely held corporation on a shareholder in order to facilitate the redemption of the shareholder's stock should be considered a corporate asset when calculating the value of the shareholder's shares for purposes of the federal estate tax.

Holding: A corporation's contractual obligation to redeem shares is not necessarily a liability that reduces a corporation's value for purposes of the federal estate tax.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine | Case No. 23-235 | Date Argued: 3/26/24 | Date Decided: 6/13/24 Mar 26, 2024

Oral Argument: FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine | Case No. 23-235 | Date Argued: 3/26/24 | Date Decided: 6/13/24

Case consolidated with Danco Laboratories, L.L.C. v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, Case No. 23-236.

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

In 2000, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved Danco's drug Mifeprex for termination of early pregnancy based on the agency's expert judgment that clinical data showed the drug to be safe and effective. The agency later modified certain conditions of use for mifepristone in 2016 and 2021, again relying on clinical data and the agency's expert judgment that the drug would remain safe and effective under the modified conditions of use. In 2022, associations of doctors who have never prescribed Mifeprex sued FDA, arguing that FDA's actions modifying the drug's conditions of use in 2016 and 2021 violated the Administrative Procedure Act.

Question Presented:

Whether an association can demonstrate Article III standing to enjoin a government action by arguing that some unspecified member may be injured at some future time by the challenged action; and
Whether the Fifth Circuit erred in upholding the preliminary injunction of FDA's 2016 and 2021 actions based on the court's review of an incomplete administrative record.

Holding: Plaintiffs lack Article Ill standing to challenge the Food and Drug Administration's regulatory actions regarding mifepristone.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For federal Petitioners: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Petitioner Danco Laboratories, L.L.C.: Jessica L. Ellsworth, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents: Erin M. Hawley, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Becerra v. San Carlos Apache Tribe | Case No. 23-250 | Date Argued: 3/25/24 | Date Decided: 6/6/24 Mar 25, 2024

Oral Argument: Becerra v. San Carlos Apache Tribe | Case No. 23-250 | Date Argued: 3/25/24 | Date Decided: 6/6/24

Case consolidated with Becerra v. Northern Arapaho Tribe, Case No. 23-253.

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. 5301 et seq., permits eligible Indian tribes to contract with the federal government to assume responsibility for federal health care programs administered for the benefit of Indians. Upon entering into the contract, a tribe is entitled to the appropriated funds that the Indian Health Service (IHS) would have otherwise allocated to the federal program. 25 U.S.C. 5325(a)(1). The Act also requires IHS to pay "contract support costs"-funds "added to" that appropriated amount to cover the costs of activities the tribe must undertake to operate the transferred program, but which either "normally are not carried on" by IHS when acting as program operator, or which IHS would have "provided * * * from resources other than" the appropriated funds transferred under the contract. 25 U.S.C. 5325(a)(2). Separately, contracting tribes are permitted to collect payment from third-party payors-like private insurers, Medicare, and Medicaid-when they provide health care services to covered individuals.

Question Presented: Whether IHS must pay "contract support costs" not only to support IHS-funded activities, but also to support the tribe's expenditure of income collected from third parties.

Holding: The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act requires the Indian Health Service to pay the contract support costs that a tribe incurs when it collects and spends program income (i.e., revenue from third-party payers like Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurers) to further the functions, services, activities, and programs transferred to it from IHS in a self-determination contract.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent in 23-253: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent in 23-250: Lloyd B. Miller, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Harrow v. Department of Defense | Case No. 23-21 | Date Argued: 3/25/24 | Date Decided: 5/16/24 Mar 25, 2024

Oral Argument: Harrow v. Department of Defense | Case No. 23-21 | Date Argued: 3/25/24 | Date Decided: 5/16/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

When a federal employee petitions the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to review a final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any petition for review shall be filed within 60 days after the Board issues notice of the final order or decision of the Board." In the decision below, the Federal Circuit relied on settled circuit precedent holding this filing deadline to be jurisdictional, despite recent opinions from other Circuits and this Court holding analogous filing deadlines to be nonjurisdictional.

Question Presented: Whether the 60-day deadline in Section 7703(b)(1)(A) is jurisdictional.

Holding: Title 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(l)'s 60-day filing deadline for a federal employee to petition the Federal Circuit to review a final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board is not jurisdictional.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Joshua P. Davis, San Francisco, Cal.
For Respondent: Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Gonzalez v. Trevino | Case No. 22-1025 | Date Argued: 3/20/24 | Date Decided: 6/20/24 Mar 20, 2024

Oral Argument: Gonzalez v. Trevino | Case No. 22-1025 | Date Argued: 3/20/24 | Date Decided: 6/20/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

In Nieves v. Bartlett, this Court held that probable cause does not bar a retaliatory arrest claim against a "police officer" when a plaintiff shows "that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been." 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019). The circuits admittedly disagree on whether only specific examples of non-arrests, Pet. App. 28-29 (5th Cir. 2022), or any "objective proof of retaliatory treatment" can satisfy this standard, Lund v. City of Rockford, 956 F.3d 938, 945 (7th Cir. 2020); see also Ballentine v. Tucker, 28 F.4th 54, 62 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, a 72-year-old councilwoman organized a petition criticizing a city manager, and unwittingly placed it in her binder during a council meeting. Two months later, Respondents-the city manager's allies- engineered her arrest for tampering with a government record. That charge has no precedent involving similar conduct, was supported by an affidavit based on the councilwoman's viewpoints, and skirted ordinary procedures to ensure her jailing. The councilwoman sued Respondents but no arresting officer.

Question Presented:

Whether the Nieves probable cause exception can be satisfied by objective evidence other than specific examples of arrests that never happened.
Whether the Nieves probable cause rule is limited to individual claims against arresting officers for split-second arrests.

Holding: In requiring Petitioner Sylvia Gonzalez to provide specific comparator evidence to support her retaliatory arrest claim, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit did not properly apply the principles of Nieves v. Barlett.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Per curiam opinion. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Anya A. Bidwell, Arlington, Va.
For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Texas v. New Mexico | Case No. 141, Orig. | Date Argued: 3/20/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24 Mar 20, 2024

Oral Argument: Texas v. New Mexico | Case No. 141, Orig. | Date Argued: 3/20/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: EXCEPTION OF THE UNITED STATE TO THE THIRD INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER: The United States excepts to the Special Master's recommendation that the States' joint motion to enter a consent decree be granted.

Holding: Because the proposed consent decree would dispose of the United States’ Compact claims without its consent, the States’ motion to enter the consent decree is denied.

Result: Exception sustained.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For United States, as intervenor: Ann O'Connell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For plaintiff: Scott A. Keller, Solicitor General of Texas, Austin, Texas.
For defendant Colorado: Frederick R. Yarger, Solicitor General of Colorado, Denver, Colo.
For defendant New Mexico: Marcus J. Rael, Jr., Albuquerque, N.M.

Oral Argument: Diaz v. United States | Case No. 23-14 | Date Argued: 3/19/24 | Date Decided: 6/20/24 Mar 19, 2024

Oral Argument: Diaz v. United States | Case No. 23-14 | Date Argued: 3/19/24 | Date Decided: 6/20/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) provides: "In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone." Fed. R. Evid. 704(b).

Question Presented: In a prosecution for drug trafficking-where an element of the offense is that the defendant knew she was carrying illegal drugs-does Rule 704(b) permit a governmental expert witness to testify that most couriers know they are carrying drugs and that drug-trafficking organizations do not entrust large quantities of drugs to unknowing transporters?

Holding: Expert testimony that "most people" in a group have a particular mental state is not an opinion about "the defendant" and thus does not violate Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b).

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, Cal.
For Respondent: Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Murthy v. Missouri | Case No. 23-411 | Date Argued: 3/18/24 | Date Decided: 6/26/24 Mar 19, 2024

Oral Argument: Murthy v. Missouri | Case No. 23-411 | Date Argued: 3/18/24 | Date Decided: 6/26/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented:

Whether Respondents have Article III standing;
Whether the government's challenged conduct transformed private social-media companies' content-moderation decisions into state action and violated Respondents' First Amendment rights; and
Whether the terms and breadth of the preliminary injunction are proper.

Holding: Respondents, two states and five individual social media users who sued executive branch officials and agencies, alleging that the government pressured the platforms to censor their speech in violation of the First Amendment, lack Article Ill standing to seek an injunction.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents: J. Benjamin AguiÃ±aga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, La.

Oral Argument: National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo | Case No. 22-842 | Date Argued: 3/18/24 | Date Decided: 5/30/24 Mar 18, 2024

Oral Argument: National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo | Case No. 22-842 | Date Argued: 3/18/24 | Date Decided: 5/30/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Bantam Books v. Sullivan held that a state commission with no formal regulatory power violated the First Amendment when it "deliberately set out to achieve the suppression of publications" through "informal sanctions," including the "threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion, persuasion, and intimidation." 372 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1963). Respondent here, wielding enormous regulatory power as the head of New York's Department of Financial Services ("DFS"), applied similar pressure tactics-including backchannel threats, ominous guidance letters, and selective enforcement of regulatory infractions-to induce banks and insurance companies to avoid doing business with Petitioner, a gun rights advocacy group. App. 199-200 ¶ 21. Respondent targeted Petitioner explicitly based on its Second Amendment advocacy, which DFS's official regulatory guidance deemed a "reputational risk" to any financial institution serving the NRA. Id. at 199, n.16. The Second Circuit held such conduct permissible as a matter of law, reasoning that "this age of enhanced corporate social responsibility" justifies regulatory concern about "general backlash" against a customer's political speech. Id. at 29-30.

Question Presented: Does the First Amendment allow a government regulator to threaten regulated entities with adverse regulatory actions if they do business with a controversial speaker, as a consequence of (a) the government's own hostility to the speaker's viewpoint or (b) a perceived "general backlash" against the speaker's advocacy?

Holding: The NRA plausibly alleged that former superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services Maria Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing regulated entities to terminate their business relationships with the NRA in order to punish or suppress the NRA's gun-promotion advocacy.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Gorsuch and Justice Jackson each filed a concurring opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: David D. Cole, Washington, D.C.
For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski | Case No. 23-3 | Date Argued: 2/28/24 | Date Decided: 5/23/24 Feb 28, 2024

Oral Argument: Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski | Case No. 23-3 | Date Argued: 2/28/24 | Date Decided: 5/23/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Where parties enter into an arbitration agreement with a delegation clause, should an arbitrator or a court decide whether that arbitration agreement is narrowed by a later contract that is silent as to arbitration and delegation?

Holding: Where parties have agreed to two contracts, one sending arbitrability disputes to arbitration, and the other either explicitly or implicitly sending arbitrability disputes to the courts, a court must decide which contract governs.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Jessica L. Ellsworth, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents: David J. Harris, Jr., San Diego, Cal.

Oral Argument: Garland v. Cargill | Case No. 22-976 | Date Argued: 2/28/24 | Date Decided: 6/14/24 Feb 28, 2024

Oral Argument: Garland v. Cargill | Case No. 22-976 | Date Argued: 2/28/24 | Date Decided: 6/14/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Since 1986, Congress has prohibited the transfer or possession of any new "machinegun." 18 U.S.C. 922(o)(1). The National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. 5801 et seq., defines a "machinegun" as "any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger." 26 U.S.C. 5845(b). The statutory definition also encompasses "any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun." Ibid. A "bump stock" is a device designed and intended to permit users to convert a semiautomatic rifle so that the rifle can be fired continuously with a single pull of the trigger, discharging potentially hundreds of bullets per minute. In 2018, after a mass shooting in Las Vegas carried out using bump stocks, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) published an interpretive rule concluding that bump stocks are machineguns as defined in Section 5845(b). In the decision below, the en banc Fifth Circuit held that the ATF rule was unlawful because the statutory definition of "machinegun" does not encompass bump stocks.

Question Presented: Whether a bump stock device is a "machinegun" as defined in 26 U.S.C. 5845(b) because it is designed and intended for use in converting a rifle into a machinegun, i.e., into a weapon that fires "automatically more than one shot . . . by a single function of the trigger."

Holding: The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives exceeded its statutory authority by issuing a rule that classifies a bump stock as a "machinegun" under 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b).

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.

Oral Argument: McIntosh v. United States | Case No. 22-7386 | Date Argued: 2/27/24 | Date Decided: 4/17/24 Feb 27, 2024

Oral Argument: McIntosh v. United States | Case No. 22-7386 | Date Argued: 2/27/24 | Date Decided: 4/17/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether a district court may enter a criminal forfeiture order outside the time limitations set forth in Rule 32.2, Fed.R.Crim.P.?

Holding: A district court's failure to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(2)(B)'s requirement to enter a preliminary order imposing criminal forfeiture before sentencing does not bar a judge from ordering forfeiture at sentencing subject to harmless-error principles on appellate review.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Steven Y. Yurowitz, New York, N. Y.
For Respondent: Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A. | Case No. 22-529 | Date Argued: 2/27/24 | Date Decided: 5/30/24 Feb 27, 2024

Oral Argument: Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A. | Case No. 22-529 | Date Argued: 2/27/24 | Date Decided: 5/30/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

At least thirteen states have, enacted laws requiring mortgage lenders to pay a minimum interest rate on funds held in mortgage escrow accounts. Congress has since recognized the existence of these state escrow-interest laws and has expressly required national banks to comply with them where applicable. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639d(g)(3).

Question Presented: Does the National Bank Act preempt the application of state escrow-interest laws to national banks?

Holding: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit failed to analyze whether New York's interest-on-escrow law is preempted as applied to national banks in a manner consistent with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N. A. v. Nelson.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Jonathan E. Taylor, Washington, D.C.; and Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
For Respondent: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton | Case No. 22-555 | Date Argued: 2/26/24 | Date Decided: 7/1/24 Feb 26, 2024

Oral Argument: NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton | Case No. 22-555 | Date Argued: 2/26/24 | Date Decided: 7/1/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Throughout our Nation's history, the First Amendment's freedoms of speech and press have protected private entities' rights to choose whether and how to publish and disseminate speech generated by others. E.g., Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (2019); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 570, 575 (1995); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,258 (1974). Over two decades ago, this Court held there is "no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to" speech disseminated on "the Internet." Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). Today, many Internet websites publish and disseminate curated collections of expression generated by themselves and others. Nevertheless, the State of Texas-much like Florida before it-has enacted a viewpoint-, content-, and speaker-based law (House Bill 20 or "HB20") targeting certain disfavored "social media" websites. HB20 Section 7 prohibits these websites from making editorial choices based on "viewpoint." And HB20 Section 2 imposes on these websites burdensome operational and disclosure requirements, chilling their editorial choices. This Court has already ensured once that Respondent cannot enforce this law against Petitioners' members. NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 142 S. Ct. 1715, 1715-16 (2022).

Question Presented: Whether the First Amendment prohibits viewpoint-, content-, or speaker-based laws restricting select websites from engaging in editorial choices about whether, and how, to publish and disseminate speech-or otherwise burdening those editorial choices through onerous operational and disclosure requirements.

Holding: The judgments are vacated, and the cases are remanded, because neither the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 11th Circuit nor the 5th Circuit conducted a proper analysis of the facial First Amendment challenges to the Florida and Texas laws regulating large internet platforms.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined in full, and in which Justice Jackson joined as to Parts I, II and III-A. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. (Opinion together with No. 22-277).

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.; and Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

Oral Argument: Moody v. NetChoice, LLC | Case No. 22-277 | Date Argued: 2/26/24 | Case No. 7/1/24 Feb 26, 2024

Oral Argument: Moody v. NetChoice, LLC | Case No. 22-277 | Date Argued: 2/26/24 | Case No. 7/1/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Florida has enacted a law that attempts to prevent social-media companies from abusing their enormous power to censor speech.

Question Presented:

Whether the First Amendment prohibits a State from requiring that social-media companies host third-party communications, and from regulating the time, place, and manner in which they do so.
Whether the First Amendment prohibits a State from requiring social-media companies to notify and provide an explanation to their users when they censor the user's speech.

Holding: The judgments are vacated, and the cases are remanded, because neither the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 11th Circuit nor the 5th Circuit conducted a proper analysis of the facial First Amendment challenges to the Florida and Texas laws regulating large internet platforms.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined in full, and in which Justice Jackson joined as to Parts I, II and III-A. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. (Opinion together with No. 22-555).

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: For Petitioners: Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Fla.
For Respondents: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.; and Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Oral Argument: Ohio v. EPA | Case No. 23A349 | Date Argued: 2/21/24 | Date Decided: 6/27/2024 Feb 21, 2024

Oral Argument: Ohio v. EPA | Case No. 23A349 | Date Argued: 2/21/24 | Date Decided: 6/27/2024

Case consolidated with Kinder Morgan, Inc. v. EPA, Case No. 23A350, American Forest & Paper Assn. v. EPA, Case No. 23A351 and U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, Case No. 23A384.

Link to Docket: Here.

Holding: The enforcement of the Environmental Protection Agency's federal implementation plan against the applicant states, whose own state implementation plans were determined by EPA to be inadequate because they failed to adequately address certain obligations under the Good Neighbor Provision, shall be stayed pending disposition of the applicants' petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and any petition for writ of certiorari, timely sought.

Result: Application for stay granted.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For state applicants: Mathura J. Sridharan, Deputy Solicitor General, Columbus, Ohio.
For industry applicants: Catherine E. Stetson, Washington, D.C. For federal Respondents: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For state Respondents: Judith N. Vale, Deputy Solicitor General, New York, N.Y.

