Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

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Zevachim 75 - November 29, 8 Kislev Nov 28, 2025

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If sacrifices of the same type become intermingled, the Mishna rules that they are offered for "whichever owner they belong to." However, in cases where smicha is required, how can the sacrifice be brought, since one cannot perform smicha on another's offering? Rav Yosef explains that the Mishna must be referring to women, who are not obligated in smicha. Men's sacrifices, by contrast, would not be offered; instead, they would be left to graze until they developed a blemish and then sold, with new animals purchased for the altar. Abaye raises a difficulty from a braita that discusses public and individual sacrifices that became mixed both before and after slaughter and were nevertheless offered. Since public sacrifices are brought by men, the braita must also be referring to individual sacrifices brought by men. Rava resolves this by reinterpreting the braita, noting a difficulty in its plain reading. He explains that it refers only to a case where the blood of the animals was mixed after slaughter, and not to intermingling of live animals.

In the braita cited by Abaye, Rebbi rules that if the blood of two animals was mixed in one cup, the kohen may combine the sprinkling for both sacrifices, but only if there is enough blood for each. A difficulty is raised against Rebbi from another braita in which he quotes Rabbi Eliezer regarding the red heifer purification waters, where no minimum amount is required for sprinkling. The same should apply to blood. Two answers are offered: either the purification waters differ from blood, or Rebbi was not stating his own view but merely quoting Rabbi Eliezer.

Rami bar Hama poses two questions concerning a firstborn animal that became blemished. Rabbi Yosi bar Zevida attempts to answer from the Mishna about firstborns intermingled with other sacrifices, but his answer is rejected.

The Mishna states that only sin and guilt offerings cannot be intermingled, since their differences are identifiable. The Gemara considers whether other offerings might also fall into this category, but all such suggestions are rejected.

If a guilt offering becomes mixed with a peace offering, they are offered according to the stricter requirements of the two. This could potentially cause sanctified items to be disqualified. Rabbi Shimon does not have an issue with this, but the rabbis disagree and do not allow it. Rava limits Rabbi Shimon's ruling to a post facto situation and does not permit it ab initio.

Zevachim 74 - November 27, 7 Kislev Nov 27, 2025

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In a set of intermingled parts of sacrifices, including from a blemished animal, Rabbi Eliezer rules that if one was sacrificed, we can "assume" that the one sacrificed was the blemished one and all the others are permitted. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Eliezer follows a unique opinion, that of Chanan the Egyptian, who holds that animals, even after slaughter, are not considered "rejected," and if they are brought on the altar, they can be accepted.

Similarly, Rav Nachman cites a ruling of Rav that if one ring of idol worship was mixed in with many other rings, and one fell into the sea, all the rest are permitted. After Rava raised a difficulty on this from the Mishna—that all the animals are left to die, so why wouldn't we permit them after the first one dies—the Gemara concludes that Rav holds like Rabbi Eliezer. It is then established that both Rabbi Eliezer and Rav would permit the others only if they are sacrificed or sold in pairs, since one of the pair will certainly be a permitted item.

Rav also ruled in a case where there were one hundred rings with one being of idol worship. If they were separated into sixty and forty, and then one from each section was mixed into separate sets of rings, the one that came from the forty is permitted based on a safek sefeika—two doubts: likely it was in the sixty, and even if it was in the forty, likely it remained in the original forty.

Shmuel disagreed and did not permit safek sefeika in idol worship. A difficulty is raised against Shmuel's position from a braita that permits it, but it is established that there is a tannaitic debate.

Reish Lakish brings a similar ruling to Rav Nachman regarding a barrel of wine of truma. The Gemara explains why both his case and Rav Nachman's case needed to be ruled on separately, as one would not necessarily be able to infer one from the other. Raba and Rav Yosef disagree about the extent to which Reish Lakish's leniency applies.

Rabbi Elazar rules leniently in a case of a barrel of truma, but his ruling is modified after Rav Nachman raised a difficulty against it. Rabbi Oshaya rules about a similar case, adding another potential issue.

