Show notes
This month's learning is dedicated in memory of Rabbi Dr. Raymond Harari z"l, on the occasion of his first yahrzeit. Rabbi Harari was my first Gemara teacher and the one who sparked my love for learning Gemara. Over the course of his distinguished career as an educator, as principal of the Yeshiva of Flatbush, and as community rabbi, he inspired thousands of students with his wisdom, warmth, and unwavering commitment to Torah.
As his wife Vicky beautifully expressed, Rabbi Harari embodied six core values that he cultivated with deep intentionality throughout his life: hard work, gratitude, forgiveness, patience, focusing on families and our priorities, and the inclusion of women in halakhic Judaism. Yehi zichro baruch.
The Mishna presents a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis regarding a thought during the slaughtering of a sacrifice to leave the blood or the parts designated for burning until the next day. Rabbi Yehuda rules that such a thought disqualifies the offering, while the rabbis disagree, arguing that the thought does not pertain to "consumption," and therefore does not invalidate the sacrifice.
The Mishna further clarifies that only specific types of improper intent disqualify a sacrifice: namely, intent involving "outside of time," "outside of location," or "not for the sake of the correct sacrifice" and the latter only in the cases of sin offerings and the Paschal offering. It then enumerates several examples of thoughts that do not disqualify the offering, such as intending that an impure or uncircumcised person will eat the meat, or that the blood will be placed on the wrong altar or in the wrong location on the altar.
Rabbi Yehuda's position is initially derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:15, which states "lo yaniach" - "do not leave it" - referring to meat left beyond its designated time. However, the Gemara ultimately rejects this derivation, noting that it cannot be applied to thoughts of "outside of location." Additionally, a braita clarifies that Rabbi Yehuda's reasoning is based on logical inference: if physically leaving the blood beyond its designated time or place disqualifies the sacrifice, then merely intending to do so should also disqualify it.
Rabbi Yehuda does not extend his logic to the other cases listed in the Mishna, such as consumption by an impure or uncircumcised person, because even if these acts were actually carried out, the sacrifice itself would not be invalidated. The Gemara analyzes each of the cases mentioned in the Mishna and explains why none of them would disqualify the offering.
Rabbi Abba explains that although Rabbi Yehuda disqualifies a sacrifice when there is intent to leave the blood until the next day, if a pigul thought is later introduced, such as intending that the meat be eaten after its designated time, the sacrifice becomes pigul, despite the earlier disqualifying thought. Rava attempts to support Rabbi Abba's statement, but his proof is ultimately rejected. Rav Huna raises a challenge to Rabbi Abba's position, which remains unresolved.
Rav Chisda presents two statements, both of which Rava attempts to prove, though each proof is refuted. The first states that if one intends for impure individuals to eat the sacrifice on the following day, the offering becomes pigul and is punishable by karet, even though impure individuals are already prohibited from eating it. The second concerns a Paschal offering that was not roasted, or a thanksgiving offering brought without its accompanying loaves. Although the meat of these offerings is forbidden to be eaten in such cases, if an impure person consumes them, it is still punishable by karet.
Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree regarding the minimum number of blood applications required on the altar for a sin offering. Both agree that for all sacrifices offered on the outer altar, except for the sin offering, if only one blood application is performed, the sacrifice is still valid. However, they differ on the sin offering itself: Beit Shammai maintains that at least two applications are required, while Beit Hillel holds that one suffices.
In a case where only one application is required, if the first application is performed properly and a pigul thought (i.e., intent to eat the meat after its designated time) occurs during the second application, the sacrifice is not disqualified. However, if the first application is performed with a pigul thought and the second is done properly, the sacrifice is rendered pigul and is punishable by karet, since the disqualifying thought occurred during the essential act that permits the meat to be eaten.
In contrast, for sacrifices offered on the inner altar, all blood applications are essential. Therefore, if a disqualifying thought, such as intending to eat or burn the meat beyond its designated time, occurs during only part of the applications, the sacrifice is disqualified. However, it is not considered pigul and is not punishable by karet, because pigul status only applies when the improper intent accompanies the entire act that permits the consumption of the meat.
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