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    BrakeSec Education Podcast

    A podcast about the world of Cybersecurity, Privacy, Compliance, and Regulatory issues that arise in today’s workplace. Co-hosts Bryan Brake, Brian Boettcher, and Amanda Berlin teach concepts that aspiring Information Security professionals need to know, or refresh the memories of seasoned veterans.

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    Copyright: © Copyright 2019. All rights reserved

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    Latest Episodes:
    2021-023-d3fend framework, DLL injection types, more solarwinds infections Jun 30, 2021
    Show notes

    Pihole setup

    Conference talk

    https://www.reuters.com/technology/microsoft-says-new-breach-discovered-probe-suspected-solarwinds-hackers-2021-06-25/

    https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/119425/apt/solarwinds-nobelium-ongoing-campaign.html

    https://www.ehackingnews.com/2021/06/attackers-pummelled-gaming-industry.html

    https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/windows-11-wont-work-without-a-tpm-what-you-need-to-know/

    https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/hijacking-dlls-in-windows

    https://d3fend.mitre.org/

    https://www.theregister.com/2021/06/15/zoll_defibrillator_dashboard_vulnerabilities/

    https://twitter.com/Hexacorn

    https://www.ionos.com/digitalguide/server/configuration/winsxs-cleanup/

    https://www.customink.com/fundraising/mental-health-hackers-7816

    Buy @infoseccampout tickets: https://www.eventbrite.com/e/infosec-campout-2021-tickets-157561790557

    Check out our Store on Teepub! https://brakesec.com/store

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    Comments, Questions, Feedback: bds.podcast@gmail.com

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    2021-022-github policy updates targeting harmful software, Ms. Berlin discusses WWHF, CVSS discussion Jun 22, 2021
    Show notes

    Ms. Berlin's conference report WWFH (reno, NV)

    Her next appearances will be at Defcon 2021 and BlueTeam Con 2021!

    https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/amazon-prime-day-phishing-deluge/

    https://www.ehackingnews.com/2021/06/threat-actors-use-google-drives-and.html

    https://www.kennasecurity.com/blog/vulnerability-score-on-its-own-is-useless/

    https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/nist-charts-course-towards-more-secure-supply-chains-for-government-software

    https://github.blog/2021-04-29-call-for-feedback-policies-exploits-malware/

    https://github.com/github/site-policy/pull/397

    https://twitter.com/vm_call/status/1405937492642123782?s=20

    https://thenewstack.io/cvss-struggles-to-remain-viable-in-the-era-of-cloud-native-computing/

    ZOMG BUY SHIRTS HERE

    https://www.customink.com/fundraising/mental-health-hackers-7816

    Buy @infoseccampout tickets: https://www.eventbrite.com/e/infosec-campout-2021-tickets-157561790557

    Check out our Store on Teepub! https://brakesec.com/store

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    2021-021-Security Sphynx, ZeroTrust, implementation prep- part2 Jun 16, 2021
    Show notes

    EO from President Biden asked for a plan to create Zerotrust implementation in the next 90 days (well, 70ish days now… as of 23 May)

    https://twitter.com/SecuritySphynx/status/1390475868032618496

    @securitySphynx

    "CIO: Zero Trust is the way…"

    What is the optimal configuration (read: easiest) zero trust config?

    Are there different ways to implement Zero Trust?`

    https://solutions.pyramidci.com/blog/posts/2021/february/the-swiss-cheese-approach/

    https://tulsaworld.com/opinion/columnists/zero-trust-security-assume-that-everyone-and-everything-on-the-internet-is-out-to-get/article_f6bdbfad-1aae-5063-8ac0-6a1faf5a244c.html

    https://www.reddit.com/r/devops/comments/bqo6kp/open_source_or_cheap_zero_trust_beyondcorp/

    https://opensource.com/article/17/6/4-easy-ways-work-toward-zero-trust-security-model

    https://dodcio.defense.gov/Portals/0/Documents/Library/(U)ZT_RA_v1.1(U)_Mar21.pdf

    What is ZTA?

