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    Judaism

    Daf Yomi for Women – Hadran

    Hadran.org.il is the portal for Daf Yomi studies for women.

    Hadran.org.il is the first and only site where one can hear a daily Talmud class taught by a woman. The classes are taught in Israel by Rabbanit Michelle Cohen Farber, a graduate of Midreshet Lindenbaum’s scholars program with a BA in Talmud and Tanach from Bar-Ilan University. Michelle has taught Talmud and Halacha at Midreshet Lindenbaum, Pelech high school and MATAN. She lives in Ra’anana with her husband and their five children. Each morning the daf yomi class is delivered via ZOOM and then immediately uploaded and available for podcast and download.

    Hadran.org.il reaches women who can now have access to a woman’s perspective on the most essential Jewish traditional text. This podcast represents a revolutionary step in advancing women’s Torah study around the globe.

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    Copyright: © Copyright Michelle Cohen Farber 2012-2020 All rights reserved

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    Latest Episodes:
    Nedarim 22 - November 16, 22 Cheshvan Nov 16, 2022
    Show notes

    A certain style of petach was used by a number of rabbis and yet, was discouraged by the Gemara for concern that people would not tell the truth. This petach took on different forms but the idea was that the chacham would say something like: "Had you known how terrible a sin it is to God to vow, would you have taken this vow?" Since it is unlikely someone would have the audacity to answer 'yes' to this question in front of a chacham, they ruled one cannot use it. There is a debate between Rava and Abaye regarding whether or not one can use this petach: "Had you known it was like building a bama and sacrificing a sacrifice, would you have vowed?" There is a debate regarding what part of that sentence they disagree about - the bama or the sacrifice? The Gemara brings several statements about the dangers of anger since the assumption is that most people vow in a moment of anger. A story is told of Ulla who witnessed a murder on his travels from Babylonia to Israel. Rabbi Yochanan questions a detail of the story - how one could have gotten angry in Israel and murdered another, as the verse says that God will bring anger outside of Israel. Anger causes one to dismiss the divine presence, causes folly and sin. Is it possible to dissolve a vow/oath if one vowed/swore in the name of God? Most of the amoraim say that it is not, but Rav Nachman rules at the end of the sugya that it is allowed. It is told about Rav Sechora who came to Rabbi Nachman to permit a vow and after Rav Nachman tried all kinds of openings without success, he became angry with Rav Sechora. When Rabbi Sechora left there, he came up with a petach himself that if he had known that it would make Rabbi Nachman angry with him, he would not have made a vow. Another similar story is told about the breaking of a vow of Rabbi Shimon the son of Rebbi.


    Nedarim 21 - November 15, 21 Cheshvan Nov 15, 2022
    Show notes

    There are four kinds of vows listed in the Mishna that are not considered valid vows and therefore one would not need to go to a chacham to dissolve them. The next few mishnayot will bring examples of each of the four types. The first type is zeiruzin, vows used in negotiation, such as a vow that I will not sell/buy for less/more than a certain amount. First, the Gemara suggests that the Mishna follows Rabbi Tarfon's position as quoted by Rabbi Yehuda that a nazir vow will not be effective unless one makes a definitive statement. Rava, however, proves from the language of the Mishna that it could fit with the opposing position as well, as the language indicates that they never really meant what they said as, from the start, they intended to compromise. This would make the vow invalid as his intent does not match his words. Ravina asked about a case where one took a vow that he won't sell for less than 5 dinarim and the other won't buy for more than 1 dinar. Are these valid vows or not? Rav Ashi answered from a Mishna (Nedarim 63) where one said to a friend who was pushing an invitation to eat at their house, "I won't even drink a drop of water in your house," and the ruling is that one can drink a drop of water, as the intent was clearly not to eat a meal. People often exaggerate in these ways and don't really mean exactly what they say. Ravina rejects the proof and we are left with his question. Two different versions of a statement of Rav Asi are brought which either say the four types of vows mentioned in the Mishna need to be dissolved by a chacham or that other vows need to be dissolved in the manner that these four vows don't apply, meaning with a petach (the chacham suggests that if the person has realized at the time of the vow that ____, the person would never have made the vow) and not with regret. Several cases show different approaches to dissolving vows – can one use regret or only a petach? Does one need a more tangible form of regret, such as, "Where there ten people there who would have appeased you, would you have made the vow?" This is a tannaitic debate as well. Four cases are brought of rabbis who permitted vows based on regret or based on a petach.