Oral Argument: Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy | Case No. 22-1078 | Date Argued: 2/21/2024 | Date Decided: 5/9/24 Feb 21, 2024

Oral Argument: Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy | Case No. 22-1078 | Date Argued: 2/21/2024 | Date Decided: 5/9/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether, under the discovery accrual rule applied by the Circuit Courts and the Copyright Act's statute of limitations for civil actions, 17 U.S.C. §507(b), a copyright plaintiff can recover damages for acts that allegedly occurred more than three years before the filing of a lawsuit.

Holding: The Copyright Act entitles a copyright owner to obtain monetary relief for any timely infringement claim, no matter when the infringement occurred.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents: Joe Wesley Earnhardt, New York, N.Y.; and Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Oral Argument: Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC | Case No. 23-51 | Date Argued: 2/20/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24 Feb 20, 2024

Oral Argument: Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC | Case No. 23-51 | Date Argued: 2/20/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Federal Arbitration Act exempts the "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1. The First and Seventh Circuits have held that this exemption applies to any member of a class of workers that is engaged in foreign or interstate commerce in the same way as seamen and railroad employees-that is, any worker "actively engaged" in the interstate transportation of goods. The Second and Eleventh Circuits have added an additional requirement: The worker's employer must also be in the "transportation industry."

Question Presented: To be exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act, must a class of workers that is actively engaged in interstate transportation also be employed by a company in the transportation industry?

Holding: A transportation worker need not work in the transportation industry to be exempt from coverage under Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Jennifer D. Bennett, San Francisco, Cal.
For Respondents: Traci L. Lovitt, New York, N.Y.

Oral Argument: Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors, FRS | Case No. 22-1008 | Date Argued: 2/20/2024 | Date Decided: 7/1/2024 Feb 20, 2024

Oral Argument: Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors, FRS | Case No. 22-1008 | Date Argued: 2/20/2024 | Date Decided: 7/1/2024

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Petitioner Corner Post, Inc. is a convenience store and truck stop in North Dakota that first opened for business in 2018. In 2021, Corner Post sued the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System under the Administrative Procedure Act, challenging a Board rule adopted in 2011 that governs certain fees for debit-card transactions. The Eighth Circuit held that Corner Post's APA claims were barred by 28 U.S.C. §2401 (a)'s six-year statute of limitations. In so doing, it adopted the majority position in an acknowledged circuit split on when APA claims "first accrue[]" under §2401(a). The Eighth Circuit held that Corner Post's APA claims "first accrue[d]" when the Board issued the rule in 2011-even though Corner Post did not open for business until seven years later. As a result, Corner Post's limitations period expired in 2017-a year before it opened for business. The court did not explain how Corner Post could have "suffer[ed] legal wrong" from or been "adversely affected or aggrieved by" the Board's rule-a predicate to stating an APA claim, 5 U.S.C. §702-before Corner Post accepted even one debit-card payment subject to the rule.

Question Presented: Does a plaintiff's APA claim "first accrue[]" under 28 U.S.C. §2401(a) when an agency issues a rule-regardless of whether that rule injures the plaintiff on that date (as the Eighth Circuit and five other circuits have held)-or when the rule first causes a plaintiff to "suffer[] legal wrong" or be "adversely affected or aggrieved" (as the Sixth Circuit has held)?

Holding: An Administrative Procedure Act claim does not accrue for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), the default 6-year statute of limitations applicable to suits against the United States, until the plaintiff is injured by final agency action.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Bryan K. Weir, Arlington, Va.
For Respondent: Benjamin W. Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Trump v. Anderson | Case No. 23-719 | Date Argued: 2/8/24 | Date Decided: 3/4/24 Feb 08, 2024

Oral Argument: Trump v. Anderson | Case No. 23-719 | Date Argued: 2/8/24 | Date Decided: 3/4/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Supreme Court of Colorado held that President Donald J. Trump is disqualified from holding the office of President because he "engaged in insurrection" against the Constitution of the United States-and that he did so after taking an oath "as an officer of the United States" to "support" the Constitution. The state supreme court ruled that the Colorado Secretary of State should not list President Trump's name on the 2024 presidential primary ballot or count any write-in votes cast for him. The state supreme court stayed its decision pending United States Supreme Court review.

Question Presented: Did the Colorado Supreme Court err in ordering President Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential primary ballot?

Holding: Because the Constitution makes Congress, rather than the states, responsible for enforcing Section 3 of the 14th Amendment against federal officeholders and candidates, the Colorado Supreme Court erred in ordering former President Donald Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential primary ballot.

Result: Reversed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Per curiam opinion. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.
For Respondents Anderson, et al.: Jason C. Murray, Denver, Colo.
For Respondent Griswold: Shannon W. Stevenson, Solicitor General, Denver, Colo.

Oral Argument: Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce | Case No. 22-1219 | Date Argued: 1/17/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24 Jan 17, 2024

Oral Argument: Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce | Case No. 22-1219 | Date Argued: 1/17/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Magnuson-Stevens Act ("MSA'') governs fishery management in federal waters. It states that, with the approval of the Secretary of Commerce, the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") may require fishing vessels to carry federal observers who enforce the agency's regulations. Congress appropriates funds for these observers. In three circumstances absent here, but not elsewhere, the MSA allows federal observers to be paid in some manner by the regulated party. Deeming annual Congressional appropriations for the federal observers insufficient, the agency asserted a right to force the fishing vessels into contracts to pay the federal observers. The First Circuit approved this practice without stating whether its conclusion was a "product of Chevron step one or step two." It held the mere fact that the MSA provides for federal observers gave the agency carte blanche to charge the regulated party for those observers. Neither Chevron nor the MSA provision allowing measures "necessary and appropriate" to enforce the statute allows this result.

Question Presented: Whether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.

Holding: The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council is overruled.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch filed concurring opinions. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in which Justice Jackson joined as it applies to No. 22-1219. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case in No. 22-451.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Roman Martinez, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo | Case No. 22-451 | Date Argued: 1/17/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24 Jan 17, 2024

Oral Argument: Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo | Case No. 22-451 | Date Argued: 1/17/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24

Case consolidated with Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, Case No. 22-1219.

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) governs fishery management in federal waters and provides that the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) may require vessels to "carry" federal observers onboard to enforce the agency's myriad regulations. Given that space onboard a fishing vessel is limited and valuable, that alone is an extraordinary imposition. But in three narrow circumstances not applicable here, the MSA goes further and requires vessels to pay the salaries of the federal observers who oversee their operations-although, with the exception of foreign vessels that enjoy the privilege of fishing in our waters, the MSA caps the costs of those salaries at 2-3% of the value of the vessel's haul. The statutory question underlying this petition is whether the agency can also force a wide variety of domestic vessels to foot the bill for the salaries of the monitors they must carry to the tune of 20% of their revenues. Under well-established principles of statutory construction, the answer would appear to be no, as the express grant of such a controversial power in limited circumstances forecloses a broad implied grant that would render the express grant superfluous. But a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit answered yes under Chevron on the theory that statutory silence produced an ambiguity that justified deferring to the agency.

Question Presented: Whether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.

Holding: The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council is overruled.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch filed concurring opinions. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in which Justice Jackson joined as it applies to No. 22-1219. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case in No. 22-451.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Roman Martinez, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P. | Case No. 22-1165 | Date Argued: 1/16/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24 Jan 16, 2024

Oral Argument: Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P. | Case No. 22-1165 | Date Argued: 1/16/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Section l0(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits deception in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. To that end, SEC Rule l0b-5 declares it unlawful to make an untrue statement or omit a material fact "necessary" to make an affirmative statement "not misleading." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b). A violation of this requirement can give rise to a private claim-a judicially implied private right of action that this Court has construed narrowly. Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K calls for additional disclosures under a different standard. Item 303 is an administrative rule that requires a company to disclose known trends or uncertainties that are likely to have a material impact on its financial position, regardless of whether the company had made any statements that would otherwise be misleading.

Question Presented: Whether the Second Circuit erred in holding-in conflict with the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits-that a failure to make a disclosure required under Item 303 can support a private claim under Section l0(b), even in the absence of an otherwise-misleading statement.

Holding: Pure omissions are not actionable under SEC Rule 10b-5(b), which makes it unlawful to omit material facts in connection with buying or selling securities when that omission renders "statements made" misleading.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Linda T. Coberly, Chicago, Ill.
For Respondent Moab Partners, L.P.: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.; and Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Timestamps:

Oral Argument: Devillier v. Texas | Case No. 22-913 | Date Argued: 1/16/24 | Date Decided: 4/16/24 Jan 16, 2024

Oral Argument: Devillier v. Texas | Case No. 22-913 | Date Argued: 1/16/24 | Date Decided: 4/16/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, this Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause was "self-executing" and that "[s]tatutory recognition was not necessary" for claims for just compensation because they "are grounded in the Constitution itself[.]" 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987). Since First English, several state courts of last resort have held that the self-executing nature of the Takings Clause requires them to entertain claims directly under the Clause without the need for statutory authorization. Two federal Circuits, the Fifth and the Ninth, disagree and have held that claims for just compensation are only available if they are legislatively authorized.

Question Presented: May a person whose property is taken without compensation seek redress under the self-executing Takings Clause even if the legislature has not affirmatively provided them with a cause of action?

Holding: Owners of property north of U.S. Interstate Highway 10 adversely affected by the flood evacuation barrier constructed by Texas should be permitted on remand to pursue their takings clause claims through the cause of action available under Texas law.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Robert J. McNamara, Arlington, Va.
For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.; and Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Oral Argument: Smith v. Arizona | Case No. 22-899 | Date Argued: 1/10/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24 Jan 10, 2024

Oral Argument: Smith v. Arizona | Case No. 22-899 | Date Argued: 1/10/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment permits the prosecution in a criminal trial to present testimony by a substitute expert conveying the testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst, on the grounds that (a) the testifying expert offers some independent opinion and the analyst's statements are offered not for their truth but to explain the expert's opinion, and (b) the defendant did not independently seek to subpoena the analyst.

Holding: When an expert conveys an absent lab analyst's statements in support of the expert's opinion, and the statements provide that support only if true, then the statements come into evidence for their truth, and thus implicate the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined, and in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined as to Parts I, II, and IV. Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch filed opinions concurring in part. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Hari Santhanam, Chicago, Ill.
For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Alexander W. Samuels, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Phoenix, Ariz.

Oral Argument: Sheetz v. County of El Dorado | Case No. 22-1074 | Date Argued: 1/9/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24 Jan 09, 2024

Oral Argument: Sheetz v. County of El Dorado | Case No. 22-1074 | Date Argued: 1/9/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

George Sheetz applied, to the County of El Dorado, California, for a permit to build a modest manufactured house on his property. Pursuant to legislation enacted by the County, and as the condition of obtaining the permit, Mr. Sheetz was required to pay a monetary exaction of $23,420 to help finance unrelated road improvements. The County demanded payment in spite of the fact that it made no individualized determination that the exaction-a substantial sum for Mr. Sheetz bore an "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" to the purported impacts associated with his modest project as required in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). Mr. Sheetz challenged the exaction as an unconstitutional condition under Nollan and Dolan. A California trial court upheld the exaction, holding that, because it was authorized by legislation, the exaction was immune from Nollan/Dolan review. In a published decision, the California Court of Appeal affirmed, and the California Supreme Court denied review. California's judicially-created exemption from Nollan/Dolan scrutiny for legislative exactions conflicts with the decisions of other federal and state courts across the country, and is in strong tension with this Court's more recent precedents.

Question Presented: Whether a permit exaction is exempt from the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine as applied in Nollan and Dolan simply because it is authorized by legislation.

Holding: The Fifth Amendment's takings clause does not distinguish between legislative and administrative land-use permit conditions.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Paul J. Beard, II, Los Angeles, Cal.
For Respondent: Aileen M. McGrath, San Francisco, Cal.; and Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Oral Argument: United States Trustee v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC | Case No. 22-1238 | Date Argued: 1/9/24 | Date Decided: 6/14/24 Jan 09, 2024

Oral Argument: United States Trustee v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC | Case No. 22-1238 | Date Argued: 1/9/24 | Date Decided: 6/14/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Section 1004(a) of the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, Pub. L. No.115-72, Div. B, 131 Stat. 1232 (28 U.S.C. 1930(a)(6)(B) (2018)), amended the schedule of quarterly fees payable to the United States Trustee in certain pending bankruptcy cases. In Siegel v. Fitzgerald, 142 S. Ct. 1770 (2022), this Court held that that provision contravened Congress's constitutional authority to "establish * * * uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies," U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 4, because it was initially applied only in the 88 federal judicial districts that have United States Trustees but not in the 6 districts that have Bankruptcy Administrators. This Court left open the question of "the appropriate remedy" for the violation. Siegel, 142 S. Ct. at 1783.

Question Presented: Whether the appropriate remedy for the constitutional uniformity violation found by this Court in Siegel, supra, is to require the United States Trustee to grant retrospective refunds of the increased fees paid by debtors in United States Trustee districts during the period of disuniformity, or is instead either to deem sufficient the prospective remedy adopted by Congress or to require the collection of additional fees from a much smaller number of debtors in Bankruptcy Administrator districts.

Holding: Prospective parity (i.e., requiring equal fees for otherwise identical Chapter 11 debtors going forward) is the appropriate remedy for the short-lived and small disparity created by the fee statute held unconstitutional in Siegel v. Fitzgerald.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. "Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Barrett joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents: Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, Tex.

Oral Argument: FBI v. Fikre | Case No. 22-1178 | Date Decided: 1/8/24 | Date Decided: 3/19/24 Jan 08, 2024

Oral Argument: FBI v. Fikre | Case No. 22-1178 | Date Decided: 1/8/24 | Date Decided: 3/19/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Individuals are sometimes removed from the No Fly List during ongoing litigation about their placement on that list. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have held that an individual's removal from the No Fly List moots a case when the government represents that the individual will not be placed back on the list based on currently available information. In conflict with those decisions, the Ninth Circuit held in this case that Respondent's claims were not moot even though he was removed from the No Fly List in 2016 and the government provided a sworn declaration stating that he "will not be placed on the No Fly List in the future based on the currently available information."

Question Presented: Whether Respondent's claims challenging his placement on the No Fly List are moot.

Holding: The government failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that Yonas Fikre's removal from the government's No Fly List mooted his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case because its declaration did not disclose the conduct that landed Fikre on the No Fly List and did not ensure that he would not be placed back on the list for engaging in the same or similar conduct in the future.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Gadeir Abbas, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Campos-Chaves v. Garland | Case No. 22-674 | Date Argued: 1/8/24 | Date Decided: 6/14/24 Jan 08, 2024

Oral Argument: Campos-Chaves v. Garland | Case No. 22-674 | Date Argued: 1/8/24 | Date Decided: 6/14/24

Host Note: This case was consolidated with Garland v. Singh, Case No. 22-884.

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that a noncitizen who does not appear at a removal hearing shall be ordered removed in absentia, but only if she was provided "written notice required under paragraph (l) or (2) of section 1229(a).'' 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (b)(5)(A). The Act authorizes rescission of an in absentia order if the noncitizen "did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a)." Id. § 1229a (b)(5)(C)(ii). Paragraph (1) of section 1229(a) requires a single notice document that contains all the information specified in the statute, including the "time and place" of proceedings. See Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1480-1485 (2021). Paragraph (2) requires notice of the "new time and place" "in the case of any change or postponement in the time and place of such proceedings."

Question Presented: If the government serves an initial notice document that does not include the "time and place" of proceedings, followed by an additional document containing that information, has the government provided notice "required under" and "in accordance with para- graph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a)" such that an immigration court must enter a removal order in absentia and deny a noncitizen's request to rescind that order?

Holding: Because each of the aliens in this case received a proper notice for the removal hearings they missed and at which they were ordered removed from the United States, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), they cannot seek rescission of their in absentia removal orders on the basis of defective notice under Section 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General: Charles L. McCloud, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Petitioner in 22-674 and Respondents in 22-884: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.

Oral Argument: Muldrow v. St. Louis | Case No. 22-193 | Date Argued: 12/6/23 | Date Decided: 4/17/24 Dec 06, 2023

Oral Argument: Muldrow v. St. Louis | Case No. 22-193 | Date Argued: 12/6/23 | Date Decided: 4/17/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual" with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). The Eighth Circuit below followed binding circuit precedent to hold that discriminatory job transfers (and denials of requested transfers) are lawful under Title VII when they do not impose "materially significant disadvantages" on employees.

Question Presented: Does Title VII prohibit discrimination as to all "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," or is its reach limited to discriminatory employer conduct that courts determine causes materially significant disadvantages for employees?

Holding: An employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII must show that the transfer brought about some harm with respect to an identifiable term or condition of employment, but that harm need not be significant.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh each filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Brian Wolfman, Washington, D.C.; and Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
For Respondents: Robert M. Loeb, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Moore v. United States | Case No. 22-800 | Date Argued: 12/5/23 | Date Decided: 6/20/24 Dec 05, 2023

Oral Argument: Moore v. United States | Case No. 22-800 | Date Argued: 12/5/23 | Date Decided: 6/20/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Beginning with Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), this Court's decisions have uniformly held "income," for Sixteenth Amendment purposes, to require realization by the taxpayer. In the decision below, however, the Ninth Circuit approved taxation of a married couple on earnings that they undisputedly did not realize but were instead retained and reinvested by a corporation in which they are minority shareholders. It held that "realization of income is not a constitutional requirement" for Congress to lay an "income" tax exempt from apportionment. App.12. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit became "the first court in the country to state that an 'income tax' doesn't require that a 'taxpayer has realized income.'" App.38 (Bumatay, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

Question Presented: Whether the Sixteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to tax unrealized sums without apportionment among the states.

