Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

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Menachot 25 - February 5, 18 Shvat Feb 05, 2026

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The tzitz (headplate of the Kohen Gadol) effects atonement only for the disqualification of impurity (tum'ah) and not for other disqualifications such as yotzei (sacrificial meat taken outside its boundaries), piggul (improper intent), notar (remnants left past the legal time), or ba'al mum (a blemished animal). Both in the braita and in the discussions of the amoraim, these laws are derived from the biblical verses - establishing that the tzitz atones specifically for impurity and not for other types of disqualifications.

The Gemara highlights a contradiction between two braitot: one states that the tzitz atones for an individual's offering only if it occurred inadvertently (shogeg), while the other states that the tzitz atones whether it occurred inadvertently or intentionally (mezid). The Gemara offers four potential solutions to resolve this contradiction, the first of which is rejected.

Menachot 24 - February 4, 17 Shvat Feb 04, 2026

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A Mishna in Chagigah 20b explains that sanctified items placed in the same sanctified vessel are considered combined for purposes of impurity; for example, if a tvul yom touched one, everything else in the vessel would become impure. However, this is only if they are all touching. The sons of Rabbi Chiya asked Rav Kahana if that would hold true even if they weren't touching. Rav Kahana derived from the word "tzeiruf" used in the Mishna there that they would combine. They ask two more related questions and Rav Kahana answers them.

Then, Rav Kahana asks them a question about whether combining two items in a bowl, when not touching, would be valid for taking a kemitza (if the dough of the mincha was split into two parts). They attempted to make a comparison between the case in question and the case in our Mishna regarding the two minchas that got mixed together. However, Rava rejects the comparison as it is likely they were touching.

Rabbi Yirmia asks a follow-up question about items being connected regarding impurity—in a case where the item is attached through water (in a pipe) to something outside of the vessel. Would the impurity extend to there as well? Or what if the outside piece became impure, would it extend to the other piece in the bowl as well?

If a mincha offering was divided and one part became impure and was then added to a bowl with its other half, if a tvul yom then comes and touches the impure half while it is in the bowl with the other, is the other piece impure as well? This is in essence asking whether once something is impure, can impurity be added again? Rava asked this question and Abaye tried to answer it from a Mishna in Keilim 27:9, explaining that there is no such concept that once something is impure it cannot become impure again, but Rava rejects his proof as the cases aren't comparable. The Gemara further tries to prove Abaye's point from the continuation of that Mishna, but that is rejected as well.

Rava and Abaye disagree about a case where there are three pieces—two from the original, one of which was lost temporarily, and a third that came to replace the lost half. What is the relationship between the three for laws of impurity and laws of kemitza?

Menachot 23 - February 3, 16 Shvat Feb 03, 2026

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Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about a case where oil was placed on the kometz of a mincha of a sinner, which is not meant to be mixed with oil. Rabbi Yochanan disqualifies it, but Reish Lakish does not, as he holds that the oil should not be mixed with the mincha before the kometz is taken, but the kometz can (and ideally should) be mixed with a little bit of oil. Rabbi Yochanan brings a tannaitic source to raise a difficulty against Reish Lakish's position, but it is resolved.

Rava asks a question about a kometz whose oil (some of it) was absorbed onto a piece of wood. Can both be burned together to ensure that all the oil of the kometz is burned, or would this not be effective as the wood is completely separate from the kometz? Ravina questions Rava as the issue is already known as a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish. But they explain why the question can be asked according to each.

The Mishna explains what to do in three different cases of mixtures of meal offerings that were at various stages - either two minchas before the kometz was taken, or a kometz with a different mincha where the kometz was not yet taken, or a kometz mixed with the remainder.

Rav Chisda and Rabbi Chanina disagree within Rabbi Yehuda's position of min b'mino (items of the same type) is not nullified, as understood by Rabbi Chiya, that items are considered the same if the status of one can change to be like the other. Rav Chisda says it is determined by the item trying to nullify, and Rabbi Chanina by the item being nullified. The three cases in our Mishna and a fourth source regarding matza are brought as difficulties to one or both of the opinions, but all are resolved.