    Nedarim 20 - November 14, 20 Cheshvan Nov 14, 2022
    Show notes

    This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

    The Mishna brings examples of vows that when the one who took the vow explains that they never intended it to be a vow, we rule leniently and it is not a vow. For example, if one used the language of sacrifice but explained that one intended it to mean like gifts for a king, that is not a vow. Therefore there is no need to go to a chacham to dissolve the vow. But if one did go, Rabbi Meir rules that we are strict with them and they are punished. How does the Gemara understand this opinion in light of the earlier part of the Mishna that stated that it is not a vow at all? A distinction is made between a Torah scholar and an am haaretz. In what manner are they punished? The rabbis disagree somewhat and say that they require a petach from another place - how is this understood? - and we use this as a way to teach people not to take vows lightly. A braita is quoted with a list of things one should try to avoid, such as making vows, spending time with an am haaretz, speaking to women, etc. so as to avoid transgressing something more serious. From here, the Gemara discusses issues of tzniut/recommended between husband and wife, even during relations. Yochanan ben Dehavai is particularly stringent and, according to Rabbi Yochanan, the rabbis disagree with him.


    Nedarim 19 - November 13, 19 Cheshvan Nov 13, 2022
    Show notes

    Study Guide Nedarim 19

    Today's daf is sponsored by Stacey Goodstein Ashtamker in loving memory of my mother Arlene Goodstein's 7th yahrzeit. "My mother's love of Judaism and the land of Israel set the stage for my life. Missing her always."

    In order to resolve a contradiction between our Mishna and the Mishna in Taharot 4:12, regarding the issue of whether we rule stringently or leniently with regard to vows, the Gemara suggested that each Mishna reflected a different tannaitic opinion. First, they try to establish that the lenient opinion matches Rabbi Elazar (Eliezer), but difficulties are raised against this suggestion, first from the continuation of the Mishna in Taharot and then from the Tosefta Taharot Chapter 5. The first difficulty is resolved but the second is not. The second suggestion is that the Mishnayot each represents a different tannaitic opinion regarding a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon about a case where one says "I will be a nazir if there are 100 kur in the pile." If the pile is lost or stolen before they measure it, Rabbi Yehuda ruled the person is not a nazir and Rabbi Shimon rules the opposite. Based on this understanding, Rabbi Yehuda's reasoning is based on the fact that when one vows, one does not put oneself into a situation of uncertainty. This contradicts an inference from a statement of Rabbi Yehuda in our Mishna regarding a case of doubt when one said a vow using the language of teruma where the ruling is to be stringent. Rava answers by explaining the case of the nazir differently as the case of doubt for a nazir is worse than a doubt regarding a regular vow as one has no way to end the nazir prohibitions. Therefore, we can assume the person did not want to get into a situation of becoming a nazir out of doubt. Two questions are raised against Rava and one is resolved, but the other is not. Rav Ashi answers that Rabbi Yehuda by nazir is not his own opinion but him stating Rabbi Tarfon's position that nazir can only be taken on by a definitive declaration. A difficulty is raised against Rav Ashi as well, but it is resolved. The Mishna has brought two cases where the law is different between those living in Judea and the Galilee. However, they seem to contradict each other and therefore the Gemara concludes that one is Rabbi Yehuda's position and the other is Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Tzadok.


    Nedarim 18 - Shabbat November 12, 18 Cheshvan Nov 11, 2022
    Show notes

    Today's daf is sponsored by Beth Kissileff Perlman in honor of the lives and in memory of the deaths of the 11 kedoshim killed at Tree of Life, New Light and Dor Hadash synagogues in Pittsburgh on October 27, 2018. Joyce Fienberg, Richard Gottfried, Rose Mallinger, Jerry Rabinowitz, Cecil Rosenthal, David Rosenthal, Bernice Simon, Sylvan Simon, Dan Stein, Mel Wax and Irving Younger.