    Who are your users? What Devices in use? Device attestation/health checks Applications exist? Connections exist? Not just into/out of the traditional LAN network - do you understand dependencies of applications and databases and how the traffic flows? Where is the data/traffic? coming from? Going to? When is this activity occurring and what is expected? WHY: Need to balance the access to technical resources in a rapidly evolving and dynamic business landscape that ceases to exist within the confines of normal security perimeters. Mobile workforce - how much work can you get done without ever getting on the VPN? Blockers Technical Debt IT Hygiene Zero Trust REQUIRES the pre-work of establishing baselines. You cannot detect abnormality in the absence of normality. Policy should exist to drive what the specifications of a baseline system, server, application, etc will be. Network traffic, endpoint performance, SIEM tuning, endpoint agent/software accountability ZTA is less useful if you're not doing basic patching, application updates, and allowing local admin on the system level). Legacy Systems: Not designed with this approach in mind, and often costly to modernize. Asset Management Where are your assets and how are they used? A "rough estimate" of endpoints is never good enough. What are you logging? What AREN'T you logging? User rights auditing Stale accounts, service accounts, HR Workflows for onboarding/offboarding Limitations of admin rights Local admin/password expiration issues for sales/travelling employees Human resources/talent Politics: Getting support/$$$/Buy-in for retrofitting applications that are "working just fine" is a huge political/business hurdle. Where to go from here: SaaS/PaaS/etc offerings What can you move from traditional off-prem solutions to cloud-based services (more up to date, regularly reviewed for security vulnerabilities, offloading responsibility of maintenance, SSO capabilities) AAA requirements MFA is a MUST. No, it's not perfect, but it is one more layer in efficacy. Have discussions around REAL RBAC needs BEFORE implementing a solution. It is easier to expand permissions than it is to take them away. Resist the idea that the easy button of broad stroke permissions is always the right choice. Identify data owners, make them responsible for RBAC development with technical departments. Quantify risk associated with mishandled resources for crown jewels (see previous section on politics). Change control around permissions, access Security as an active participant in the development/acquisition of new products, software, services, or organizations Like remodeling a house, it is much easier to build security into the process than hire someone to retrofit it later.. What auditing are you doing? Have you baselined behavior? Where are your logs going, and WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR REVIEWING THEM. Manage the Endpoint: Stop thinking about the perimeter as your weakest point. The endpoint is critical and increasingly vulnerable, mobile, out of traditional "control". Real time, actionable data and capabilities are critical to remediation and progress. Asset Inventory (again)... Then… HIDS/Firewall Patch Applocker/Application Controls Lather, rinse, repeat. DLP Classification It's hard, it's time-consuming, and it requires a LOT of support for business unit owners. Capture metrics, then set KPIs and regular check ins to reduce MTTP/MTTR/MTTD

    Would you like to know more? https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/why-zero-trust-is-an-unrealistic-security-model


    2021-020: Security Sphynx, Preparing for ZeroTrust implementation - Part1 Jun 06, 2021
    Show notes

    Full show notes are available here: https://docs.google.com/document/d/14dCpXeQ520IcZC3m007zVPhlIPXKgfv0LkqVnbDx0fc/edit?usp=sharing

    EO from President Biden asked for a plan to create Zerotrust implementation in the next 90 days (well, 70ish days now… as of 23 May)https://twitter.com/SecuritySphynx/status/1390475868032618496

    @securitySphynx

    "CIO: Zero Trust is the way…"

    What is the optimal configuration (read: easiest) zero trust config?

