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Zevachim 105 - December 28, 8 Tevet Dec 28, 2025

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Two additional questions are raised regarding the impurity status of those who handle the bull and goat offerings whose bodies are burned outside Jerusalem, but neither question receives a definitive answer.

Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree about the impurity of the scapegoat (se'ir la'azazel) that is sent off a cliff on Yom Kippur. While both sides agree that the red heifer and the bulls and goats burned outside Jerusalem impart impurity to food and drink, they dispute whether the scapegoat does the same. According to the rabbis, since the scapegoat is a live animal - and live animals generally do not become impure or transmit impurity - it does not impart impurity in this case either, even though the person who sends it off does become impure. Rabbi Meir, however, maintains that the scapegoat does transmit impurity, because anything destined to eventually acquire a severe level of impurity (i.e., the ability to transmit impurity to humans) already imparts impurity to food and drink even before reaching that stage.

The rabbis' position is challenged based on a braita from the school of Rabbi Yishmael, who discusses a concept similar to Rabbi Meir's in the context of the carcass of a kosher bird. Since the bird will eventually attain a severe level of impurity (when someone eats it), it already imparts impurity to food and drink beforehand. If the rabbis agree with Rabbi Yishmael, then this principle should apply to the scapegoat as well. But if they do not follow Rabbi Yishmael, then the red heifer and the bulls and goats burned outside the Temple should likewise not impart impurity to food and drink.

Rav Dimi resolves this by explaining Rabbi Yishmael's view in a way that allows the rabbis to accept his principle while still excluding the scapegoat. Although items destined to eventually reach a severe level of impurity can already transmit impurity to food and drink, this applies only to items that are generally subject to impurity - namely, dead animals. It does not extend to live animals, such as the scapegoat.

Two questions are raised regarding Rabbi Yishmael's principle that an item destined to eventually contract a severe level of impurity can already transmit impurity to food and drink. How do we define the phrase "they will ultimately contract severe impurity"? If an additional action is required before the item reaches that stage, this may prevent it from transmitting impurity, since it is still one step removed from becoming fully impure. The questions, therefore, focus on what qualifies as a "missing action." Would the need to remove the item from the Azara count as such an action? What about the case of a kosher bird's carcass held in one's hand, the size of an olive, that is on the verge of being eaten?

Another issue discussed is whether this type of impurity renders food and drink a first-degree impurity or only a second-degree impurity.

Zevachim 104 - Shabbat December 27, 7 Tevet Dec 26, 2025

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Zevachim 103 - December 26, 6 Tevet Dec 26, 2025

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The hide of burnt offerings is given to the kohanim, as stated in Vayikra 7:8. However, the Mishna explains that if the offering became disqualified before the blood was sprinkled, the kohanim do not receive the hide. If it was sacrificed for the sake of a different type of offering, since the sacrifice remains valid, the hide is given to the kohanim.

In addition to burnt offerings, the kohanim also receive the hides of all kodshei kodashim, such as guilt and sin offerings. This is derived through a kal va'chomer argument in the Mishna, but later a braita brings different opinions of how to derive this.

A braita records a debate between two tannaim regarding the phrase "the burnt offering of a man" in the verse that grants the kohen rights to the hide. One opinion says it excludes a burnt offering of hekdesh, property belonging to the Temple, while the other says it excludes the burnt offering of a convert. Three explanations are offered for what is meant by a burnt offering of hekdesh, and one explanation is given for the case of a convert, since a convert is certainly considered a "person."

The three explanations of hekdesh are: a burnt offering brought from leftover funds of an offering; one who consecrates an offering for bedek habayit, the maintenance of the Temple; and one who consecrates all of their property, among which there were animals.

The exemption regarding a convert refers to a case where the convert designated a burnt offering and then died without heirs. Since the sacrifice is ownerless, it does not qualify as a "burnt offering of a man."

A braita is cited to explain the derivation of the laws in the Mishna. Although the verse says "man," the offerings of women and slaves are included as well, as is derived from a phrase in the verse. It also records a debate about how kodshei kodashim are included and kodashim kalim excluded from this law - whether it is learned from a kal va'chomer, from a verse, or whether no derivation is needed at all, since the hide always follows the meat, and the meat of other kodshei kodashim goes to the kohen.

The Mishna concludes that the determining factor for whether the hide goes to the kohen in a case where the meat was disqualified is whether the hide was still attached at the moment of disqualification.

Zevachim 102 - December 25, 5 Tevet Dec 25, 2025

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Rav held that Moshe served as a kohen gadol. Four tannaitic sources are brought to challenge this position, but each one is ultimately resolved. A braita is then cited to show that whether Moshe was a kohen gadol is itself a tannaitic dispute.

One of the tannaitic views in that debate cites a statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha: whenever the Torah uses the expression charon af, anger, it implies some concrete action or consequence. His statement is challenged by the verse in Shemot 11:8, where Moshe becomes angry at Pharaoh, yet no action seems to follow. Reish Lakish resolves this by saying that Moshe slapped Pharaoh in the face. This explanation is challenged by another statement of Reish Lakish, in which he says that Moshe showed respect toward Pharaoh. Two answers are offered to reconcile these conflicting statements.

