Show notes
Rav and Shmuel disagreed regarding a case where one promised a gift using the phrase "in life and in death." Rav held that this language indicated a deathbed gift, with "in life" being mentioned merely as an expression of hope. Shmuel, however, interpreted it as a gift from a healthy person.
In Nehardea, they followed Rav's ruling. Later, Rava introduced a distinction: he argued that Rav would agree that using the phrase "from life" (rather than "in life") would be treated as a gift from a healthy person. Ameimar, however, rejected Rava's interpretation of Rav's position.
When a case of this nature came before Rav Nachman in Nehardea, he sent it to be adjudicated in a different city, not wanting to rule against Shmuel in Shmuel's own city of Nehardea.
In another instance, Rava ruled against a woman who tried to reclaim her gift, which was consistent with his position (as she had used the phrase "from life and in death"). When she persistently complained about his ruling, Rava arranged for another rabbi to write her the ruling she desired, but instructed him to add a citation at the bottom of the document from Bava Metzia regarding deception, signaling that he was deceiving her and the ruling should not be followed. Upon realizing this subterfuge, the woman cursed Rava that his boat should sink—and indeed, his boat sank.
When a gift document lacks language indicating either a deathbed or healthy status of the giver, and there is a dispute between the giver claiming it was written while dying and the recipients claiming otherwise, who bears the burden of proof? Rabbi Meir holds that we presume the person was healthy until proven otherwise. The rabbis, however, rule that the money remains with the giver until proven otherwise.
A case arose involving a deathbed gift that used appropriate deathbed gift language, but the document didn't record that the person had died. After the person's death, the recipients claimed the gift, while the heirs argued that their father had recovered from his illness (thus invalidating the gift) before becoming sick again and dying. Raba ruled in favor of the recipients, reasoning that since the person was now dead, it was likely they died from the original illness, making the gift valid.
Abaye challenged Raba's ruling by citing the case of a sunken ship: even though we presume the passengers died, we must consider the possibility they survived if their bodies aren't found. Similarly, he argued, we should consider the possibility of recovery, as most sick people do recover. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, resolved the difficulty by explaining that Raba was following Rabbi Natan's position.
Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yaakov disagreed about a case where the document did not include whether given while healthy or on one's deathbed. Rabbi Yaakov held that we follow the last known presumption of ownership, regardless of current possession. Rabbi Natan ruled that we follow the current presumption - if the person is currently on their deathbed, we assume the gift was given on their deathbed; if healthy, we assume they were healthy at the time the document was written.
Rabbi Elazar noted that this same dispute between Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yaakov applies to a case in Mishna Taharot 6:7 regarding ritual impurity. The case involves a valley enclosed by a fence that is defined as a public space in summer (due to heavy foot traffic) but as a private space in winter (due to minimal traffic). When there's a known dead body present but uncertainty about whether someone passed over it, the rule is: doubt in a public space yields ritual purity, while doubt in a private space yields impurity (based on Sotah laws). If it's unknown whether the person was there in summer or winter, Rabbi Yaakov would rule based on the last known presumption of the person, which means they are deemed pure, while Rabbi Natan would rule based on the current season - they would be declared impure if the issue arises in the winter, and pure if it is summer.
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