Menachot 22 - February 2, 15 Shvat Feb 02, 2026

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Rav Mordechai reinstates the original interpretation of Shmuel's limitation on the Mishna in Shekalim 7:7 - namely, that the court permitted the kohanim to use Temple salt for salting their sacrifices (for burning on the altar) but not for salting the meat of the sacrifices for consumption. This ruling of the court follows Ben Buchri's opinion that kohanim are not obligated to pay the half-shekel (machatzit hashekel) used to fund communal items in the Temple. Since they did not contribute to the fund, one might have assumed they were ineligible to benefit from Temple salt; therefore, the court issued a specific stipulation to permit it.

The Mishna in Shekalim also mentions that the kohanim could use wood from the Temple for their private sacrifices. The source for this is derived from Vayikra 1:8, which mentions the wood "which is on the fire on the altar." The phrase "on the altar" is considered superfluous, indicating that the wood shares the same status as the altar itself; just as the altar is built from communal property, so too the wood must be communal. This teaching establishes that individuals are not required to bring wood from their own homes for their voluntary offerings. Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua defines the altar differently positing that the altar must be built using stones that have never been used. This requirement would also preclude individuals from bringing wood from their own homes. Consequently, the Gemara asks: what is the practical difference between these two opinions? The answer is that the latter opinion requires the wood to be brand new and never previously used, whereas the former does not.

If a kometz, which contains one log of oil, is mixed with the mincha of a kohen or a mincha of libations, which contains three log of oil, there is a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda. They disagree on whether the mixture may be burned on the altar or if the blending disqualifies both offerings. The concern is that the oil from the mincha becomes added to the kometz, potentially disqualifying both; the kometz would then contain an excessive amount of oil, while the mincha would be left with an insufficient amount.

The Gemara cites a Mishna in Zevachim 77b featuring a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding whether two similar substances (min be'mino) can nullify one another. Rabbi Yochanan explains that both parties derive their respective positions from the Yom Kippur service, during which the blood of the bull and the blood of the goat are mixed together. Despite the volume of the bull's blood being significantly greater than that of the goat, the Torah continues to refer to the mixture as both "the blood of the bull" and "the blood of the goat"—indicating that the goat's blood remains distinct and is not nullified. The rabbis derive a broad principle from this: items designated for the altar never nullify one another, regardless of their type. Conversely, Rabbi Yehuda derives a different principle: blood does not nullify blood because they are the same type of substance (min be'mino). The Gemara raises challenges against both derivations, and they are left unresolved.

Rabbi Yehuda's opinion in our Mishna appears to contradict his ruling in the Mishna in Zevachim; if two similar substances (min be'mino) do not nullify each other, then the oil of the mincha should not be nullified by (or absorbed into) the kometz. Rava resolves this contradiction by explaining that this case is an exception, as it is considered a situation where one substance "adds to" the other rather than merely mixing with it.

Menachot 21 - February 1, 14 Shvat Feb 01, 2026

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The braita initially listed two items offered on the altar that do not require salting: wood and blood. However, the Gemara notes a difficulty: this braita appears to follow the position of Rebbi, yet Rebbi himself maintains that blood does require salting. Consequently, the Gemara emends the text, removing "wood" and replacing it with libations (wine). To support this, a second braita is cited which lists wine, blood, wood, and incense as exempt from salting. Yet, this proof-text presents its own challenge, as it aligns neither with Rebbi (who requires salting for blood) nor with the Rabbis (who require it for incense). Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that this braita follows Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka, who uses a different categorization based on the characteristics of a mincha (meal offering) to determine which items require salt.

A further challenge on the braita quoted in Menachot 20a is raised. The braita implies that blood is excluded from salting only because of a specific scriptural derivation (drasha). However, according to Zeiri, if blood is salted, it becomes disqualified for use on the altar regardless; if so, why is a drasha necessary to exclude it? To resolve this, the Gemara distinguishes between two levels of salting: a small amount of salt, which might not disqualify the blood but is still excluded by the verse, and a large amount, which renders the blood physically unfit for the altar. This leads to a discussion regarding the status of salted or coagulated blood: is it still considered "blood" enough to be valid for the altar, and conversely, does the prohibition against eating blood still apply to it?

A braita is then introduced expounding on the biblical verses regarding salting to derive various procedural laws. These include the type of salt required, the quantity ushttps://five.libsyn.com/showed, and the specific method of application. Another braita clarifies the legal status of salt found in the sanctuary: if salt is found directly on a sacrificial limb, it is considered sanctified and subject to the laws of meila (misappropriation of sacred property). However, if the salt is found on the altar's ramp or on the roof of the altar itself, it does not carry this sanctity.