Two verses are then brought to support the principle that one must show respect to a king, even a wicked king, one verse concerning Pharaoh and another concerning Ahab.

Earlier, a source had referred to Moshe as a king. However, Ulla stated that Moshe desired to be king but was not granted that status. Rava resolves this by qualifying Ulla's statement: Moshe wished for his sons to inherit kingship, and that request was denied, but Moshe himself was indeed considered a king.

The Gemara then asks: from where do we derive that kohanim with any type of blemish are entitled to receive portions of the priestly gifts? Four braitot are cited, each offering a drasha that builds upon the previous one.

The Mishna states that those who cannot serve in the Temple do not receive a portion, which seems to contradict the ruling regarding blemished kohanim. Furthermore, the implication that those who do serve may eat is difficult in the case of impure kohanim during communal offerings, where they may serve, yet do not receive a portion. The Gemara explains how this contradiction is resolved.

Rav relates that Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon was once in the bathroom and devised various arguments that a tevul yom might use to claim a share of sacrificial portions. Yet for every argument he proposed, a pure kohen could cite a verse proving that a tevul yom is excluded, since he cannot perform the Temple service. The Gemara then asks: how was Rabbi Elazar able to think Torah thoughts in the bathroom, something that is normally forbidden?

Zevachim 101 - December 24, 4 Tevet Dec 24, 2025

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Study Guide

There is a dispute between Rabbi Nechemia and Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon regarding the reason Aaron burned the sin‑offering goat on the eighth day of the inauguration (miluim). Rabbi Nehemiah holds that the reason was aninut (the status of a mourner on the day of death), whereas Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda argue that the goat was burned because it had become impure. They raise three objections to Rabbi Nechemia's position - how can these objections be resolved, and how does each of them interpret the verses in the passage?

When did Pinchas become a kohen?

According to Rav, Moshe served as the kohen gadol. The Gemara raises objections to his statement.

Zevachim 100 - December 23, 3 Tevet Dec 23, 2025

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Study Guide

Three additional resolutions, bringing the total to five, are proposed to reconcile the contradiction between the two baraitot, each of which presents a different view of Rabbi Shimon on whether an onen may eat the Pesach offering at night. A challenge is raised against the third resolution, evidence is presented in support of the fourth, and a statement of Rava bar Rav Huna is cited to bolster the fifth.

Zevachim 99 - December 22, 2 Tevet Dec 22, 2025

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After the Mishna discusses which kohanim are entitled to portions of sacrificial meat, Reish Lakish derives from the verse "the kohen who offers it shall eat it" that only those who perform the service may partake, excluding a tvul yom and mechusar kipurim. The Gemara challenges this, noting that priests on weekly rotation receive a share even if they did not offer that sacrifice, and that minors also eat despite being unfit for service. The verse is therefore reinterpreted to mean that those "fit for service" may receive a portion, though others, such as children, may still partake in eating. This raises a difficulty regarding blemished priests, who are unfit for offering yet still receive a share. To resolve this, the verse "all male kohanim" is understood to include them, and the Gemara analyzes why a tvul yom is excluded while a blemished priest is included.

Reish Lakish further asks whether a blemished kohen who is also impure may receive a portion. Raba cites the case of the kohen gadol who, while an onen (mourner on the day of a relative's death), works in the Temple but cannot eat, and does not receive a share to eat later - showing that eligibility requires fitness for eating. Rav Oshaya raises a similar question about a kohen who is impure in a situation where impurity is permitted for communal offerings, and Ravina responds with the same proof from the kohen gadol, again affirming that fitness for eating is required.

The Mishna states that an onen may touch sacred items, which contradicts a Mishna in Chagiga 21a requiring immersion for sacrificial items (kodashim). Three resolutions are offered: first, that our Mishna refers to before immersion, though this is rejected since immersion does not remove aninut; second, distinguishing between one who was careful to avoid impurity that conveys tumah but not impurity that disqualifies, versus one who was careful in all respects; and third, that our Mishna refers to touching, while Chagiga refers to eating. A source is brought to prove that there could be situations where one is careful about one type of impurity and not another, a distinction that carries halakhic consequences.

Since the Mishna rules that an onen does not receive a share, it seems to imply that he may nevertheless eat sacrificial meat. Yet this conflicts with Pesachim 91b, which teaches that an onen may immerse and eat the Passover sacrifice at night but not other offerings. The resolution distinguishes between Passover, where eating is permitted due to its unique requirements, and other sacrifices throughout the year. This leads to mention of a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon over whether nighttime aninut is biblical or rabbinic, since the permission for the onen to eat the Passover sacrifice rests on Rabbi Shimon's view that it is rabbinic. However, a braita suggests that Rabbi Shimon holds aninut at night to be a Torah law. Two possible resolutions are offered to reconcile this apparent contradiction.