    The third question against Rav Huna is answered and a fourth question is raised and answered. When the Mishna stated that one is not liable for an oath on an oath, Rava infers that one is not liable but the oath exists, meaning that if the first oath is undone, the second will move into its place. If the language of a vow is unclear, one rules stringently. But if the language was ambiguous and the one who vowed explained the meaning of their words to be referring to a language that would not be a valid vow, then we can rule leniently and it is not considered a vow. The Mishna brings different examples of cases where one would rule leniently or stringently. This Mishna contradicts an explicit Mishna that one rules leniently in cases of nazir, which is a type of vow.


    Nedarim 17 - November 11, 17 Cheshvan Nov 11, 2022
    Show notes

    Study Guide Nedarim 17

    Today's daf is sponsored by Diana Bloom in loving memory of her zeide, Israel Marmurek, on the occasion of his yahrzeit. Today's daf is sponsored by Avi and Shelly Yonitzman in honor of their daughters' bat-mitzvah, Shira and Hallel. From where is it derived that an oath taken to not fulfill a mitzva is invalid? On Nedarim 16, it was derived from the word "devaro," his word, which refers to an oath about voluntary actions, excluding mitzvot. However, the Gemara brings a different source to teach the same law, "le'hara o le'heitiv" for good or for bad. From the juxtaposition of these words, they learn that it only refers to voluntary actions, as just a "to do good" which refers to positive actions (i.e. to eat) cannot include an oath that would cause one to not keep a mitzva (as inherently that is not good), also "to do bad" (i.e. to eat) would include an oath not to keep a mitzva. Why are both derivations necessary? Another stringency of vows over oaths is that if one makes a vow twice on the same thing, both vows are valid, whereas if one takes the same oath twice, the second oath is not valid. Rav Huna holds this is only true about a vow if they do not 100% overlap, such as, "I will be a nazir today" and "I will be a nazir tomorrow." Shmuel says it is true even if the second vow is 100% identical to the first, such as, "I will be a nazir today" and "I will be a nazir today." The Gemara raises difficulties with Rav Huna's opinion from four different sources (two from our Mishna). Three of the difficulties appear in this daf, one more in the continuation in Nedarim 18).

    Nedarim 16 - November 10, 16 Cheshvan Nov 10, 2022
    Show notes

    Study Guide Nedarim 16

    The Mishna mentioned different expressions of a vow using forms of the word korban, sacrifice, which would not be valid. This Mishna is attributed to Rabbi Meir, as it cannot be attributed to Rabbi Yehuda. The same expressions if used with the word shevua (oath), will be valid. One of the expressions mentioned was "shevua that I will eat from you, which is understood as "I am taking an oath that I will not eat from you." This contradicts a Mishna is Shevuot that lists four different kinds of oaths - and two of them are that I will eat or will not eat, understanding "I will eat" as its simple meaning and not as our Mishna understands is as "I will not eat." Abaye answers by saying that it depends on the context and one must rely on the context to establish what the meaning is in each particular situation. Rav Ashi answers by emending the text to read "shevua she'iy ochal", which mean "shevua that I will not eat." According to this reading, the reason the Mishna needs to list this case is that one not think that maybe it came out as a stutter and one really meant to say "that I will eat." Why do each of them (Abaye and Rav Ashi) not hold like the other? The Mishna refers back to a previous Mishna stating that there it was clear what are the stringencies of an oath that are not in a vow. To what Mishna was this referring? The Mishna then states the stringencies of a vow, if one vows to not do a mitzva, this is a valid vow and one must not go against the vow. Why does this not apply to oaths as well? Rava and Abaye both answer in a similar matter, that for the vow to be effective, it must be worded in a way that the vow applies to the object of the mitzva and not to the person fulfilling the mitzva. However, they differ on the exact wording of the vow - does it include the word "benefit" at all or not, as Rava argues that the performance of mitzvot is not considered a benefit.