A Mishna in Shekalim states that the rabbis allowed the kohanim to benefit from the salt of the Temple. Shmuel explains that this permission applies only to the kohanim's offerings and not for eating. The Gemara analyzes whether Shmuel meant that salt is permitted only for the actual sacrifice on the altar but forbidden for the meat the kohanim eat, or if it is permitted for seasoning their sacrificial meat but forbidden for use with non-sacred food. The Gemara initially concludes that since the kohanim were even permitted to use Temple salt for tanning animal hides, they must certainly be allowed to use it to season the holy meat they consume. Under this view, Shmuel's restriction only excludes using the salt for personal, non-sacred food. This is further supported by the logic that if even an Israelite's sacrifice is salted with Temple salt, a kohen's sacrifice surely would be as well, meaning the court's special decree must have addressed something else. However, Rav Mordechai suggests an alternative reading that could reinstate the first possibility: that the court permitted salt only for the actual sacrifice on the altar but forbade it for the meat the kohanim eat. He explains that the Mishna's decree was specifically necessary to account for the position of Ben Buchri, as will be explained further on.

Menachot 20 - Shabbat January 31, 13 Shvat Jan 30, 2026

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Rav explained that details that are essential (me'akev) are specifically those that are repeated (appear twice) in the text. Rav Huna raises a difficulty on this assertion from the requirement of salting the offering; both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon rule that salting is essential, yet the command does not appear twice. Two answers are suggested to resolve this. Rav Yosef suggests that Rav may hold like the Tanna of our Mishna, who holds that salting is actually not essential. Another possible answer is that salting is a unique exception to the rule because the word "covenant" (brit) appears in the verse, signifying its indispensable status regardless of repetition.

The Gemara then raises a difficulty with the premise of the original challenge, noting that the word for salt actually does appear twice in Vayikra 2:13. This is answered by explaining that the repetition in that verse is necessary for specific drashot found in a braita. The braita extrapolates from the verse to teach which sacrificial items require salt and which do not - concluding that while most offerings require it, wood and blood do not. After quoting the brraita in its entirety, the Gemara delves into the different sections of the text, analyzing each clause to better understand the underlying logic of these inclusions and exclusions.

Menachot 19 - January 30, 12 Shvat Jan 30, 2026

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The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon on whether pouring of the oil of a meal offering requires a kohen is based on different ways of interpreting the verses in Vayikra 2:1-2. The Rabbis maintain that the requirement for a kohen is only mentioned from the act of scooping, or kemitza, allowing a non-kohen to handle the pouring and mixing of the oil. Rabbi Shimon, however, views the connective language in the verse as a link that binds the entire process together, necessitating a kohen for every stage. At first the Gemara suggested that Rabbi Shimon's reasoning was based on "a phrase can relate to both the upcoming and previous action," but after showing that in a different issue, Rabbi Shimon did not employ that principle, they explain the "vav"("and") connects the previous section to the kohen.

Rav explains that if the words torah and chukka appear in a verse, that signifies that a failure to perform a detail exactly as described invalidates the entire offering. Through a series of challenges involving the nazir, the metzora, and the service of Yom Kippur, the Gemara refines this: if either term is employed, it indicates it is an essential detail. However, after raising a difficulty from all sacrifices, Rav's statement is further refined: the term chukka is the primary indicator of indispensability, whereas torah on its own is not.

Repetition serves as another marker of necessity in the eyes of Rav, who argues that when the Torah returns to a subject multiple times, it is to emphasize that the detail is essential. This leads to a clash with Shmuel about whether or not is it essential that the scooping (kemitza) be performed by hand. Rav considers the method essential because it is repeated in the context of the Tabernacle's inauguration. Shmuel, however, holds that a one-time historical event is not a binding source for future generations.

A difficulty is raised against the principle of Rav that if something is repeated, it is indispensable, as the act of hagasha, bringing the mincha offering to the Altar, is repeated and yet is listed in the Mishna as not essential. The Gemara responds by explaining that the second mention is needed for a different purpose – to pinpoint the exact location on the Altar where the mincha offering is to be brought.

