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Zevachim 6 - Shabbat September 20, 27 Elul Sep 19, 2025

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Continuing the discussion surrounding Reish Lakish's response to Rabbi Elazar, the Gemara examines whether heirs acquire the sacrificial offering of someone who dies. Various sources are presented supporting both sides of the debate. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the heirs do not acquire the offering, though they may receive a limited degree of atonement through it.

Another question arises regarding a sacrifice brought lo lishma, with intent for a different type of offering. If the original sacrifice is still offered, does it fulfill its intended purpose? If not, why is it brought at all? And if it does, why is a second offering required? Rav Ashi clarifies that the first offering is brought due to the power of its original designation, while the second is needed to achieve full atonement.

The Gemara also explores whether a burnt offering can atone for positive commandments that were neglected between the time the animal was designated and the time it was slaughtered, or only for those neglected before its designation. Sources are cited in an attempt to resolve this question.

Zevachim 5 - September 19, 26 Elul Sep 19, 2025

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Reish Lakish grappled with the legal concept of a sacrifice slaughtered with the intent of fulfilling a different offering (lo lishma). If such a sacrifice is valid and not disqualified, why does it fail to fulfill the owner's obligation? And conversely, if it does not fulfill the obligation, why is it offered at all?

Rabbi Elazar responded by citing a precedent: a sacrifice that does not provide atonement but is nevertheless brought. For example, when a woman gives birth, she becomes obligated to bring a pair of birds—one as a sin offering and one as a burnt offering. If she dies before fulfilling this obligation, her children still bring the burnt offering. In this case, the sacrifice is offered despite not providing atonement for the heirs.

Reish Lakish accepted that there is precedent for bringing a burnt offering, and similarly for offerings like the peace offering, which may be brought without atonement. However, he continued to question the case of the guilt offering. Rabbi Elazar replied that Reish Lakish's view aligns with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the Mishna, who holds that a guilt offering is disqualified if slaughtered not for its intended purpose. Yet Reish Lakish resisted being confined to Rabbi Eliezer's position, expressing a desire to understand the mainstream view as well.

Reish Lakish then proposed that the principle might be derived from Devarim 23:24, which discusses a neder (vow) that becomes a nedava (voluntary offering). This verse had previously been interpreted as referring to a sacrifice brought lo lishma.

Some questioned this verse being used by Reish Lakish, as the verse only applies to voluntary offerings, such as those brought through a vow, and not to obligatory ones like the guilt offering. In response, Abaye suggested that Reish Lakish intended to derive the principle from both that verse and another: "And he slaughtered it as a sin offering" (Vayikra 4:33). From the word "it," we learn that only a sin offering is disqualified when not brought lishma. The verse in Devarim then explains that although other sacrifices may be brought, they do not fulfill the owner's obligation.

Although the verse in Devarim refers specifically to burnt and peace offerings, Abaye argued that the principle could be extended to guilt offerings through a kal v'chomer argument. However, this reasoning was rejected, as one can distinguish between voluntary and obligatory offerings. Rava then suggested a different derivation from Vayikra 7:37, which juxtaposes various types of sacrifices in a single verse. This allows the laws of lishma to be extended from the peace offering to other offerings as well. This interpretation compares the other offerings to the peace offering, which is valid even when not brought lishma, rather than to the sin offering, which is disqualified, as per the earlier drasha that limited the disqualification to the sin offering alone ("And he slaughtered it as a sin offering").

Later, other rabbis revisited the discussion between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Elazar, raising two questions. First, why didn't Rabbi Elazar respond that a guilt offering can also be brought after death? Rav Sheshet addressed this question. Second, why didn't Reish Lakish counter that the heirs who bring their mother's burnt offering do, in fact, receive atonement—thus undermining the precedent cited by Rabbi Elazar?

Zevachim 4 - September 18, 25 Elul Sep 18, 2025

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What is the source for the Mishna's ruling that if one intends a different sacrifice than the one designated, the offering is no longer valid to fulfill the obligation of the original owner? The Gemara investigates the derivation of this principle across each of the four sacrificial rites: slaughtering, collecting the blood, carrying the blood to the altar, and sprinkling the blood on the altar. Why is it not sufficient to derive the law from just one of these rites? The Gemara then poses a similar question regarding a change in ownership—specifically, if the sacrifice was offered on behalf of someone other than its designated owner. Again, it seeks a source for each of the four rites. If these requirements are mandated by Torah law, why do they not render the sacrifice invalid?