    Nedarim 16 - November 10, 16 Cheshvan Nov 10, 2022
    Show notes

    Study Guide Nedarim 16

    The Mishna mentioned different expressions of a vow using forms of the word korban, sacrifice, which would not be valid. This Mishna is attributed to Rabbi Meir, as it cannot be attributed to Rabbi Yehuda. The same expressions if used with the word shevua (oath), will be valid. One of the expressions mentioned was "shevua that I will eat from you, which is understood as "I am taking an oath that I will not eat from you." This contradicts a Mishna is Shevuot that lists four different kinds of oaths - and two of them are that I will eat or will not eat, understanding "I will eat" as its simple meaning and not as our Mishna understands is as "I will not eat." Abaye answers by saying that it depends on the context and one must rely on the context to establish what the meaning is in each particular situation. Rav Ashi answers by emending the text to read "shevua she'iy ochal", which mean "shevua that I will not eat." According to this reading, the reason the Mishna needs to list this case is that one not think that maybe it came out as a stutter and one really meant to say "that I will eat." Why do each of them (Abaye and Rav Ashi) not hold like the other? The Mishna refers back to a previous Mishna stating that there it was clear what are the stringencies of an oath that are not in a vow. To what Mishna was this referring? The Mishna then states the stringencies of a vow, if one vows to not do a mitzva, this is a valid vow and one must not go against the vow. Why does this not apply to oaths as well? Rava and Abaye both answer in a similar matter, that for the vow to be effective, it must be worded in a way that the vow applies to the object of the mitzva and not to the person fulfilling the mitzva. However, they differ on the exact wording of the vow - does it include the word "benefit" at all or not, as Rava argues that the performance of mitzvot is not considered a benefit.


    Nedarim 15 - November 9, 15 Cheshvan Nov 09, 2022
    Show notes

    Study Guide Nedarim 15

    Today's daf is sponsored by Sylvia Simmons in loving memory of Rachel Wohl, Rachel Leah bat Avraham Mordechai z"l, her maternal grandmother, on her yahrzeit today.

    Rav Yehuda holds that if one vows: "My eyes will be konam to sleep today if I do not sleep tomorrow," one cannot sleep today as they may not be careful tomorrow to make sure the condition isn't met. The Gemara raises six difficulties against Rav Yehuda's position from tannaitic sources and resolves each of them. The Mishna mentioned a case where a man vowed to forbid his wife from having relations with him. How can this kind of vow be effective if her rights to relations with him if by Torah law and therefore it is not within his ability to forbid it using a vow, just like one cannot forbid an item of someone else's on another person through a vow? The Mishna brings the language of an oath that would work for sleeping, eating, etc. wihch are not tangible items. However, there are other languages mentioned in the Mishna that would not be valid languages connoting a vow or an oath.


    Nedarim 14 - November 8, 14 Cheshvan Nov 08, 2022
    Show notes

    Study Guide Nedarim 14

    Today's daf is sponsored by Art Gould for the refuah shleima of his wife, Carol Robinson, Karina Gola bat Huddah. "This is dedicated to the healing of my beloved wife and in gratitude to our Hadran family for all the notes and messages of support and in general just holding us in their hearts as we go through this difficult period."

    The Gemara gives two explanations as to how the Mishna can be explained according to Rabbi Yehuda's opinion, but the second explanation is rejected. What is the source of the halacha that one can take a vow by attaching it to another vowed item, but not a forbidden item? Why is it not possible to learn from the same verse to also include a forbidden item? The Mishna stated that the one who vows that he will not benefit from his wife with the words "She is forbidden to be like my mother" should be strict and undo the vow. But this is contradicted by an express braita. Abaye and Raba each resolve this in a different manner. Raba distinguished between a Torah scholar and an am haaeretz. Proof that the law sometimes distinguishes between these groups and requires annulling a vow only for an am haaretz can be learned from a braita about one who takes a vow on a Torah. The Gemara brings the braita in its entirety and discusses a difficulty with one of the lines of the braita and brings three resolutions. The Mishna says that one who says a vow not to sleep or not to talk or not to walk, must keep the vow. This Mishna will be further explained in Nedarim 15. The Gemara brings a dispute between Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav and Rav Nachman regarding one who said "I vow (konam) my eyes not to sleep today if I sleep tomorrow." Are they allowed to sleep today, and we will assume they will be careful tomorrow not to sleep so as not the break his vow, or do we tell them they cannot sleep today so that if they sleep tomorrow, the vow will not be broken? In the event that the declaration was said in the opposite direction "My eyes will be konam to sleep tomorrow if I sleep today" both agree that one need not be careful not to sleep today as the fulfillment of the vow is tomorrow and that we can assume people will be careful about. Whereas in the previous case, it was only fulfillment of the condition that was tomorrow and that, perhaps, people are less careful about.


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