    Are there different ways to implement Zero Trust?`

    https://solutions.pyramidci.com/blog/posts/2021/february/the-swiss-cheese-approach/

    https://tulsaworld.com/opinion/columnists/zero-trust-security-assume-that-everyone-and-everything-on-the-internet-is-out-to-get/article_f6bdbfad-1aae-5063-8ac0-6a1faf5a244c.html

    https://www.reddit.com/r/devops/comments/bqo6kp/open_source_or_cheap_zero_trust_beyondcorp/

    https://opensource.com/article/17/6/4-easy-ways-work-toward-zero-trust-security-model

    https://dodcio.defense.gov/Portals/0/Documents/Library/(U)ZT_RA_v1.1(U)_Mar21.pdf

    1. What is ZTA
      1. Who are your users?
        1. Devices in use?
          1. Device attestation/health checks
        2. Applications exist?
          1. Not just into/out of the traditional LAN network - do you understand dependencies of applications and databases and how the traffic flows?
        3. Connections exist?
      2. What
      3. Where is the data/traffic? coming from? Going to?
      4. When is this activity occurring and what is expected?
      5. WHY: Need to balance the access to technical resources in a rapidly evolving and dynamic business landscape that ceases to exist within the confines of normal security perimeters.

    Mobile workforce - how much work can you get done without ever getting on the VPN?

    1. Blockers
    • Technical Debt
        1. IT Hygiene
          1. Zero Trust REQUIRES the pre-work of establishing baselines. You cannot detect abnormality in the absence of normality.
            1. Policy should exist to drive what the specifications of a baseline system, server, application, etc will be.
            2. Network traffic, endpoint performance, SIEM tuning, endpoint agent/software accountability
          2. ZTA is less useful if you're not doing basic patching, application updates, and allowing local admin on the system level).
          1. Not designed with this approach in mind, and often costly to modernize.
        2. Legacy Systems:
          1. Where are your assets and how are they used? A "rough estimate" of endpoints is never good enough.
          2. What are you logging? What AREN'T you logging?
        3. Asset Management
          1. Stale accounts, service accounts, HR Workflows for onboarding/offboarding
          2. Limitations of admin rights
          3. Local admin/password expiration issues for sales/travelling employees
        4. User rights auditing
        5. Human resources/talent
      1. Politics: Getting support/$$$/Buy-in for retrofitting applications that are "working just fine" is a huge political/business hurdle.
      1. SaaS/PaaS/etc offerings What can you move from traditional off-prem solutions to cloud-based services (more up to date, regularly reviewed for security vulnerabilities, offloading responsibility of maintenance, SSO capabilities)
    1. Where to go from here:
    • AAA requirements
      1. MFA is a MUST. No, it's not perfect, but it is one more layer in efficacy.
        1. Identify data owners, make them responsible for RBAC development with technical departments.
        2. Quantify risk associated with mishandled resources for crown jewels (see previous section on politics).
        3. Change control around permissions, access
        4. Security as an active participant in the development/acquisition of new products, software, services, or organizations Like remodeling a house, it is much easier to build security into the process than hire someone to retrofit it later..
      2. Have discussions around REAL RBAC needs BEFORE implementing a solution. It is easier to expand permissions than it is to take them away. Resist the idea that the easy button of broad stroke permissions is always the right choice.
      3. What auditing are you doing? Have you baselined behavior? Where are your logs going, and WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR REVIEWING THEM.
      1. Asset Inventory (again)... Then…
        1. HIDS/Firewall
        2. Patch
        3. Applocker/Application Controls
        4. Lather, rinse, repeat.
        1. It's hard, it's time-consuming, and it requires a LOT of support for business unit owners.
      2. DLP Classification
      3. Capture metrics, then set KPIs and regular check ins to reduce MTTP/MTTR/MTTD
    1. Manage the Endpoint: Stop thinking about the perimeter as your weakest point. The endpoint is critical and increasingly vulnerable, mobile, out of traditional "control". Real time, actionable data and capabilities are critical to remediation and progress.