Holding: The Mandatory Repatriation Tax, "which attributes the realized and undistributed income of an American-controlled foreign corporation to the entity's American shareholders, and then taxes the American shareholders on their portions of that income" does not exceed Congress's constitutional authority.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Andrew M. Grossman, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P. | Case No. 23-124 | Date Argued: 12/4/23 | Date Decided: 6/27/24 Dec 04, 2023

Oral Argument: Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P. | Case No. 23-124 | Date Argued: 12/4/23 | Date Decided: 6/27/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a court to approve, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, a release that extinguishes claims held by nondebtors against nondebtor third parties, without the claimants' consent.

Holding: The bankruptcy code does not authorize a release and injunction that, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11, effectively seek to discharge claims against a nondebtor without the consent of affected claimants.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.: Gregory G. Garre, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.: Pratik A. Shah, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: SEC v. Jarkesy | Case No. 22-859 | Date Argued: 11/29/23 | Date Decided: 6/27/24 Nov 29, 2023

Oral Argument: SEC v. Jarkesy | Case No. 22-859 | Date Argued: 11/29/23 | Date Decided: 6/27/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Questions Presented:

Whether statutory provisions that empower the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to initiate and adjudicate administrative enforcement proceedings seeking civil penalties violate the Seventh Amendment.
Whether statutory provisions that authorize the SEC to choose to enforce the securities laws through an agency adjudication instead of filing a district court action violate the nondelegation doctrine.
Whether Congress violated Article II by granting for-cause removal protection to administrative law judges in agencies whose heads enjoy for-cause removal protection.

Holding: When the Securities and Exchange Commission seeks civil penalties against a defendant for securities fraud, the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial.

Result: Affirmed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents: S. Michael McColloch, Dallas, Tex.

Oral Argument: McElrath v. Georgia | Case No. 22-721 | Date Argued: 11/28/23 | Date Decided: 2/21/24 Nov 28, 2023

Oral Argument: McElrath v. Georgia | Case No. 22-721 | Date Argued: 11/28/23 | Date Decided: 2/21/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Georgia Supreme Court held that a jury's verdict of acquittal on one criminal charge and its verdict of guilty on a different criminal charge arising from the same facts were logically and legally impossible to reconcile. It called the verdicts "repugnant," vacated both of them, and subsequently held that the defendant could be prosecuted a second time on both charges.

Question Presented: Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibit a second prosecution for a crime of which a defendant was previously acquitted?

Holding: The jury's verdict that the defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity of malice murder constituted an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes notwithstanding any inconsistency with the jury's other verdicts.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Richard A. Simpson, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Stephen J. Petrany, Solicitor General, Atlanta, Ga.

Oral Argument: Wilkinson v. Garland | Case No. 22-666 | Date Argued: 11/28/23 | Date Decided: 3/19/24 Nov 28, 2023

Oral Argument: Wilkinson v. Garland | Case No. 22-666 | Date Argued: 11/28/23 | Date Decided: 3/19/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General has discretion to cancel removal of non-permanent residents who satisfy four eligibility criteria, including "that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to the applicant's immediate family member who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(D). Congress stripped courts of jurisdiction to review cancellation-of-removal determinations, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), but expressly preserved their jurisdiction to review "questions of law." Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). And as this Court has already held, this "statutory phrase 'questions of law' includes the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts"—that is, a "mixed question of law and fact." Guerrero-Lasprilla u. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1068-69 (2020).

Question Presented: Whether an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D), as three circuits have held, or whether this determination is a discretionary judgment call unreviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), as the court below and two other circuits have concluded.

Holding: The Immigration Judge's discretionary decision that Situ Kamu Wilkinson failed to satisfy 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(D)'s "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard for determining eligibility for cancellation of removal is a mixed question of law and fact, reviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(D)'s jurisdiction restoring exception for "questions of law"; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit's holding that the IJ's decision was unreviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) was in error.

Result: Reversed in part, Vacated in part, remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Jaime A. Santos, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Brown v. United States | Case No. 22-6389 | Date Argued: 11/27/2023 | Date Decided: 5/23/24 Nov 27, 2023

Oral Argument: Brown v. United States | Case No. 22-6389 | Date Argued: 11/27/2023 | Date Decided: 5/23/24

Host Note: Case consolidated with Jackson v. United States, Case No. 22-6640.

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") provides that felons who possess a firearm are normally subject to a maximum 10-year sentence. But if the felon already has at least three "serious drug offense" convictions, then the minimum sentence is fifteen years. Courts decide whether a prior state conviction counts as a serious drug offense using the categorical approach. That requires determining whether the elements of a state drug offense are the same as, or narrower than those of its federal counterpart. If so, the state conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate. But federal drug law often changes-as here, where Congress decriminalized hemp, narrowing the federal definition of marijuana. If state law doesn't follow suit, sentencing courts face a categorical conundrum. Under an earlier version of federal law, the state and federal offenses match-and the state offense is an ACCA predicate. Under the amended version, the offenses do not match-and the state offense is not an ACCA predicate. So the version of federal law that the court chooses to consult dictates the difference between serving a 10-year maximum or a 15-year minimum.

Question Presented: Which version of federal law should a sentencing court consult under ACCA's categorical approach?

Holding: For purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act's 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on certain defendants with three or more previous convictions, a state drug conviction counts as an ACCA predicate if it involved a drug on the federal schedules at the time of that conviction.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined, and in which Justice Gorsuch joined as to Parts I, II, and III.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner Brown: Jeffrey T. Green, Washington, D.C.
For Petitioner Jackson: Andrew Adler, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Fort Lauderdale, Fla.
For Respondent: Austin Raynor, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Rudisill v. McDonough | Case No. 22-888 | Date Argued: 11/8/23 | Date Decided: 4/16/24 Nov 08, 2023

Oral Argument: Rudisill v. McDonough | Case No. 22-888 | Date Argued: 11/8/23 | Date Decided: 4/16/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether a veteran who has served two separate and distinct periods of qualifying service under the Montgomery GI Bill, 38 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq., and under the Post-9/11 GI Bill, 38 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq., is entitled to receive a total of 48 months of education benefits as between both programs, without first exhausting the Montgomery benefit in order to obtain the more generous Post-9/11 benefit.

Holding: Service members who, through separate periods of service, accrue educational benefits under both the Montgomery and Post-9/11 GI Bills may use either one, in any order, up to 38 U.S.C. § 3695(a)'s 48-month aggregate-benefits cap.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: For Petitioner: Misha Tseytlin, Chicago, Ill.
For Respondent: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: United States v. Rahimi | Case No. 22-915 | Date Argued: 11/7/23 | Date Decided: 6/21/24 Nov 07, 2023

Oral Argument: United States v. Rahimi | Case No. 22-915 | Date Argued: 11/7/23 | Date Decided: 6/21/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8), which prohibits the possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic-violence restraining orders, violates the Second Amendment on its face.

Holding: When an individual has been found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another, that individual may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for the Court, in which Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined. Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson filed concurring opinions. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: J. Matthew Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Amarillo, Tex.

Oral Argument: Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Serv. v. Kirtz | Case No. 22-846 | Argument Date: 11/6/23 | Date Decided: 2/8/24 Nov 06, 2023

Oral Argument: Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Serv. v. Kirtz | Case No. 22-846 | Argument Date: 11/6/23 | Date Decided: 2/8/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the civil-liability provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., unequivocally and unambiguously waive the sovereign immunity of the United States.

Holding: A consumer may sue a federal agency under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 16810 for defying the terms of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Benjamin W. Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Nandan M. Joshi, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Vidal v. Elster | Case No. 22-704 | Date Argued: 11/1/23 | Date Decided: 6/13/24 Nov 01, 2023

Oral Argument: Vidal v. Elster | Case No. 22-704 | Date Argued: 11/1/23 | Date Decided: 6/13/24

Question Presented: Whether the refusal to register a mark under Section 1052(c) violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment when the mark contains criticism of a government official or public figure.

Holding: The Lanham Act's names clause "which prohibits the registration of a mark that "[c]onsists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent," does not violate the First Amendment.

Result: Reversed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III. Justices Alito and Gorsuch joined that opinion in full; Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh joined all but Part III; and Justice Barrett joined Parts I, II-A, and II-B. Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Justice Kagan joined, in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to Parts I, II, and III-B, and in which Justice Jackson joined as to Parts I and II. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Jonathan E. Taylor, Washington, D.C.

Oral Arguments: Lindke v. Freed | Case No. 22-611 | Date Argued: 10/31/2023 | Date Decided: 3/15/24 Oct 31, 2023

Case Info: Lindke v. Freed | Case No. 22-611 | Date Argued: 10/31/2023 | Date Decided: 3/15/24

Background: Courts have increasingly been called upon to determine whether a public official who selectively blocks access to his or her social media account has engaged in state action subject to constitutional scrutiny. To answer that question, most circuits consider a broad range of factors, including the account's appearance and purpose. But in the decision below, the court of appeals rejected the relevance of any consideration other than whether the official was performing a "duty of his office" or invoking the "authority of his office."

Question Presented: Whether a public official's social media activity can constitute state action only if the official used the account to perform a governmental duty or under the authority of his or her office.

Holding: A public official who prevents someone from commenting on the official's social-media page engages in state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if the official both (1) possessed actual authority to speak on the state's behalf on a particular matter, and (2) purported to exercise that authority when speaking in the relevant social-media posts.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Allon Kedem, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Victoria R. Ferres, Port Huron, Mich.; and Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Oral Argument: O'Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier | Case No. 22-324 | Date Argued: 10/31/2023 | Date Decided: 3/15/2024 Oct 31, 2023

Case Info: O'Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier | Case No. 22-324 | Date Argued: 10/31/2023 | Date Decided: 3/15/2024

Question Presented: Whether a public official engages in state action subject to the First Amendment by blocking an individual from the official's personal social-media account, when the official uses the account to feature their job and communicate about job-related matters with the public, but does not do so pursuant to any governmental authority or duty.

Holding: Judgment vacated and case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion in Lindke v. Freed.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Per Curiam opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: Hashim M. Mooppan, Washington, D.C.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
For Respondents: Pamela S. Karlan, Stanford, Cal.

Oral Argument: Culley v. Marshall | Case No. 22-585 | Date Argued: 10/30/23 | Date Decided: 5/9/24 Oct 30, 2023

Case Info: Culley v. Marshall | Case No. 22-585 | Date Argued: 10/30/23 | Date Decided: 5/9/24

Question Presented: In determining whether the Due Process Clause requires a state or local government to provide a post seizure probable cause hearing prior to a statutory judicial forfeiture proceeding and, if so, when such a hearing must take place, should district courts apply the "speedy trial" test employed in United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555 (1983) and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), as held by the Eleventh Circuit or the three-part due process analysis set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) as held by at least the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.

Holding: In civil forfeiture cases involving personal property, the due process clause requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require a separate preliminary hearing.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents: Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., Solicitor General, Montgomery, Ala.; and Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Oral Argument: Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP | Case No. 22-807 | Date Argued: 10/11/23 | Date Decided: 5/23/24 Oct 11, 2023

Case Info: Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP | Case No. 22-807 | Date Argued: 10/11/23 | Date Decided: 5/23/24

Background: The three-judge district court never mentioned the presumption of the South Carolina General Assembly's good faith, analyzed Congressional District 1 as a whole, or examined the intent of the General Assembly as a whole. It also disregarded the publicly available election data used to draw District 1 and legislator testimony demonstrating that politics and traditional districting principles better explain District 1 than race. And it never identified an alternative map that achieved the General Assembly's political objectives while similarly adhering to traditional criteria. The court nonetheless held that a portion of District 1 is racially gerrymandered and discriminatory, and therefore permanently enjoined elections there. After an eight-day trial featuring more than twenty witnesses and hundreds of exhibits, the court rested this holding on its brief questioning of the experienced nonpartisan map drawer and its conclusion that he used a racial target as a proxy for politics in District 1. Plaintiffs did not pursue that theory at trial, and the court never explained why the General Assembly would use race as a proxy to draw lines for political reasons when it could (and did) use election data directly to do the job.

Questions Presented:

Did the district court err when it failed to apply the presumption of good faith and to holistically analyze District 1 and the General Assembly's intent?
Did the district court err in failing to enforce the alternative-map requirement in this circumstantial case?
Did the district court err when it failed to disentangle race from politics?
Did the district court err in finding racial predominance when it never analyzed District l's compliance with traditional districting principles?
Did the district court clearly err in finding that the General Assembly used a racial target as a proxy for politics when the record showed only that the General Assembly was aware of race, that race and politics are highly correlated, and that the General Assembly drew districts based on election data? 6. Did the district court err in upholding the intentional discrimination claim when it never even considered whether-let alone found that-District 1 has a discriminatory effect?

Holding: Because the district court's finding that race predominated in the design of South Carolina's first congressional district was clearly erroneous, the district court's racial-gerrymandering and vote-dilution holdings cannot stand.

Result: Reversed in Part, Remanded in Part.

Voting Breakdown: 5-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined, and in which Justice Thomas joined as to all but Part III-C. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Appellants: John M. Gore, Washington, D.C.
For Appellees: Leah C. Aden, New York, N. Y.
For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC | Case No. 22-660 | Date Argued: 10/10/23 | Date Decided: 2/8/24 Oct 10, 2023

Case Info: Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC | Case No. 22-660 | Date Argued: 10/10/23 | Date Decided: 2/8/24

Background: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 protects whistleblowers who report financial wrongdoing at publicly traded companies. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. When a whistleblower invokes the Act and claims he was fired because of his report, his claim is "governed by the legal burdens of proof set forth in section 42121(b) of title 49, United States Code." 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C). Under that incorporated framework, a whistleblowing employee meets his burden by showing that his protected activity "was a contributing factor in the unfavorable personnel action alleged in the complaint." 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iii). If the employee meets that burden, the employer can prevail only if it "demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the employer would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of that behavior." Id. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iv).

Question Presented: Under the burden-shifting framework that governs Sarbanes-Oxley cases, must a whistleblower prove his employer acted with a "retaliatory intent" as part of his case in chief, or is the lack of "retaliatory intent" part of the affirmative defense on which the employer bears the burden of proof?

Holding: A whistleblower seeking to invoke the protections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act must prove that their protected activity was a contributing factor in the employer's unfavorable personnel action, but need not prove that the employer acted with "retaliatory intent."

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Barrett joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
For Respondents: Eugene Scalia, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co. | Case No. 22-500 | Date Argued: 10/10/23 | Date Decided: 2/21/24 Oct 10, 2023

Case Info: Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co. | Case No. 22-500 | Date Argued: 10/10/23 | Date Decided: 2/21/24

Question Presented: Under federal admiralty law, can a choice of law clause in a maritime contract be rendered unenforceable if enforcement is contrary to the "strong public policy" of the state whose law is displaced?

Holding: Choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable under federal maritime law, with narrow exceptions not applicable in this case.

Result: Reversed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Jeffrey B. Wall, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Howard J. Bashman, Fort Washington, Pa.

Oral Argument: Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer | Case No. 22-429 | Date Argued: 10/4/23 | Date Decided: 12/5/23 Oct 04, 2023

Case Info: Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer | Case No. 22-429 | Date Argued: 10/4/23 | Date Decided: 12/5/23

Question Presented: Does a self-appointed Americans with Disabilities Act "tester" have Article III standing to challenge a place of public accommodation's failure to provide disability accessibility information on its website, even if she lacks any intention of visiting that place of public accommodation?

Holding: Because Deborah Laufer voluntarily dismissed her pending suits under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Laufer's case against Acheson is moot.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Thomas and Justice Jackson filed opinions concurring in the judgment.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D.C.
For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Kelsi B. Corkran, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: CFPB v. Community Financial Services Assn. of America, Ltd. | Case No. 22-448 | Date Argued: 10/3/23 | Date Decided: 4/16/24 Oct 03, 2023

Case Info: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Assn. of America, Ltd. | Case No. 22-448 | Date Argued: 10/3/23 | Date Decided: 4/16/24

Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the statute providing funding to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), 12 U.S.C. 5497, violates the Appropriations Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 9, Cl. 7, and in vacating a regulation promulgated at a time when the CFPB was receiving such funding.

Holding: Congress' statutory authorization allowing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to draw money from the earnings of the Federal Reserve System to carry out the bureau's duties, 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(l)-(2), satisfies the appropriations clause.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Pulsifer v. United States | Case No. 22-340 | Date Argued: 10/2/23 | Date Decided: 3/15/24 Oct 02, 2023

Case Info: Pulsifer v. United States | Case No. 22-340 | Date Argued: 10/2/23 | Date Decided: 3/15/24

Background: The "safety valve" provision of the federal sentencing statute requires a district court to ignore any statutory mandatory minimum and instead follow the Sentencing Guidelines if a defendant was convicted of certain nonviolent drug crimes and can meet five sets of criteria. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5). Congress amended the first set of criteria, in§ 3553(f)(1), in the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 402, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221, broad criminal justice and sentencing reform legislation designed to provide a second chance for nonviolent offenders. A defendant satisfies § 3553(f)(1), as amended, if he "does not have-(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (emphasis added).

Question Presented: Whether the "and" in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) means "and," so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, and (C) a 2-point offense (as the Ninth Circuit holds), or whether the "and" means "or," so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, or (C) a 2-point violent offense (as the Seventh and Eighth Circuits hold).