The Mishna discusses a situation in which a treifa is mixed in with other animals. As a treifa should be recognizable, the Gemara asks how such a situation could occur. Three possible answers are given.

If sacrifices of the same type are intermingled, the Mishna rules that they are sacrificed for "whichever owner they belong to." However, in sacrifices where smicha is necessary, how can the sacrifice be brought—since one cannot perform smicha on someone else's sacrifice? Rav Yosef explains that the Mishna must be referring to women, who are not obligated in smicha.

Zevachim 73 - November 26, 6 Kislev Nov 26, 2025

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Two additional answers are offered to explain why, in the Mishna, the animal is not nullified among the others if one follows Rabbi Yochanan, who holds that only items sold exclusively by unit are not nullified in a mixture. The first answer is that the Mishna follows Rabbi Yehoshua according to Rabbi Yehuda in the case of a litra of dried figs, teaching that items sometimes sold individually are not nullified. The second answer is that live animals are considered significant and therefore cannot be nullified.

The Gemara continues to ask why animals designated for sacrifices, when intermingled with an animal forbidden for benefit, are all left to die. It suggests resolving the issue through the laws of probability: one could remove an animal at a time and assume each emerged from the majority of permitted animals. The difficulty is that, according to halakhic rules of probability, this only applies once an animal has already been separated, allowing us to presume it came from the majority. But if the animals remain fixed and one is taken directly from the group, the law treats it as either permitted or forbidden (50/50), with no majority to rely upon.

The Gemara further proposes creating a situation where the animals scatter from their fixed location, so they are no longer considered fixed, and each could then be assumed to come from the majority. Rava offers three explanations why this solution fails, the first two of which are rejected. The final answer is that, although theoretically possible, it was prohibited by decree, lest people apply the same reasoning in cases where the animals remain fixed.

Rava concludes that since the animal is not nullified by rabbinic decree, if any of the animals in the mixture are sacrificed on the altar, they do not achieve atonement, and a new sacrifice must be brought. Rav Huna raises a difficulty with this explanation based on two Mishnayot in Kinnim 1:2 and 3:1. The difficulty is resolved by explaining that Rava holds live animals and birds can be rejected from the altar, whereas the Mishna rules that they cannot.

Zevachim 72 - November 25, 5 Kislev Nov 25, 2025

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Study Guide

After comparing the Mishna in Zevachim with a parallel Mishna in Temurah, the Gemara explains that the Mishna in Zevachim was included to emphasize that even an item prohibited outside the Temple — since it is forbidden for benefit altogether — will not be nullified and must be left to die. This, however, raises a difficulty, as such a principle could seemingly be derived from a Mishna in Avodah Zarah.

The resolution is that the Mishna in Avodah Zarah does not deal with items designated for the altar. Therefore, if only that Mishna existed, one might assume that for sacrificial purposes, the laws of nullification would apply, so as not to destroy offerings. Conversely, if only the Mishna in Zevachim were taught, one might think the stringency applies specifically because these items are inherently despicable and unfit for the altar, whereas in non-Temple contexts, nullification might still be valid.

According to Torah law, when permitted and forbidden items are intermingled, the forbidden items are nullified if the permitted ones form the majority. Yet there are exceptions to this rule. Why, then, is an animal not nullified in the majority here? The Gemara first suggests that animals fall into the category of items sold individually, which are not nullified according to Rabbi Meir. This explanation aligns with Reish Lakish's reading of Rabbi Meir's position in Mishna Orlah 3:6–7, which includes items usually sold individually but occasionally sold otherwise. However, it does not fit Rabbi Yochanan's interpretation of Rabbi Meir, which applies only to items sold exclusively as individuals — a category that does not include animals, since they are sometimes sold in flocks.

