Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

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Shevuot 25 - Yom Yerushalayim - May 26, 28 Iyar May 26, 2025

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Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Ariel Bruce on her birthday. "A wonderful daughter, wife, and mother of three beautiful, strong, sweet children. May this year bring you only happiness and peace to Kol Yisrael. All our love, Saba, Steve and Savta Lisa."

Today's daf is sponsored by Rebecca Darshan in memory of (lilui nishmat) Helene Isaacs, her mother, on the occasion of her 25th yahrzeit. "She encouraged women's learning and especially loved learning in Jerusalem during the last 10 years of her life. Her life was too short in years, but full every day."

The Mishna delineates different possible oaths of expression (shevuot bitui), both those relating to future actions and past actions. Rabbi Yishmael does not hold that past oaths are considered oaths of expression for which one would be liable to bring a sacrifice. Oaths can apply to intangible matters, whereas vows cannot. However, vows can apply to a mitzva while an oath cannot, as one can render the object of a mitzva forbidden, such as a sukka, through a vow.

Rav and Shmuel disagree about a case where one takes an oath that someone else threw or didn't throw a stone in the sea. Rav holds the oath is valid as it can be stated in both the positive and negative formulations. Shmuel holds the oath is invalid as it cannot be stated in the future, as one cannot take an oath regarding an action that is out of one's control, and whether or not someone else will throw a stone or not is out of one's control.

The Gemara makes two attempts to connect the debate of Rav and Shmuel to a tannaitic debate, but both attempts are unsuccessful.

The Gemara raises two difficulties on Shmuel's opinion from tannitic sources but resolves both difficulties.

Why did the Torah create a different category for a shevuat haedut, one who withholds testimony, if it could have been considered an oath of expression? Rava and Abaye have different approaches to understanding the connection between the two categories.

Shevuot 24 - May 25, 27 Iyar May 25, 2025

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This week's learning is sponsored by Dvora Lopez in loving memory of her mother on her 51st yahrzeit. "She had great strength and abundant love."

This week's learning is sponsored by the Futornick family in honor of Shira's 21st birthday.

This week's learning is sponsored by Yisroel and Masha Rotman, for a refuah shleima, a complete and speedy recovery, for Elisheva Mindel bat Masha Tzivia.

The Mishna appears to contradict itself regarding general oaths about eating. It implies that a general oath "not to eat" would not include foods that cannot be eaten (which would encompass non-kosher food), yet another case in the Mishna rules that someone who makes a general oath "not to eat" does include non-kosher food in that prohibition. Two different resolutions are offered. The first resolution distinguishes between someone who made a general oath ("I will not eat") and someone who made a specific oath ("I will not eat regular and non-kosher foods"). The sages provide two different interpretations for why an oath that specifically mentions both non-kosher and kosher foods would be effective. Difficulties are raised against both positions, and one remains unresolved. The second interpretation explains that the previous implication from the Mishna is incorrect—"foods that cannot be eaten" refers to truly inedible items and does not include non-kosher foods, which are technically edible. The final case in the Mishna is cited as proof for this position but is ultimately rejected.

What distinguishes issur kollel from issur mosif? Issur kollel occurs when a second prohibition encompasses additional prohibited items, while issur mosif occurs when a second prohibition adds further restrictions to the same item or extends the prohibition to additional people. Based on this distinction, Rava explains why someone who accepts that issur mosif applies would not necessarily accept the same for issur kollel. Since issur mosif relates to a single item—adding a prohibition to the item itself or prohibiting the item to more people, it can apply. However, when additional items are included in the prohibition, it will not necessarily apply to what was already forbidden.

Rava further explains that just as issur kollel takes effect, the same principle applies to an oath that includes other items. He needed to specify this because one might have assumed it only applies to prohibitions that arise independently, not to oaths where a person creates the prohibition.

Rava the son of Raba raises a challenge to Rava's statement based on a Mishna in Kreitut, which suggests that an oath adding additional prohibitions would not apply to what was already forbidden. Six different explanations are offered to resolve this contradiction.

Shevuot 23 - Shabbat May 24, 26 Iyar May 23, 2025

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From where can one derive that the word "food" includes drinking? Does our Mishna support this understanding?

In the cases in our Mishna where someone detailed a number of items that are forbidden, why is it assumed that they meant to create a separate oath for each item rather than to exclude other items from the oath?

How does an expressive oath differ from an oath in which one denies having another person's item in one's possession?

The debate regarding an oath that combines forbidden and permitted items, which was discussed previously, is now examined more in depth.

Shevuot 22 - May 23, 25 Iyar May 23, 2025

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Today's daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in gratitude for the love and support of the Hadran Family during his latest medical misadventures.

Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis had a back-and-forth discussion in the Mishna each supporting their own position. The rabbis claimed that there is no other place in the Torah where one who eats any amount is liable. The Gemara raises several instances where one is liable for eating any amount but then explains why these are expectations to the rule. Rabbi Akiva answered that there is no other place where one speaks and is liable to bring a sacrifice. The Gemara suggests a few cases where that would be the case and also then explains why they are not the same as what Rabbi Akiva was referring to.

Rava limits their debate to cases where one did not specify that "I will not each any amount" or where one said, "I will not taste." Rav Pappa limited the case to oaths, not to konamot. A difficulty is raised on Rav Pappa's assertion from a braita where it is clear there is a requisite amount for konamot. There are two resolutions. One is to explain the case of konamot in the braita where one used the language of eating. Ravina offers an alternative answer and differentiates between the obligation of lashes (no requisite amount) and the obligation to bring a meila sacrifice (requisite amount at a value of a pruta). However, not all agree that there is a prohibition of meila by konamot. If so, how can the braita be explained according to Ravina?

Rava raises two dilemmas about the requisite amounts required for oaths in particular situations where the item discussed is not edible or not generally eaten on its own. They are both left unanswered. Rav Ashi raises a dilemma about a nazir who takes an oath to forbid grape pits. Is the oath invalid as it is already forbidden, or since the nazir can't eat an olive-bulk of grape pits, perhaps the oath is forbidding any amount? The Gemara quotes the upcoming Mishna regarding one who took an oath not to eat and then ate non-kosher meat. Based on the amoraim's interpretation of the Mishna, they conclude that the oath would not be valid, as an unspecified oath would be forbidden only at an olive-bulk, and that is already forbidden to the nazir by Torah law.

Shevuot 21 - May 22, 24 Iyar May 22, 2025

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Study Guide Shevuot 21

Today's daf is sponsored by Ruth Leah Kahan, Jessica Shklar, and Emily Michelson in commemoration of the seventh yahrzeit of their mother, Kadimah Freedman Michelson -- קדימה בת הרב אברהם זבי וחיה. We miss her every day.

What is the type of oath that is included in the negative commandment - do not swear falsely in my (God's) name? There is a debate regarding Rabbi Yochanan's opinion on this matter - is it referring to an oath on future actions or on past actions? Difficulties are raised on both approaches and are resolved.

When Rabbi Akiva in the Mishna says that one is obligated for not keeping to one's oath by eating a minuscule amount, meaning there is no requisite amount, does he hold this across the board (as per Rabbi Shimon's opinion), or only for oaths? The Gemara proves from other sources that it is a unique ruling only for oaths.

Shevuot 20 - May 21, 23 Iyar May 21, 2025

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Today's daf is sponsored by Helen Danczak in memory of her beloved mother on her 28th yahrzeit. "Her love of family is a guiding force for me."

Today's daf is sponsored by Debbie and Yossi Gevir on the birth of two new grandchildren. "With joy and gratitude to Hashem! Mazal Tov to our beloved children Elazar and Sarah on the birth, two months ago. of their daughter, Shaked Tova. And to our beloved children Eliav and Noya, upon the birth of their son Ofek Shalom, whose Brit was yesterday. שירבו שמחות בישראל!

A contradiction is brought between a braita and the Mishna regarding the language "I take an oath that I will eat." This contradiction is resolved in two different ways.

A braita explains what "mivta" is and what "isar" is. They are both languages of oaths. But an isar can be liable a sacrifice and also not necessarily. The meaning of this braita is a subject of debate between Abaye and Rava who disagree about whether isar is a language of being matpis on an oath or not.

Rav Dimi explains in the name of Rabbi Yochanan what negative commandments are transgressed by different types of oath of expression (past and future) and for vows. He explains that oaths about something that one will do in the future are "false oaths" and in the past are "vain oaths." However, there is a braita that says that false and vain oaths are the same. How can this braita be explained in light of Rav Dimi's statement?

Shevuot 19 - May 20, 22 Iyar May 20, 2025

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Study Guide Shevuot 19

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree about how to extrapolate the verse in Vayikra 5:2. Chizkiya explains the difference of opinion between them, while Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Sheshet hold that they do not disagree, rather each exempts one who forgot the Temple or sacrificial items from bringing a sacrifice, but extrapolates it from different words in the verse. Rava asks Rav Nachman: if forgetting the Temple or sacrificial items does not obligate one to bring a sacrifice, what if one forgot both the Temple and that one was impure? Rav Nachman answers that since the person also forgot they were impure, of course there is an obligation to bring a sacrifice. But Rava retorts that perhaps since one who forgets the Temple is exempt, this person would be exempt as well. Rav Ashi suggests an answer to this deliberation, but Ravina rejects it.