Holding: A criminal defendant facing a mandatory minimum sentence is eligible for safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(l) only if the defendant satisfies each of the provision's three conditions.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Argument: Tyler v. Hennepin County | Case No. 22-166 | Date Argued: 4/26/2023 | Date Decided: 5/25/2023 Apr 26, 2023

Oral Argument: Tyler v. Hennepin County | Case No. 22-166 | Date Argued: 4/26/2023 | Date Decided: 5/25/2023

Oral Argument: Yegiazaryan v. Smagin | Case No. 22-381 | Date Argued: 4/25/2023 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023 Apr 25, 2023

Oral Argument: Yegiazaryan v. Smagin | Case No. 22-381 | Date Argued: 4/25/2023 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023

Oral Argument: Dupree v. Younger | Case No. 22-210 | Date Argued: 4/24/2023 | Date Decided: 5/25/2023 Apr 24, 2023

Oral Argument: Dupree v. Younger | Case No. 22-210 | Date Argued: 4/24/2023 | Date Decided: 5/25/2023

Oral Argument: Lac du Flambeau Band v. Coughlin | Case No. 22-227 | Date Argued: 4/24/2023 | Date Decided: 6/15/2023 Apr 24, 2023

Oral Argument: Lac du Flambeau Band v. Coughlin | Case No. 22-227 | Date Argued: 4/24/2023 | Date Decided: 6/15/2023

Oral Argument: Counterman v. Colorado | Case No. 22-138 | Date Argued: 4/19/2023 | Date Decided: 6/27/2023 Apr 19, 2023

Oral Argument: Counterman v. Colorado | Case No. 22-138 | Date Argued: 4/19/2023 | Date Decided: 6/27/2023

Oral Argument: Groff v. DeJoy | Case No. 22-174 | Date Argued: 4/18/2023 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023 Apr 18, 2023

Oral Argument: Groff v. DeJoy | Case No. 22-174 | Date Argued: 4/18/2023 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023

Oral Argument: U.S., ex rel. Schutte v. Supervalu Inc. | Case No. 21-1326 | Date Argued: 4/18/2023 | Date Decided: 6/1/2023 Apr 18, 2023

Oral Argument: U.S., ex rel. Schutte v. Supervalu Inc. | Case No. 21-1326 | Date Argued: 4/18/2023 | Date Decided: 6/1/2023

Oral Argument: Pugin v. Garland | Case No. 22-23 | Date Argued: 4/17/2023 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023 Apr 17, 2023

Oral Argument: Pugin v. Garland | Case No. 22-23 | Date Argued: 4/17/2023 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023

Oral Argument: Slack Technologies, LLC v. Pirani | Case No. 22-200 | Date Argued: 4/17/2023 | Date Decided: 6/1/2023 Apr 17, 2023

Oral Argument: Slack Technologies, LLC v. Pirani | Case No. 22-200 | Date Argued: 4/17/2023 | Date Decided: 6/1/2023

Oral Argument: Samia v. United States | Case No. 22-196 | Date Argued: 3/29/2023 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023 Mar 29, 2023

Oral Argument: Samia v. United States | Case No. 22-196 | Date Argued: 3/29/2023 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023

Oral Argument: Smith v. United States | Case No. 21-1576 | Date Argued: 3/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/15/2023 Mar 28, 2023

Oral Argument: Smith v. United States | Case No. 21-1576 | Date Argued: 3/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/15/2023

Oral Argument: Lora v. United States | Case No. 22-49 | Date Argued: 3/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/16/2023 Mar 28, 2023

Oral Argument: Lora v. United States | Case No. 22-49 | Date Argued: 3/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/16/2023

Oral Argument: Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi | Case No. 21-757 | Date Argued: 3/27/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023 Mar 27, 2023

Oral Argument: Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi | Case No. 21-757 | Date Argued: 3/27/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023

Oral Argument: United States v. Hansen | Case No. 22-179 | Date Argued: 3/27/2023 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023 Mar 27, 2023

Oral Argument: United States v. Hansen | Case No. 22-179 | Date Argued: 3/27/2023 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023

Oral Argument: Karcho Polselli v. IRS | Case No. 21-1599 | Date Argued: 3/29/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023 Mar 22, 2023

Oral Argument: Karcho Polselli v. IRS | Case No. 21-1599 | Date Argued: 3/29/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023

Oral Argument: Jack Daniel's Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products | Case No. 22-148 | Date Argued: 3/22/2023 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023 Mar 22, 2023

Oral Argument: Jack Daniel's Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products | Case No. 22-148 | Date Argued: 3/22/2023 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023

Oral Argument: Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, Inc. | Case No. 21-1043 | Date Argued: 3/21/2023 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023 Mar 21, 2023

Oral Argument: Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, Inc. | Case No. 21-1043 | Date Argued: 3/21/2023 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023

Oral Argument: Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski | Case No. 22-105 | Date Argued: 3/21/2023 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023 Mar 21, 2023

Oral Argument: Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski | Case No. 22-105 | Date Argued: 3/21/2023 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023

Oral Argument: Arizona v. Navajo Nation | Case No. 21-1484 | Date Argued: 3/20/2023 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023 Mar 20, 2023

Oral Argument: Arizona v. Navajo Nation | Case No. 21-1484 | Date Argued: 3/20/2023 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023

Oral Argument: New York v. New Jersey Oral Argument | Case No. 156-Orig | Date Argued: 3/1/2023 | Date Decided: 4/18/2023 Mar 01, 2023

Oral Argument: New York v. New Jersey Oral Argument | Case No. 156-Orig | Date Argued: 3/1/2023 | Date Decided: 4/18/2023

Oral Argument: Biden v. Nebraska | Case No. 22-506 | Date Argued: 2/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/30/2023 Feb 28, 2023

Oral Argument: Biden v. Nebraska | Case No. 22-506 | Date Argued: 2/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/30/2023

Oral Argument: Deptartment of Education v. Brown | Case No. 22-535 | Date Argued: 2/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/30/2023 Feb 28, 2023

Oral Argument: Deptartment of Education v. Brown | Case No. 22-535 | Date Argued: 2/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/30/2023

Oral Argument: Dubin v. United States | Case No. 22-10 | Date Argued: 2/27/2023 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023 Feb 27, 2023

Oral Argument: Dubin v. United States | Case No. 22-10 | Date Argued: 2/27/2023 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023

Oral Argument: Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh | Case No. 21-1496 | Date Argued: 2/22/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023 Feb 22, 2023

Oral Argument: Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh | Case No. 21-1496 | Date Argued: 2/22/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023

Oral Argument: Gonzalez v. Google LLC | Case No. 21-1333 | Date Argued: 2/21/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023 Feb 21, 2023

Oral Argument: Gonzalez v. Google LLC | Case No. 21-1333 | Date Argued: 2/21/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023

Oral Argument: Gonzalez v. Google LLC | Case No. 21-1333 | Date Argued: 2/21/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023 Feb 21, 2023

Oral Argument: Gonzalez v. Google LLC | Case No. 21-1333 | Date Argued: 2/21/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023

Oral Argument: Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools | Case No. 21-887 | Date Argued: 1/18/2023 | Date Decided: 3/21/2023 Jan 18, 2023

Oral Argument: Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools | Case No. 21-887 | Date Argued: 1/18/2023 | Date Decided: 3/21/2023

Oral Argument: Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 21-1436 | Date Argued: 1/17/2023 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023 Jan 17, 2023

Oral Argument: Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 21-1436 | Date Argued: 1/17/2023 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023

Oral Argument: Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States | Case No. 21-1450 | Date Argued: 1/17/2023 | Date Decided: 4/19/2023 Jan 17, 2023

Oral Argument: Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States | Case No. 21-1450 | Date Argued: 1/17/2023 | Date Decided: 4/19/2023

Oral Argument: Financial Oversight Board v. CPI | Case No. 22-96 | Date Argued: 1/11/2023 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023 Jan 11, 2023

Oral Argument: Financial Oversight Board v. CPI | Case No. 22-96 | Date Argued: 1/11/2023 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023

Oral Argument: Glacier Northwest, Inc. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters | Case No. 21-1449 | Date Argued: 1/10/2023 | Date Decided: 6/1/2023 Jan 10, 2023

Oral Argument: Glacier Northwest, Inc. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters | Case No. 21-1449 | Date Argued: 1/10/2023 | Date Decided: 6/1/2023

Oral Argument: In Re Grand Jury | Case No. 21-1397 | Date Argued: 1/9/2023 | Date Decided: 1/23/2023 Jan 09, 2023

Oral Argument: In Re Grand Jury | Case No. 21-1397 | Date Argued: 1/9/2023 | Date Decided: 1/23/2023

Oral Argument: OH Adjutant Gen.'s Dept. v. FLRA | Case No. 21-1454 | Date Argued: 1/9/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023 Jan 09, 2023

Oral Argument: OH Adjutant Gen.'s Dept. v. FLRA | Case No. 21-1454 | Date Argued: 1/9/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023

Oral Argument: Moore v. Harper | Case No. 21-1271 | Date Argued: 12/7/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2023 Dec 07, 2022

Oral Argument: Moore v. Harper | Case No. 21-1271 | Date Argued: 12/7/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2023

Oral Argument: U.S., ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health | Case No. 21-1052 | Date Argued: 12/6/2022 | Date Decided: 6/16/2023 Dec 06, 2022

Oral Argument: U.S., ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health | Case No. 21-1052 | Date Argued: 12/6/2022 | Date Decided: 6/16/2023

Oral Argument: Bartenwerfer v. Buckley | Case No. 21-908 | Date Argued: 12/6/2022 | Date Decided: 2/22/2023 Dec 06, 2022

Oral Argument: Bartenwerfer v. Buckley | Case No. 21-908 | Date Argued: 12/6/2022 | Date Decided: 2/22/2023

Oral Argument: 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis | Case No. 21-476 | Date Argued: 12/5/2022 | Date Decided: 6/30/2023 Dec 05, 2022

Oral Argument: 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis | Case No. 21-476 | Date Argued: 12/5/2022 | Date Decided: 6/30/2023

Oral Argument: MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC | Case No. 21-1270 | Date Argued: 12/5/2022 | Date Decided: 4/19/2023 Dec 05, 2022

Oral Argument: MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC | Case No. 21-1270 | Date Argued: 12/5/2022 | Date Decided: 4/19/2023

Oral Argument: Wilkins v. United States | Case No. 21-1164 | Date Argued: 11/30/2022 | Date Decided: 3/28/2023 Nov 30, 2022

Oral Argument: Wilkins v. United States | Case No. 21-1164 | Date Argued: 11/30/2022 | Date Decided: 3/28/2023

Oral Argument: United States v. Texas | Case No. 22-58 | Date Argued: 11/29/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023 Nov 29, 2022

Oral Argument: United States v. Texas | Case No. 22-58 | Date Argued: 11/29/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023

Oral Argument: Percoco v. United States | Case No. 21-1158 | Date Argued: 11/28/2022 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023 Nov 28, 2022

Oral Argument: Percoco v. United States | Case No. 21-1158 | Date Argued: 11/28/2022 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023

Oral Argument: Ciminelli v. United States | Case No. 21-1170 | Date Argued: 11/28/2022 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023 Nov 28, 2022

Oral Argument: Ciminelli v. United States | Case No. 21-1170 | Date Argued: 11/28/2022 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023

Oral Argument: Haaland v. Brackeen | Case No. 21-376 | Date Argued: 11/9/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2023 Nov 09, 2022

Oral Argument: Haaland v. Brackeen | Case No. 21-376 | Date Argued: 11/9/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2023

Oral Argument: Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. | Case No. 21-1168 | Date Argued: 11/8/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2023 Nov 08, 2022

Oral Argument: Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. | Case No. 21-1168 | Date Argued: 11/8/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2023

Oral Argument: Health and Hospital Corp. v. Talevski | Case No. 21-806 | Date Argued: 11/8/2022 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023 Nov 08, 2022

Oral Argument: Health and Hospital Corp. v. Talevski | Case No. 21-806 | Date Argued: 11/8/2022 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023

Oral Argument: Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC | Case No. 21-86 | Date Argued: 11/7/2022 | Date Decided: 4/14/2023 Nov 07, 2022

Oral Argument: Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC | Case No. 21-86 | Date Argued: 11/7/2022 | Date Decided: 4/14/2023

Oral Argument: SEC v. Cochran | Case No. 21-1239 | Date Argued: 11/7/2022 | Date Decided: 4/13/2023 Nov 07, 2022

Oral Argument: SEC v. Cochran | Case No. 21-1239 | Date Argued: 11/7/2022 | Date Decided: 4/13/2023

Oral Argument: Bittner v. United States | Case No. 21-1195 | Date Argued: 11/2/2022 | Date Decided: 2/28/2023 Nov 02, 2022

Oral Argument: Bittner v. United States | Case No. 21-1195 | Date Argued: 11/2/2022 | Date Decided: 2/28/2023

Oral Argument: Jones v. Hendrix | Case No. 21-857 | Date Argued: 11/1/2022 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023 Nov 01, 2022

Oral Argument: Jones v. Hendrix | Case No. 21-857 | Date Argued: 11/1/2022 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023

Oral Argument: Cruz v. Arizona | Case No. 21-846 | Date Argued: 11/1/2022 | Date Decided: 2/22/2023 Nov 01, 2022

Oral Argument: Cruz v. Arizona | Case No. 21-846 | Date Argued: 11/1/2022 | Date Decided: 2/22/2023

Oral Argument: Students for Fair Admissions v. UNC | Case No. 21-707 | Date Argued: 10/31/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023 Oct 31, 2022

Oral Argument: Students for Fair Admissions v. UNC | Case No. 21-707 | Date Argued: 10/31/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023

Oral Argument: Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard | Case No. 20-1199 | Date Argued: 10/31/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023 Oct 31, 2022

Oral Argument: Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard | Case No. 20-1199 | Date Argued: 10/31/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023

Oral Argument: Andy Warhol Found., Inc. v. Goldsmith | Case No. 21-869 | Date Argued: 10/12/2022 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023 Oct 12, 2022

Oral Argument: Andy Warhol Found., Inc. v. Goldsmith | Case No. 21-869 | Date Argued: 10/12/2022 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023

Oral Argument: Helix Energy Solutions v. Hewitt | Case No. 21-984 | Date Argued: 10/12/2022 | Date Decided: 2/22/2023 Oct 12, 2022

Oral Argument: Helix Energy Solutions v. Hewitt | Case No. 21-984 | Date Argued: 10/12/2022 | Date Decided: 2/22/2023

Oral Argument: National Pork Producers v. Ross | Case No. 21-468 | Date Argued: 10/11/2022 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023 Oct 11, 2022

Oral Argument: National Pork Producers v. Ross | Case No. 21-468 | Date Argued: 10/11/2022 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023

Oral Argument: Reed v. Goertz | Case No. 21-442 | Date Argued: 10/11/2022 | Date Decided: 4/19/2023 Oct 11, 2022

Oral Argument: Reed v. Goertz | Case No. 21-442 | Date Argued: 10/11/2022 | Date Decided: 4/19/2023

Oral Argument: Arellano v. McDonough | Case No. 21-432 | Date Argued: 10/4/2022 | Date Decided: 1/23/2023 Oct 04, 2022

Oral Argument: Arellano v. McDonough | Case No. 21-432 | Date Argued: 10/4/2022 | Date Decided: 1/23/2023

Oral Argument: Merrill v. Milligan | Case No. 21-1086 | Date Argued: 10/4/2022 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023 Oct 04, 2022

Oral Argument: Merrill v. Milligan | Case No. 21-1086 | Date Argued: 10/4/2022 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023

Oral Argument: Sackett v. EPA | Case No. 21-454 | Date Argued: 10/3/2022 | Date Decided: 5/25/2023 Oct 03, 2022

Oral Argument: Sackett v. EPA | Case No. 21-454 | Date Argued: 10/3/2022 | Date Decided: 5/25/2023

Oral Argument: Delaware v. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin | Case No. 145-Orig | Date Argued: 10/3/2022 | Date Decided: 2/28/2023 Oct 03, 2022

Oral Argument: Delaware v. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin | Case No. 145-Orig | Date Argued: 10/3/2022 | Date Decided: 2/28/2023

Oral Argument: Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta | Case No. 21-429 | Date Argued: 4/27/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2022 Apr 27, 2022

Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta | Case No. 21-429 | Date Argued: 4/27/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2022

Question Presented: 1. Whether a State has authority to prosecute non-Indians who commit crimes against Indians in Indian country. 2. Whether McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), should be overruled.

Holding: The Federal Government and the State have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Zachary C. Schauf, Washington, D.C.; and Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Oral Argument: Biden v. Texas | Case No. 21-954 | Date Argued: 4/26/2022 | Date Decided: 6/30/2022 Apr 26, 2022

Biden v. Texas | Case No. 21-954 | Date Argued: 4/26/2022 | Date Decided: 6/30/2022

Background: This case concerns the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), a former policy of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under which certain noncitizens arriving at the southwest border were returned to Mexico during their immigration proceedings. On June 1, 2021, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued a memorandum terminating MPP. The district court vacated the Secretary's termination decision and remanded the matter to the agency on two grounds: (1) that terminating MPP violates 8 U.S.C. 1225 because DHS lacks capacity to detain all the inadmissible noncitizens it encounters who purportedly must be detained under that provision, and (2) that the Secretary had not adequately explained his decision. The court entered a permanent injunction requiring DHS to reinstate and maintain MPP unless Congress funds sufficient detention capacity for DHS to detain all noncitizens subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225 and until the agency adequately explained a future termination. On October 29, 2021, after thoroughly reconsidering the matter on remand, the Secretary issued a new decision terminating MPP and providing a comprehensive explanation for the decision. The court of appeals nevertheless affirmed the injunction, endorsing the district court's reading of Section 1225 and holding that the Secretary's new decision could not be considered because it had no legal effect.