Zevachim 98 - Rosh Chodesh Tevet - December 21, 1 Tevet Dec 21, 2025

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If mixtures of an offering are cooked together with those of another offering of a different status, or with non-sacred food, the resulting food assumes the status of the more stringent offering, as stated in Vayikra 6:20. Although this law is presented in the context of the sin offering, a drasha on the verse in Vayikra 7:37 which juxtaposes various types of offerings, teaches that this principle applies to all sacrifices. Each offering mentioned in that verse serves to transmit a particular law to the others.

A braita quoted in the name of Rabbi Akiva derives the law of foods cooked together from the word 'mincha' in that verse, since the same rule appears in the context of the meal offerings in Vayikra 6:11. The sin offering in the verse, however, is used to teach other laws. While the braita derives three laws from the sin offering - that it cannot be purchased with second tithe money, must be offered during the day, and that all actions must be performed with the right hand - the Gemara limits this to two, and possibly even to one, since the other laws are taught explicitly regarding different offerings.

Rava raises two questions concerning blood on a garment: one about the Temple laws of laundering blood from a sin offering, and the other about chatzitza (interposition) in the mikveh. He resolves the first question, but the second remains unanswered.

The Mishna lists cases where kohanim do not receive a portion of the meat. If they are unable to perform the sacrifice due to impurity or similar disqualifications, they cannot receive a share. However, blemished kohanim, though not permitted to sacrifice the sacrifices, but are nevertheless entitled to receive a portion of the meat.

Zevachim 97 - Shabbat Rosh Chodesh - December 20, 30 Kislev Dec 19, 2025

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Rabbi Tarfon and the Rabbis disagree about whether merika and shetifa of metal utensils that were used for cooking sacrificial meat are necessary daily during the holidays, or whether on the holidays one also needs to perform it only after the holiday ends. What is the basis of Rabbi Tarfon's position to be lenient on the holiday?

The time for performing merika and shetifa is after the time for eating the sacrifice has passed. From where is this derived?

Rebbi and the Rabbis disagree about whether merika and shetifa are both done with cold water, or whether merika is with hot water and shetifa with cold. Even according to Rebbi, who holds that both are with cold water, one would still be required beforehand to boil the pot with hot water to remove the taste of the meat that has now become notar, left beyond the time the sacrifice can be eaten.

If mixtures of an offering are cooked together with those of another offering of a different status, or with non-sacred food, the food takes on the status of the more severe offering, as stated in Vayikra 6:20. This law is only applicable if flavor is imparted. The details of this law are analyzed.

A question is asked: why does the positive commandment to eat sacrificial meat not override the negative commandment not to eat disqualified meat? Rava answers that this principle does not apply in the Temple. Rav Ashi answers that there is both a negative and a positive commandment not to eat the meat, which is why the positive commandment to eat it does not override.

The verse relating to this law is mentioned in the context of the sin offering. From the verse in Vayikra 7:37, which mentions various different offerings, the sages learned that the laws of each type apply to all the other types as well. From the sin offering in that verse, they derive that this law applies to all sacrifices. What is derived from the other words in that verse?

Zevachim 96 - December 19, 29 Kislev Dec 19, 2025

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The Gemara raises two difficulties with the conclusion that earthenware vessels can be koshered by placing fire inside them. First, why does the Torah command that earthenware vessels in which sanctified meat was cooked must be broken, if they could simply be put into a kiln? The answer given is that kilns could not be used in Jerusalem, as they would blacken the walls and mar the beauty of the city. Second, why were the Temple ovens made of metal if earthenware ovens could have been used and koshered? The assumption behind this question is flawed, since the ovens needed to serve as a sanctified vessel in certain cases (such as the two loaves on Shavuot and the showbread), and sanctified vessels cannot be made of earthenware.

Rav Yitzchak bar Yehuda left the study hall of Rami bar Hama and joined that of Rav Sheshet. Rami bar Hama was offended, assuming Rav Yitzchak sought greater honor. Rav Yitzchak explained that he had not received satisfactory answers from Rami bar Hama, who relied on logical reasoning rather than tannaitic sources. Rami bar Hama challenged Rav Yitzchak to send him a question, promising to answer with a tannaitic source. Rav Yitzchak asked about merika and shtifa (scouring and rinsing) of a vessel in which only part was used for cooking sacrificial items: does the entire vessel require cleansing, or only the part that was used? Rami bar Hama answered logically that only the part used requires cleansing, as in the case of blood on clothing. Rav Yitzchak rejected this reasoning and cited a braita proving the opposite, thereby refuting Rami bar Hama completely.

Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether the requirement of merika and shtifa applies to both kodshei kodashim and kodashim kalim, or only to kodshei kodashim. From where do they derive this distinction? They both agree that merika and shtifa do not apply to truma. The Gemara raises a challenge to this from a braita, and three answers are offered.

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