    Would you like to know more?

    https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/why-zero-trust-is-an-unrealistic-security-model

    Check out our Store on Teepub! https://brakesec.com/store

    Join us on our #Slack Channel! Send a request to @brakesec on Twitter or email bds.podcast@gmail.com

    #AmazonMusic: https://brakesec.com/amazonmusic

    #Spotify: https://brakesec.com/spotifyBDS #Pandora: https://brakesec.com/pandora

    #RSS: https://brakesec.com/BrakesecRSS

    #Youtube Channel: http://www.youtube.com/c/BDSPodcast

    #iTunes Store Link: https://brakesec.com/BDSiTunes

    #Google Play Store: https://brakesec.com/BDS-GooglePlay

    Our main site: https://brakesec.com/bdswebsite

    #iHeartRadio App: https://brakesec.com/iHeartBrakesec

    #SoundCloud: https://brakesec.com/SoundcloudBrakesec

    Comments, Questions, Feedback: bds.podcast@gmail.com

    Support Brakeing Down Security Podcast by using our #Paypal: https://brakesec.com/PaypalBDS OR our #Patreon

    https://brakesec.com/BDSPatreon

    #Twitter: @brakesec @boettcherpwned @bryanbrake @infosystir

    #Player.FM : https://brakesec.com/BDS-PlayerFM

    #Stitcher Network: https://brakesec.com/BrakeSecStitcher

    #TuneIn Radio App: https://brakesec.com/TuneInBrakesec


    2021-019-Joe Gray, OSINT CTFs, gamifying and motivating to do the right thing May 28, 2021
    Show notes

    part 2:

    CTF OSINT discussion

    How people will give additional information, even if they aren't receiving points for it.

    Gamifying and motivating people to 'do the right thing', like offering a chance to win a lottery for a covid vaccine, or free sports tickets to get a shot, or gift cards when reporting phishes.

    Joe Gray @C_3PJoe

    OSINTION

    https://theosintion.com

    New book… ship date? How to get it?

    https://www.amazon.com/Practical-Social-Engineering-Joe-Gray/dp/171850098X/

    https://nostarch.com/practical-social-engineering

    "Gray provides a very accessible look at social engineering that should be essential reading for pentesters and ethical hackers."

    — Ian Barker, BetaNews

    Story (Bryan: found my shipmate from the Navy)

    Gathering OSINT (what is ethically too far?)

    OSINT heartbeat

    https://matrix.berkeley.edu/research-article/berkeley-protocol-open-source-investigations/

    https://hunter.io/

    https://halalgoogling.com/

    The OSINTion Discord: https://discord.gg/p78TTGa

    stick/carrot interactions https://www.aamc.org/news-insights/dollars-doughnuts-will-incentives-motivate-covid-19-vaccination

    How do we motivate or create the desire?

    Ohio Covid lottery - https://www.dispatch.com/story/news/2021/05/13/ohio-covid-vaccine-lottery-heres-how-you-can-win/5071370001/

    Art sessions with Ms. Berlin

    Check out our Store on Teepub! https://brakesec.com/store

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    https://brakesec.com/BDSPatreon

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    2021-018-LawyerLiz, Pres. Biden's EO, and the clueless professor May 22, 2021
    Show notes

    Elizabeth Wharton: @lawyerliz on Twitter

    Executive Order: (https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/publications/teaching-legal-docs/what-is-an-executive-order-/)

    "An executive order is a signed, written, and published directive from the President of the United States that manages operations of the federal government. They are numbered consecutively, so executive orders may be referenced by their assigned number, or their topic. Other presidential documents are sometimes similar to executive orders in their format, formality, and issue, but have different purposes. Proclamations, which are also signed and numbered consecutively, communicate information on holidays, commemorations, federal observances, and trade. Administrative orders—e.g. memos, notices, letters, messages—are not numbered, but are still signed, and are used to manage administrative matters of the federal government. All three types of presidential documents—executive orders, proclamations, and certain administrative orders—are published in the Federal Register, the daily journal of the federal government that is published to inform the public about federal regulations and actions. They are also catalogued by the National Archives as official documents produced by the federal government. Both executive orders and proclamations have the force of law, much like regulations issued by federal agencies, so they are codified under Title 3 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which is the formal collection of all of the rules and regulations issued by the executive branch and other federal agencies.

