Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Latest Episodes:

Kiddushin 51 - October 3, 18 Tishrei Oct 03, 2023

Show notes

If one betrothed two women at the same time who are both forbidden to him on account of each other, such as a woman and her sister or a woman and her mother, neither betrothal is effective. Rami bar Hama and Raba each bring a different explanation for this. The basis for Raba's explanation is that if a man cannot marry another one after the other, then if he betroths them simultaneously, the betrothal is not effective. Difficulties are raised against this principle of Raba from three other areas of halakha (tithes on produce, animal tithes, and the breads of the thanksgiving offering, korban toda) where the same situation exists - that if one does an action one after the other, it would not be effective - however, when done simultaneously, it is effective! Rava and Abaye have a disagreement regarding a betrothal between two people in a situation where the couple cannot have relations (as in the case above where each wife is prohibited to the husband on account of the other - i.e. sister of a woman he is betrothed to). Rava holds that it is not effective and Abaye rules that it is. Five mishnayot, including our Mishna, are brought to raise a difficulty with Rava's position, but each difficulty is resolved.

Kiddushin 50 - October 2, 17 Tishrei Oct 02, 2023

Show notes

Today's daf is sponsored by Elana Kermaier in loving memory of her father Moshe Fox z"l, Moshe Yehuda ben haRav Binyamin v'Chaya Tzipora on his sixth yahrzeit. "Your love of nature and the outdoors made Sukkot your favorite holiday. We so much miss celebrating this chag with you in our Sukkah.".

Today's daf is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs in loving memory of Shira's mother, Batya Rachel bat Yakov v'Rivkah, Brenda Katz, on her first yahrzeit.

If one sells a house with the intent to move to Israel but does not mention it as a condition of the sale and the move to Israel does not work out, can one cancel the sale of the house? Rava rules that "matters of the heart are not considered matters" and therefore the sale cannot be canceled. The sages bring five different sources to bring a source for this principle but the first four suggestions are rejected. Eventually, it is proven from a Mishna in Meila 6:1. A few other cases are mentioned regarding one who sold his house with the intent to move to Israel - in one case, he moved but then moved back as it didn't work out and in another, he never moved. In the first case, Rava ruled and in the second, Rav Ashi ruled, but there were two different versions regarding each of the rulings. If a man appoints an agent to betroth his wife in a specific location, the betrothal is only effective if the agent does exactly as he was told. But if the man tells the agent to betroth her and specifies where the agent can find her, if he finds her somewhere else and betroths her there, the betrothal is effective. Why does this need to be specified here by betrothal and also in Gittin regarding marriage? If a man betroths a woman with a condition that she does not have vows she has taken upon herself or blemishes and she in fact does, the betrothal is ineffective. But if he did not betroth her with that condition and yet finds out once betrothed that she has vows or blemishes, he can divorce her without having to give her the ketuba money. If a betrothal takes place but the husband does not do it with the value of a pruta and then later sends gifts that were traditionally sent to the bride's family after betrothal (sovlonot) to her house, the betrothal is ineffective as we assume the gifts were not meant for kiddushin. The Mishna lists three different types of cases where sending gifts would be ineffective - what is unique about each of the three cases that warranted each being mentioned? If the man only sent gifts (without a betrothal), do we need to be concerned that perhaps it was sent with the intent to betroth (or that there must have already been a betrothal - otherwise, why would he be sending the gifts)? Rav Huna and Raba hold that she is considered betrothed by safek (out of doubt) and will require a get before getting married to someone else. Two versions are brought about a discussion Raba and Abaye have regarding this ruling - in each version one supports and one disagrees. What does the Gemara conclude regarding this case? If one finds a ketuba of a woman in the marketplace and it is not known that she was betrothed, do we need to be strict and assume she must have been betrothed? On what does it depend? If one betrothed two women at the same time who are both forbidden to him on account of each other, such as a woman and her sister or a woman and her mother, neither betrothal is effective.

Kiddushin 49 - October 1, 16 Tishrei Oct 01, 2023

Show notes

This week's learning is sponsored by Jonathan Aibel in honor of Natasha Shabat. "Giving in honor of my teacher, who has opened many doors of Torah for me."

Rava explained the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the Mishna to be referring to a case where the woman sent an agent to accept a betrothal for her and specified with what the husband would betroth her and the messenger accepted something else of higher value. He ruled that this betrothal is effective as she was merely suggesting a possible method. Abaye explains that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Elazar each hold the same thing but in a different case - one regarding a regular document/tied document and the other regarding a woman who appoints an agent to receive her divorce document and also specifies the location where the agent is to go to receive it. Ula qualified the debate between Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis as a case of differences in monetary value, but not differences in social status as not every woman would be happy to marry a man of higher status. A braita is brought to strengthen his qualification and it is derived from the Mishnayot here as well. Mar, the son of Rav Ashi raises a difficulty about the derivation from the Mishna but it is resolved in two possible ways. The Gemara brings in a braita with possible terms a husband can use as a condition when betrothing a wife and an explanation is brought for each as to what is meant by that, such as, "that I am a learner," what type of learner does he need to be, i.e. how do we check the veracity of his statement? Following a discussion on "on the condition that I am wise" which mentioned a number of examples of the best of the sages, the Gemara agra brings a series of statements: "Ten measures of...came down to the world and nine of them were taken by..."