Question Presented: Whether 8 U.S.C. 1225 requires DHS to continue implementing MPP. Whether the court of appeals erred by concluding that the Secretary's new decision terminating MPP had no legal effect.

Holding: The Government’s rescission of MPP did not violate section 1225 of the INA, and the October 29 Memoranda constituted final agency action.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch joined as to all but the

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

Oral Argument: Shoop v. Twyford | Case No. 21-511 | Date Argued: 4/26/2022 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022 Apr 26, 2022

Oral Argument: Nance v. Ward | Case No. 21-439 | Date Argued: 4/25/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022 Apr 25, 2022

Nance v. Ward | Case No. 21-439 | Date Argued: 4/25/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022

Background: In Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019), "all nine Justices" agreed that a person challenging a State's method of execution could allege an alternative "not ... authorized under current state law" and that there was therefore "little likelihood that an inmate facing a serious risk of pain will be unable to identify an available alternative." Id. at 1136 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). In the proceedings below, Petitioner filed a § 1983 suit bringing an as-applied challenge to Georgia's sole statutorily authorized method of execution, lethal injection. Petitioner alleged the use of a firing squad as an alternative method. A divided panel held that Petitioner's challenge could not be heard. The panel ruled that Petitioner must bring his challenge in habeas rather than via § 1983 because he had alleged an alternative method not currently authorized under Georgia law. It further held that Petitioner's claim would be an impermissible successive petition notwithstanding that the claim would not have been ripe at the time of Petitioner's first petition.

Question Presented: Whether an inmate's as-applied method-of-execution challenge must be raised in a habeas petition instead of through a § 1983 action if the inmate pleads an alternative method of execution not currently authorized by state law. Whether, if such a challenge must be raised in habeas, it constitutes a successive petition where the challenge would not have been ripe at the time of the inmate's first habeas petition.

Holding: Section 1983 remains an appropriate vehicle for a prisoner’s method-of-execution claim where, as here, the prisoner proposes an alternative method not authorized by the State’s death-penalty statute. Both §1983 and the federal habeas statute enable a prisoner to complain of “unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 480. A prisoner may generally sue under §1983, unless his claim falls into that statute’s “implicit exception” for actions that lie “within the core of habeas corpus.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U. S. 74, 79. When a prisoner seeks relief that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” he comes within the core and must proceed in habeas. Heck, 512 U. S., at 487. The Court has twice held that prisoners could bring method-ofexecution claims under §1983. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 644–647; Hill v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 573, 580–583. Although these cases predated the Court’s requirement that prisoners identify alternative methods of execution, each prisoner had still said enough to leave the Court convinced that alternatives to the challenged procedures were available. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 646; Hill, 547 U. S., at 580–581. Because alternatives were available, the prisoners’ challenges would not “necessarily prevent [the State] from carrying out [their] execution[s].” Nelson, 541 U. S., at 647 (emphasis in original); see Hill, 547 U. S., at 583. That made §1983 a proper vehicle. In Nelson and Hill, the Court observed that using a different method required only a change in an agency’s uncodified protocol. Here, Georgia would have to change its statute to carry out Nance’s execution by firing squad. Except for that fact, this case would even more clearly than Nelson and Hill be fit for §1983. Since those cases, the Court has required a prisoner bringing a method-of-execution claim to propose an alternative way of carrying out his death sentence. Thus, an order granting the prisoner relief does not, as required for habeas, “necessarily prevent” the State from implementing the execution. Nelson, 541 U. S., at 647 (emphasis in original). Rather, the order gives the State a pathway forward. That remains true even where, as here, the proposed alternative is one unauthorized by present state law. Nance’s requested relief still places his execution in Georgia’s control. If Georgia wants to carry out the death sentence, it can enact legislation approving what a court has found to be a fairly easy-to-employ method of execution. Although that 3 Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) Syllabus may take more time and effort than changing an agency protocol, Hill explained that the “incidental delay” involved in changing a procedure is irrelevant to the vehicle question—which focuses on whether the requested relief would “necessarily” invalidate the death sentence. 547 U. S., at 583. And anyway, Georgia has given no reason to think that passing new legislation would be a substantial impediment. The Court of Appeals could reach the contrary conclusion only by wrongly treating Georgia’s statute as immutable. In its view, granting Nance relief would necessarily imply the invalidity of his death sentence because Georgia law must be taken as “fixed.” 981 F. 3d, at 1211. But one of the “main aims” of §1983 is to “override”—and thus compel change of—state laws when necessary to vindicate federal constitutional rights. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 173. Indeed, courts not uncommonly entertain prisoner suits under §1983 that may, if successful, require changing state law. Under the contrary approach, the federal vehicle for bringing a federal method-of-execution claim would depend on the vagaries of state law. Consider how Nance’s claim would fare in different States. In Georgia (and any other State with lethal injection as the sole authorized method), he would have to bring his claim in a habeas petition. But in States authorizing other methods when a court holds injection unlawful, he could file a §1983 suit. It would be strange to read stateby-state discrepancies into the Court’s understanding of how §1983 and the habeas statute apply to federal constitutional claims. That is especially so because the use of the vehicles can lead to different outcomes: An inmate in one State could end up getting his requested relief, while an inmate in another might have his case thrown out. The approach of the Court of Appeals raises one last problem: It threatens to undo the commitment this Court made in Bucklew. The Court there told prisoners they could identify an alternative method not “presently authorized” by the executing State’s law. 587 U. S., at ___. But under the approach of the Court of Appeals, a prisoner who presents an out-of-state alternative is relegated to habeas—and once there, he will almost inevitably collide with the second-or-successive bar. That result, precluding claims like Nance’s, would turn Bucklew into a sham. Finally, recognizing that §1983 is a good vehicle for a claim like Nance’s does not countenance “last-minute” claims to forestall an execution. Id., at ___. Courts must consider delay in deciding whether to grant a stay of execution, and outside the stay context, courts have tools to streamline §1983 actions and protect a sentence’s timely enforcement.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Matthew S. Hellman, Washington, D.C.; and Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Stephen J. Petrany, Solicitor General, Atlanta, Ga.

Oral Argument: Nance v. Ward | Case No. 21-439 | Date Argued: 4/25/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022 Apr 25, 2022

Nance v. Ward | Case No. 21-439 | Date Argued: 4/25/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022

Background: In Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019), "all nine Justices" agreed that a person challenging a State's method of execution could allege an alternative "not ... authorized under current state law" and that there was therefore "little likelihood that an inmate facing a serious risk of pain will be unable to identify an available alternative." Id. at 1136 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). In the proceedings below, Petitioner filed a § 1983 suit bringing an as-applied challenge to Georgia's sole statutorily authorized method of execution, lethal injection. Petitioner alleged the use of a firing squad as an alternative method. A divided panel held that Petitioner's challenge could not be heard. The panel ruled that Petitioner must bring his challenge in habeas rather than via § 1983 because he had alleged an alternative method not currently authorized under Georgia law. It further held that Petitioner's claim would be an impermissible successive petition notwithstanding that the claim would not have been ripe at the time of Petitioner's first petition.

Question Presented: Whether an inmate's as-applied method-of-execution challenge must be raised in a habeas petition instead of through a § 1983 action if the inmate pleads an alternative method of execution not currently authorized by state law. Whether, if such a challenge must be raised in habeas, it constitutes a successive petition where the challenge would not have been ripe at the time of the inmate's first habeas petition.

Holding: Section 1983 remains an appropriate vehicle for a prisoner’s method-of-execution claim where, as here, the prisoner proposes an alternative method not authorized by the State’s death-penalty statute. Both §1983 and the federal habeas statute enable a prisoner to complain of “unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 480. A prisoner may generally sue under §1983, unless his claim falls into that statute’s “implicit exception” for actions that lie “within the core of habeas corpus.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U. S. 74, 79. When a prisoner seeks relief that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” he comes within the core and must proceed in habeas. Heck, 512 U. S., at 487. The Court has twice held that prisoners could bring method-ofexecution claims under §1983. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 644–647; Hill v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 573, 580–583. Although these cases predated the Court’s requirement that prisoners identify alternative methods of execution, each prisoner had still said enough to leave the Court convinced that alternatives to the challenged procedures were available. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 646; Hill, 547 U. S., at 580–581. Because alternatives were available, the prisoners’ challenges would not “necessarily prevent [the State] from carrying out [their] execution[s].” Nelson, 541 U. S., at 647 (emphasis in original); see Hill, 547 U. S., at 583. That made §1983 a proper vehicle. In Nelson and Hill, the Court observed that using a different method required only a change in an agency’s uncodified protocol. Here, Georgia would have to change its statute to carry out Nance’s execution by firing squad. Except for that fact, this case would even more clearly than Nelson and Hill be fit for §1983. Since those cases, the Court has required a prisoner bringing a method-of-execution claim to propose an alternative way of carrying out his death sentence. Thus, an order granting the prisoner relief does not, as required for habeas, “necessarily prevent” the State from implementing the execution. Nelson, 541 U. S., at 647 (emphasis in original). Rather, the order gives the State a pathway forward. That remains true even where, as here, the proposed alternative is one unauthorized by present state law. Nance’s requested relief still places his execution in Georgia’s control. If Georgia wants to carry out the death sentence, it can enact legislation approving what a court has found to be a fairly easy-to-employ method of execution. Although that 3 Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) Syllabus may take more time and effort than changing an agency protocol, Hill explained that the “incidental delay” involved in changing a procedure is irrelevant to the vehicle question—which focuses on whether the requested relief would “necessarily” invalidate the death sentence. 547 U. S., at 583. And anyway, Georgia has given no reason to think that passing new legislation would be a substantial impediment. The Court of Appeals could reach the contrary conclusion only by wrongly treating Georgia’s statute as immutable. In its view, granting Nance relief would necessarily imply the invalidity of his death sentence because Georgia law must be taken as “fixed.” 981 F. 3d, at 1211. But one of the “main aims” of §1983 is to “override”—and thus compel change of—state laws when necessary to vindicate federal constitutional rights. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 173. Indeed, courts not uncommonly entertain prisoner suits under §1983 that may, if successful, require changing state law. Under the contrary approach, the federal vehicle for bringing a federal method-of-execution claim would depend on the vagaries of state law. Consider how Nance’s claim would fare in different States. In Georgia (and any other State with lethal injection as the sole authorized method), he would have to bring his claim in a habeas petition. But in States authorizing other methods when a court holds injection unlawful, he could file a §1983 suit. It would be strange to read stateby-state discrepancies into the Court’s understanding of how §1983 and the habeas statute apply to federal constitutional claims. That is especially so because the use of the vehicles can lead to different outcomes: An inmate in one State could end up getting his requested relief, while an inmate in another might have his case thrown out. The approach of the Court of Appeals raises one last problem: It threatens to undo the commitment this Court made in Bucklew. The Court there told prisoners they could identify an alternative method not “presently authorized” by the executing State’s law. 587 U. S., at ___. But under the approach of the Court of Appeals, a prisoner who presents an out-of-state alternative is relegated to habeas—and once there, he will almost inevitably collide with the second-or-successive bar. That result, precluding claims like Nance’s, would turn Bucklew into a sham. Finally, recognizing that §1983 is a good vehicle for a claim like Nance’s does not countenance “last-minute” claims to forestall an execution. Id., at ___. Courts must consider delay in deciding whether to grant a stay of execution, and outside the stay context, courts have tools to streamline §1983 actions and protect a sentence’s timely enforcement.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Matthew S. Hellman, Washington, D.C.; and Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Stephen J. Petrany, Solicitor General, Atlanta, Ga.

Oral Argument: Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist. | Case No. 21-418 | Date Argued: 4/25/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2022 Apr 25, 2022

Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist. | Case No. 21-418 | Date Argued: 4/25/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2022

Background: Petitioner Joseph Kennedy lost his job as a football coach at a public high school because he knelt and said a quiet prayer by himself at midfield after the game ended. After considering an interlocutory petition in which Kennedy sought review of the lower courts' refusal to grant him a preliminary injunction, four members of this Court observed that "the Ninth Circuit's understanding of the free speech rights of public school teachers is troubling and may justify review in the future," but concluded that this Court should stay its hand until the lower courts definitively determined the reason for Kennedy's termination. The statement also noted that Kennedy had a then unaddressed claim under the Free Exercise Clause. On remand, the lower courts found-and the school district ultimately agreed-that Kennedy lost his job solely because of his religious expression. Yet the Ninth Circuit nevertheless ruled against him again. The court not only doubled down on its "troubling" free-speech reasoning, which transforms virtually all speech by public-school employees into government speech lacking any First Amendment protection, but reached the remarkable conclusion that, even if Kennedy's prayer was private expression protected by the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses (which it undoubtedly was), the Establishment Clause nevertheless required its suppression. The court denied en banc review over the objection of 11 judges.

Question Presented: 1. Whether a public-school employee who says a brief, quiet prayer by himself while at school and visible to students is engaged in government speech that lacks any First Amendment protection. 2. Whether, assuming that such religious expression is private and protected by the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, the Establishment Clause nevertheless compels public schools to prohibit it.

Holding: The Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment protect an individual engaging in a personal religious observance from government reprisal; the Constitution neither mandates nor permits the government to suppress such religious expression.

Result: Judgment REVERSED.

Voting Breakdown: 5-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett joined and in which Justice Kavanaugh joined except as to Part IIIâB. Justice Thomas and Justice Alito filed concurring opinions. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Richard B. Katskee, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Kemp v. United States | Case No. 21-5726 | Date Argued: 4/19/2022 | Date Decided: 6/13/2022 Apr 20, 2022

Vega v. Tekoh | Case No. 21-499 | Date Argued: 4/20/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022

Background: In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), this Court announced a prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. That rule generally prohibits criminal trial courts from admitting into evidence against a criminal defendant any self- incriminating statement made by that defendant while he was in custody, unless the defendant first received certain warnings spelled out in Miranda. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides a damages remedy for deprivations of any right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff may state a claim for relief against a law enforcement officer under Section 1983 based simply on an officer's failure to provide the warnings prescribed in Miranda.

Holding: A violation of the Miranda rules does not provide a basis for a §1983 claim.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Roman Martinez, Washington, D.C.; and Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Paul L. Hoffman, Hermosa Beach, Cal.

Oral Argument: George v. McDonough | Case No. 21-234 | Date Argued: 4/19/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022 Apr 19, 2022

George v. McDonough | Case No. 21-234 | Date Argued: 4/19/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022

Background: In the veterans-benefits system, Congress has provided that an otherwise-final agency decision is subject to revision if that decision is based on "clear and unmistakable error." Here, the Federal Circuit held that the agency's application of a regulation that conflicts with the plain meaning of a statute cannot amount to "clear and unmistakable error." The Federal Circuit reasoned that a federal court's later invalidation of such a regulation is merely a change in interpretation of the law. But this Court has made clear that when a court interprets the plain meaning of a statute, it is not announcing a change but rather declaring what the statute has always meant. An agency regulation that departs from that plain meaning is — and always was — legally invalid. And if the agency relied on that unlawful regulation in an adjudication, that adjudication is infected with a legal error that is clear and unmistakable on the face of the ruling.

Question Presented: When the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) denies a veteran's claim for benefits in reliance on an agency interpretation that is later deemed invalid under the plain text of the statutory provisions in effect at the time of the denial, is that the kind of "clear and unmistakable error" that the veteran may invoke to challenge VA's decision?

Holding: The invalidation of a VA regulation after a veteran’s benefits decision becomes final cannot support a claim for collateral relief based on clear and unmistakable error.

Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

Voting Breakdown: 6-2. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Breyer joined and in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to all but Part IIâC.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Melanie L. Bostwick, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Kemp v. United States | Case No. 21-5726 | Date Argued: 4/19/2022 | Date Decided: 6/13/2022 Apr 19, 2022

Kemp v. United States | Case No. 21-5726 | Date Argued: 4/19/2022 | Date Decided: 6/13/2022

Background: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) authorizes relief from final judgment based on "mistake," as well as inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.

Question Presented: The question presented is: Whether Rule 60(b)(1) authorizes relief based on a district court's error of law.

Holding: The term “mistake” in Rule 60(b)(1) includes a judge’s errors of law. Because Kemp’s motion alleged such a legal error, it was cognizable under Rule 60(b)(1) and untimely under Rule 60(c)’s 1-year limitations period.

Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Andrew L. Adler, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. For Respondent: Benjamin W. Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: United States v. Washington | Case No. 21-404 | Date Argued: 4/18/2022 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022 Apr 18, 2022

United States v. Washington | Case No. 21-404 | Date Argued: 4/18/2022 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022

Question Presented: Whether a state workers' compensation law that applies exclusively to federal contract workers who perform services at a specified federal facility is barred by principles of intergovernmental immunity, or is instead authorized by 40 U.S.C. 3172(a), which permits the application of state workers' compensation laws to federal facilities "in the same way and to the same extent as if the premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State."

Holding: Washington’s law facially discriminates against the Federal Government and its contractors. Because §3172 does not clearly and unambiguously waive the Federal Government’s immunity from discriminatory state laws, Washington’s law is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Tera M. Heintz, Deputy Solicitor General, Olympia, Wash.