    Executive orders are not legislation; they require no approval from Congress, and Congress cannot simply overturn them. Congress may pass legislation that might make it difficult, or even impossible, to carry out the order, such as removing funding. Only a sitting U.S. President may overturn an existing executive order by issuing another executive order to that effect."

    https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/05/12/executive-order-on-improving-the-nations-cybersecurity/ Another Review: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/markup-our-experts-annotate-bidens-new-executive-order-on-cybersecurity/

    https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2021/05/21/615373.htm

    Within 60 days of the date of this order, the head of each agency shall:

    (i) update existing agency plans to prioritize resources for the adoption and use of cloud technology as outlined in relevant OMB guidance;

    (ii) develop a plan to implement Zero Trust Architecture, which shall incorporate, as appropriate, the migration steps that the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) within the Department of Commerce has outlined in standards and guidance, describe any such steps that have already been completed, identify activities that will have the most immediate security impact, and include a schedule to implement them; and

    Within 180 days of the date of this order, agencies shall adopt multi-factor authentication and encryption for data at rest and in transit, to the maximum extent consistent with Federal records laws and other applicable laws.

    Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security acting through the Director of CISA, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Director of the FBI, and the Administrator of General Services acting through the Director of FedRAMP, shall establish a framework to collaborate on cybersecurity and incident response activities related to FCEB cloud technology, in order to ensure effective information sharing among agencies and between agencies and CSPs.

    SBOM! Dr. Allan Friedman on BrakeSec

    https://brakeingsecurity.com/2020-031-allan-friedman-sbom-software-transparency-and-knowing-how-the-sausage-is-made

    http://brakeingsecurity.com/2020-032-dr-allan-friedman-sbom-software-transparency-and-how-the-sausage-is-made-part-2 providing a purchaser a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for each product directly or by publishing it on a public website;

    (viii) participating in a vulnerability disclosure program that includes a reporting and disclosure process;

    (ix) attesting to conformity with secure software development practicesWithin 270 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce acting through the Director of NIST, in coordination with the Chair of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and representatives of other agencies as the Director of NIST deems appropriate, shall identify IoT cybersecurity criteria for a consumer labeling program, and shall consider whether such a consumer labeling program may be operated in conjunction with or modeled after any similar existing government programs consistent with applicable law. The criteria shall reflect increasingly comprehensive levels of testing and assessment that a product may have undergone, and shall use or be compatible with existing labeling schemes that manufacturers use to inform consumers about the security of their products. The Director of NIST shall examine all relevant information, labeling, and incentive programs and employ best practices. This review shall focus on ease of use for consumers and a determination of what measures can be taken to maximize manufacturer participation.

    https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/553891-our-cybersecurity-industry-best-practices-keep-allowing-breaches?rl=1

    Rebuttal to "The Hill article": https://soatok.blog/2021/05/19/a-balanced-response-to-allen-gwinn/ thank you Brian Harden (@_noid)

    Author's 'apology': https://twitter.com/2wiredSecurity/status/1395531110436704258

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    2021-017-Joe Gray on his future book, the OSINT loop, motivators, and gamification - part1 May 18, 2021
    Show notes

    Joe Gray @C_3PJoe

    OSINTION

    https://theosintion.com

    New book… ship date? How to get it?

    https://www.amazon.com/Practical-Social-Engineering-Joe-Gray/dp/171850098X/

    https://nostarch.com/practical-social-engineering

    "Gray provides a very accessible look at social engineering that should be essential reading for pentesters and ethical hackers."

    — Ian Barker, BetaNews

    Story (Bryan: found my shipmate from the Navy)

    Gathering OSINT (what is ethically too far?)