A case is brought of one who walked on two paths - one pure and one impure and went into the Temple. Two variations are brought and there is a debate about the halakha in each case. There are three different opinions regarding these three cases. What is the root of their debate? The issues raised here relate to what type of previous knowledge of impurity is necessary to obligate one for a sacrifice.

Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish each offer different interpretations for the first opinion in the cases of the two paths. Their opinions here contradict their opinions in a different place. How are these contradictions reconciled?

Shevuot 18 - May 19, 21 Iyar May 19, 2025

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The Gemara discusses a case where a man had relations with his wife and she became a nidda during the act. Abaye and Rava each quote different rabbis stating that in such a case, the man could incur an obligation of two sacrifices. Rava then explains the specific circumstances that would warrant this double punishment. The man is a Torah scholar who engages in relations with his wife when she is about to menstruate. When she informs him in the middle of the act that she has begun menstruating, he withdraws immediately. He is considered shogeg (unintentional transgressor) regarding entering the woman's body, as he incorrectly assumed he would be able to complete relations before she began menstruating. He is also considered shogeg regarding his immediate withdrawal from her body, as he, despite being a Torah scholar, was unaware of the halakha requiring him to wait until he is no longer erect before withdrawing.

Rava explains that the obligation to bring a sacrifice for each of these acts can be found in tannaitic sources. The rule about withdrawing appears in our Mishna, while the rule about entering appears in a Mishna in Nidda 14a. Rav Ada bar Matna debates with Rava whether the Mishna in Nidda actually refers to the case under discussion. Rav Ada suggests that it instead refers to withdrawal.

Rava and Abaye disagree about why a man who withdraws while not erect is exempt from bringing a sacrifice. Rava maintains that intercourse without an erection is not considered a true act of intercourse. Abaye, however, argues that the exemption exists because a situation where his wife begins menstruating during intercourse is considered beyond the person's control (ones).

Where can one find in the Torah a source for both a negative commandment (prohibition) and a positive commandment regarding a man's obligation to withdraw when not erect and to not withdraw when erect in the situation described above? Additionally, what is the source for the rabbinic prohibition against engaging in relations when a woman expects to begin her menstrual period soon?

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree in the Mishna, though the precise point of their disagreement is unclear. Chizkia clarifies the subject of their debate.

Shevuot 17 - May 18, 20 Iyar May 18, 2025

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Today's daf is dedicated to Mimi and Rafi Schachat on the birth of a daughter!

Rava and Rav Ashi each pose a series of unresolved questions concerning the minimum duration one must spend in the Temple to incur the obligation of bringing a sacrifice if they became ritually impure while inside. They debate whether these requirements apply only to unwitting impurity or also to intentional cases, and whether similar requirements would apply to a nazir who unknowingly entered a cemetery.

The Mishna states that one who leaves the Temple by the shortest path after becoming impure will be exempt from bringing a sacrifice, while one who takes a longer path will be obligated. The Gemara then questions whether this distinction is measured in terms of time or physical distance.

Rabbi Oshaya offers a ruling regarding a leprous house: if one enters backward with only their nose remaining outside, they would not become impure, as the Torah imposes impurity only when entering a house in the typical manner. A braita supports this reasoning, noting that an impure person entering the Temple through the roof would not be liable for entering the Temple while impure, as entering through the roof is not the conventional method.

The Mishna clarifies that entering the Temple while impure is excluded from cases where the community would bring a bull offering for an erroneous court ruling. The bull offering applies only to sins requiring a fixed sin offering, not to those requiring a sliding scale offering. However, a bull sin offering would be brought for an erroneous court ruling involving nidda, specifically in a case where a man had relations with his wife and she became a nidda during the act. Abaye and Rava each quote different rabbis stating that in such a case, the man could incur an obligation of two sacrifices. Rava then attempts to understand the specific circumstances that would warrant this double punishment.

Shevuot 16 - Shabbat May 17, 19 Iyar May 16, 2025

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Today's daf is sponsored by Elana Storch in honor of Patti Evan's birthday. " יומולדת שמח to my dear friend and chevruta partner! Wishing you many more years of good health, Mazal and bracha. Loads of love."

Are all the elements mentioned in the Mishna that are needed for sanctifying additional space essential or is it sufficient for just one of them? This has ramifications for expansions in the second Temple period where not all these elements were present. This debate is dependent on whether or not the kedusha from the first Temple remained forever or did it need to be resanctified in the time of Ezra.

From where is it derived that one who becomes impure while in the Temple will need to bring a sliding-scale sacrifice if one doesn't leave the temple immediately?

What are the measurements for how long one needs to be in there to be obligated in the sacrifice? Would it be the same measurements for one who did it intentionally and will be punished by lashes?

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