Zevachim 3 - September 17, 24 Elul Sep 17, 2025

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Study Guide Zevachim 3

This week's learning is sponsored by Tina Lamm in loving memory of her father, Mr. Mike Senders, A"H, Yitzchak Meir ben HaRav Tzvi Aryeh v'Esther Bayla, on his shloshim. "Reaching the age of 101 was not only a personal milestone for my father, but also a testament to the fullness of his life. He used those years well - building Torah institutions, nurturing family and living in intimacy with Hakadosh Baruch Hu.

Today's daf is sponsored by Lisa Malik & Adi Wyner in loving memory of Lisa's grandmother, Regina Post z"l. "Babi Gina was the one who insisted on her grandchildren going to the Yeshivah Flatbush and who was especially proud of her 2 granddaughters who were Hebrew valedictorians. She would also be so proud to know that one of her namesakes, Rivkah Gottlieb, made aliyah and that she now has 6 Israeli grandchildren and 3 Israeli great-grandchildren. May the memory of Rivkah bat Shmuel v'Chavah be for a blessing."

From where do we know for certain that a get that is written without any specific intent for the woman is disqualified (the basis of a contradiction in Zevachim 2)? After four failed attempts, they eventually find a fifth case in the Mishna in Gittin that clearly proves this.

Four contradictions are raised against statements brought in the name of Rav relating to cases in which sacrifices are/are not disqualified when offered for a similar but different intent or for a completely different intent. Comparisons are made to divorce documents, impurities in utensils (what things are considered a barrier that the impurity cannot pass through), and laws within the topic itself (various cases where wrong intentions disqualify/don't disqualify the sacrifices). Each contradiction is resolved.

How do we know with certainty that a get (divorce document) written without specific intent for the woman is invalid? This question arises as part of a contradiction discussed in Zevachim 2. After four unsuccessful attempts to find the source, the Gemara ultimately finds a definitive proof in a Mishna in Gittin, which clearly establishes that a get must be written lishmah—with specific intent for the woman receiving it.

The sugya presents four challenges to statements attributed to Rav regarding when sacrificial offerings are disqualified due to improper intent. These challenges explore cases where the intent is slightly off (e.g., for a different type of offering) or entirely unrelated. The contradictions are from:

The laws of gittin (divorce documents)
The laws of tumah in utensils (what constitutes a barrier to impurity)
Internal comparisons within the sacrificial laws themselves

Each contradiction is carefully analyzed and ultimately resolved, reinforcing the nuanced understanding of how intent affects the validity of offerings—and by extension, other halachic domains.

Zevachim 2 - September 16, 23 Elul Sep 16, 2025

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Masechet Zevachim is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross on his third yahrzeit. "He exemplified a path of holiness and purity, living with kedushah in his everyday life."

Today's daf is sponsored by Judi Felber in loving memory of her mother, Yocheved bat Zvi and Sara, on her 4th yahrzeit.

If one takes an animal that was designated for a specific sacrificial purpose and slaughters it with the intention that it be used for a different type of offering (shelo lishma), the sacrifice is not invalidated. It must still be offered according to its original designation. However, it does not fulfill the obligation of the person who brought the sacrifice.

There are exceptions to this rule - cases in which slaughtering with the wrong intent completely disqualifies the offering. The Mishna records four differing opinions regarding these exceptions:

Tana Kamma holds that a sin offering (chatat) and a Passover offering (korban Pesach) - when brought at the proper time (the afternoon of the 14th of Nissan, or possibly even the morning) - are disqualified if slaughtered with incorrect intent.
Rabbi Eliezer adds the guilt offering (asham) to the list, arguing that it is similar in nature to the sin offering.
Yosi ben Honi expands the rule further, stating that any sacrifice slaughtered with the mistaken intent that it be offered as a sin offering or a Passover offering on the 14th of Nissan is disqualified.
Shimon, brother of Azaria, maintains that if a sacrifice is slaughtered with the intent that it be offered as a higher-level offering than originally designated, it remains valid. However, if the intent is to downgrade it to a lower-level offering, the sacrifice is disqualified. The Mishna provides examples of what constitutes higher and lower offerings.