Menachot 18 - January 29, 11 Shvat Jan 29, 2026

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The Gemara explains the braita in a different way than previously to show that there is really no Tannaitic opinion that Rabbi Eliezer holds one is liable for karet if they have a pigul thought to eat something normally burned or burn something normally eaten. They explain that the braita is highlighting a three-way debate between tanna kama, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbl Elazar ben Shammua about whether in a case of someone who has a thought to leave over part of the blood until the next day without sprinkling it, would both the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer agree that is it valid, invalid or do they disagree as they do in the previous case.

A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yehuda's position from an intruiging story in which his position is mentioned in an interaction between Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua and Yosef the Babylonian, who repeatedly questioned Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua on this very point. The story was witnessed and told by Rabbi Yehuda haNasi when he went to the Beit Midrash of Rabbi Elazar to either learn his positions on various topics or to garner wisdom from him. In the end, the difficulty is resolved.

The conclusion of the Gemara leads to the understanding the Rabbi Eliezer disqualified an offering with a thought to eat something that is normally burned, as a rabbinic ordinance.

The Mishna lists various parts of the mincha offering that are not essential. The Gemara explains that when it lists pouring the oil as a non-essential action, that cannot be right, as it is essential. Therefore, they explain it must mean it can be done by a non-kohen. However, the next item in the Mishna, one does not need to mix, must be understood literally, i.e. is not essential at all, as is proven from a different sugya. The Mishna in Menachot 104a teaches that that one may volunteer a meal offering of up to sixty esronim (tenths of an ephah) in a single vessel, because sixty tenths can be properly mixed with a log (a liquid measure) of oil. However, if one volunteers sixty-one tenths, they must be brought in two separate vessels, as such a large quantity cannot be effectively mixed. Rabbi Zeira establishes a fundamental principle: "Anything that is fit for mixing, the lack of mixing does not invalidate it; but anything that is not fit for mixing, the lack of mixing invalidates it." This means that as long as it is physically possible to perform the mitzva of mixing, the offering is valid even if the mixing wasn't actually done. But if the quantity is so large (61 tenths) that mixing is physically impossible, the offering is disqualified even if the kohen attempts to proceed without mixing. From here it is clear, it does not need to be mixed.

The Gemara suggests, and then conclusively proves, that the Mishna does not accord with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon who rules in a braita that pouring the oil must be performed by a kohen. Rav Nachman attempts to reconcile Rabbi Shimon with the Mishna, but Rava rejects his suggestion.

Menachot 17 - January 28, 10 Shvat Jan 28, 2026

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The sharp scholars (charifei) of Pumbedita argue that one burning can create pigul for another. Specifically, if one burns the kometz (handful) with the intention to burn the levona (frankincense) outside its designated time, it becomes pigul. They explain that even the Rabbis - who generally hold that a pigul thought during only half of a permitting act (matir) is ineffective - would agree here, because the levona was included in the person's thoughts. Rava supports this from the general rule in the Mishna, however, his proof is rejected as it is inconclusive.

Rav Hisda, however, cites Rav to argue that one burning cannot create pigul for another. He reasons that since the kometz is not the permitting agent (matir) for the levona, an intention concerning burning the levona during the burning of the kometz is irrelevant. A proof is brought for this from a case involving the two lambs of Shavuot, but it is countered by distinguishing between items in separate vessels versus items in the same vessel.

Rav Hamnuna presents a unique case that he considers of immense value, where the pigul thought "spreads" through the entire process. If one burns the kometz with intent to burn the levona tomorrow, and with intent to eat the shirayim (remnants) tomorrow, the offering is pigul. This is because the thoughts combined eventually cover both the completion of the permitting acts and the consumption of the remnants.

The chapter concludes with a discussion of a braita regarding a case that all agree on. At first it seems they all agree that there is pigul even if the pigul thought is only in one matir. However, since it is clear that is not the case, they edit the braita to read "pasul" instead of "pigul," as all agree that it is disqualified, even if it is not necessarily pigul.

The third chapter begins with a Mishna discussing intentions regarding items not normally meant for that specific use. If one has intent during the kometz service to eat something not usually eaten (like the kometz itself) or to burn something not usually burned (like the remnants), the rabbis rule the offering valid, while Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies it. Additionally, if the intention involves a quantity less than an olive-bulk, or if it combines half an olive-bulk of eating and half an olive-bulk of burning, it remains valid because eating and burning do not combine to reach the required measure for pigul.