Kiddushin 48 - First Day of Sukkot/ Shabbat September 30, 15 Tishrei Sep 29, 2023

Show notes

The Gemara continues with suggestions by quoting tannaitic sources that Rav's statement that a man cannot betroth a woman by canceling a loan is a tannaitic debate. However, each source can be explained in several different ways, showing that the tannaitic debate in the source is not necessarily about the issue that Rav was discussing. If one betrothed woman and said with what item he was betrothing her and it turned out it was not what he said, is the betrothal effective? Does it depend on what item was stated and what item was actually used?

Kiddushin 47 - September 29, 14 Tishrei Sep 29, 2023

Show notes

Rava holds that according to Rabbi Ami who thinks that the case in the Mishna where the woman ate each date as it was given to her is referring to the case of "this one and this one," it would be limited to that case only and not to one where the man said, "betroth me with all of these." A braita is brought to support this statement of Rava. After explaining how the braita supports Rava, they need to explain how to read the last line in the braita according to Rav and Shmuel and Rabbi Ami. Rav holds that a betrothal cannot be effected by canceling a loan that the woman owes the man because a loan is intended for spending and therefore the money owed is not considered owned by the man. Is this a subject of debate among tannaim? Two braitot are brought to attempt to show that what Rav said is a tannaitic debate. However, they reject both suggestions as each braita can be explained to be referring to a debate about a different subject. Another braita is brought to raise a difficulty against Rav. But, again, to resolve the difficulty, they suggest an alternative reading of the braita, which then again raises the possibility that Rav's statement is a subject of debate among tannaim, but this too is rejected.

Kiddushin 46 - September 28, 13 Tishrei Sep 28, 2023

Show notes

Today's daf is sponsored by The Hadran Zoom Family in honor of the marriage of Shirli Noiman to Amitai Levy, the son of our co-learner, Dahlia Levy. "בין כסה לעשור, we continue to learn and celebrate! Mazel tov!"

A minor who was betrothed and married to a kohen without her father's consent, can she eat truma? How is this case different from the previous cases? A man who betrothed a woman with dates and with each date he gave her, said "You will be betrothed to me with this date, be betrothed to me with this date," if one of them is worth a pruta, it is a valid betrothal. If he said, "You will be betrothed to me with this date and this date and this date," then if there is a value of a pruta between all the dates, she is betrothed. If she ate each date as he gave it to her, there needs to be the value of a pruta in one of them. This last ruling is said about the first case or about the second case ("be betrothed to me with this date, be betrothed to me with this date," or "with this date and this date and this date"). If one betroths his sister, do we assume he gave her the money as a deposit (and she must return it) or as a gift (and she does not have to return it)? Rav and Shmuel disagree. A difficulty is raised against Shmuuel from a Mishna in Halla 2:5, but is resolved.

Kiddushin 45 - September 27, 12 Tishrei Sep 27, 2023

Show notes

Today's daf is sponsored by Jason, Erica, and Raquel in honor of their mother, Patty Belkin on her birthday yesterday. "Wishing a very happy birthday to our amazing mother!"

Ulla held that if a minor girl accepted a betrothal and her father did not react, the betrothal is completely invalid. Two sources (a Mishna and a braita) are brought to raise a difficulty with his ruling, but the difficulties are resolved. Rav and Shmuel ruled that there is a doubt to whether or not the father agreed and therefore she must receive a get and do mi'un in order to be able to marry someone else. If the man who betrothed her died, and she became obligated in levirate marriage with the brother, and he performed maamar, Rav held that she needs to receive a get, perform chalitza and do mi'un with the brother of her deceased husband. If a father arranged a betrothal for his son, is there concern that perhaps the son agreed, just as there is concern that perhaps a father agreed to his minor daughter's betrothal? A story is told about a father who disagreed with his wife as to whether to marry off their daughter to his or her relatives. In the end, he conceded to his wife to marry her off to her relative, but at the betrothal ceremony, one of his relatives betrothed her in the attic. Is there concern that the father was pleased with this as it was his original desire? What is the ruling if a minor was betrothed by her father but then married him without the father's knowledge when the father was out of town? Can she eat truma if her husband is a kohen? How would the ruling be different if the father was in town and did not say anything when he heard of the marriage?