The Gemara raises a question: Why does the Mishna use the word "ela" ("but") instead of "ve" ("and") in the phrase "but [a sacrifice slaughtered with the wrong intent] does not fulfill the owner's obligation"? The answer given is that although the sacrifice does not fulfill the owner's obligation, its original sanctity and designation remain intact. Therefore, the remaining sacrificial rites must be performed in accordance with its original purpose. This explanation aligns with a statement made by Rava, and two reasons are offered to support this ruling—one derived from a biblical verse, and the other based on logical reasoning.

A further question arises: If a sacrifice is slaughtered without any specific intent, is that considered "no intent" or does it count as "intent"? Rava infers from the Mishna that such a case is treated as if it were done with intent. However, he notes a contradiction with the laws of lishma regarding a get (divorce document), which must be written specifically for the woman being divorced. Why, then, is the law different in each case?

After addressing this question, the Gemara investigates the sources that underpin Rava's apparent contradiction: first, that a sacrifice brought without specific intent is still valid; and second, that a get lacking explicit intent is invalid.

Introduction to Masechet Zevachim with Dr. Ayelet Hoffman Libson Sep 15, 2025

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Introduction to Masechet Zevachim

Horayot 14 - September 15, 22 Elul Sep 14, 2025

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Siyum Masechet Horayot and Seder Nezikin is sponsored by the Tannenbaum family in loving memory of their beloved mother/grandmother Ruth Zemsky z"l, Raizel bat Chaya Kayla, on her 9th yahrzeit on 23rd of Elul. "Marking the completion of Nezikin, a seder that is focused on bein adam l'chavero- both in the building and healing of society, aptly reflects the life she lead. She was a paragon of sensitivity and taking care of "the other", often those unseen, in community, work and home. Her example continues to inspire us all. Yehi zichra baruch."

A braita outlines the protocols for showing respect to the Nasi, the Av Beit Din, and the Chacham—each accorded honor in a distinct manner. This differentiation was instituted by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (the Nasi) on a day when Rabbi Natan (Av Beit Din) and Rabbi Meir (the Chacham) were absent from the Beit Midrash. Feeling slighted, they conspired to remove Rabban Shimon from his position. However, their plan was overheard by Rabbi Yaakov ben Karshi and ultimately thwarted.

Upon discovering their plot, Rabban Shimon expelled them from the Beit Midrash. In response, they began submitting challenging questions into the study hall. When the students inside couldn't answer, they would send in the correct answers. Rabbi Yosi eventually intervened, arguing that it was absurd for Torah to remain outside while the students sat within. Rabban Shimon agreed to reinstate them—but imposed a penalty: the Torah they taught would no longer be attributed to them by name. Thus, Rabbi Meir's teachings were transmitted as "acherim" ("others"), and Rabbi Natan's as "yesh omrim" ("some say").

Later, they both dreamt that they should seek reconciliation with Rabban Shimon. Only Rabbi Natan acted on the dream. But Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel was not exactly willing to reconcile.

A generation later, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was teaching his son, Rabbi Shimon, a teaching of Rabbi Meir, referring to it as "acherim omrim." When his son asked why he didn't cite Rabbi Meir directly, Rabbi Yehuda explained that these sages had once tried to undermine their family's honor. Rabbi Shimon replied that they were long deceased and had failed in their attempt. Rabbi Yehuda relented and agreed to cite Rabbi Meir—though still indirectly, saying "They say in the name of Rabbi Meir."

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and other sages also debated a broader question: is it better to be a sinai - one with vast Torah knowledge, or an oker Harim - one with powerful analytical skills who can "uproot mountains"? Rav Yosef was a sinai, while Raba was an oker Harim. Although the scholars in Israel recommended Rav Yosef for leadership, he humbly deferred to Raba. Raba led the yeshiva for 22 years, and only after his passing did Rav Yosef assume the role. During Raba's tenure, Rav Yosef refrained from receiving honor out of respect.