Rabbi Asi in the name of Rabbi Yochanan explains that Rabbi Eliezer derives his position from the double expression in the verse: "ve'im he'achol ye'achel" (and if it should surely be eaten). He understands this to include two types of "eating": human consumption and the consumption of the altar (burning). Therefore, an intention to switch these roles - intending to eat what is meant for the fire - is a valid disqualifying thought. The rabbis who disagree extrapolate that verse in a different manner, either to include a case of one who uses the language of eating instead of burning when having a pigul intent, or to derive the requisite amount of burning from the requisite amount for eating - an olive-bulk - meaning one who has a thought to burn less than an olive-bulk beyond its given time will not render the offering pigul.

Rabbi Zeira questions Rav Asi that if Rabbi Eliezer derives his position from the Torah, it should carry the penalty of karet, and yet Rav Asi said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that is does not. Rav Asi answer that there is a Tannaitic dispute regarding the nature of Rabbi Eliezer's disqualification: one view holds it is a Torah-level disqualification punishable by karet, while another suggests it is a Rabbinic disqualification and he brings a braita to support this.

The braita discusses one who slaughters a sacrifice with the intent to drink the blood tomorrow or to burn the meat tomorrow. Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies these cases, while the rabbis validate them. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar disagree in a case where one's intent was to leave the blood for tomorrow. Rabbi Yehuda says it is disqualified while Rabbi Elazar says that the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer disagree about this as well. In trying to assess the point of disagreement between Rabbis Yehuda and Elazar, they suggest that it is on their understanding of Rabbi Eliezer's position and whether he views these cases as disqualified (rabbinic) or as pigul (Torah law, with karet). However, this understanding of the braita is rejected.

Menachot 16 - January 27, 9 Shvat Jan 27, 2026

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Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree about whether the meal offering can become pigul if the pigul thought was only during part of the permitting act (matir), such as during the burning of the kometz, but not the burning of the frankincense, or the slaughtering of one sheep of the two sheep offerings on Shavuot. Rabbi Meir holds that it is pigul, while the rabbis do not.

Rav and Shmuel disagree regarding this debate. Rav holds that if the first action included a pigul thought, while the second was performed in silence, it is pigul, even according to the rabbis, as the second action follows the first and is considered to have been performed with the same thought. Shmuel disagrees and holds that silence following a pigul thought does not render the item pigul according to the rabbis, who require pigul in both actions that are considered a matir.

Two difficulties are raised against Rav's position from two different sources from the Tosefta. The first is resolved but the second is only partially resolved, i.e., according to one position in a different debate.

A question is raised on the Tosefta quoted previously. If one is not punished by karet in a case of pigul unless the rest of the sacrifice was brought properly, in the case of the sacrifice on Yom Kippur, if one had a pigul thought while sprinkling the first set of blood, but not the next, how could Rabbi Meir call this pigul as the next sets of blood are considered like sprinkling water, as the sacrifice is already disqualified since the earlier sprinkling of blood is invalid. Raba and Rava each provide solutions to this problem.

If one had a pigul thought while bringing the kometz to the altar, is that considered half a matir, as also the frankincense needs to be brought to the altar? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree. Rabbi Yochanan views it like taking the kometz, and it is therefore considered a whole matir. He holds that bringing it to the altar is not actually a matir, but an important part of the service and therefore a pigul thought will disqualify the sacrifice even if there is a parallel action (bringing the frankincense to the altar) that is not performed with a pigul thought. Reish Lakish views it like the burning of the kometz and is only half a matir. Two difficulties are raised against Rabbi Yochanan, from our Mishna and a braita, and are both resolved, and one against Reish Lakish which is left unresolved.

If one burned a tiny amount with a thought to eat a tiny amount beyond its designated time, and continually does this until the whole thing is burned and the thoughts cover the whole remainder, is it pigul. Three rabbis disagree – one says it's pigul, one says it is disqualified and the third says it's permitted. At first they think they each are based on a different opinion – Rabbi Meir, the rabbis and Rebbi. But this suggestion is rejected and it is explained to be based on whether one views a burning of a tiny amount as a proper act of burning and the eating of a tiny amount as a proper act of eating.

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