Oral Argument: United States v. Washington | Case No. 21-404 | Date Argued: 4/18/2022 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022 Apr 18, 2022

United States v. Washington | Case No. 21-404 | Date Argued: 4/18/2022 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022

Question Presented: Whether a state workers' compensation law that applies exclusively to federal contract workers who perform services at a specified federal facility is barred by principles of intergovernmental immunity, or is instead authorized by 40 U.S.C. 3172(a), which permits the application of state workers' compensation laws to federal facilities "in the same way and to the same extent as if the premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State."

Holding: Washington’s law facially discriminates against the Federal Government and its contractors. Because §3172 does not clearly and unambiguously waive the Federal Government’s immunity from discriminatory state laws, Washington’s law is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Tera M. Heintz, Deputy Solicitor General, Olympia, Wash.

Oral Argument: Siegel v. Fitzgerald | Case No. 21-441 | Date Argued: 4/18/2022 | Date Decided: 6/6/2022 Apr 18, 2022

Siegel v. Fitzgerald | Case No. 21-441 | Date Argued: 4/18/2022 | Date Decided: 6/6/2022

Background: This case presents a clear and acknowledged conflict over the constitutionality of a federal statute governing the quarterly fees in large Chapter 11 bankruptcies. The Bankruptcy Clause authorizes Congress to "establish * * * uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." Notwithstanding this directive, Congress has divided the nation's bankruptcy courts into two distinct programs: 88 judicial districts operate under the U.S. Trustee program, and 6 judicial districts (all in North Carolina and Alabama) operate under the Bankruptcy Administrator program. Each program generally performs similar tasks, and each program-until recently-imposed the same quarterly fees on Chapter 11 debtors in their districts. In the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, however, Congress adopted a five-year increase in quarterly fees paid only in U.S. Trustee districts-increasing the maximum fee from $30,000 to $250,000 for all pending cases. 28 U.S.C. 1930(a)(6)(B) (2018). That same increase was not imposed in Administrator districts until nine months later, and it applied only to cases filed after that date. The result is a wide disparity in fees paid by identically situated debtors based solely on the geographic location of their bankruptcy. The total difference exceeds $100 million in aggregate fees in Chapter 11 cases nationwide. In the decision below, the Fourth Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit (each over dissents) in upholding these non-uniform fees; the Second Circuit has rejected those decisions and declared the 2017 Act unconstitutional.

Question Presented: Whether the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act violates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause by increasing quarterly fees solely in U.S. Trustee districts.

Holding: Congress’ enactment of a significant fee increase that exempted debtors in two States violated the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, Tex. For Respondent: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana | Case No. 20-1573 | Date Argued: 3/30/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022 Mar 30, 2022

Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana | Case No. 20-1573 | Date Argued: 3/30/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022

Background: In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), and Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018), this Court held that when parties agree to resolve their disputes by individualized arbitration, those agreements are fully enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). Courts are not free to disregard or "reshape traditional individualized arbitration" by applying rules that demand collective or representational adjudication of certain claims. Epic, 138 S.Ct. at 1623. The FAA allows the parties not only to choose arbitration but to retain the benefits of arbitration by maintaining its traditional, bilateral form. While California courts follow Concepcion and Epic when a party to an individualized arbitration agreement tries to assert class-action claims, they refuse to do so when a party to such an agreement asserts representative claims under the California Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"), which — like a class action — allows aggrieved employees to seek monetary awards on a representative basis on behalf of other employees. See Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 327 P.3d 129 (Cal. 2014). As a result, Concepcion and Epic have not caused bilateral arbitration to flourish in California, as this Court intended, but have merely caused FAA-defying representational litigation to shift form.

Question Presented: Whether the Federal Arbitration Act requires enforcement of a bilateral arbitration agreement providing that an employee cannot raise representative claims, including under PAGA.

Holding: The FAA preempts the rule of Iskanian insofar as it precludes division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan and Gorsuch joined in which Chief Justice Roberts joined as to Parts I and III and in which Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett joined as to Part III. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Scott L. Nelson, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Torres v. Texas Dept. of Public Safety | Case No. 20-603 | Date Argued: 3/29/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2022 Mar 29, 2022

Torres v. Texas Dept. of Public Safety | Case No. 20-603 | Date Argued: 3/29/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2022

Background: In the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), Congress gave the over 19 million military servicemembers — including over 800,000 who work for state and local government employers — a cause of action to remedy adverse employment actions taken because of their military service. It enacted USERRA pursuant to its constitutional War Powers, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16, recognizing that unremedied employment discrimination by state employers based on military service could interfere with the nation's "ability to provide for a strong national defense." H.R. Rep. No. 105-448, at 5 (1998). USERRA's cause of action against state employers may be pursued only in state courts. In a sharply divided decision that conflicts with the Constitution's text, structure, and history, the court below, a Texas intermediate appellate court with jurisdiction over more than 2 million Texas citizens, held that USERRA's cause of action is unconstitutional because Congress lacks the power to authorize lawsuits against nonconsenting states pursuant to its War Powers.

Question Presented: Whether Congress has the power to authorize suits against nonconsenting states pursuant to its War Powers.

Holding: By ratifying the Constitution, the States agreed their sovereignty would yield to the national power to raise and support the Armed Forces. Congress may exercise this power to authorize private damages suits against nonconsenting States, as in USERRA.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt, Washington, D.C.; and Christopher G. Michel, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

Oral Argument: LeDure v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. | Case No. 20-807 | Date Argued: 3/28/2022 | Date Decided: 4/28/2022 Mar 28, 2022

LeDure v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. | Case No. 20-807 | Date Argued: 3/28/2022 | Date Decided: 4/28/2022

Question Presented: [cannot locate]

Holding: [NO INFORMATION]

Result: Voting information not found

Voting Breakdown: ?-?. Voting breakdown not found

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.; and Colleen E. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: J. Scott Ballenger, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon | Case No. 21-309 | Date Argued: 3/28/2022 | Date Decided: 6/6/2022 Mar 28, 2022

Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon | Case No. 21-309 | Date Argued: 3/28/2022 | Date Decided: 6/6/2022

Question Presented: Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") provides that the FAA does not apply "to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1. In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), this Court held that Section 1 applies only to interstate "transportation workers." The Court did not define the term "transportation worker."

Holding: Saxon belongs to a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” to which §1’s exemption applies.

Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined except Justice Barrett, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Jennifer D. Bennett, San Francisco, Cal.

Oral Argument: Golan v. Saada | Case No. 20-1034 | Date Argued: 3/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022 Mar 22, 2022

Golan v. Saada | Case No. 20-1034 | Date Argued: 3/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022

Question Presented: Whether, upon finding that return to the country of habitual residence places a child at grave risk, a district court is required to consider ameliorative measures that would facilitate the return of the child notwithstanding the grave risk finding.

Holding: A court is not categorically required to examine all possible ameliorative measures before denying a Hague Convention petition for return of a child to a foreign country once the court has found that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm.

Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Karen R. King, New York, N.Y. For United States, as amicus curiae: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Richard Min, New York, N.Y.

Oral Argument: Golan v. Saada | Case No. 20-1034 | Date Argued: 3/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022 Mar 22, 2022

Golan v. Saada | Case No. 20-1034 | Date Argued: 3/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022

Question Presented: Whether, upon finding that return to the country of habitual residence places a child at grave risk, a district court is required to consider ameliorative measures that would facilitate the return of the child notwithstanding the grave risk finding.

Holding: A court is not categorically required to examine all possible ameliorative measures before denying a Hague Convention petition for return of a child to a foreign country once the court has found that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm.

Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Karen R. King, New York, N.Y. For United States, as amicus curiae: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Richard Min, New York, N.Y.

Oral Argument: Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. | Case No. 21-328 | Date Argued: 3/21/2022 | Date Decided: 5/23/2022 Mar 21, 2022

Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. | Case No. 21-328 | Date Argued: 3/21/2022 | Date Decided: 5/23/2022

Background: Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right and, in the context of contracts, occurs when one party to a contract either explicitly repudiates its rights under the contract or acts in a manner inconsistent with an intention of exercising them.

Question Presented: Does the arbitration-specific requirement that the proponent of a contractual waiver defense prove prejudice violate this Court's instruction that lower courts must "place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts?" AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).

Holding: The Eighth Circuit erred in conditioning a waiver of the right to arbitrate on a showing of prejudice. Federal courts have generally resolved cases like this one as a matter of federal law, using the terminology of waiver. The parties dispute whether that framework is correct. Assuming without deciding that it is, federal courts may not create arbitration-specific variants of federal procedural rules, like those concerning waiver, based on the FAA’s “policy favoring arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 24. That policy “is merely an acknowledgment of the FAA’s commitment to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.” Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U. S. 287, 302 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a court must hold a party to its arbitration contract just as the court would to any other kind. But a court may not devise novel rules to favor arbitration over litigation. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 218–221. The federal policy is about treating arbitration contracts like all others, not about fostering arbitration. The text of the FAA makes clear that courts are not to create arbitration-specific procedural rules like the one here. Section 6 of the FAA provides that any application under the statute—including an application to stay litigation or compel arbitration—“shall be made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions” (unless the statute says otherwise). A directive to treat arbitration applications “in the manner provided by law” for all other motions is simply a command to apply the usual federal procedural rules, including any rules relating to a motion’s timeliness. Because the usual federal rule of waiver does not include a prejudice requirement, Section 6 instructs that prejudice is not a condition of finding that a party waived its right to stay litigation or compel arbitration under the FAA. Stripped of its prejudice requirement, the Eighth Circuit’s current waiver inquiry would focus on Sundance’s conduct. Did Sundance knowingly relinquish the right to arbitrate by acting inconsistently with that right? On remand, the Court of Appeals may resolve that question, or determine that a different procedural framework (such as forfeiture) is appropriate. The Court’s sole holding today is that it may not make up a new procedural rule based on the FAA’s “policy favoring arbitration.”.

Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Karla A. Gilbride, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Paul D. Clement, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Berger v. North Carolina State Conf. of NAACP | Case No. 21-248 | Date Argued: 3/21/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022 Mar 21, 2022

Berger v. North Carolina State Conf. of NAACP | Case No. 21-248 | Date Argued: 3/21/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022

Background: The leaders of North Carolina's Republican-controlled legislature retained a private attorney to represent them, purportedly on behalf of the State, to defend the constitutionality of North Carolina's voter-ID law. Rather than allowing both Executive Branch officials and legislative leaders to speak on behalf of the State as they did at the district court, the Fourth Circuit ordered the dismissal of the legislative leaders from the case on appeal.

Question Presented: Whether a state agent authorized by state law to defend the State's interest in litigation must overcome a presumption of adequate representation to intervene as of right in a case in which a state official is a defendant.

Holding: North Carolina’s legislative leaders are entitled to intervene in this litigation.

Result: Judgment REVERSED.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: David H. Thompson, Washington, D.C. For NAACP Respondents: Elisabeth S. Theodore, Washington, D.C. For state Respondents: Sarah Boyce, Deputy Solicitor General, Raleigh, N. C.

Oral Argument: Egbert v. Boule | Case No. 21-147 | Date Argued: 3/2/2022 | Date Decided: 6/8/2022 Mar 02, 2022

Egbert v. Boule | Case No. 21-147 | Date Argued: 3/2/2022 | Date Decided: 6/8/2022

Question Presented: [cannot locate]

Holding: Bivens does not extend to create causes of action for Boule’s Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim and First Amendment retaliation claim.

Result: Judgment REVERSED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Sarah M. Harris, Washington, D.C.; and Michael R. Huston, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Felicia H. Ellsworth, Boston, Mass.

Oral Argument: Ruan v. United States | Case No. 20-1410 | Date Argued: 3/1/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2022 Mar 01, 2022

Ruan v. United States | Case No. 20-1410 | Date Argued: 3/1/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2022

Background: A physician otherwise authorized to prescribe controlled substances may be convicted of unlawful distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) if his prescriptions "fall outside the usual course of professional practice." United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 124 (1975).

Question Presented: Whether a physician alleged to have prescribed controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice may be convicted under Section 841(a)(1) without regard to whether, in good faith, he "reasonably believed" or "subjectively intended" that his prescriptions fall within that course of professional practice.

Holding: Section 841’s “knowingly or intentionally” mens rea applies to the statute’s “except as authorized” clause. Once a defendant meets the burden of producing evidence that his or her conduct was “authorized,” the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized manner.

Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Parts IâA, IâB and II.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner in 20-1410: Lawrence S. Robbins, Washington, D.C. For Petitioner in 21-5261: Beau B. Brindley, Chicago, Ill. For Respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: West Virginia v. EPA | Case No. 20-1530 | Date Argued: 2/28/2022 | Date Decided: 6/30/2022 Feb 28, 2022

West Virginia v. EPA | Case No. 20-1530 | Date Argued: 2/28/2022 | Date Decided: 6/30/2022

Question Presented: [cannot locate]

Holding: [NO INFORMATION]

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For state Petitioners: Lindsay S. See, Solicitor General, Charleston, W. Va. For private Petitioners: Jacob M. Roth, Washington, D.C. For federal Respondents: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For power company Respondents: Beth S. Brinkmann, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas | Case No. 20-493 | Date Argued: 2/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022 Feb 22, 2022

Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas | Case No. 20-493 | Date Argued: 2/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022

Background: In 1987, following years of negotiation and drafting, the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo (the "Pueblo") and Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas (together, the "Tribes") secured restoration of their trust relationships with the federal government through the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama-Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act ("Restoration Act"). That Act includes a "Gaming Activities" provision that states in relevant part: (a) IN GENERAL.- All gaming activities which are prohibited by the laws of the State of Texas are hereby prohibited on the reservation and on lands of the tribe ... (b) NO STATE REGULATORY JURISDICTION.-Nothing in this section shall be construed as a grant of civil or criminal regulatory jurisdiction to the State of Texas. In 1994, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 36 F.3d 1325 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Ysleta I") eschewed the Restoration Act's plain language, legislative history, and this Court's governing precedent to grant Texas regulatory jurisdiction over non-prohibited gaming activities on the Tribes' lands. Ysleta I and its progeny effectively read Section 107(b) out of the Restoration Act and deprive the Pueblo of its sovereign authority to regulate its own non-prohibited gaming.

Question Presented: Whether the Restoration Act provides the Pueblo with sovereign authority to regulate non-prohibited gaming activities on its lands (including bingo), as set forth in the plain language of Section 107(b), the Act's legislative history, and this Court's holding in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), or whether the Fifth Circuit's decision affirming Ysleta I correctly subjects the Pueblo to all Texas gaming regulations.

Holding: The Restoration Act bans as a matter of federal law on tribal lands only those gaming activities also banned in Texas.

Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan and Barrett joined. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito and Kavanaugh joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: Brant C. Martin, Fort Worth, Tex.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

Oral Argument: Denezpi v. United States | Case No. 20-7622 | Date Argued: 2/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/13/2022 Feb 22, 2022

Denezpi v. United States | Case No. 20-7622 | Date Argued: 2/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/13/2022

Background: In April 2017, a Court of Indian Offenses in Colorado prosecuted petitioner Merle Denezpi for violations of federal regulatory laws and the code of the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe. In June 2018, more than a year after sentencing for those offenses, a federal court in Colorado indicted Mr. Denezpi for one count of aggravated sexual abuse. The indictment was based on the same incident for which Mr. Denezpi had been prosecuted and sentenced in the Court of Indian Offenses. Mr. Denezpi moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds.

Question Presented: Whether the Court of Indian Offenses of Ute Mountain Ute Agency is a federal agency such that a defendant's conviction in that court bars a subsequent prosecution for a federal offense arising out of the same incident.

Holding: The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive prosecutions of distinct offenses arising from a single act, even if a single sovereign prosecutes them.

Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Alito and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined as to Parts I and III.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Michael B. Kimberly, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate | Case No. 21-12 | Date Argued: 1/19/2022 | Date Decided: 5/16/2022 Jan 19, 2022

Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate | Case No. 21-12 | Date Argued: 1/19/2022 | Date Decided: 5/16/2022

Question Presented: [cannot locate]

Holding: 1. Appellees have standing to challenge the threatened enforcement of Section 304.

Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For appellant: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For appellees: Charles J. Cooper, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Concepcion v. United States | Case No. 20-1650 | Date Argued: 1/19/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2022 Jan 19, 2022

Concepcion v. United States | Case No. 20-1650 | Date Argued: 1/19/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2022

Question Presented: [cannot locate]

Holding: The First Step Act allows district courts to consider intervening changes of law or fact in exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Breyer, Kagan and Gorsuch joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Barrett joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Charles L. McCloud, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Shurtleff v. Boston | Case No. 20-1800 | Date Argued: 1/18/2022 | Date Decided: 5/2/2022 Jan 18, 2022

Shurtleff v. Boston | Case No. 20-1800 | Date Argued: 1/18/2022 | Date Decided: 5/2/2022

Background: Boston creates designated public forums in many contexts, including on City Hall Plaza. Over a twelve-year period, the City approved 284 applications from private organizations to use one of the City's three flagpoles on the Plaza, which the City designated as a public forum for private speech. Boston approved all prior applications, denying none, and exercised no substantive control over the content of these 284 flag raisings. The City rejected only one application, Camp Constitution's request to briefly raise a Christian flag in connection with an event celebrating the civic contributions of Boston's Christian community. Although the City admitted that the flag raisings are private speech, it invoked the Establishment Clause to justify censoring Camp Constitution's Christian viewpoint.