    OSINT heartbeat

    https://matrix.berkeley.edu/research-article/berkeley-protocol-open-source-investigations/

    https://hunter.io/

    https://halalgoogling.com/

    The OSINTion Discord: https://discord.gg/p78TTGa

    Check out our Store on Teepub! https://brakesec.com/store

    Join us on our #Slack Channel! Send a request to @brakesec on Twitter or email bds.podcast@gmail.com

    #AmazonMusic: https://brakesec.com/amazonmusic

    #Spotify: https://brakesec.com/spotifyBDS #Pandora: https://brakesec.com/pandora

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    2021-016-researchers knowingly add vulnerable code to linux kernel, @pageinsec joins us to discuss -part2 May 05, 2021
    Show notes

    Updates to the Linux kernel controversy: https://lwn.net/SubscriberLink/854645/334317047842b6c3/

    @pageinSec on Twitter

    Dan Kaminsky obit: https://www.theregister.com/2021/04/25/dan_kaminsky_obituary/

    Spencer Geitzen: http://brakeingsecurity.com/2018-024-pacu-a-tool-for-pentesting-aws-environments

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milgram_experiment

    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210421130105.1226686-1-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org/

    https://cse.umn.edu/cs/statement-cse-linux-kernel-research-april-21-2021

    https://www.labbott.name/blog/2021/04/21/breakingtrust.html

    Seems like a number of patches were added (~190) and each had to be reviewed to ensure badness

    https://twitter.com/UMNComputerSci/status/1384948683821694976 response to researchers

    Linux Kernel mailing list: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nfs/YH%2FfM%2FTsbmcZzwnX@kroah.com/

    https://danielmiessler.com/blog/explaining-threats-threat-actors-vulnerabilities-and-risk-using-a-real-world-scenario/

    https://twitter.com/SarahJamieLewis/status/1384871385537908736

    @sarahJamieLewis shows the change they submitted in their paper: https://twitter.com/SarahJamieLewis/status/1384876050207940608

    https://twitter.com/SarahJamieLewis/status/1330671897822982144/photo/1

    https://twitter.com/SarahJamieLewis/status/1384880034146574341/photo/1

    https://web.archive.org/web/20210421145121/https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~kjlu/papers/crix.pdf (appears the researcher deleted this paper from their site.)

    https://web.archive.org/web/20210422144500/https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~kjlu/papers/clarifications-hc.pdf (researcher deleted this paper from their site.)"Throughout the study, we honestly did not think this is human research, so we did not apply for an IRB approval in the beginning. We apologize for the raised concerns. This is an important lesson we learned---Do not trust ourselves on determining human research; always refer to IRB whenever a study might be involving any human subjects in any form. We would like to thank the people who suggested us to talk to IRB after seeing the paper abstract."

    https://github.com/QiushiWu/qiushiwu.github.io

    NSF Grant application (thank you Page!) https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1931208&HistoricalAwards=false

    NSF IRB requirements (from 2007): https://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2007/nsf07006/nsf07006.jsp

    Might be more recent - Human Subjects | NSF - National Science Foundation

    The researchers issued an apology today 25 April: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAK8KejpUVLxmqp026JY7x5GzHU2YJLPU8SzTZUNXU2OXC70ZQQ@mail.gmail.com/ *thanks to Zach Whittacker's security mailing list..*

    https://twitter.com/argvee

    Thought provoking question for your show: is it realistically possible for an organization to build and scale a culture of code review that catches malicious insertions through (1) expert analysis; (2) adversarial mindset?

    Co-author of : https://www.amazon.com/Building-Secure-Reliable-Systems-Implementing/dp/1492083127

    Introduction of bugs (meaningful or otherwise) caused more work for devs.

    Revert: https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/4/21/454

    Quick overview of using deception in research from Duke's IRB: Using Deception in Research | Institutional Review Board (duke.edu)

    Is this better? Where's the line on this?

    https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/emotet-malware-nukes-itself-today-from-all-infected-computers-worldwide/


    2021-015-researchers knowingly add vulnerable code to linux kernel, @pageinsec joins us to discuss -part1 Apr 27, 2021
    Show notes

    @pageinSec on Twitter

    Dan Kaminsky obit: https://www.theregister.com/2021/04/25/dan_kaminsky_obituary/

    Spencer Geitzen: http://brakeingsecurity.com/2018-024-pacu-a-tool-for-pentesting-aws-environments