In another case, Abaye, Rava, Rabbi Zeira, and Raba bar Matna were studying together and needed a leader. Abaye was chosen, as his teachings remained unrefuted, unlike the others.

The Gemara concludes with a question: who was greater—Rabbi Zeira or Raba bar Rav Matna? Each had unique strengths, and the matter is left unresolved with the classic Talmudic closure: teiku.

Horayot 13 - September 14, 21 Elul Sep 14, 2025

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Today's daf is sponsored by Tova and David Kestenbaum in loving memory of Tova's father, Rabbi Dr. Israel Rivkin z"l, on the occasion of his first yahrzeit. "My father was a pillar of strength and love for our family, a passionate learner of Torah, and a man whose chessed for his community and Klal Yisrael knew no bounds. He was deeply grateful to be living in Israel, together with my mother, surrounded by generations of descendants — a dream he cherished and fulfilled with joy and pride. יהי זכרו ברוך"

Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Shapiro in memory of her mother Deera Tychman, Tzvia Bracha bat Mordechai v'Chaya Tova, on her 12th yahrzeit. "My mother was a lover of Israel and the Hebrew language. May her memory be a blessing."

Today's daf is dedicated to my brother Jonathan Cohen on his 50th birthday! He has been learning daf yomi with me since Masechet Nidda of the last cycle.

The bull offering of the kohen gadol precedes the bull offering of the community. This is derived both from a verse in the Torah and a logical argument. The bull offering of the community (sin offering) precedes the bull offering of the community in a case of idol worship (burnt offering), as a sin offering precedes a burnt offering, as is derived from a verse regarding the sliding scale offering when two birds are offered - one as a sin offering and one as burnt offering. The Gemara brings several other rulings regarding which sacrifice precedes another and the source for it in the Torah. Only in one case is there a tannaitic debate.

If there are two lives to save or two people to feed or two people taken hostage, on what basis do we decide who to save, feed, or redeem first? The Mishnayot list who comes first, and a braita explands on this list.

Lineage plays a key role in determining precedence, but a Torah scholar overrides this and comes before even a mamzer, as is derived from a verse in Mishlei 3:15.

What things cause one to forget one's Torah, and what can one do to restore forgotten Torah? What are ten things that are detrimental to Torah study?

A braita delineates the rules for showing respect for the Nasi, Av Beit Din and Chacham – each in a different manner. This differentiation was instituted by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (the nasi) on a day that Rabbi Natan, the Av Beit Din, and Rabbi Meir, the Chacham were not in the Beit Midrash.

Horayot 12 - Shabbat September 13, 20 Elul Sep 12, 2025

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How could Yehoachaz have been anointed with shemen hamishcha if Yoshiyahu hid the shemen hamishcha? What else did Yoshiyahu hide, and for what reason?

The king and kohen gadol are anointed in different ways—how is each performed?

Kings were anointed near a flowing stream as a good omen, symbolizing that their reign would endure. The Gemara digresses into a broader discussion about various practices people use to seek signs—whether they will survive the year, succeed in business, return safely from a journey, and so on. Some authorities caution against relying on such signs. Abaye, however, says that since we see signs do have meaning, one should eat symbolic foods on Rosh Hashana—such as gourds, chard, dates, and others—because they grow quickly, serving as a good omen for the coming year.

Rabbi Meir disagrees with the Mishna, holding that even a kohen gadol who assumed the role by wearing the special garments (rather than being anointed) would still be required to bring a bull offering if he sinned. From where does he derive this ruling? A difficulty arises, as the continuation of the Mishna appears to align with Rabbi Meir's position. Could it be that the Mishna is split—part following Rabbi Meir and part not? If not, how can the Mishna be reconciled? Three different answers are offered to resolve this question.

The Mishna teaches that there are five mitzvot commanded to the kohen gadol that also apply to the mashuach milchama—the kohen who addresses the people before they go out to war. A braita provides the source for this ruling.