Question Presented: Whether the First Circuit's failure to apply this Court's forum doctrine to the City's exclusion of the Christian flag from a city hall flagpole, which was designated as a public forum open to "all applicants" until the City denied access to the Christian flag, is inconsistent with this Court's precedents holding that speech restrictions based on religious viewpoint violate the First Amendment or are otherwise subject to strict scrutiny. Whether the First Circuit's classifying private religious speech as government speech because it occurs on a government flagpole in a public forum, when nothing about the religious speech or the circumstances of the temporary flag display in the forum is attributable to the government, conflicts with this Court's decisions in Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017), Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009), and Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993). Whether the First Circuit's finding that the Establishment Clause justified a city's viewpoint-based exclusion of religious expression from a flagpole forum that was open to "all applicants" conflicts with this Court's precedents in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995), and Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).

Holding: 1. Boston’s flag-raising program does not express government speech.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: Mathew Staver, Orlando, Fla.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondents: Douglas Hallward-Driemeier, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection | Case No. 20-1566 | Date Argued: 1/18/2022 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022 Jan 18, 2022

Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection | Case No. 20-1566 | Date Argued: 1/18/2022 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022

Background: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 ("FSIA"), provides that where a foreign state or an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state is not entitled to immunity, a federal court should "apply the law of the forum state, including its choice-of-law rules." Here, the foreign state defendant (an agency or instrumentality of the Kingdom of Spain) seeks to avoid California's choice-of-law rule and instead asks the federal court to apply federal common law.

Question Presented: Whether a federal court hearing state law claims brought under the FSIA must apply the forum state's choice-of-law rules to determine what substantive law governs the claims at issue, or whether it may apply federal common law.

Holding: In an FSIA suit raising non-federal claims against a foreign state or instrumentality, a court should determine the substantive law by using the same choice-of-law rule applicable in a similar suit against a private party. Here, that means applying the forum State’s choiceof-law rule, not a rule deriving from federal common law. The FSIA provides a baseline principle of foreign sovereign immunity from civil actions unless a statutory exception applies (including the expropriation exception found to apply here). See §§1604–1607. Yet the FSIA was never “intended to affect the substantive law determining the liability of a foreign state or instrumentality” deemed amenable to suit. First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U. S. 611, 620. To the contrary, Section 1606 of the statute provides: “As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is not entitled to immunity under [the FSIA], the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” When a foreign state is not immune from suit, it is subject to the same rules of liability (the same substantive law) as a private party. See First Nat. City Bank, at 622, n. 11. Section 1606 dictates the selection of a choice-of-law rule: It must mirror the rule that would apply in a similar suit between private parties. Only the same choice-of-law rule can guarantee use of the same substantive law—and thus guarantee the same liability. Consider two suits seeking recovery of a painting: one suit against a foreign-statecontrolled museum (as here), the other against a private museum. If the choice-of-law rules in the two suits differed, so might the substantive law chosen. And if the substantive law differed, so might the suits’ outcomes. Contrary to Section 1606, the two museums would not be “liable to the same manner and to the same extent.” In this case, Section 1606 requires the use of California’s choice-oflaw rule—because that is the rule a court would use in comparable private litigation. Consider the just-hypothesized suit against a private museum, brought as this case was in California and asserting 3 Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) Syllabus non-federal claims. If the private suit were filed in state court, California’s choice-of-law rule would govern. And if the private suit were filed in federal court, the same would be true, because a federal court sitting in diversity borrows the forum State’s choice-of-law rule. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487, 496. If California’s choice-of-law rule applies in the private-museum suit, it must also apply in the suit here, against the Foundation. That is the only way to ensure—as Section 1606 demands—that the Foundation, although a Spanish instrumentality, will be liable in the same way as a private party. Even absent the clarity of Section 1606, the Court would likely reach the same result. Scant justification exists for federal common lawmaking in this context. Judicial creation of federal common law to displace state-created rules must be “necessary to protect uniquely federal interests.” Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 640. While foreign relations is an interest of that kind, here even the Federal Government disclaims any necessity for a federal choiceof-law rule in FSIA suits raising non-federal claims.

Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: David Boies, Armonk, N.Y.; and Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Thaddeus J. Stauber, Los Angeles, Cal.

Oral Argument: Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue | Case No. 20-1472 | Date Argued: 1/12/2022 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022 Jan 12, 2022

Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue | Case No. 20-1472 | Date Argued: 1/12/2022 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022

Background: Section 6330(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code establishes a 30-day time limit to file a petition for review in the Tax Court of a notice of determination from the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS").

Question Presented: Whether the time limit in Section 6330(d)(1) is a jurisdictional requirement or a claim-processing rule subject to equitable tolling.

Holding: Section 6330(d)(1)’s 30-day time limit to file a petition for review of a collection due process determination is a nonjurisdictional deadline subject to equitable tolling.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Melissa Arbus Sherry, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Jonathan C. Bond, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Gallardo v. Marstiller | Case No. 20-1263 | Date Argued: 1/10/2022 | Date Decided: 6/6/2022 Jan 10, 2022

Gallardo v. Marstiller | Case No. 20-1263 | Date Argued: 1/10/2022 | Date Decided: 6/6/2022

Question Presented: Whether the federal Medicaid Act provides for a state Medicaid program to recover reimbursement for Medicaid's payment of a beneficiary's past medical expenses by taking funds from the portion of the beneficiary's tort recovery that compensates for future medical expenses.

Holding: The Medicaid Act permits a State to seek reimbursement from settlement payments allocated for future medical care.

Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

Voting Breakdown: 7-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed dissenting opinion in which, Justice Breyer joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Bryan S. Gowdy, Jacksonville, Fla.; and Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Fla.

Oral Argument: Shinn v. Ramirez | Case No. 20-1009 | Date Argued: 12/8/2021 | Date Decided: 5/23/2022 Dec 08, 2021

Shinn v. Ramirez | Case No. 20-1009 | Date Argued: 12/8/2021 | Date Decided: 5/23/2022

Question Presented: The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), precludes a federal court from considering evidence outside the state-court record when reviewing the merits of a claim for habeas relief if a prisoner or his attorney has failed to diligently develop the claim's factual basis in state court, subject to only two statutory exceptions. In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), this Court announced an equitable exception to the procedural default bar, holding that a prisoner may obtain federal habeas review of a defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel if post-conviction counsel was ineffective in failing to raise it. The Ninth Circuit has held that Martinez also requires an exception to § 2254(e)(2)'s prohibition on expansion of the state-court record in federal court. Does Martinez justify a federal habeas court's disregard of § 2254(e)(2)'s clear prohibition on expanding the state-court record?

Holding: Under §2254(e)(2), a federal habeas court may not conduct an evidentiary hearing or otherwise consider evidence beyond the state-court record based on the ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel.

Result: Judgment REVERSED.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Brunn W. Roysden, III, Solicitor General, Phoenix, Ariz. For Respondents: Robert M. Loeb, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Carson v. Makin | Case No. 20-1088 | Date Argued: 12/8/2021 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022 Dec 08, 2021

Carson v. Makin | Case No. 20-1088 | Date Argued: 12/8/2021 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022

Background: In Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020), this Court held that a state cannot exclude families and schools from participating in a student-aid program because of a school's religious status. The Court expressly declined to address religious use—that is, whether a state may exclude families and schools based on what they plan to do with the money.

Question Presented: Does a state violate the Religion Clauses or Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution by prohibiting students participating in an otherwise generally available student-aid program from choosing to use their aid to attend schools that provide religious, or "sectarian," instruction?

Holding: Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments violates the Free Exercise Clause.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 6-2. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined and in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to all but Part IâB. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: Michael Bindas, Seattle, Wash. For Respondent: Christopher C. Taub, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Augusta, Me.; and Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Oral Argument: United States v. Taylor | Case No. 20-1459 | Date Argued: 12/7/2021 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022 Dec 07, 2021

United States v. Taylor | Case No. 20-1459 | Date Argued: 12/7/2021 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022

Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A)'s definition of "crime of violence" excludes attempted Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951(a).

Holding: Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under §924(c)(3)(A) because no element of the offense requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force.

Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

Voting Breakdown: 7-1. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas and Justice Alito filed dissenting opinions.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Rebecca Taibleson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Michael R. Dreeben, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Hughes v. Northwestern University | Case No. 19-1401 | Date Argued: 12/6/2021 | Date Decided: 1/24/2022 Dec 06, 2021

Hughes v. Northwestern University | Case No. 19-1401 | Date Argued: 12/6/2021 | Date Decided: 1/24/2022

Background: Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1104, a plan fiduciary must discharge its duties "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence" that a prudent person "acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters" would use. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). Petitioners filed a class action alleging that respondents violated their duty of prudence by: (1) failing to monitor and control recordkeeping fees, resulting in unreasonably high costs to plan participants; (2) offering retail class mutual funds with higher fees than those charged by otherwise identical share classes of the same funds; and (3) offering options with unnecessary fees when other options with lower costs and identical investment guarantees were available to the plan fiduciaries.

Question Presented: Whether allegations that a defined-contribution retirement plan paid or charged its participants fees that substantially exceeded fees for alternative available investment products or services are sufficient to state a claim against plan fiduciaries for breach of the duty of prudence under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).

Holding: The Seventh Circuit erred in relying on the participants’ ultimate choice over their investments to excuse allegedly imprudent decisions by respondents. Determining whether petitioners state plausible claims against plan fiduciaries for violations of ERISA’s duty of prudence requires a context-specific inquiry of the fiduciaries’ continuing duty to monitor investments and to remove imprudent ones as articulated in Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 575 U. S. 523. Tibble concerned allegations that plan fiduciaries had offered “higher priced retail-class mutual funds as Plan investments when materially identical lower priced institutional-class mutual funds were available.” Id., at 525–526. The Tibble Court concluded that the plaintiffs had identified a potential violation with respect to certain funds because “a fiduciary is required to conduct a regular review of its investment.” Id., at 528. Tibble’s discussion of the continuing duty to monitor plan investments applies here. Petitioners allege that respondents’ failure to monitor investments prudently—by retaining recordkeepers that charged excessive fees, offering options likely to confuse investors, and neglecting to provide cheaper and otherwise-identical alternative investments—resulted in respondents failing to remove imprudent investments from the menu of investment offerings. In rejecting petitioners’ allegations, the Seventh Circuit did not apply Tibble’s guidance but instead erroneously focused on another component of the duty of prudence: a fiduciary’s obligation to assemble a diverse menu of options. But respondents’ provision of an adequate array of investment choices, including the lower cost investments plaintiffs wanted, does not excuse their allegedly imprudent decisions. Even in a defined-contribution plan where participants choose their investments, Tibble instructs that plan fiduciaries must conduct their own independent evaluation to determine which investments may be prudently included in the plan’s menu of options. See id., at 529–530. If the fiduciaries fail to remove an imprudent investment from the plan within a reasonable time, they breach their duty. The Seventh Circuit’s exclusive focus on investor choice elided this aspect of the duty of prudence. The court maintained the same mistaken focus in rejecting petitioners’ claims with respect to recordkeeping fees on the grounds that plan participants could have chosen investment options with lower expenses. The Court vacates the judgment below so that the Seventh Circuit may reevaluate the allegations as a whole, considering whether petitioners have plausibly alleged a violation of the duty of prudence as articulated in Tibble under applicable pleading standards. The content of the duty of prudence turns on “the circumstances . . . prevailing” at the time the fiduciary acts, 29 U. S. C. §1104(a)(1)(B), so the appropriate inquiry will be context specific. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U. S. 409, 425.

Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Barrett, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.; and Michael R. Huston, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondents: Gregory G. Garre, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health | Case No. 19-1392 | Date Argued: 12/1/2021 | Date Decided: 6/24/2022 Dec 01, 2021

Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health | Case No. 19-1392 | Date Argued: 12/1/2021 | Date Decided: 6/24/2022

Question Presented: Whether all pre-viability prohibitions on elective abortions are unconstitutional. Whether the validity of a pre-viability law that protects women's health, the dignity of unborn children, and the integrity of the medical profession and society should be analyzed under Casey's "undue burden" standard or Hellerstedt's balancing of benefits and burdens. Whether abortion providers have third-party standing to invalidate a law that protects women from the dangers of late-term abortions by restricting inhumane dismemberment abortions.

Holding: The Constitution does not confer a right to abortion; Roe and Casey are overruled; and the authority to regulate abortion is returned to the people and their elected representatives.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh filed concurring opinions. Chief Justice Roberts filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, filed

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: Scott G. Stewart, Solicitor General, Jackson, Miss. For Respondents: Julie Rikelman, New York, N.Y.; and Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Oral Argument: Cummings v. Premier Rehab | Case No. 20-219 | Date Argued: 11/30/2021 | Date Decided: 4/28/2022 Nov 30, 2021

Cummings v. Premier Rehab | Case No. 20-219 | Date Argued: 11/30/2021 | Date Decided: 4/28/2022

Background: Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits recipients of federal funds from discriminating based on race, color, or national origin, and provides that victims of discrimination may recover compensatory damages for intentional violations. This Court has interpreted Title VI's implied private right of action as providing victims of intentional discrimination compensatory, but not punitive, damages. Congress has expressly incorporated Title VI's remedial scheme into other statutes that prohibit recipients of federal funds from discriminating on other grounds, including disability.

Question Presented: Whether the compensatory damages available under Title VI and the statutes that incorporate its remedial scheme include compensation for emotional distress.

Holding: Emotional distress damages are not recoverable in a private action to enforce either the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the Affordable Care Act.

Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Andrew Rozynski, New York, N.Y.; and Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: American Hospital Assn. v. Becerra | Case No. 20-1114 | Date Argued: 11/30/2021 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022 Nov 30, 2021

American Hospital Assn. v. Becerra | Case No. 20-1114 | Date Argued: 11/30/2021 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022

Question Presented: Whether Chevron deference permits HHS to set reimbursement rates based on acquisition cost and vary such rates by hospital group if it has not collected hospital acquisition cost survey data. Whether petitioners' suit challenging HHS's adjustments is precluded by 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(12), which bars judicial review of "the development of the [outpatient prospective payment] classification system," "the establishment of" various groups of outpatient services, and "adjustments" pursuant to certain provisions of the statute.

Holding: 1. The statute does not preclude judicial review of HHS’s reimbursement rates. Judicial review of final agency action is traditionally available unless “a statute’s language or structure” precludes it, Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U. S. 480, 486, and this Court has long recognized a “strong presumption” in its favor, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 586 U. S. ___, ___. Here, no provision in the Medicare statute precludes judicial review of the 2018 and 2019 reimbursement rates. HHS cites two nearby provisions that preclude review of the general payment methodology that HHS employs to set rates for other Medicare outpatient services. See §§1395l(t)(12)(A), (C). But HHS sets rates for outpatient prescription drugs using a different payment methodology. HHS also argues that other statutory requirements would make allowing judicial review of the 2018 and 2019 reimbursement rates impractical. Regardless, such arguments cannot override the text of the statute and the traditional presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Christopher G. Michel, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation | Case No. 20-1312 | Date Argued: 11/29/2021 | Date Decided: 6/24/2022 Nov 29, 2021

Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation | Case No. 20-1312 | Date Argued: 11/29/2021 | Date Decided: 6/24/2022

Background: The Medicare statute provides that a hospital that serves a "significantly disproportionate number of low-income patients" is entitled to an upward adjustment in the rate at which the federal government reimburses the hospital for services provided to Medicare patients. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(i)(I), (ii). That adjustment-known as a "disproportionate share hospital" (DSH) adjustment-requires a determination of the percentage of the hospital's patients who are eligible for Medicaid, the low-income healthcare program.

Question Presented: Whether the Secretary has permissibly included in a hospital's Medicare fraction all of the hospital's patient days of individuals who satisfy the requirements to be entitled to Medicare Part A benefits, regardless of whether Medicare actually paid the hospital for those particular days.

Holding: In calculating the Medicare fraction, individuals “entitled to [Medicare Part A] benefits” are all those qualifying for the program, regardless of whether they receive Medicare payments for part or all of a hospital stay.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor and Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Gorsuch joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Jonathan C. Bond, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Daniel J. Hettich, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Austin v. Reagan National Advertising | Case No. 20-1029 | Date Argued: 11/10/2021 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022 Nov 10, 2021

Austin v. Reagan National Advertising | Case No. 20-1029 | Date Argued: 11/10/2021 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022

Background: Austin sign code provisions distinguish between on-premise and off-premise signs based solely on location—specifically, whether a sign is located at the same location as the business, person, activity, goods, products, or services being advertised. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, this Court held that, because the Gilbert sign code "single[d] out specific subject matter for differential treatment," it was content-based regardless of the government's purpose. 576 U.S. 155, 169 (2015).

Question Presented: Is the city code's distinction between on- and off-premise signs a facially unconstitutional content-based regulation under Reed v. Town of Gilbert?

Holding: The City’s on-/off-premises distinction is facially content neutral under the First Amendment.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Kagan and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Gorsuch and Barrett joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Michael R. Dreeben, Washington, D.C.; and Benjamin Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondents: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: United States v. Vaello-Madero | Case No. 20-303 | Date Argued: 11/9/2021 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022 Nov 09, 2021

United States v. Vaello-Madero | Case No. 20-303 | Date Argued: 11/9/2021 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022

Question Presented: Whether Congress violated the equal-protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by establishing Supplemental Security Income—a program that provides benefits to needy aged, blind, and disabled individuals—in the 50 States and the District of Columbia, and in the Northern Mariana Islands pursuant to a negotiated covenant, but not extending it to Puerto Rico.