Kiddushin 44 - September 26, 11 Tishrei Sep 26, 2023

Show notes

Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Dahlia and Jack Levy on the marriage of their son, Amitai to Shirli Noiman.

There is a disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis about whether a naara can accept her own get or only her father can. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about whether the debate between them is also for kiddushin or do they both agree that the father must accept the kiddushin. What is the reason for Rabbi Yochanan who distinguishes between divorce and kiddushin? A braita states that a naara can accept maamar (which is like kiddushin for a yevama). How is this braita explained according to both Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish's positions? Our Mishna can also be used to raise a difficulty with Reish Lakish's position as only the father can appoint a messenger, not the naara. The first suggestion is to associate our Mishna with Rabbi Yehuda's position. However, this suggestion is rejected as the next Mishna does not follow Rabbi Yehuda's position. The conclusion is that both Mishnayot follow Rabbi Shimon who must hold like Rabbi Yehuda regarding the issue of the naara. Rabbi Avin testified that he was in the beit midrash when the rabbis voted to accept Rabbi Yochanan's position against Reish Lakish and permit only a father to accept the betrothal of a naara. Rava asked Rav Nachman: if a naara can accept her get, can she appoint an agent to accept it on her behalf or is it only the father that can do that? On what exactly is Rava's deliberation based? Rav Nachman answered that a naara cannot appoint an agent to accept her get. They raise a difficulty against his ruling from a Mishna in Gittin, but resolve it. If a minor girl accepted a betrothal on her own and when her father heard, he was silent, is that an indication that he accepted her actions and the betrothal is valid on a Torah level or not? Shmuel and Ulla disagree regarding this case.

Kiddushin 44 - September 26, 11 Tishrei Sep 26, 2023

Show notes

Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Dahlia and Jack Levy on the marriage of their son, Amitai to Shirli Noiman.

There is a disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis about whether a naara can accept her own get or only her father can. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about whether the debate between them is also for kiddushin or do they both agree that the father must accept the kiddushin. What is the reason for Rabbi Yochanan who distinguishes between divorce and kiddushin? A Mishna states that a naara can accept maamar (which is like kiddushin for a yevama). How is this Mishna explained according to both Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish's positions? Our Mishna can also be used to raise a difficulty with Reish Lakish's position as only the father can appoint a messenger, not the naara. The first suggestion is to associate our Mishna with Rabbi Yehuda's position. However, this suggestion is rejected as the next Mishna does not follow Rabbi Yehuda's position. The conclusion is that both Mishnayot follow Rabbi Shimon who must hold like Rabbi Yehuda regarding the issue of the naara. Rabbi Avin testified that he was in the beit midrash when the rabbis voted to accept Rabbi Yochanan's position against Reish Lakish and permit only a father to accept the betrothal of a naara. Rava asked Rav Nachman: if a naara can accept her get, can she appoint an agent to accept it on her behalf or is it only the father that can do that? On what exactly is Rava's deliberation based? Rav Nachman answered that a naara cannot appoint an agent to accept her get. They raise a difficulty against his ruling from a Mishna in Gittin, but resolve it. If a minor girl accepted a betrothal on her own and when her father heard, he was silent, is that an indication that he accepted her actions and the betrothal is valid on a Torah level or not? Shmuel and Ulla disagree regarding this case.

Kiddushin 43 - Yom Kippur - September 25, 10 Tishrei Sep 24, 2023

Show notes

Today's daf is sponsored by Gitta and David Neufeld in loving memory of Meir ben Aryeh Leib HaLevi, Marvin Stokar. "Although his title of Zaidy was an honorary one, he and (lehavdil bein chayim lechayim) Bubby Fran were - and continue to be - an important part of our family. His love of all learning and of Eretz Yisrael were surpassed only by his love and care for our dear Bubby Fran. May he continue to be a meilitz yosher for her and all of us!"

Why do we say that a person who sends a messenger to commit a sin is not punished, but the messenger is? Even though there are some cases where the sender is liable, we do not build a paradigm from those cases to learn about all other commandments – why not? Shamai the elder has a different approach. There are three different interpretations explaining his opinion. Can a messenger also function as a witness in a case where he was also the messenger? Rav and Rabbi Shila disagree. What is at the root of their debate? A question is raised against Rav's position from a Beit Shamai/Beit Hillel debate but is resolved. The ruling is that the messenger can function as a witness. Rav Nachman rules this way in marriage, divorce, and monetary law. Why did each need to be specified? Why was he not concerned in monetary law that the messenger is a party to the transaction? How did this change once the rabbis required a heiseit oath? Can a young woman (naara) accept a get for divorce or accept a marriage betrothal or only her father can? In what case is there a disagreement?

Our TOPPODCAST Picks

Follow Us

Stay Connected

Daf Yomi for Women – Hadran

Related Podcasts

Links

Stay Connected