Rava asked Rav Nachman whether a kohen gadol who becomes leprous is permitted to marry a widow. Rav Nachman did not know the answer. Rav Papa later posed the same question, and Rav Huna son of Rav Nachman responded.

The Mishna discusses differences between a kohen gadol and a regular kohen regarding the laws of mourning—specifically, whether they may perform Temple service while in the state of onen (the period between the death of a relative and burial), and how they tear their garments. The kohen gadol tears his garment l'mata and a regular kohen l'maala. Rav and Shmuel disagree about how to translate these terms in this context.

The Mishna rules that an action performed regularly (tadir) takes precedence over one that is less frequent. Additionally, if one mitzvah is more sanctified than another, it takes precedence. From where are these principles derived?

Horayot 11 - September 12, 19 Elul Sep 12, 2025

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A braita explains that the words "מעם הארץ" — "from one of the land" — mentioned in the section about the individual's sin offering serve to exclude the king and the kohen gadol. The braita then questions this drasha, noting that the king and kohen gadol are already explicitly excluded by the verses. It concludes that the exemption in the braita for the kohen gadol applies in a case where he committed a forbidden act unwittingly, but without relying on an erroneous ruling. The exemption for the king applies when he sinned before being appointed. However, this interpretation aligns only with Rabbi Shimon's view, as the rabbis maintain that in such a case, the king must bring an individual sin offering. To reconcile this with the rabbis' position, Rav Zevid in the name of Rava suggests a scenario in which the king ate half the requisite amount of forbidden fat (cheilev) before becoming king, and then ate the other half afterward. In this case, he would not be obligated to bring an individual sin offering.

Rava asked Rav Nachman: if someone ate half the requisite amount before becoming king, then became king, and later ceased being king before eating the second half, would the two halves combine to obligate him to bring an individual sin offering? They attempt to resolve the question by comparing it to a parallel case involving a Jew who ceased practicing religion, a meshumad, but the comparison is ultimately rejected.

Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet, according to Rabbi Shimon's position: if someone ate a piece of fat whose status — permitted or forbidden — was unclear, and only discovered the issue after becoming king, would he bring a provisional guilt offering? The reasoning is that the type of sacrifice does not change with the person's change in status from a regular individual to a king. The question remains unresolved.

A braita presents two different drashot to derive that a meshumad does not bring an individual sin offering. The practical difference between the two derivations is explored.

There is a debate regarding which transgressions qualify someone as a meshumad.

A braita explains that when the Torah refers to a nasi, it means a king — as no one is above him except God. Rabbi Yehuda haNasi, known as Rebbi, asked Rabbi Chiya whether he would be required to bring the unique offering designated for a nasi. Rabbi Chiya responded that Rebbi had a counterpart in Babylonia, the Exilarch, and therefore did not meet the criteria of someone who has no one above him but God. A difficulty is raised, as both kings of the kingdoms of Judea and Israel would bring the offering, yet it is explained that Rebbi was subservient to the Exilarch. Rav Safra offers a different version of the discussion between Rebbi and Rabbi Chiya.

The kohen gadol who brings a unique sacrifice is specifically one who was anointed with the shemen hamishcha, the special oil prepared by Moshe. The Mishna outlines the legal differences between a kohen gadol who was anointed and one who assumed the role by wearing the special garments. It also distinguishes between a kohen gadol currently serving and one who is no longer in the position.

A braita records a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi regarding whether the shemen hamishcha was prepared in a miraculous manner. Rabbi Yehuda, who believes it was prepared miraculously, supports his view by citing several miracles associated with the oil, arguing that its miraculous preparation should not be surprising.

If a king inherits the throne from his father, he is not anointed, but the kohen gadol is. Only kings from the Davidic dynasty were anointed. Challenges to this theory are raised: Shlomo was anointed despite his father being king, and Yehu, an Israelite king, was also anointed. These are resolved by explaining that Yehu was anointed with balsam oil, not the shemen hamishcha, and that Shlomo's anointment was due to uncertainty over succession. Yehoachaz, whose father was also king, was anointed because he became king instead of his older brother Yehoyakim, who was two years his senior. Was he really two years his senior? The Gemara delves into the different verses to understand the age order among the brothers.

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