Holding: The Constitution does not require Congress to extend SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico. In Califano v. Torres, 435 U. S. 1, and Harris v. Rosario, 446 U. S. 651, the Court applied the deferential rational-basis test to uphold Congress’s decision not to extend certain federal benefits to Puerto Rico, noting that because Congress chose to treat residents of Puerto Rico differently from residents of the States for purposes of tax laws, it could do the same for benefits programs. Those two precedents dictate the result here. Congress’s decision to exempt Puerto Rico’s residents from most federal income, gift, estate, and excise taxes supplies a rational basis for likewise distinguishing residents of Puerto Rico from residents of the States for purposes of the SSI benefits program. Vaello Madero’s contrary position would usher in potentially far-reaching consequences, with serious implications for the Puerto Rican people and the Puerto Rican economy. The Constitution does not require that extreme outcome.

Result: Judgment REVERSED.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch filed concurring opinions. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Hermann Ferre, New York, N.Y.

Oral Argument: Ramirez v. Collier | Case No. 21-5592 | Date Argued: 11/9/2021 | Date Decided: 3/24/2022 Nov 09, 2021

Ramirez v. Collier | Case No. 21-5592 | Date Argued: 11/9/2021 | Date Decided: 3/24/2022

Question Presented: Under the Free Exercise Clause and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), if a prisoner requests a religious accommodation that the state rejects, must the prisoner prove that the state has substantially burdened his religious exercise, or does the state need to prove that its denial of the religious accommodation satisfies strict scrutiny?

Holding: Ramirez is likely to succeed on his RLUIPA claims because Texas’s restrictions on religious touch and audible prayer in the execution chamber burden religious exercise and are not the least restrictive means of furthering the State’s compelling interests.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kavanaugh filed concurring opinions. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Seth Kretzer, Houston, Tex. For United States, as amicus curiae: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

Oral Argument: FBI v. Fazaga | Case No. 20-828 | Date Argued: 11/8/2021 | Date Decided: 3/4/2022 Nov 08, 2021

FBI v. Fazaga | Case No. 20-828 | Date Argued: 11/8/2021 | Date Decided: 3/4/2022

Background: Section 1806 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq., governs the "[u]se of information" obtained or derived from electronic surveillance conducted under FSIA. Section 1806(c) requires the government to notify a person of its intent to use or disclose such information against that person in a judicial or administrative proceeding in specified circumstances.

Question Presented: Whether Section 1806(f) displaces the state-secrets privilege and authorizes a district court to resolve, in camera and ex parte, the merits of a lawsuit challenging the lawfulness of government surveillance by considering the privileged evidence.

Holding: Section 1806(f) does not displace the state secrets privilege.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Agent Respondents: Catherine M.A. Carroll, Washington, D.C. For Respondents Fazaga, et al.: Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Los Angeles, Cal.

Oral Argument: Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P. | Case No. 20-915 | Date Argued: 11/8/2021 | Date Decided: 2/24/2022 Nov 08, 2021

Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P. | Case No. 20-915 | Date Argued: 11/8/2021 | Date Decided: 2/24/2022

Question Presented: Did the Ninth Circuit err in breaking with its own prior precedent and the findings of other circuits and the Copyright Office in holding that 17 U.S.C. § 411 requires referral to the Copyright Office where there is no indicia of fraud or material error as to the work's registrability, but rather only good-faith mistakes in the registration application?

Holding: Section 411(b) does not distinguish between a mistake of law and a mistake of fact; lack of either factual or legal knowledge can excuse an inaccuracy in a copyright registration under §411(b)(1)(A)’s safe harbor.

Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 6-1. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined and in which Justice Gorsuch joined except as to Part II.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: E. Joshua Rosenkranz, New York, N.Y.; and Melissa N. Patterson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Peter K. Stris, Los Angeles, Cal.

Oral Argument: New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen | Case No. 20-843 | Date Argued: 11/3/2021 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022 Nov 03, 2021

New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen | Case No. 20-843 | Date Argued: 11/3/2021 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022

Background: New York prohibits its ordinary law-abiding citizens from carrying a handgun outside the home without a license, and it denies licenses to every citizen who fails to convince the state that he or she has "proper cause" to carry a firearm. In District of Columbia v. Heller, this Court held that the Second Amendment protects "the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation," 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008), and in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court held that this right "is fully applicable to the States," 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).

Question Presented: Whether the Second Amendment allows the government to prohibit ordinary law-abiding citizens from carrying handguns outside the home for self-defense.

Holding: New York’s proper-cause requirement violates the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms in public for self-defense.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 6-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor and Kagan

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: Paul D. Clement, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, New York, N.Y.; and Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Oral Argument: Houston Community College Sys. v. Wilson | Case No. 20-804 | Date Argued: 11/2/2021 | Date Decided: 3/24/2022 Nov 02, 2021

Houston Community College Sys. v. Wilson | Case No. 20-804 | Date Argued: 11/2/2021 | Date Decided: 3/24/2022

Question Presented: Does the First Amendment restrict the authority of an elected body to issue a censure resolution in response to a member's speech?

Holding: Mr. Wilson does not possess an actionable First Amendment claim arising from the Board’s purely verbal censure.

Result: Judgment REVERSED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Richard A. Morris, Houston, Tex.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: MIchael B. Kimberly, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Badgerow v. Walters | Case No. 20-1143 | Date Argued: 11/2/2021 | Date Decided: 3/31/2022 Nov 02, 2021

Badgerow v. Walters | Case No. 20-1143 | Date Argued: 11/2/2021 | Date Decided: 3/31/2022

Background: This case presents a clear and intractable conflict regarding an important jurisdictional question under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). When parties to an arbitration seek to confirm, vacate, or modify their award under Sections 9, 10, and 11 of the FAA, those provisions do not themselves create federal jurisdiction. Instead, there must be an independent jurisdictional basis for federal courts to act. This Court has established that there is no "look through" jurisdiction under Section 10 of the FAA absent complete diversity between the parties. But the circuits are hopelessly split on whether there is "look through" jurisdiction under Section 10 for federal question cases. This case asks a straightforward question: Does the "look through" approach to federal jurisdiction apply to requests to confirm or vacate arbitration awards under Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA?

Question Presented: Whether federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitration award under Sections 9 and 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act when the only basis for jurisdiction is that the underlying dispute involved a federal question.

Holding: Vaden’s “look-through” approach to determining federal jurisdiction does not apply to requests to confirm or vacate arbitral awards under Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, Tex. For Respondents: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson | Case No. 21-463 | Date Argued: 11/1/2021 | Date Decided: 12/10/2021 Nov 01, 2021

Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson | Case No. 21-463 | Date Argued: 11/1/2021 | Date Decided: 12/10/2021

Background: The State of Texas adopted a law banning abortions at approximately six weeks of pregnancy, in clear violation of this Court's precedent. Rather than forthrightly defending the constitutionality of the law, or even the propriety of a state court enforcement proceeding, Texas crafted an unprecedented enforcement scheme that was designed to evade judicial review and shield this unconstitutional statute from the normal mechanisms by which state officials would otherwise have to enforce it. This state of affairs should not be tolerated in our federal system, especially where the rights at issue are explicitly protected by the Federal Constitution.

Question Presented: Whether a State can insulate from federal-court review a law that prohibits the exercise of a constitutional right by delegating to the general public the authority to enforce that prohibition through civil actions.

Holding: The order of the District Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded. ___F. Supp. 3d ___, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. JUSTICE GORSUCH announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered the opinion of the Court except as to Part II–C, concluding that a pre-enforcement challenge to S. B. 8 under the Federal Constitution may proceed past the motion to dismiss stage against certain of the named defendants but not others.

Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch, announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court except as to Part IIâC. Justices Alito, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined that opinion in full and Justice Thomas joined except for Part IIâC. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Chief Justice Roberts filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: Marc A. Hearron, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

Oral Argument: United States v. Texas | Case No. 21-588 | Date Argued: 11/1/2021 | Date Decided: 12/10/2021 Nov 01, 2021

United States v. Texas | Case No. 21-588 | Date Argued: 11/1/2021 | Date Decided: 12/10/2021

Question Presented: THE APPLICATION IS TREATED AS A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT, AND THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT IS GRANTED, LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: MAY THE UNITED STATES BRING SUIT IN FEDERAL COURT AND OBTAIN INJUNCTIVE OR DECLARATORY RELIEF AGAINST THE STATE, STATE COURT JUDGES, STATE COURT CLERKS, OTHER STATE OFFICIALS, OR ALL PRIVATE PARTIES TO PROHIBIT S.B. 8 FROM BEING ENFORCED.

Holding: Dismissed as Improvidently Granted

Result: Voting information not found

Voting Breakdown: ?-?. Voting breakdown not found

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For state Respondent: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex. For private Respondents: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.

Oral Argument: United States v. Tsarnaev | Case No. 20-443 | Date Argued: 10/13/2021 | Date Decided: 3/4/2022 Oct 13, 2021

United States v. Tsarnaev | Case No. 20-443 | Date Argued: 10/13/2021 | Date Decided: 3/4/2022

Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that respondent's capital sentences must be vacated on the ground that the district court, during its 21-day voir dire, did not ask each prospective juror for a specific accounting of the pretrial media coverage that he or she had read, heard, or seen about respondent's case. Whether the district court committed reversible error at the penalty phase of respondent's trial by excluding evidence that respondent's older brother was allegedly involved in different crimes two years before the offenses for which respondent was convicted.

Holding: The Court of Appeals improperly vacated Dzhokhar’s capital sentences.

Result: Judgment REVERSED.

Voting Breakdown: 6-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined and in which Justice Sotomayor joined except as to Part IIâC.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Ginger D. Anders, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Thompson v. Clark | Case No. 20-659 | Date Argued: 10/12/2021 | Date Decided: 4/4/2022 Oct 12, 2021

Thompson v. Clark | Case No. 20-659 | Date Argued: 10/12/2021 | Date Decided: 4/4/2022

Question Presented: I. Whether the rule that a plaintiff must await favorable termination before bringing a Section 1983 action alleging unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process requires the plaintiff to show that the criminal proceeding against him has "formally ended in a manner not inconsistent with his innocence," as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit decided in Laskar v. Hurd, 972 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2020); or that the proceeding "ended in a manner that affirmatively indicates his innocence," as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit decided in Lanning v. City of Glens Falls, 908 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2018); or that the proceeding terminated without a conviction, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit and several other circuits have held. II. Whether, if the Supreme Court adopts the "affirmative indication of innocence" standard, the withdrawal of criminal charges suffices to satisfy that rule.

Holding: To demonstrate a favorable termination of a criminal prosecution for purposes of the Fourth Amendment claim under §1983 for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff need not show that the criminal prosecution ended with some affirmative indication of innocence. A plaintiff need only show that his prosecution ended without a conviction. Thompson has satisfied that requirement here.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan and Barrett joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Amir H. Ali, Washington, D.C.; and Jonathan Y. Ellis, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondents: John D. Moore, New York, N.Y.

Oral Argument: United States v. Zubaydah | Case No. 20-827 | Date Argued: 10/6/2021 | Date Decided: 3/3/2022 Oct 06, 2021

United States v. Zubaydah | Case No. 20-827 | Date Argued: 10/6/2021 | Date Decided: 3/3/2022

Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred when it rejected the United States' assertion of the state-secrets privilege based on the court's own assessment of potential harm to the national security, and required discovery to proceed further under 28 U.S.C. 1782(a) against former Central Intelligence Agency contractors on matters concerning alleged clandestine CIA activities.

Holding: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. 938 F. 3d 1123, reversed and remanded. JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to all but Parts II–B–2 and III, concluding that, in the context of Zubaydah’s §1782 discovery application, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the state secrets privilege did not apply to information that could confirm or deny the existence of a CIA detention site in Poland.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 4-1. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Parts II-B-2 and III. Chief Justice Roberts joined that opinion in full, Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett joined as to all but Part II-B-2, Justice Kagan joined as to all but Parts III and IV and the judgment of dismissal and Justices Thomas and Alito joined Part IV. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Justice Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Brian H. Fletcher, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: David F. Klein, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Brown v. Davenport | Case No. 20-826 | Date Argued: 10/5/2021 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022 Oct 05, 2021

Brown v. Davenport | Case No. 20-826 | Date Argued: 10/5/2021 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022

Background: In Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), the Court held that the test for determining whether a constitutional error was harmless on habeas review is whether the error had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence" on the verdict. Later, in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court held that, in addition to satisfying Brecht, a habeas petitioner must satisfy the requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). AEDPA provides that federal courts cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law."

Question Presented: May a federal habeas court grant relief based solely on its conclusion that the Brecht test is satisfied, or must the court also find that the state court's Chapman application was unreasonable under AEDPA?

Holding: [NO INFORMATION]

Result: Judgment REVERSED.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, Lansing, Mich. For Respondent: Tasha Bahal, Boston, Mass.

Oral Argument: Hemphill v. New York | Case No. 20-637 | Date Argued: 10/5/2021 | Date Decided: 1/20/2022 Oct 05, 2021

Hemphill v. New York | Case No. 20-637 | Date Argued: 10/5/2021 | Date Decided: 1/20/2022

Background: A litigant's argumentation or introduction of evidence at trial is often deemed to "open the door" to the admission of responsive evidence that would otherwise be barred by the rules of evidence. In People v. Reid, the New York Court of Appeals announced an "open door" rule of constitutional dimension, separate and apart from the traditional evidentiary rule. Under this rule, a criminal defendant who, in the court's view, "opened the door" to responsive evidence, may thereby forfeit hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections that would otherwise preclude admission of the responsive evidence. The New York court has applied that rule even where it rests on an accused's truthful trial arguments or evidence; the accused has not engaged in a course of conduct suggesting that the right to object to responsive evidence would be abused; nor, indeed, the accused has done anything that could be construed as a knowing waiver of constitutional protections.

Question Presented: Whether, or under what circumstances, a criminal defendant who opens the door to responsive evidence also forfeits his right to exclude evidence otherwise barred by the Confrontation Clause.

Holding: The trial court’s admission of the transcript of Morris’ plea allocution over Hemphill’s objection violated Hemphill’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, Cal. For Respondent: Gina Mignola, Assistant District Attorney, Bronx, N.Y.

Oral Argument: Wooden v. United States | Case No. 20-5279 | Date Argued: 10/4/2021 | Date Decided: 3/7/2022 Oct 04, 2021

Wooden v. United States | Case No. 20-5279 | Date Argued: 10/4/2021 | Date Decided: 3/7/2022

Question Presented: 1. Did the warrantless entry and search of petitioner's home violate his Fourth Amendment right to be free from illegal search and seizure? 2. Were petitioner Wooden's prior convictions for ten burglaries committed during a single criminal episode at a storage facility "committed on occasions different from one another" under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA")?

Holding: Wooden’s ten burglary offenses arising from a single criminal episode did not occur on different “occasions” and thus count as only one prior conviction for purposes of ACCA.

Result: Judgment REVERSED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kavanaugh joined and in which Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett joined as to all but Part IIâB. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to Parts II, III and IV.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Allon Kedem, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

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SCOTUS Oral Arguments and Opinions – SCOTUS Oral Arguments

Overview

Episode Roadmap

Monday, Nov. 3:

Tuesday, Nov. 4:

Wednesday, Nov. 5:

Key Concepts Explained:

Background:

Lower Court Journey:

Petitioner's (GEO) Arguments:

Respondent's (Menocal) & U.S. Government's Arguments:

GEO's Reply:

Stakes & Oral Argument Preview:

Overview

The Shocking Violation

The Circuit Split and Lower Court Decision

Landor's Arguments (Seeking Individual Damages)

Louisiana's Arguments (Opposing Individual Liability)

Constitutional Stakes: Spending Clause Analysis

The Practical Impact Question

Broader Religious Liberty Implications

If Louisiana Wins:

Looking Ahead to November 10th Oral Arguments

Key Legal Concepts Explained

Overview

Episode Roadmap

Petitioner's Arguments (Coney Island Auto Parts):

Respondent's Arguments (Burton):

Episode Highlights

Key Legal Concepts Explained

Overview

Roadmap

Opening: Explosive Constitutional Questions

Background: The Trump Tariff Orders

The Central Legal Question

Lower Court Journey

Referenced Cases

Trump v. V.O.S. Selections | Case No. 24-1286 | Docket Link: Here

Learning Resources v. Trump | Case No. 24-1287 | Docket Link: Here

Key Legal Precedents Examined

Historical Foundation Cases

Modern Constitutional Doctrines

Strategic Legal Arguments

Government's Core Position

Challengers' Core Position

Broader Constitutional Implications

If Government Wins

If Challengers Win

Key Legal Concepts Explained

Timeline and Practical Impact

Overview

Episode Roadmap

Episode Highlights

Overview

Episode Roadmap

Episode Highlights

Key Legal Concepts Explained

Overview

Episode Roadmap

Episode Highlights

Referenced Cases

Overview

Episode Roadmap

Episode Highlights

Referenced Cases

Overview

Episode Roadmap

Opening: Unprecedented Stakes and Attention

Constitutional Framework: The Fourth Amendment Text

Background: The Tragic Facts in Anaconda, Montana

The Police Response and Corroborating Evidence

Procedural History: The Court Journey

The Circuit Split Crisis

Case's Three Main Arguments (Seeking Higher Standard)

Montana's Three Main Arguments (Defending Current Standard)

Key Precedents in Battle

Constitutional Stakes and Broader Implications