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milgram_experiment

    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210421130105.1226686-1-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org/

    https://cse.umn.edu/cs/statement-cse-linux-kernel-research-april-21-2021

    https://www.labbott.name/blog/2021/04/21/breakingtrust.html

    Seems like a number of patches were added (~190) and each had to be reviewed

    https://twitter.com/UMNComputerSci/status/1384948683821694976 response to researchers

    Linux Kernel mailing list: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nfs/YH%2FfM%2FTsbmcZzwnX@kroah.com/

    https://danielmiessler.com/blog/explaining-threats-threat-actors-vulnerabilities-and-risk-using-a-real-world-scenario/

    https://twitter.com/SarahJamieLewis/status/1384871385537908736

    @sarahJamieLewis shows the change they submitted in their paper: https://twitter.com/SarahJamieLewis/status/1384876050207940608

    https://twitter.com/SarahJamieLewis/status/1330671897822982144/photo/1

    https://twitter.com/SarahJamieLewis/status/1384880034146574341/photo/1

    https://web.archive.org/web/20210421145121/https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~kjlu/papers/crix.pdf (appears the researcher deleted this paper from their site.)

    https://web.archive.org/web/20210422144500/https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~kjlu/papers/clarifications-hc.pdf (researcher deleted this paper from their site.)"Throughout the study, we honestly did not think this is human research, so we did not apply for an IRB approval in the beginning. We apologize for the raised concerns. This is an important lesson we learned---Do not trust ourselves on determining human research; always refer to IRB whenever a study might be involving any human subjects in any form. We would like to thank the people who suggested us to talk to IRB after seeing the paper abstract."

    https://github.com/QiushiWu/qiushiwu.github.io

    NSF Grant application (thank you Page!) https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1931208&HistoricalAwards=false

    NSF IRB requirements (from 2007): https://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2007/nsf07006/nsf07006.jsp

    Might be more recent - Human Subjects | NSF - National Science Foundation

    The researchers issued an apology today 25 April: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAK8KejpUVLxmqp026JY7x5GzHU2YJLPU8SzTZUNXU2OXC70ZQQ@mail.gmail.com/ *thanks to Zach Whittacker's security mailing list..*

    https://twitter.com/argvee

    Thought provoking question for your show: is it realistically possible for an organization to build and scale a culture of code review that catches malicious insertions through (1) expert analysis; (2) adversarial mindset?

    Co-author of : https://www.amazon.com/Building-Secure-Reliable-Systems-Implementing/dp/1492083127

    Introduction of bugs (meaningful or otherwise) caused more work for devs.

    Revert list of 190 patches (threaded): https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/4/21/454

    Quick overview of using deception in research from Duke's IRB: Using Deception in Research | Institutional Review Board (duke.edu)

    Is this better? Where's the line on this?

    https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/emotet-malware-nukes-itself-today-from-all-infected-computers-worldwide/


    2021-014-Slipstreaming blocked by Chrome, Slack being used for malware, plus dork and deskjockeys! Apr 13, 2021
    Show notes

    Chrome Blocks Port 10080 to Prevent Slipstreaming Hacks - E Hacking News - Latest Hacker News and IT Security News

    https://www.reddit.com/r/netsec/comments/jlu3cf/nat_slipstreaming/

    Samy Kamkar - NAT Slipstreaming v2.0

    Slack and Discord are Being Hijacked by Hackers to Distribute Malware - E Hacking News - Latest Hacker News and IT Security News

    Texan's alleged Amazon bombing effort fizzles: Militia man wanted to take out 'about 70 per cent of the internet' • The Register

    Pwn2Own 2021: Hackers Offered $200,000 for Zoom, Microsoft Teams Exploits | SecurityWeek.Com

    https://twitter.com/k8em0/status/1381258155485585409

    https://twitter.com/alisaesage/status/1380797761801445376?s=20

    infosecCampout 2021

    Hackers Who Paint

    WWHF Way west

    https://pastebin.com/2eYY6trD (for training students)

    @lintile

    @infosecroleplay


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