Zevachim 71 - November 24, 4 Kislev Nov 24, 2025

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This chapter addresses cases where different items become mixed together - sacrificial animals with other sacrificial animals, sacrificial animals with non-sacrificial ones, or valid offerings with disqualified ones. Each type of mixture is governed by distinct rules.

If sacrificial animals are mixed with animals that are forbidden for benefit, such as an ox sentenced to death for goring, or a sin offering left to die because its owner passed away, for example, then all the animals in the mixture must be left to die. In these cases, the usual laws of nullification do not apply.

If a sacrifice becomes mixed with animals that are prohibited for the altar but permitted for benefit, the animals are left to graze, then sold. The proceeds from the most valuable animal are used to purchase a replacement sacrifice.

If a sacrifice is mixed with animals that were never designated as offerings, all the animals are sold for sacrifices of that type and offered on the altar with the intent of "whoever their owner is."

If sacrifices of the same type are mixed, they are all offered on the altar with the same designation. However, if different types of sacrifices are mixed, for example, burnt offerings with peace offerings, the animals are left to graze until they develop blemishes. At that point, new animals of each type are purchased, equal in value to the most expensive animal in the group, at the expense of the owners.

In cases where an animal is mixed with others designated for sacrifice that cannot be sold, such as firstborns or animal tithes, they are left to graze until blemished. The owner then redeems the sanctity of one animal (for the sacrifice) in the amount of the most expensive animal and uses that money to buy a new sacrifice. Once blemished, the original animals may be slaughtered and eaten like ordinary firstborns or tithes.

The Mishna also notes a case where the laws of mixtures do not apply: sin offerings and guilt offerings cannot be brought from the same animals. Thus, if animals designated for sin offerings are mixed with those for guilt offerings, this is not considered a mixture, as it is clear which animal goes with which offering.

The Gemara questions the Mishna's phrasing of "even one in ten thousand," clarifying that the case refers to a single ox that gored, becoming mixed with many sacrificial animals.

The Gemara compares this Mishna with a parallel Mishna in Temurah and then another in Avodah Zarah, questioning why each is needed. It concludes that every text contributes a distinct detail that cannot be fully derived from the others.

Zevachim 70 - November 23, 3 Kislev Nov 23, 2025

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Study Guide

How does Rabbi Yehuda counter the difficulties raised by Rav Shizbi? First, the Gemara shows that he derives the rulings of Rav Shizbi (that both the verses on a dead bird and the cheilev of an animal only apply to kosher birds/animals differently. Then, they bring three suggestions on how to explain the meaning of the word treifa in the verse regarding the cheilev. The first two suggestions are rejected.

How does Rabbi Meir explain the three different verses - two for the impurity of a dead bird and the one for cheilev?

A braita is brought that derives some of the halakhot previously mentioned from the verses, that the cheilev ruling only applies to kosher animals and not to undomesticated animals.

Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree about whether Rabbi Meir would hold that melika removes a bird from having impurity of a carcass in birds with blemishes or even birds not generally offered on the altar. This leads to Rabbi Yirmia asking if the same would be true if, instead of breaking the neck of a calf in the egla arufa ceremony, they broke the back of a goat?

Zevachim 69 - Shabbat November 22, 2 Kislev Nov 21, 2025

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The Gemara continues its discussion on whether melika performed by a non-kohen renders the bird a neveila, thereby imparting ritual impurity. Chizkiyah presents a ruling: if a non-kohen performs melika and the bird is subsequently placed on the altar, it is not removed. However, in a parallel case involving kmitza performed by a non-kohen, the offering would be removed. This raises the question - why is there a distinction between the two cases?

A braita is cited to provide the Torah source for the Mishna's rulings regarding melika performed with the left hand, at night, and in other disqualifying circumstances.

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about whether melika performed on a treifa bird (one with a fatal defect) prevents it from being considered a neveila. The Gemara examines the sources for their respective opinions. A verse concerning the prohibition of consuming the forbidden fats (cheilev) of a neveila or treifa is analyzed, challenging Rabbi Yehuda's proof text.